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Zusammenfassung 
Die Tablīghī Jamāʿat (TJ) ist eine in den 1920er Jahren von Maulana Muhammad Ilyas in 
Britisch Indien gegründete transnationale islamische Laienbewegung. Sie ist seit den 1950er 
Jahren in Kenia aktiv und hat zu Beginn mit sunnitischen Muslimen asiatischer Abstammung 
Kontakt aufgenommen. Trotz ihrer relativ langen Geschichte in Kenia zählt die Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat zu einem weitgehend unerforschten religiösen Phänomen. Die Bewegung verhält sich 
in der Öffentlichkeit unauffällig. Ihre Aktivitäten zielen vielmehr auf eine Respiritualisierung 
des Alltagslebens des Individuums ab. Sie lehnt zeitgenössische Medien, wie Internet, Radio 
und Fernsehen als Mittel der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit ab. Vielmehr bevorzugt sie den direkten 
persönlichen Kontakt und zieht mit ihrer Botschaft von Tür zu Tür. Politische oder 
gesellschaftliche Diskussionen innerhalb ihrer Reihen werden nicht geduldet. Zudem 
vermeidet sie eine direkte Konfrontation mit dem religiösen Establishment. Durch ihre 
quietistische Vorgehensweise entging sie bislang weitgehend der Aufmerksamkeit der 
akademischen Forschung. Dennoch handelt es sich um eine der weltweit aktivsten 
muslimischen „Missionsbewegungen“ mit einer enormen Präsenz gerade bei der breiten Basis 
der Gläubigen. Ihre Mitglieder sind bekannt für ihre hohe Mobilität und ihre jährlichen 
Zusammenkünfte, die enorme Teilnehmerzahlen aufweisen. Ihre Anhängerschaft in Kenia ist 
mannigfaltig. Die Bewegung vereint in sich Somalis, Suahilis, Boranas, Digos, Muslime 
südasiatischer Abstammung und sogar Tablīghīs aus Nachbarstaaten, die allesamt in regem 
Austausch stehen und ein aktives Netzwerk bilden. Dieses enggeknüpfte Netz an 
Beziehungen führte zu einer tragfähigen transnationalen Bewegung. Der Erfolg dieser 
Bewegung vor allem bei muslimischen Laien lässt sich durch überzeugende 
Rekrutierungsmaßnahmen erklären, die sowohl Herz als auch Verstand ansprechen. Die 
Bewegung ist nahezu weltweit aktiv. Das Leitthema dieser Dissertation ist die Frage nach den 
Auswirkungen internationaler und nationaler Grenzüberschreitungen einer derartigen 
Bewegung, deren Hauptanliegen es ist, innerhalb rasch wachsender und sich gerade 
islamisierender Gemeinschaften zu predigen, zu rekrutieren und zu wachsen. 
 
Diese Studie zielt darauf ab, die Verortung der Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenia im Allgemeinen 
sowie in dessen nördlichem Landesteil im Besonderen zu beschreiben, zu dokumentieren und 
zu analysieren. Die Borana sind der Ausgangspunkt dieser Studie. Bei dieser ethnischen 
Gruppe handelt es sich um Nomaden, die zu beiden Seiten der Kenianisch-Äthiopischen 
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Grenze leben. Des Weiteren leben Borana in Isiolo sowie in einigen informellen Siedlungen 
in und bei Nairobi. Aufgrund der enormen räumlichen Ausdehnung Nordkenias wurden zwei 
Gebiete zur genaueren Untersuchung ausgewählt. Einerseits Merti, eine vor allem von Waso 
Borana bewohnte Stadt im Bezirk von Isiolo, andererseits Moyale, eine kosmopolitische Stadt 
zu beiden Seiten der Grenze von Kenia und Äthiopien. Die Auswahl dieser Gebiete 
ermöglicht einen unterschiedlichen Verlauf der Ausbreitung der TJ sowie deren 
unterschiedlichen Strategien zu beobachten. Hinzu kommt die Tatsache, dass die TJ in diesem 
Gebiet eine Brückenfunktion hinsichtlich weiterer boranasprechender Gruppen ausüben, die 
entschlossen sind, bei lokalen Borana sowie bei den Borana Äthiopiens zu predigen. Ihre 
benachbarten ethnischen Gruppen sind in diesem Gebiet meistens Gabra, Burji, Garre und 
Sakuye. Im Nordosten Kenias wird ihre Sprache, das Borana, weitgehend von allen 
Bewohnern gesprochen.  
 
Diese Studie zielt auf die Frage ab, was passiert, wenn religiöse Ideen Grenzen 
unterschiedlicher Art überschreiten und sich letztendlich in neuen, weit von ihren 
ursprünglichen Ausgangpunkten entfernten Gebieten festsetzen. Aufbauend auf dieser 
allgemeinen Leitfrage, wird die Entwicklung der TJ in Kenia im Allgemeinen sowie in 
Nordkenia im Speziellen untersucht. Hierbei findet die Mitgliederzunahme, die Etablierung 
und letztendlich die Konsolidierung dieser Bewegung besondere Beachtung. Es kommen die 
innovativen religiösen Praktiken der TJ, ihre pragmatischen Strategien zur Anwerbung von 
Mitgliedern und Betreuung Mitglieder sowie ihre dynamische Herangehensweise im Umgang 
mit der Gesamtgesellschaft zur Untersuchung. Weitere Untersuchungspunkte ist die von der 
TJ praktizierte „Glaubensbürokratie“; die Vorgehensweise der TJ in der Schaffung und der 
Nutzung von Raum sowie die Tragweite zwischenmenschlicher sowie inter-regionaler 
Netzwerke, die die lokale, regionale und internationale Mitgliederschaft miteinander in 
Solidarität und Zweck verbindet. Beachtung findet auch die Beziehung zwischen der TJ und 
bereits bestehender islamischer Traditionen im Untersuchungsgebiet, da die TJ ihre Position 
in einer bereits umkämpften religiösen Landschaft als Neuankömmling bestimmen muss. 
Hierbei hat die TJ um Anerkennung als eine gleichwertige authentische religiöse Bewegung 
auf Grundlagen der Hauptlehren des Glaubens zu ringen. Ein besonderes Anliegen dieser 
Studie sind die Mitglieder der TJ aus der Ethnie der Borana. Hier findet die Untersuchung auf 
zwei Ebenen statt: einerseits innerhalb ihres angestammten Siedlungsgebietes, andererseits 
auf gesamtstaatlicher Ebene. Somit beschäftigt sich diese Studie mit der Motivation und der 
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Art und Weise wie die Borana unter ihresgleichen predigen, den Hauptreiserichtungen sowie 
mit den konkreten Auswirkungen dieser Aktivitäten auf die religiöse und ethnische Identität.  
 
Diese Studie geht von folgenden vorläufigen Annahmen aus.  
1. Die Prediger der Tablīghī Jamāʿat etablierten sich innerhalb der boranasprechenden 
Ethnien zu einer einflussreichen Gruppe. Verantwortlich hierfür ist die erfolgreiche 
Neuanwerbung von Mitgliedern aus unterschiedlichen Schichten dieser 
Gemeinschaften. Diese Neubekehrten engagierten sich stark für die religiösen Ziele 
und Vorstellungen der Bewegung.  
2. Um sich nachhaltig zu etablieren, hat diese Bewegung Strategien der 
Reterritorialisierung angewandt. Diese Strategien der Reterritorialisierung beinhaltete 
die Schaffung von „sprengelartigen“ Einheiten, die die einzelnen Mitglieder im 
transnationalen Raum durch aufwändige Netzwerke miteinander verknüpft haben, 
sowie der Schaffung einer locker miteinander verbundenen, aber dennoch sehr 
effizienten „Glaubensbürokratie“, die die alltäglichen Abläufe dieser transnational 
agierenden Bewegung überwacht.  
3. Boranasprechende Mitglieder der TJ wurden häufig in die Regionen Kenias und 
Äthiopiens entsandt, in denen ebenfalls Borana gesprochen wird. Die in diesem 
linguistischen und ethnischen Zusammenhang erfolgte Propagierung des rechten 
Glaubens (da
c
wa) verortete diese Bewegung nicht nur als eine an der Basis 
erfolgreiche „Missionierungsbewegung“, sondern vermochte auch ethno-religiöse 
Identitäten wiederherzustellen. Hierbei handelt es sich um die bislang voneinander 
getrennt lebenden Gruppen der Orma vom Tana Fluss, die Waso Borana von Isiolo, 
die Borana von Marsabit und Isiolo, die in die informellen Siedlungen Nairobis 
migrierten boranasprechenden Arbeiter und Siedler sowie die Verwandten der Borana 
im südlichen Teil des Oromia Regional Staat von Äthiopien. 
4. Boranasprechende Mitglieder der TJ nehmen an den regionalen, nationalen und 
internationalen Versammlungen regelmäßig teil. Ihre Reisetätigkeit umfasst sowohl 
lokale als auch darüber hinausgehende Ziele. Hierbei werden sie mit neuen und auch 
innovativen religiösen Ideen und Glaubenspraktiken konfrontiert. Durch diese 
Eindrücke werden sie dazu in die Lage versetzt, bestehende religiöse Traditionen zu 
hinterfragen. Dies kann dazu führen, dass sie sich der Macht und dem Einfluss 
etablierten religiöser Experten entziehen.  
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In dieser Studie wird ein interdisziplinärer Ansatz verwendet. Unterschiedliche, aber 
miteinander verwandte Disziplinen sollen eine holistische Perspektive auf den 
Untersuchungsgegenstand gewährleisten. Die Nützlichkeit von ethnographischen Methoden 
liegen in diesem Zusammenhang auf der Hand. Zur Sicherstellung der Interdisziplinarität 
wurden anthropologische, geographische, soziologische sowie religionswissenschaftliche 
Methoden angewendet. Dadurch soll ein holistisches Bild des Untersuchungsgegenstandes 
gezeichnet werden. Es wurden historische, analytische, ethnographische und komparative 
Forschungsansätze zur Anwendung gebracht. Methoden aus der Geschichtswissenschaft 
ermöglichten eine Rekonstruktion der Geschichte des Islam in Nordkenia sowie des Verlaufs 
der Ausbreitung der TJ in Kenia. Mit Hilfe der „dichten Beschreibung“ sollen verschiedene 
Aspekte der transnational agierenden TJ verdeutlicht werden. In der Forschung zu religiösen 
Bewegungen in Kenia kam dieser vielfältige Ansatz bislang nicht zur Anwendung.  
 
Zur Ermittlung von Schlüsselinformanten – Mitglieder und Nichtmitglieder der TJ – wurde 
die Technik der zielgerichteten Stichprobenbildung angewendet. Die Stichprobe ist in drei 
Kategorien unterteilt: TJ Mitglieder, Adepten der Ṣūfī bruderschaften sowie Anhänger der 
Salafīyyabewegung. Jeder einzelne dieser Cluster bestand aus Informanten, die aus den 
beiden Hauptuntersuchungsgebieten stammten sowie aus einem kleineren Gebiet: Moyale mit 
Merti, Isiolo (Waso Borana) und Nairobi. Es wurde darauf geachtet, dass sowohl 
Führungspersönlichkeiten als auch normale Anhänger dieser religiösen Traditionen Teil des 
Clusters waren. Informanten aus früheren Forschungsprojekten zählten zu den Erstkontakten 
und diese erleichterten Kontakte zu höher qualifizierten Informanten herzustellen. Hierbei 
wurde die Snowball-Sampling-Methode zum Einsatz gebracht. Bei den ausgewählten TJ 
Mitgliedern handelt es sich sowohl um altgediente Mitglieder als auch um Novizen. Bei der 
Stichprobenbildung wurde darauf geachtet, dass Befangenheit hinsichtlich der religiösen oder 
ethnischen Affiliation, dem Alter oder dem Bildungshintergrund ausgeschlossen wird. Den 
Interview- und Gesprächspartnern wurde die Forschungsabsicht erklärt und ihr Einverständnis 
eingeholt. Zur Wahrung der Identität der Informanten wurde Vertraulichkeit vereinbart und 
Anonymität vereinbart. Bei der Datenerhebung wurden Methoden aus der qualitativen 
Sozialforschung angewendet. Es wurden sowohl formelle als auch informelle Interviews 
geführt. Sie lassen sich in zwei Typen unterteilen: Einzelinterviews und 
Gruppendiskussionen. Informelle Interviews, sprich Unterhaltungen, werden als grundlegende 
Primärdaten erachtet. Zudem wurden insgesamt 46 formelle Interviews durchgeführt. 
Teilnehmende Beobachtung fungierte ebenfalls als eine der Forschungsmethoden. Hierbei 
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wurde strikt darauf geachtet, dass Teilnahme und Beobachtung den ethnographischen 
Forschungsgegenstand nicht kompromittieren. Die Natur der besuchten Veranstaltungen war 
vielfältig und reichte von nationalen Kongressen bis zu Exkursionen mit TJ Mitgliedern zu 
lokalen Moscheen. Diese unterschiedlichen Ereignisse ermöglichten nicht nur das Sammeln 
von frischen Daten, sondern boten auch die Gelegenheit, wiederholende Muster in der 
Glaubenspraxis sowie dessen Abläufe zu beobachten. Hinzu kommt der Umstand, diverse 
Innovationen und Varianten ähnlicher Ereignissen im regionalen Kontext und über einen 
gewissen Zeitraum zu registrieren. Die Feldforschung erstreckte sich über einen 
Gesamtzeitraum von neun Monaten und war gleichmäßig über die Forschungszeit verteilt. 
Das Sammeln von Daten, deren Interpretation und ihre gründliche Analyse war während der 
Feldforschung ein kontinuierlicher Prozess. Interviewtranskripte und weiteres übersetztes 
Material sowie Feldbeschreibungen und Zusammenfassungen bildeten für die Analyse einen 
Teil der Primärdaten. Mündliche Daten wurden transkribiert und aus unterschiedlichen 
Sprachen, wie Swahili und Borana in das Englische übersetzt. Der Großteil des Erfolgs der TJ 
Praktiken beruht auf Räumlichkeit. Somit genießen ethnographische Landkarten, 
Organisationsabläufe und Fallstudien innerhalb dieser Studie einen hohen Stellenwert. Quer 
durch die Interviews und Unterhaltungen laufende Themen wurden kategorisiert, kodiert, 
sortiert und typologisiert. Die Leitmotive mit vergleichenden Daten aus Sekundärquellen 
verflochten und schließlich zum Text der Dissertation verschmolzen. 
 
Diese Dissertation, eine grundlegende Arbeit über die TJ in Ostafrika, ist ein zeitgemäßer 
Beitrag zur wachsenden Literatur über die aus Indian stammende transnationale islamische 
Bewegung, die gegenwärtig in Afrika einen starken Zulauf hat. Zudem handelt es sich hierbei 
um einen beträchtlichen Beitrag für interdisziplinäre Studien, die Mobilität, 
Transnationalisierung und religiöse Wiederbelebung in einer sich globalisierenden Welt 
thematisieren. 
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Abstract  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat is a transnational lay Islamic movement started by Māwlanā Muhammad 
Ilyās in 1920s in the British India. It came to Kenya in mid 1950s and found transnational 
partnership with the Kenya’s Sunni Muslims of Asian descent. Despite its early establishment 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat remains one of the least researched religious phenomena in Kenya. The 
movement maintains a low profile instead focusing on re-spiritualisation of everyday life of 
individual Muslims. It shuns modern means of publicity such as internet, radio, and television 
opting for face-to-face and door-to-door preaching of its message. It also mutes discussions of 
a socio-political nature and avoids direct confrontation with mainstream religious leadership 
and all this has in a way contributed to its quietist presence that escapes academic inquiry. 
However, it is one of the most active Muslim ‘missionary’ organisations in the world with 
immense presence even at the grassroots level. The members are renowned for frequent 
mobility and large scale annual congregations. In Kenya, membership is fluid, diverse and 
multifaceted. It brings together the Somali, Swahili, Borana, Digo, Muslims of South Asian 
origin and even fellow Tablīghīs from neighbouring countries in engaged interaction and 
networks. These interactions have led to the resilience of this transnational movement. The 
success of the movement, especially among lay Muslims is buoyed by convincing recruitment 
drives that appeals to their hearts and minds. The question that forms the central theme of this 
thesis is what happens when such a movement crosses international and national borders in 
order to preach, recruit and grow among rapidly Islamising communities.  
 
Taking the Borana as the starting point, this study attempts to describe, document and analyse 
the localisation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya in general and the northern part of Kenya 
particular. The Borana are a nomadic community that straddles the Kenya-Ethiopia border. 
The members of the community are found also in Isiolo and in a number of informal 
settlements in and around Nairobi. Due to the vastness of northern Kenya, two field sites were 
chosen, namely Merti, a stronghold of Waso Borana in Isiolo County and Moyale, a 
cosmopolitan town on the border of Kenya and Ethiopia. This second field site avails a 
different Tablīghī growth trajectory and strategies as well as position the Tablīghīs in this area 
as a bridge for other Borana speaking adherents opting to preach among the local Borana and 
the Borana in Ethiopia. In most of these areas, Gabra, Burji, Garre and Sakuye are their 
neighbours. Their language, Borana, is largely spoken by most residents in this upper eastern 
region of Kenya. 
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In this study we ask the question what happens when religious ideas travel across different 
forms of boundaries to establish itself in new grounds far away from its point of origin. Based 
on this general guiding question, we shall explore the growth, establishment and consolidation 
of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya in general and northern Kenya in particular. We shall examine 
the Tablīghī innovative religious practices, pragmatic strategies for membership increase and 
maintenance, dynamic approaches to deal with the larger society, working faith bureaucracy, 
politics of space use and place making and engaged interpersonal and inter-regional networks 
that link local, zonally, national and international adherents in a bond of solidarity and 
purpose. We shall investigate the relations between the Tablīghīs and existing Islamic 
traditions as the new group navigate an already competitive religious landscape and seek 
recognition as an equally authentic religious movement based on the core teachings of the 
faith. We shall particularly concern ourselves with how the Borana Tablīghīs fit within their 
own region in the north and also within the national movement. Hence we explore how they 
preach among their own kin, what motivates them, where they mainly travel to and the 
implication of their efforts on religious and ethnic identities. 
 
This study is based on a few tentative assumptions. One, Tablīghī Jamāʿat is becoming a well-
established preaching group among the Borana speaking communities, this has been 
facilitated by successful recruitment of members from various segments of the communities 
and the emergence of these converts as committed promoters of the movement’s religious 
goods and goal. Two, to effectively establish itself, the movement has relied on strategies of 
re-territorialisation that involves creation of ‘parish-like’ units that link individuals through an 
intricate web of networks across the transnational space and the establishment of a loose but 
highly effective ‘faith bureaucracy’, that oversees the day to day running of the transnational 
movement. Three, Borana speaking Tablīghīs are often sent to Borana speaking regions in 
Kenya and Ethiopia. This contextualized da
c
wa not only localized the movement as 
successful grassroots missionary outfit but also re-builds ethno-religious identities between 
the hitherto separated Orma of Tana River, the Waso Borana of Isiolo, Borana of Marsabit 
and Isiolo, migrant Borana speaking workers and dwellers in informal settlement in Nairobi 
and their kin in southern part of Oromia Regional State in Ethiopia. Four, Borana speaking 
Tablīghīs attend regular gatherings in the regions, at national and international levels and 
travel to several local and translocal destinations, bringing with them new and innovative 
religious practices and ideas, thus not only contesting with pre-existing religious traditions but 
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attempting to wrestle from the religious specialists influence and power over the religious 
behaviour of the lay Muslims. 
 
We employed interdisciplinary approach that incorporated diverse but related disciplines to 
give the subject of study a holistic perspective. Ethnography proved to be very useful in this 
endeavour. This study is interdisciplinary in nature, as it has incorporates methodologies from 
disciplines such as anthropology, geography, sociology and religious studies. The basic 
approaches used in the research were historical, analytical, ethnographic and comparative. 
Historical approach was used to trace the history of Islam in the northern part of the country 
and also to reconstruct the trajectories of growth of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the country. 
Ethnographic approach was particularly insightful as the study had to rely on thick description 
of various facets of the transnational movement, an academic task never undertaken in Kenya 
before. The approach strengthened materials collected through other approaches.  
 
Purposive sampling technique was used to identify the key Tablīghī and non-Tablīghī 
informants. The sample population was categorised into three clusters namely, Tablīghīs, 
Ṣūfīs and Salafīs. Each of the clusters was composed of informants from two main sites and a 
minor field zone: Moyale; Merti and Isiolo (Waso Borana) and Nairobi. In each of the clusters 
care was taken to include leaders as well as ordinary followers of the religious traditions. 
Informants from former research projects were among the initial contacts and they facilitated 
inclusion of more qualified informants through snow-balling technique. Tablīghīs chosen 
included both regulars and novice members. Care was taken so that the sample group was not 
affected by sectarian, ethnic, age or educational bias. Seeking informed consent was a priority 
during the field research. Anonymity and confidentiality was maintained so as to protect the 
identities of informants. Qualitative methods of data collection were utilised. Interviews, 
formal and informal, were conducted. The interviews conducted were categorised into two 
types: individual and group discussions. Informal interviews/conversations were an especially 
crucial source of primary data. In total 46 formal interviews were conducted. Participant 
observations were carried out but care was taken so that participation and observation did not 
compromise the ethnographic subject. Events attended were diverse ranging from national 
conventions, travel with the Tablīghīs to local mosque Tablīghī outings. These varied events 
not only allowed for fresh data collection, but also provided the opportunity to observe 
repetitive patterns in practices and schedules as well as diverse innovations and variations of 
similar events between regions and across time. The field visits were spaced evenly over the 
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entire study period and totalled about 9 months. Data collection, interpretation and in-depth 
analysis were a continuous process throughout the field research. Transcription of interviews 
and other translated materials and field description and summaries provided some of the 
primary data for analysis. Oral data was transcribed and translated from various languages 
such as from Swahili and Borana into English. Most of the Tablīghī practices rely on 
spatiality for its success. Hence, within this study, ethnographic maps, organisational charts 
and case studies have been given high priority. Themes that run through the interviews and 
conversations were categorised, coded, sorted and typologies that emerged were merged with 
comparative data from secondary sources and infuse within the body of the thesis.  
 
The thesis, a seminal one on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Eastern Africa, is a timely contribution to 
the growing literature on the Indian-borne transnational Islamic movement currently on the 
rise in Africa and it is a notable addition to interdisciplinary studies that focus on the theme of 
mobility, transnationalisation and religious revivalism in a globalising world.  
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Glossary of terms  
Abbreviations of languages: Ar. is Arabic, Bor. Means Borana, Sw. is for Swahili and Ur. is 
Urdu. Loans words from Arabic are found in Borana, Swahili and Urdu languages. 
 
ḥikma (Ar.) - wisdom, Tablīghī Jamāʽat expects individuals and preaching group to make 
decisions based on moderation, consensus and wisdom. 
aada sera Borana (Bor.) - Borana customary law. 
Abba Gada (Bor.) - the father of Gada, he reigns as a leader of the pan-Borana socio-political 
system for a period of 8 years. 
adab (Ar.) - etiquette, good behaviour.  
adab al-masjid (Ar.) - refers to the etiquette of mosque, it includes sets of behaviour an 
individual believer is encouraged to engage in immediately upon entry to such sacred 
spaces, it also includes those actions that are to be done and those to be avoided, it 
guard the sanctity of mosque as space in which the divine is to be respected and 
adored. 
adab al-naum (Ar.) - etiquette of sleeping.  
adab al-ṭacām (Ar.)  - etiquette of eating, table manners. 
adabiyāt (Ar.) - those teachings that deal with values, habits and socialization.  
adhkār al-masā’ (Ar.) - spiritual formulae to be repeated recited in the evening/night time. 
adhkār al-sabāḥ (Ar.) - spiritual formulae to be repeated recited in the morning time. 
Adhkār-plural of ḍhikr. 
afaan Borana (Bor.) – the Borana language. 
ahl al-shūra (Ar.) - members of a consultative committee of a specific regional or territorial 
unit.  
ahl al-sunna wa`l-jamāʽ (Ar.) - the community of followers of the traditions, a term of self-
description used by mainly mainstream religious scholars in Kenya to legitimate their 
religious practices as both authentic and representational of pristine Islam. 
aḥwāl (Ar.) – plural of ḥāl situation or condition, in the Tablīghī usage it refers to the oral or 
written reports about the progress of a preaching excursion, the performance of a 
regional, local or national Tablīghī unit, see also karguzari. 
akabir (Ur.) - elders, in the case of Tablīghīs, it refers to the senior members of the movement 
who make crucial decisions about the progress and plans of the movement.    
akhīra munājāt (Ar.) - a special supplication offered during the last day of a Tablīghī 
gathering which attracts hundreds of adherents, often prominent Tablighi leaders lead 
the prayer.  
aʽmāl al-ijtimāʽ (Ar.) -refers to all those religious practices that can only be carried out in a 
congregation and that require cooperation of others as a team, it includes the 
obligatory prayers, visits to general public, taʽlīm sessions, khurūj  fī sabīlillāh, 
ijtimāʽ, jor and ḥajj.  
aʽmāl al-ifrādī (Ar.) - refers to all those religious practices that can only be carried out on an 
individual basis and require the faithful commitment and sincerity of an individual 
believer, it includes engaging in  dhikr, supplications, supererogatory prayers, 
recitation of Qur’ān.  
amal shanaan (Bor.) - the five characteristics that Tablīghīs aspire to establish in every 
mosque, it is often communal in nature and facilitates the entrenchment of Tablīghī 
activities in a mosque and enhances the networking of Tablīghīs within an area 
amali tano (Sw.) - the five characteristics that Tablīghīs aspire to establish in every mosque. 
Also called amal shannan. See panch amaal. 
amīr (Ar.) - leader of a temporary preaching team, head of territorial unit such as ḥalqa. 
xix 
amr bi’l-macarūf( Ar.) - the Qur’ānic command that Muslims enjoin good deeds and forbid 
others to carry out evil or sinful deeds, it is an injunction cited by most lay preachers 
for their involvement in preaching activities.   
anbiyā (Ar.) - sing. nabī, prophets. 
ʿaqīda (Ar.)  – the main principles of faith, doctrine. 
arga dageti (Bor.) - oral history of the Borana, often it contains past historical events as well 
as future prophesies by Borana prophets and seers and passed from one generation to 
another through narratives and poetry. 
c
aṣr (Ar.) - obligatory late afternoon prayer. 
c
awra (Ar.) - something that must be concealed, specific parts of male and female bodies 
which have to be covered for decency, at times it includes the voice of a female in the 
public sphere. 
balāgha (Ar.) - to relay, to pass a message on to others.  
bayān (Ar.) - motivational talks given by Tablīghī speakers to the general mosque audience, it 
often extols diligence in religious obligations and the virtues of those willing to 
volunteer of their own accord for preaching.   
bayān fajrī- a kind of motivational talk given after the dawn obligatory prayers. 
bayān  maghrib (Ar.) - a kind of motivational talk given after the early evening obligatory 
prayer. 
bidʿa (Ar.) – unlawful religious innovations, it refers to religious practices that were not 
sanctioned by the Prophet or his companions as authentic, and hence a later addition to 
the practices of every day religious life.  
biriani (Sw.) – a spicy hot rice and meat dish popular among Asians and coastal communities 
of East Africa. 
borantiti (Bor.) - the state of being a Borana, it also denotes the willing to be part of a 
community that observes Nagaa Borana (Peace of Borana) and ready to cooperate and 
participate in all matters of communal interest. 
Buibui (Sw.) - a black female dress that covers the whole body.  
‘āyat al-kursī (Ar.) - a famous verse of the Qur’ān, 2: 255, widely memorized and esteemed 
for its description of Allah’s immense power over the universe. 
chapati (Sw.)- an Indian flat bread made flour, popular in East Africa. 
chibra (Bor.) - tradition Borana hair style for married women.  
chilla (Ur.) - it refers to forty days preaching tour. 
da’wat wa Tablīgh (Ar.) - calling others to the faith, propagation.  
da
c
wat al-nās lilallāh (Ar.) - Tablīghī term referring to the call of Muslims to the path of God, 
it also means undertaking preaching work so as to reach out to ordinary Muslims to 
remind them to be steadfast in religious observances, one of the 20 principles to be 
done in abundance.     
dāʽī (Ar.) – a caller to faith, a preacher, a Tablīghī activist  
dalīl (Ar.) - a guide, in Tablīghī circles, it refers to a local person, whether he is a Tablīghī or 
non-Tablīghī, who acts as a guide for a preaching team when they undertake a brief 
excursion to meet general public in the area in the vicinity of mosque or town, this 
brief visit is called jaula and aims to mobilize the locals to join the visiting team for 
religious instructions. 
daqapsisa (Bor.) - to convey.  
daʿwa (Ar.) - invitation or call to faith, propagate message of Islam to both to Muslims and 
non-Muslims.  
deema (Bor.) - to go out, for instance for preaching tour.  
dhambi (Sw.) - sin, transgression against God and man. 
dhikr (Ar.) – remembrance or mention, invocation of Allah by repetition of His names or 
particular formulae.  
xx 
dīn wa dunya(Ar.) - sacred and mundane, sacred and profane, the religious and the worldly.  
dures (Bor.) - a wealthy person. 
durūd sharīf (Ar.) - dhikr or supplication that praises the Prophet . 
eeb (Bor.) - blessings, supplications.  
Eel (Bor.) - a well where pastoralists access water for themselves and their animals.  
fā’ida (Ar.) - benefit, it refers to spiritual benefit, rewards accruable from the performance of 
a religious practice. 
faiṣala (Ar.) - decider, in most cases, it is a substitute name for the amīr, he makes the final 
decision on behalf of the members who are under his responsibility; he may be a 
leader of a preaching team or a residential Tablīghī  unit.  
fajr (Ar.) -obligatory dawn prayer . 
faḍā’il (Ar.) plural of faḍīla-Virtues of a religious practice, in Urdu fazā’il. 
Fazā’il Aʽmāl (Ur.) – Virtues of Religious Practices, a core book of the movement  
Fazā’il-i Dhikr (Ur.) -.Virtues of Remembrance of Allah, a chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl.  
Fazā’il-i Qur’ān (Ur.) - Virtues of the Qur’ān, a chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl.  
Fazā’il-i Ramazān (Ur.) - Virtues of Fasting, a chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl.  
Fazā’il-i Tabligh (Ur.) - Virtues of Tabligh, a chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl.  
Fazā’i’l-i Namaz (Ur.) - Virtues of the prayers, a chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl.  
fikr (Ar.) – thought, idea, deliberations on some form of religious actions to bolster the spirit 
of religious awakening among the Muslims.  
fikr al-dīn (Ar.)  - deliberations for the faith, in Tablīghī circles it refers to consultative 
meetings on the state of the affairs of daʽwa and how to remedy lax religious 
observance. Also called fikr al- jamāʽ.  
fiqh (Ar.) - Islamic jurisprudence.  
Gada (Bor.) - refers to the reign of an Abba-Gada, Gada also refers to the indigenous socio-
political system of that administers over Borana.  
gadamojji - the last of the eight stages of the Borana generational set,  
gusht/gasht (Ur.) - a brief excursion into the mosque neighbourhood by members of visiting 
Tablīghī team or local Tablīghīs often  guided by a local person, also see jaula. 
ḥadīth (Ar.) - corpus of transmitted saying, deeds and actions approved by Prophet 
Muhammad, such knowledge forms the foundation of doctrinal and theological 
arguments and guide the everyday practices of Muslims.   
ḥāfiẓ (Ar.) - a person who has memorized the Qur’ān by heart. 
ḥajj (Ar.) - annual pilgrimage to the Ka‘ba in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, it is a religious ritual 
that Muslims are expected to fulfil at least once in a lifetime.  
ḥalqa (Ur.) - a larger territorial division of Tablīghī Jamāʽat, be it a country or a sub-section 
of a country. 
ḥalqa shūra (Ur./Ar.) - a consultative forum bringing together Tablīghīs belonging to a 
territorial unit of ḥalqa, often far-flung areas send representatives.  
ḥidāya (Ar.) - a type of motivational talk given to members of a preaching team before 
departure for a tour and after their conclusion of the preaching tour, it helps prepare 
them for the task ahead. 
ḥijāb (Ar.) - female dress that covers most  of the body, revealing only the face and hands. 
ḥikayat-i ṣaḥāba (Ur.) - the stories of the companions of the Prophet, one of the popular 
chapters of Fazā’il Aʽmāl. 
ḥirāsa (Ar.) - a team or groups of individuals in charge of security at Tablīghī event or while 
on preaching tour. 
cibāda maca dhikr (Ar.) - to do sincere worship in addition to engaging in constant 
remembrance to God through recommended litanies, one of the 20 principles.  
i
clān (Ar.) - announcement, oral public advertisement of an upcoming event or activitiy, to 
give information. 
xxi 
ijtimāʽ (Ar.) - Tablīghī gatherings held periodically in different parts of the country, at times 
the gatherings are attended by hundreds of adherents from within a country and from 
neighbouring countries. It lasts from three to four days. 
 ikhlās al-niyya (Ar.) - sincerity of intention, one of the principles of sitta siffat  
ikhtilāf al-ʽulamā’ (Ar.) - arguments with the religious scholars, it is one of the 20 principles 
that forbids members on missionary tours, in order to avert costly debates on doctrinal 
and sectarian discourses, one is expected to stick to teaching the basics of the faith and 
leave complicated jurisprudential matters to religious specialists.  
Ikrām al-Muslim (Ar.) - honour and respect to Muslims, one of the key sitta siffat principles.  
c
ilm (Ar.) - religious knowledge of Islam, corpus of spiritual knowledge. 
c
ilm wa dhikr (Ar.) - religious knowledge and remembrance of Allah, one of the principles of 
sitta siffat. 
imām (Ar.) - a person who leads a group of Muslims in a congregational prayer. 
imama/surre (Bor.)  - a male head scarf. 
imān (Ar.) – faith. 
imān yaqīn (Ar.) - sincere belief, a Tablīghī term frequently used to refer to the state of pious 
adherence to religious practices and beliefs. 
cishā’ (Ar.) - obligatory evening prayer. 
 ishrāf (Ur.) - to admire other peoples’ items while on preaching tours, one of the actions one 
must avoid, one of the 20 principles. 
isrāf (Ar.) – plural of saraf, - refers to excesses, extravagance is one of those actions to be 
avoided while on preaching tours, teams on tour are at all times encouraged to avoid 
wastage, one of the 20 principles.   
istighfār (Ar.) - a supplication for forgiveness of one’s sinful deeds. 
istiqbāl (Ar.) - the team in charge of the reception of guests and visiting jamāʽats at Tablīghī 
gatherings, they guide the attendants into Tablīghī sessions going on the mosques. The 
team also helps in tracing lost and found items at such gatherings.   
jahannam (Ar.) - hell, the eternal inferno where sinful people are believed to punished in the 
hereafter. 
jāhilīya (Ar.) - period of ignorance, refers to the period that preceded the advent of Islam in 
Arabia, where the society was said to be characterized by social injustice, unbridled 
immorality and lack of religious enlightenment. Sometimes contemporary Muslim 
preachers compare the current permissiveness and lax religious observance with the 
pre-Islamic Arabia and warn the adherents to change their ways.  
jallab (Bor.) - a Borana clan councillor.  
jamāʽat  ta’aṣīl (Ar.) - a mobile missionary team sent within an area to advertise an upcoming 
Tablīghī event 
jamāʽa (Ar.) – Tablīghī Jamāʽat (Ur.), a jamāʽat (non-capitalized and italicized) refers to a 
group of Tablīghīs on preaching tour, Tablīghīs from one territorial unit or linguistic 
zone. 
janna (Ar.) - paradise, heaven. 
jaula (Ar.) - a temporary excursion into a Muslim community by a group of four to eight 
Tablīghīs in order to call local Muslims to attend ongoing religious talks and sermons 
offered by local Tablīghīs or by a visiting foreign team, it is held often in late 
afternoon or early evening.  
 jaula itiqādī - a brief excursion made by Tablīghīs from one mosque to the local community 
of a neighbouring mosque, in order to mobilize them to attend an on-going Tablīghī 
session. 
jaula maqāmī (Ar.) - a brief excursion to mobilize local Muslims in the area surrounding one 
mosque to attend an on-going Tablīghī session, this kind of jaula is carried out by 
mosque-based jamāʽat. 
xxii 
jor (Ur.) - a mini-ijtimāʽ, a congregational gathering held by Tablīghīs in one or two sub- 
ḥalqas, often lasting three to four days.  
judud (Ar.) - a novice, an adept, a new follower of Tablīghī Jamāʽat. 
juhd (Ar.) - effort, in Tablīghī circles it refers to all those concerted practices an individual or 
a group of Tablīghīs make in order to revival the faith within their own lives and that 
of others. 
juhd qabla juhd (Ar.) - preparatory activities undertaken by a group of Tablīghī volunteers 
before events such as ijtimāʽ gatherings.  
juhūd anbiyā’ (Ar.) - the efforts made by the prophets in the path of faith, it often refers to the 
duty of calling others back to faith as done by earlier prophets 
juhūd ṣaḥāba (Ar.) - the efforts of the companions of the Prophet, it reflects on dacwa as 
carried out by the companions of the Prophet. 
juhūd ummat al-rasūl (Ar.) -  concerns the dacwa  efforts to be made by the followers of the 
Prophet in reminding others of the faith.  
Kailula (Ur.) - afternoon siesta, it is the custom for Tablīghī preaching teams to rest between 
2.00-3.30 pm. 
kalām al-dunyā (Ar.) - worldly talk, one is forbidden to engage in worldly talk as it takes an 
individual away from the goal of the preaching outing, it is one of the 20 principles.  
kalām julūs (Ar.) - a practice of giving a ‘seated’ lecture in the mosque while some members 
of either a visiting team or local Tablīghīs are simultaneously making a brief excursion 
into the local Muslim community (jaula).   
kalima ṭayyiba (Ar.) - the declaration of faith: There is no god but Allah. 
kanzu (Sw.) - a male Muslim robe, jallābīya. 
Karguzari - see aḥwāl, refers to oral and written reports from preaching excursions by the lay 
preachers of Tablīghī Jamāʽat.  
khātam al-anbiyā’ (Ar.) - the seal of prophethood, it also reflects on dacwa as carried out by 
the last Prophet of God.  
khawāṣṣ (Ar.) – plural of khāṣṣa upper class, wealthy merchant or business man, a wealthy 
individual. 
khidma (Ar.) - service, refers to a service rendered by a Tablīghī for the sake of God, it 
includes cooking and all the associated duties such as shopping and serving members 
of one’s preaching team or congregants at Tablīghī gatherings. 
khurūj (Ar.) - to go out, it refers to going out for preaching tour.  
khurūj fī sabīlillāh (Ar.) - a commonly used term to refer to Tablīghī dacwa tours, individuals 
are mobilized to volunteer for specific numbers of days to engage in lay preaching at 
their own expense and away from their home.  
khurūj shahrī (Ar.) - a recommended monthly three day excursion, that members of Tablīghī 
Jamāʽat aspire to organize from among themselves and other mosque attendants.  
khuṭba (Ar.) - a public talk, sermon, especially that which is offered on Fridays from the 
pulpit. 
kikoi (Sw.) -  a cloth worn around the waist, loin-cloth. 
kitāb al-ẓuhr (Ar.) – Tablīghī practice of reading one or two ḥadīths from recommended texts 
to mosque congregants after midday prayers.  
kofia (Sw.)-  embroidered skull-cap, often worn by Muslims. 
kulm, waldena (Bor.) -congregation, gathering. 
kundi (Sw.)- a preaching team, literally: group.  
kurta pyjama (Ur.) - a typical South Asian short male robe with matching loose-trousers, it is 
often worn by Tablīghīs in Kenya.  
laff hori (Bor.) - the land for animals, pasture range land ideal for cattle camps.  
madrasa (Ar.) - Islamic religious school. 
maghrib (Ar.) - obligatory early evening prayer, literally: west. 
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maḥabbat  al-jamā c(Ar.) - love of the society/group, for the good of the community  
majma-jor (Ur.) - two day consultative forum for local, regional and national Tablīghī 
leadership, often held in the central national mosque of the movement. 
maqbūl (Ar.) - acceptance, to be accepted by God, an appeal to have an answered prayer.  
maqṣad (Ar.) - objective, aims or goal of a Tablīghī sanctioned religious practice. 
markaz (Ar.) - a centre, a Tablīghī affiliated central mosque in an area. 
masā’il (Ar.) - plural of mas’ala, refers to all those matters that deal with doctrinal or 
jurisprudential rationale for engagement or avoidance of engaging in actions, those 
matters dealing with masā’il are some of the issues avoided by members of the lay 
movement as it requires specialized knowledge and are often contested.  
mashwara (Ar.) - deliberation, consultative meeting of the Tablīghī Jamāʽat members, also 
called shūra.  
masjid (Ar.) - mosque. 
masturat jamāʽat (Ur.) – a special spousal preaching team, composed of married couples and 
largely geared to make the female Tablīghīs partake in Tablīghī dacwa tours 
mata buffacha (Bor.) – the ritual graduation ceremony when the elders enter the last of the 
cyclic eight stages of the Gada generational set, after this, the elders retire and assume 
the role of ritual specialists. 
minbar (Ar.) - a pulpit from where an imām or preacher delivers sermon. 
miraa (Carta edulis) (Sw.) - a leafy stimulant, chewed for mild intoxication, it is commonly 
grown in Meru region in Kenya, also in Ethiopia and Yemen, it is popular drug among 
Muslim communities at the Coast of Kenya and pastoralist communities of northern 
Kenya, also called khat. 
mithan (Ur.) - compound, in Tablīghī terminology, it refers to the compound of a mosque or 
markaz where ijtimāʽ takes place and needs preparations.  
mudhākara (Ar.) - study, conversations, learning, memorization. In Tablīghī usage it refers to 
memorization or learning session in which certain common Tablīghī teachings are 
often taught, study or learn. 
maḥram (Ar.) - a person to whom a person is by the criteria of Muslim person not 
marriageable to. 
mu'min (Ar.) - a believer. 
Muntakhab Aḥādith (Ar.) - a popular collection of ḥadīths on the six virtues written by 
Muhammad Yusuf Kandhalawi. 
Musalmano-ki-Mawjoodah-pasti-ka-Waahid-Ilaaj (Ur.) - Muslim Degeneration and Its Only 
Remedy, an additional chapter of Fazā’il Aʽmāl written by Ihtisham al-Hasan 
Kandhlawi. 
mutakallim (Ar.) -.the main spokesman who converses on the objectives of jaula to local 
Muslims, as a Tablīghī team conducts the brief excursion, he often instruct locals on 
the aims of Muslim life, and urge them to accompany the group back to mosque for 
religious instruction.  
nagaa borana (Bor.) - the Peace of Borana, a traditional custom that ensure that relatively 
cordial relations exist with the community, those who contravene it are often 
sanctioned, it is for the common good of all.   
nār (Ar.) – fire, hell, see jahannam. 
naum (Ar.) -  sleep, one of the 20 principles of Tablīghī daʿwa, one should reduce sleep, 
setting more time aside for religious actions instead. 
niqāb (Ar.) - a female face covering, which reveals only the eyes, used in combination with 
other body and head covering, especially by female relatives of devout Muslims, 
nicknamed: Ninja-style. 
niyya (Ar.) - intention, before any religious action, a Tablīghī is expected to do it with clear 
and sincere intention and not out of pride or need to demonstrate their piety. 
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nuṣra (Ar.) - assistance given to a visiting preaching team by local Tablīghīs, a qarya shūra 
can also dispatch a follow up and motivational team to offer assistance to their local 
Tablīghīs on preaching tour of duty.  
olla (Bor.) – a village, an outlying settlement, a town quarter, a homestead.   
paidal jamāʽat (Ur.) - a special Tablīghī preaching team that sets to carry out a preaching tour 
on foot instead of using other means of transport. 
panch amāl (Ur.) - the five characteristics that Tablīghīs aspire to establish in every mosque, 
it is often communal in nature and facilitates the entrenchment of Tablīghī activities in 
a mosque and enhance networking of Tablīghīs within an area.  
pilau (Sw.) - spicy rice and meat dish, popular in East Africa. 
Qādiriyya (Ar.) – Ṣūfī  Brotherhood founded by Sheikh cAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī of Baghdad in 
the 12
th
 Century, the most widespread ṭarīqa in the world.  
qallu (Bor.) - a priest-king, the chief indigenous Borana religion specialists, there are three 
qallus in the Borana religio-political system of gada. 
qalole (Bor.) - religious scholars, specialists, madrasa teachers, learned regular mosque 
attendants, religious preachers, and prayer leaders. 
qalole Tabliqa (Bor.) - the sheikhs/leaders/members of the movement.  
qarya (Ar.) - a village, an area, a spatial zone that brings together a number of mosque-based 
Tablīghī groups. A number of Qaryas constitute sub-ḥalqa. 
qarya shūra (Ar.) - an area Tablīghī consultative council.  
qoosa (Bor.) - joking relationship, between specific Borana clans. 
qudamā’ (Ur., Ar.) - senior Tablīghī.  
qunūt (Ar.) - lengthy supplication, occasionally embedded in the last rakāt of obligatory 
prayers. 
raaga (Bor.)- Borana prophet, seer 
rak
c
a (Ar.) - a complete cycle of Muslim prayer, that involves standing, bowing, prostrating 
so the forehead touches the ground; a prayer may have one to four raka
cāt. 
Ramaḍān (Ar.) - the 9th month of Hijri calendar within which Muslims are expected to abstain 
from food and drink from dawn to dusk, as part of the practice of fasting.  
raʽy (Ar.) - opinion, suggestion, an idea.  
Riyāḍ-al-ṣāliḥīn (Ar.) - ‘The Garden of the Righteous’ a popular ḥadīth collection compiled 
by Yahiya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi. 
sabbo gonna (Bor.) - the two moieties of the Borana.  
ṣabr wa-taḥammul (Ar.) – patience and endurance 
ṣadaqa (Ar.) - voluntary alms given by Muslims to the needy. 
al-ṣaḥīḥ al-sitta (Ar.) - the six canonical ḥadīth collections.  
salafī (Ar.) - followers of strict and puritan traditions of Islam who seek to emulate the 
practices of the pious predecessors, a return to pristine Islam.   
ṣalāt (Ar.) - prayers.  
ṣalāt al-layl and Witr (Ar.) - highly recommended nightly supererogatory prayers; it is often 
performed by devout Muslim individuals late into the night.  
sanawī (Ar.) – literally: annual, a pledge that a regular Tablīghī makes, in order to volunteer 
for specific number of days on yearly basis, fellow Tablīghīs remind each other of 
upcoming promises of this nature 
shuʽba (Ar.) – department, it refers to five different divisions during ijtimāʽ, it includes 
services like cooking, recruitment, reception, translation and preaching. 
shuʽba ikhtilāl (Ar.) - the department of ijtimāʽ concerned with directing adherents back to the 
mosque to listen to a lecture, especially away from other competing attractions, such 
as food and clothes stalls often erected outside the venue by petty traders. 
shuʽba khidma - the department of services, such as cooking and other hospitality related 
services at ijtimāʽ. 
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shūra (Ar.) - consultative forum, council. 
al-shūra al-‘ālamī (Ar.) - the highest consultative forum of the Tablīghī Jamāʽat, it is held 
annually in the Indian centre in Nizamuddin Basti in Delhi. 
shūra fi’l-bayt (Ar.) - refers to Tablīghī consultative deliberations at home, often this kind of 
shūra involves husbands and wives discussing matters of importance, it may include 
religious obligations as well as mundane plans. 
shūrat al-usbū’ (Ar.) - weekly consultative meetings, conducted by members of a mosque-
based Tablīghī group on matters arising in the movement.  
sifa jahan (Bor.) - the six virtues, also called amali tano, sitta siffat. 
siffa sitta (Ur.) - the six virtues of Tablīghī Jamāʽat, these form the core teaching of the 
movement. They are shahāda, ṣalāt, cilm wa dhikr, ikrām al-muslimīn, ikhlāṣ al-niyya, 
and tafrīq al- waqt. It is also referred to as sitta siffat (Arabic), sifa sita (Swahili) and 
sifa jahan (Borana).  
siyāsa (Ar.) - refers to political discussions, while on tours, it is completely forbidden to 
engage in such debates, and it is one of the 20 principles.  
su’āl al-nās (Ar.) - asking questions, begging. 
ṣūfī (Ar.) - a member of mystical brotherhoods 
sunna (Ar.) - it refer to the corpus of religious traditions handed down through generations, as 
the practices of the Prophet and as the guiding principles of every day Muslim 
behaviour, ranging from mundane engagements to religious observance.  
Sūrat al-Fātiḥa (Ar.) - the opening chapter of the Qur’ān  
Sūrat al-Imrān (Ar.) -the third chapter of the Qur’ān 
Sūrat al-Nās, Falāq and Ikhlāṣ (Ar.) - the shorter chapters at the end of the Qur’ān, Chapters 
112, 113 and 114.  
ṭacām (Ar.) -  food or consumption, one of the 20 principles of Tablīghī daʿwa, while on 
preaching tour a Tablīghī is encouraged to reduce food intake and the desire for its 
consumption. 
Taasīd jamāʽat (Ur.) - a publicity team sent around mosques in a zone to advertise an 
upcoming Tablīghī event and to mobilize volunteers to attend.  
ta
c
aṭū al-amīr (Ur.) - to follow the commands/instructions of the leader of a missionary team 
on tour, it is one of 20 practices, that an individual lay preacher must aspire to do with great 
vigour. It brings discipline, creates one centre of authority and mutes rivalry and rebellion in a 
preaching team. 
tābicūn (Ar.) - the generation that took over the leadership and responsibility for the 
propagation of Islam after the demise of the companions of the Prophet. 
tablīgh (Ar.) - to convey, to call people to religion, to pass message of revival to others. 
tablīghī (Ar.) - of that which pertains to the transnational lay movement of Tablīghī Jamāʽat.  
Tablīghī Jamāʽat (Ur.) - society for propagation, preaching party.  
Tablīghī Nisab (Ur.) - it the old title of Fazā’il-i a’amāl, the popular ḥadīth collection written 
by Muhammad Zakariya. 
 tādīm  (Ar.) - to praise, to revere, to exalt. When to revere, the term is mentioned in a 
religious talk, for instance, when you hear ‘wa qala lahu ta’ala’ you say ‘jalla jallalu’ 
or allahu akbar. 
tafsīr (Ar.) - exegesis. 
tajiri (Sw) - business person, rich person.  
takaza (Ur.) - a term commonly used by Tablīghīs to refer to accepting to do certain 
responsibilities; it refers to a resolution on the part of an adherent to volunteer to do 
certain obligations of the movement, an affirmation to undertake a common religious 
duty on behalf of the movement.  
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ta
clīm (Ar.) - teaching session of Tablīghī Jamāʽat, readings sourced from Tablīghī 
recommended texts are given, emphasis is placed on the six virtues. These sessions are 
done at home, in local mosques, during the preaching tours and at Tablīghī gatherings.   
ta
clīm f’il-bayt (Ar.) - instructional/teaching session done by a Tablīghī affiliated family at 
home, attendants are often drawn from members of the nuclear family, and text 
reading is given prominence. 
ta
clīm f’il-masjid (Ar.) - instructional/teaching session regularly done by Tablīghīs in their 
local mosque. 
ta
clīm wa tacllum (Ar.) - to learn and to teach others, a Tablīghī term that encourages the 
mutual exchange of religious knowledge, one of the 20 principles. 
ta
cmīr jamāʽat (Ur.) - a group of individuals who volunteer to stay at a Tablighi markaz to 
give ḥidayat and nuṣra for jamāʽats who arrive at the markaz, to assist in the tarjama 
in case a visiting group requires a local translator, to serve as dalīl or guide, to oversee 
the khidma of the markaz and also to do the duties of istiqbāl for the kundis. 
tarāwīḥ (Ar.) - a special long congregational prayer offered at during Ramaḍān nights. 
targhīb (Ar.) - motivational talk given by Tablīghīs to the general public which aims to 
encourage volunteering for Tablīghī preaching tours.  
ṭarīqa(Ar.) - Ṣūfī brotherhood.  
tarjama(Ar.) - translation, a team that renders the main messages from one language into 
another language for a specific language-based group during Tablīghī talks. 
tark-e-laya’ni (Ur.) - Avoidance of petty talks and mundane issues, unwritten 7th principle of 
Tablīghī Jamāʽat.  
ta
c
rruf (Ar.) – acquaintance, a Tablīghī practice that refers to making acquaintance with 
specific persons within an area, be they professionals, fellow Tablīghīs, traders or 
religious specialists.  
tartīb (Ar.) - Procedure or steps in the performance of religious practices.  
tartīb al-awlīd (Ar.) - etiquette of bringing up children, it is one of the core issues to be taught 
in the Tablīghī household text reading. 
tasbiḥāt (Ar.) - litanies of recommended supplications to make one closer to God, they are to 
be repeated hundreds of times on a regular basis to enhance one’s piety.  
tasdīq (Ar.) – believe, faith, to believe sincerely that the message you are listening to during 
Tablīghī session is the words of Allah and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. 
tashkīl (Ar.) - formation, it refers to the practice of motivation and recruitment of volunteers 
from the class of fellow Tablīghīs and the general Muslim public to undertake 
preaching tours for specified number of days or months. 
taṭbīq (Ar.) - to put all Tablīghī messages being preached into action, into practice. 
tawwāb (Ar.)- spiritual benefits of religious action. 
tusbahi (Bor.) - Muslim prayer beads, mostly used in remembrance of Allah and other 
supplications  
culamā’ (Ar.) – plural of cālim, religious specialists or scholars, often it extends to prayer 
leaders and teachers in Islamic schools.  
umma (Ar.) - universal community of Muslim faithfuls. 
uṣūl al-daʽwa (Ar.) - principles of mission, principles of preaching Islam.  
uṣūl cishirīn (Ar.) - it refers to the 20 principles of Tablīghī rule of thumb for undertaking a 
preaching tour, it is divided into five sets each composed of four actions. The sets deal 
with four things to do so much, four to be encouraged, four to be reduced, four to be 
avoided, and four to restrain away from at all costs, as forbidden deeds. It brings 
uniformity and disciplines errant individuals from breaking the rules of engagement 
for lay preaching. 
cuyūb nās (Ar.) - refers to talking about the faults of other human beings, a Tablīghī on a 
preaching tour is forbidden strongly to castigate any member of the general public for 
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moral laxity or other societal vices, he is expected to neither privately or while in 
public, to condemn other Muslims or talk ill of them, it is one of the 20 principles. 
warr tabliqa (Bor.) - the people of Tablīghī Jamāʽat, a Tablīghī preaching team. 
wazee (Sw.) -  elders, in the case of Tablīghīs, it refers to the senior members of the 
movement who make crucial decisions about the progress and plans of the movement, 
also called akabir (Ur.) or jarole (Bor.).     
worr buyo (Bor.) - the people of grass, a self-descriptive term used by Borana, the name is 
derived from the materials used by the community for the construction of houses.  
worr dase (Bor.) - people of the mat, a term used in reference to Gabra and Sakuye by the 
Borana. 
worr libin (Bor.) - people of Liban, a coalition of pastoralist communities headed by the 
Borana and includes Garre, Ajuran, Gabra, Sakuye, Konso and Burji. 
Wuḍū’ (Ar.) -  ablutions taken prior to the performance of prayer, water is used where 
possible. 
zakāt (Ar.) - annual Muslim alms required to be paid by those with means. 
zinā (Ar.) - illicit sexual relations, refers to both fornication and adultery.  
ziyāra (Ar.) - visits, it refers to Tablīghī practices of going out to meet specific individuals 
within a society with aims of announcing their presence, acknowledging their 
authority and standing as persons of importance within their society and winning their 
hearts and souls. 
ziyārat ammat al-nās (Ar.) - visit to general public, a practice that aims to mobilize ordinary 
Muslims to join a Tablīghī group at a mosque, volunteer their time and money for 
Tablīghī tours.  
ziyārat khalf al-dācī (Ar.) - refers to visits to homes of fellow Tablīghīs who are at that 
moment on a missionary tour, it serves to check on the state of their families, it aims at 
resolve any hardship felt due to absence of the man from his home.  
ziyārat al-khawāṣṣ (Ar.) - visit to the homes or business premises of a merchant or wealthy 
individual in an area; it is a specialized practice aimed to win over such a person to 
support the group and to volunteer time for Tablīghī tours. 
ziyārat al-qudamā’ (Ar.) - a practice of visiting a fellow senior Tablīghī, it may be for 
bonding or to encourage fellow Tablīghīs to remain commited to various practices of 
the movement such as khurūj,  tāclīm, shūra, bayān and jaula. 
ziyārat al-ṭabaqāt (Ar.) - a specialized visit to a class of individuals classified as professionals 
so that during their everyday conduct they adhere to strict rules of moral and ritual 
purity, Tablīghīs generally target traders, butchers, launderers and barbers in local 
markets and sometimes they extend the visits to government employees such as 
teachers and civil servants.  
ziyārat al-culamā’ (Ar.) - a specialized visit to religious scholars, it aims at reducing 
resistance to Tablīghī mission in an area and to win approval of the religious class so 
that the general public can partake in the movements activities as legitimate religious 
practices.   
ẓuhr (Ar.) - obligatory midday prayer. 
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Note on Transliteration  
 
Transliteration of Arabic words and terminologies followed the International Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES format. For Borana, words were written as is pronounced by 
speakers of the language in the upper Eastern part of Kenya. Standard Swahili was used for 
spelling of Kiswahili words. For Urdu, standard spelling for words and terminologies were 
also applied.   
 
 
 
1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Study Background  
 
Meet Mohamed Jattani,
1
 a middle-aged Borana Tablīghī from Merti in Isiolo County. When I 
met him in January 2012 he was about to undertake a religiously-motivated journey outside 
Kenya. He was neither heading to Makkah and Madina for annual pilgrimage nor for 
advancement of religious knowledge at various universities in the Muslim world. He was 
heading to Karachi then to New Delhi via Jeddah. His final destination is four month sojourn 
at the esteemed global headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, the transnational lay daʿwa 
movement, in Nizamuddin area of New Delhi. This stay is akin to an advance course in the 
life of career lay dāʿis. They learn a lot. They literally learn at the feet of the elders of the 
movement inculcating new directives to be taken back to their local mosque communities. 
Jattani was expected to be back in May 2012. He, undoubtedly, would come back a better 
Tablīghī man. He hopes to boost the spread of the movement among the Borana speaking 
areas in the Counties of Marsabit, Isiolo and Tana River. He is not the only one to have done 
this highly sought stay at Nizamuddin. A dozen others from the region had done it in the last 
10 years. About five others were also preparing to do in the first quarter of 2012. He will 
however join the ‘elite’ class of local Tablīghīs with a transnational experience of direct 
learning at the very source of the movement. What is so special about this example? First and 
foremost, this kind of journeying was unimagined, at least for local Borana Muslims, outside 
the experience of the movement. It indicates a local engagement of Borana Tablīghīs in an 
international network of fellow lay preachers. This kind of network is a conduit through 
which transformative religious and social practices are negotiated, adopted and adapted by the 
local Borana as legitimate, authentic and worthy of emulation. It shows that the Borana or 
rather the Borana speaking Tablīghīs are deeply involved in the growth and expansion of the 
movement in Kenya in general and northern Kenya in particular, an undertaking that requires 
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 Not real name. Throughout the thesis, for purpose of anonymity and confidentiality, pseudonyms have been 
used unless stated otherwise. The travel costs for such journeys as is often the case with other missionary tours is 
bore by the individuals. The costs of living for the Kenyan Tablīghīs travelling to the centres in South Asia are 
often subsidised by the managements of the centres. Personal conversations with Jarso Galma, Abdullahi Abdi, 
Musa Ibrahim, Moyale, October 2010. 
2 
their regular and intense interactions with the Kenya’s Muslim Asians, the Swahili, the 
Somali, and other Tablīghīs of diverse ethnic backgrounds in congregational gatherings and 
daʿwa tours. They are part of a bigger phenomenon that transcend their regional boundaries 
and with greater impact on the self-imagination of being Muslims. 
Three decades ago, such journeying described above was rare. Travels were there. Only that 
then the direction was not to but from the Indian subcontinent. Pakistani, Indian and 
Bangladeshi Tablīghīs roamed the northern frontiers of Kenya as they did the coast and the 
larger East and Central Africa. Language though was a problem; it never appeared to deter 
these enthusiastic roving preachers. At times, they were accompanied by East Africa’s 
Muslim Asians to help in translation of the messages of the revivalist movement for the local 
Muslims. The local Muslim communities accommodated them and gave them audience. They 
often left after a few days with little if any impact. Things changed however. Local Sunni 
Asians in Kenya, who were the first to volunteer and give logistical support to their fellow 
South Asians, oversaw the initial implantation of the movement as locally driven daʿwa group 
in a series of mosques in Nairobi, Meru and other towns. This process, though gradual, saw 
emergence of the Kenyan chapter of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as extremely instrumental in the 
East and Central African region with annual gatherings attracting hundreds of adherents from 
all areas of Kenya and from Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Somali. Self-financing daʿwa teams dispersed after these gatherings enhance 
their resilience and expansion within this region in Africa.  
Tablīghīs are renowned for their mobility for purpose of preaching. Membership, often drawn 
from ordinary lay believers, is highly diverse in terms of ethnic, racial, educational, class and 
generational background. What cuts across the membership is urgent need and effort to 
establish a return to ‘pure’ faith in their own life and lives of other ordinary Muslims. The 
movement, started in 1920s in colonial India by a Deobandi trained scholar called Māwlanā 
Muhammad Ilyās, aims to re-establish ‘pristine’ Islam through selective interpretations of the 
Qur’ān and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. There is an understanding among the 
followers of the movement that the present predicament of moral decadence, lack of religious 
learning and non-observance of the religiously ordained duties among modern day Muslims is 
due to a lack of a committed group of people to remind others of the ‘doing of good and 
avoidance of wrong’ as done by the Prophet and his companions. To do this ‘urgent’ work 
seen as obligatory upon all believers, the leaders of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat require that ordinary 
Muslims form their own self-financed preaching teams in their own areas. A preaching team 
travels for specified number of days or months away from home. Accommodation is sought in 
3 
mosques. Members preach to local Muslims after every five daily prayers. They are expected 
to learn core teachings of the movement such as the sitta siffat (the Six Fundamentals)
2
 and on 
daily basis conduct readings from ‘approved’ core texts like Faza’il-e-Aʽmāl and Muntakab 
Aḥadīth written by some senior elders of the movement.3 Upon return home, they are urged to 
actively participate in the movement’s daily, weekly, and monthly activities in their local 
mosques and annually and semi-annually at one of the bigger mosques affiliated with the 
movement in the region. Furthermore, the transformative programme of religious and social 
change preached to by the movement is extended to the sanctity of home through daily text 
readings and consultative meetings. There, however, exist difference in the observance and 
inculcation of the myriad of Tablīghī practices between regions, countries and even mosques 
in any given area. How has the Tablīghī Jamāʿat practices and ideas been transposed, adopted, 
transformed and adhered to by the Borana Tablīghīs and how has these innovative changes 
transformed their self-perception and identity as part of a transnational religious movement 
that continuously exposed them to the world of Islam beyond their ethnic boundaries? This 
remains one of the core concerns of the study. The question that forms the basis of the present 
study hence is, what happens when a transnational Islamic movement travels, recruits and 
adapted to by Muslims in far flung area away from its point of origin? Let us briefly turn to 
the area of study.  
Who are the Borana? The Borana are one of the Oromo speaking groups of the Horn of 
Africa. Their language is categorized under Afro-Asiatic branch. They call themselves 
Borana, their land laf Borana and their language afaan Borana (Baxter: 1954). The group has 
two moieties. Each moiety is composed of a number of clans. This arrangement has 
historically accounted for nearly neat exogamous marriage, mediated kin relations, equitable 
distribution of scarce pastoral resources and rotational and representational group leadership. 
The group is mainly known for their indigenous socio-political and cultural governance twin 
system called the Gada and Qallu. Until recently they were ardent followers of their 
traditional religion. Aada Sera Borana, Borana customary laws, governed and to some extent 
still governs almost all facets of life. Because of this close attachment to their root, the group 
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 The Six Fundamentals of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat that forms the core teachings are tawhīd (strict monontheism), 
sincerity in prayer performance, religious knowledge and remembrance of God through supplications, treating 
fellow Muslims with respect and kindness, sincerity of intention in every action and spending time, for the sake 
of God, on preaching tours (Masud 2000). 
3
 Kandhlawi, Muhammad Zakariyya. Faza’il-e-A’amaal. Revised Translation of Tabligh Nisab. 5th South 
African Impression. (Johannesburg: Waterval Islamic Institute, 2000). And Kandhlawi, Muhammad Yusuf. 
Muntakhab Aḥadīth: A Selection of Aḥadīth Relating to the Six Qualities of Daʿwat and Tabligh. (Karachi: 
Annayyar, 1997).  
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has over the years emerged as the icon of ‘Oromoness’ (Legesse 2006). The Borana are one 
of the most renowned cattle raising communities of Eastern Africa alongside the Maasai. This 
way of livelihood entailed and still entails great deal of mobility in search of pasture and 
water. This resulted to their wide and often thin distribution over large swath of land 
stretching from the present day southern Ethiopia to the dry plains north of Mount Kenya. 
Presently they number about 160,000 persons in Kenya (2009 Kenya Population and Housing 
Census Results) and are approximated at 500,000 persons in Ethiopia. In Kenya, they 
predominate Moyale, Sololo, Marsabit areas of Marsabit County; Isiolo town, Garba Tulla, 
Kinna, Sericho, Modogashe areas and Merti areas of Isiolo County (also called Waso Borana) 
and in a number of informal settlements in Nairobi such as Lakisama, Huruma, Kia Maiko, 
Mathare, Kwa Njenga, Mukuru Kayaba; Mukuru Quarry and Kayole. Sustained migration to 
Nairobi was necessitated by job searches to supplement nomadic pastoralism, an esteemed 
livelihood facing bleak future due to frequent drought and famine. In Ethiopia they are found 
in the southern region of the Oromia Regional State. Their cultural centres such as Liban and 
Dirre in southern part of Ethiopia, where the present day Aba Gada (the political leader of the 
community) and Qallu (religious leader) and other indigenous institutions are based, is 
revered by both Kenya and Ethiopia Borana, both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The regions that the Borana occupy in Kenya are largely semi-arid and support little if any 
form of economic activity except nomadic pastoralism (Homann 2005). In areas with 
favourable weather such as Marsabit, some forms of subsistence farming is practiced. There 
are also few attempts at irrigation farming along the seasonal Uaso Nyiro River in Merti and 
Sericho and the Isiolo River in Isiolo. There are thriving economic activities such as retail 
shops, hotels and markets in most of the urban centres in the area. These towns link the 
pastoral rangelands to the money economy.  
The Borana share this vast upper Eastern Kenya region with other culturally and socio-
economically similar ethnic groups. Gabra, Sakuye and Wata groups speak Borana as their 
language. The Gabra are largely found in Turbi, Bubisa, Maikona, Marsabit, Moyale and 
North Horr. Sakuye are mainly found in Dabel area and among the Waso Borana of Isiolo. 
They are also found in almost all Borana settlements in Marsabit and Isiolo Counties. Burji, 
an enterprising community, own shops and other businesses in Moyale and Marsabit towns. A 
large number of the Burji born in Kenya speak the Borana as their first language. Garre, a 
bilingual group that speaks both the Borana and Somali are also found in urban centres in 
Marsabit County and in neigbouring Mandera area. These communities in addition to some 
Ajuran Somali clans had historical alliance relations with the Borana, speak Borana and were 
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part of once a large ‘pax Borana’ polity. (Oba 1996, 2013, Schlee 1989, Schlee and 
Shongollow 2012, Schlee and Watson 2009) 
The Borana in Kenya were separated from their kinsmen in Ethiopia by expansion of the 
Ethiopian Empire under the Emperor Menelik II (1844-1913) and by the subsequent 
establishment of the British colonialism in Kenya (Baxter 1954, Oba 2013). They hence 
became subjects of two colonial powers and later citizens of two independent countries, 
Kenya and Ethiopia. Mobility for pastoral resources was largely left unrestricted during and 
after the colonial period in some areas while proscribed in others. Travels for family visits and 
for participation in Gada ceremonies and other cultural events were and are still largely 
permitted for those living close to the international borders. However during the colonial 
period, large populations of the Kenyan Borana were forcefully pushed by the British from 
Wajir in 1930s into the present day Isiolo County. The Borana-Somali line was established to 
mitigate against ethnic livestock raids and resource competition. The Borana who were settled 
in that region became the present day Waso Borana (named after Uaso Nyiro River) (Dahl 
1979, Hjort 1979, Aguilar 1998). Almost throughout the entire colonial period strict laws that 
forbade ethnic mobility and migration restricted the Waso Borana from cultural and socio-
political exchanges with their kinsmen in Marsabit, Moyale and Ethiopia. Most indigenous 
norms and customs fell into disuse. Sustained interactions with the Somali resulted to twin 
process of gradual ‘somalisation’ and islamisation (Baxter 1954). Similar gradual conversion 
to Islam occurred in Moyale and Marsabit through the efforts of religious men and merchants 
of Arab and Somali origin who resided in the area. The Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya Ṣūfī 
brotherhoods were the main Islamic traditions until the 1980s. Duksi, traditional Islamic 
schools in which memorisation of the Qur’ān was the main discipline, served as the means of 
attaining religious education. After the mid-1980s, boosted by enormous investment from 
international Islamic non-governmental organisations and charities, new form of Islamic 
tradition took root.
4
 The new tradition, affiliated with Wahabi Islam, spread with different 
intensity in the region. In some areas the clash for legitimacy and supremacy between the 
older and the new traditions were fierce and in areas where the affiliation to the Ṣūfī traditions 
was superficial, the new tradition gained prominence with ease.  
Since the 1980s the area has witnesses rising levels of Islamic awareness. Many madrasas 
(Ar. Islamic schools) and mosques were built. Mosque attendance has been steady in the 
urban centres.  However pursuance of madrasa education differs between the various ethnic 
                                                 
4
 Personal conversations with Hussein Ganna, Moyale, September 2009.  
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groups and regions. Garre often prioritise it. Hence they were more inclined towards religious 
observance, conservatism and stricter interpretation of the Qur’ān and Sunna. They, in fact, 
tied the religious time tables for fasting and celebration of Muslim feasts with Saudi Arabia. 
Borana though they constitute majority favoured and still favour secular education for their 
children over the religious education. They often take their children to elementary madrasa 
education. Only a few pursue religious education to advanced levels every year. This 
impacted on the inclusion into the class of religious specialists, the
 culamā`. Borana hence 
were less represented in religious leadership in Moyale. In this area, this class is dominated by 
the descendants of the pioneer migrants, that is, Yemeni Arabs, Somali, Garre and Arsi 
Oromo. This lack of representation and participation in the religious administration as we 
shall discuss later in the thesis partly accounts for the success of the lay daʿwa movement of 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat that targeted to recruit among the ordinary Borana Muslims. The 
participation of Gabra, Burji and Sakuye in pursuance of religious education and 
representation in Muslim leadership is similar to that of the Borana. Many of the madrasas, 
built through assistance of Kuwaiti and Saudi humanitarian agencies, were managed and 
attended by largely non-Borana groups. In Waso, there had been ambitious religious 
investment that rivaled similar development initiated by the Roman Catholic Church. A 
number of children of the Waso Borana had opportunity to pursue madrasa education to the 
high school level and then if interested travel to Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for advanced 
religious training. Islamic NGOs also assisted local Borana in the construction of schools, 
dispensaries, water projects and mosques. Within a decade or so, there rose a class of home-
grown religious class that reached out to the masses leading to an increased islamisation of 
everyday life. 
The general rising levels of religious consciousness and learning resulted to a large 
percentage of ordinary believers who though not among the 
culamā` still harboured the 
interests of religious revivalism among the masses. A certain constituencies within number of 
Borana and non-Borana Muslims were easily mobilised by a new brand of Islamic reformists, 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. It is this theme that shall constitute the bulk of our inquiry in this thesis. 
We shall explore the gradual introduction of the movement in Kenya in general and in 
northern Kenya in particular. We shall interrogate the reasons behind the success of the new 
movement among the largely religiously illiterate masses. We shall analyze the strategies put 
in place by the Borana speaking Tablīghīs in particular and in Kenya in general that 
accounted for successful recruitment and spread. New religious groups like the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat enters an arena saturated with inter-religious rivalry and competition. We shall 
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investigate the relations between the Tablīghīs and other traditions and dig deep into 
polemical and counter-polemical discourses and negotiations between the groups. Tablīghīs 
are highly mobile. It has introduced new forms of religious mobility among its followers in 
the Borana speaking areas. Locals travel within Kenya and transnational dāʿis from various 
countries visit local settings. This kind of mediated exposure to the world of transnational 
Islam and religious reform is highly innovative and novel. We shall explore the effects of this 
re-spiritualisation and reform on religious and ethnic identity, introduction of new religious 
practices, strategies for regional revivalism of the faith and localisation of the transnational 
Islamic movement as a local daʿwa outfit.  
This thesis is, hence, about the Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana speaking regions as it is 
about the Tablīghīs in Kenya. The vast network established by the leaders of the movement 
and concomitant elaborate ‘faith bureaucracy’ managed by committed senior Tablīghīs has 
linked the grassroot units of the movement to the international headquarters (Reetz 2008). The 
global is intractably the local. Borana Tablīghīs may differ from their Bengali or Mewati 
counterparts in some aspects but they share a lot in terms of religious ideology, shared global 
concerns for revivalism, use of religious texts, need for religious travel for daʿwa and attitude 
towards the religious establishment. It is prudent then to situate or position the Borana 
Tablīghīs as part of a larger network of Tablīghīs. It is important to note that the term the 
Borana and the Borana speaking Tablīghīs have been pragmatically opted for in reference to 
the ‘proper Borana’ in first instance and corpus of the ethnic communities that use the Borana 
as first language in this part of Kenya in the latter case. These include the Borana, the Garre, 
the Gabra, the Sakuye, the Burji and the Orma of Tana River unless stated otherwise. 
Interestingly, all the Tablīghīs from these Borana speaking groups congregate under ‘Borana 
Tarjama’ at the national Tablīghī gatherings, a corner in the main mosque in which one of 
their own renders the message of the movement into their language from Urdu or the Swahili. 
They already constitute a unit within the Kenya chapter of the movement.  
 
1.2 The Statement of the Problem 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya in general and in the northern part of Kenya in particular is a 
recent religious phenomenon. The movement comes to an already competitive religious field. 
Often religious groups contest for the right to be the one and the only legitimate voice of the 
community and the only group whose teaching is based on the core authoritative sources of 
Islam: the Qur’ān and Sunna. In the past, in some towns in Borana speaking areas, the 
relations between the old Qādiriyya-Ṣaliḥiyya brotherhoods and the new reformist trends with 
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its attachment to Wahabi/Salafī Islam was fierce resulting in the triumph of the latter. These 
‘clashes’ saw great utilisation of polemical rhetorics, use of external actors such as 
government officials, competing interpretation of religious texts and moves towards 
appropriating mosques as one’s own turf. The Ṣūfī orders lost most grounds. The Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat hence has to negotiate for space, legitimacy, recognition and support from the 
religious constituencies in an already competitive environment. As a movement that is always 
on the move, the movement’s use of mosques for proselytism and accommodation depends on 
members’ good relations with custodian of mosques in any given area. At first the movement 
lacked any  places of worship of their own but has of late not only infiltrated most mosques 
through strategic semi-permanent mosque-based preaching units but have even established 
exclusive sacred spaces called markazes to serve as their operational bases in the area.
5
 The 
localisation of the movement is not free from strained relations with the established traditions. 
As a movement that sought to transform ordinary believers away from home, it wrestles with 
other existing traditions for influence on the religious behaviour of the masses. This has, in 
some areas, resulted to open polemics and counter-polemics. Members of the movement cross 
different forms of boundaries such territorial, generational, linguistic and religious. They 
bring with them different religious interpretations, different and novel religious practices, 
different experience of religious mobility, different and emergent spirituality, identity and 
concern for fellow Borana speaking Muslims and above all a novel version of being a 
Muslim. At the core of the statement of the problem is, what happens when a religious group 
and ideas travel and take root in new areas? This transformative trend that involves 
challenging negotiations, contesting space usage and embodiment of new practices and 
ideologies shall be the core concern of the study. 
 
1.3 Tentative Assumptions  
 
1. Tablīghī Jamāʿat is becoming a well-established daʿwa group among the Borana 
speaking communities, this has been facilitated by successful recruitment of members 
from various segments of the communities and the emergence of these converts as 
committed promoters of the movement’s religious goods and goals. 
                                                 
5
 Markāz means centre in Arabic (Plural is marakiz). In this thesis, anglicised plural of ‘markazes’ are applied. 
Markāz is a term used by the Tablīghī s in reference to their places of worship and congregation. In Kenya, they 
have markazes in Merti, Nairobi, Garissa and Mombasa. In places where there are no markazes, one local 
mosque is identified and performs similar functions of markāz.   
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2. To effectively establish itself, the movement has relied on strategies of re-
territorialisation that involves creation of ‘parish-like’ units that links individual 
homestead of Tablīghīs to a local mosque, sum of local mosques to a regional unit, 
regional units to the national unit then to the global headquarters and establishment of 
a loose but highly effective ‘faith’ bureaucracy’ that oversees the day to day running 
of the transnational movement. 
3. To successfully establish itself in increasing competitive religious environment, the 
Tablīghīs in Kenya remains politically ‘neutral’ and low-keyed but also continuously 
engage in non-confrontational relations with existing Islamic traditions and religious 
cadres so as to be permitted to mosque use and to be considered as legitimate a 
religious tradition that bases its teaching on authoritative sources of Islam. 
4. Among the Borana speaking regions, the movement is attractive to mosque-going 
secularly educated individuals in governmental and non-governmental employment, 
small scale traders and unemployed youth and it involves a great deal of personal costs 
in terms of time and money. 
5. Most Tablīghī preaching sessions in Borana majority areas and at the sections 
allocated for the linguistic community at the transnational gatherings in Kenya utilises 
the Borana language as the most effective tool of customised mobilisation. This 
strategy promotes participation of ordinary believers as lay preachers as the threshold 
for use of public religious space is lowered and language requirements eased. 
6. Borana speaking Tablīghīs are often sent to Borana speaking regions in Kenya and 
Ethiopia. This contextualised daʿwa  not only localised the movement as successful 
grassroot daʿwa outfit but also re-builds ethno-religious identities between hitherto 
separated Orma of Tana River, the Waso Borana of Isiolo, Borana of Marsabit and 
Isiolo, migrant Borana speaking workers and dwellers in informal settlement in 
Nairobi and their kin in southern part of Oromia Regional State in Ethiopia. 
7. Borana speaking Tablīghīs attend regular gatherings in the regions, at national and 
international levels and travel to several local and translocal destination bringing with 
them new and innovative religious practices and ideas thus not only contesting with 
pre-existing religious traditions but attempting to wrestle from the religious specialists 
influence and power over the religious behaviour of the lay Muslims 
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1.3 Objective of the Study    
1. To explore the growth and establishment of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya in general 
and in northern Kenya in particular. 
2. To examine the practices, strategies and approaches that the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 
Kenya  employs in relations to spiritual reform, religious bureaucracy, place and space 
making and usage and also in engagement with the transnational network of fellow lay 
preachers in other parts of the world. 
3. To investigate the relations between the newly established Tablīghī Jamāʿat and 
existing Ṣūfī and Salafī traditions as it contests and negotiates for authenticity and 
authority as legitimate religious traditions grounded in Islamic orthodoxy. 
4. To analyse the participation of the Borana speaking Tablīghīs in the world of Islamic 
proselytism beyond their region and examine the localisation and adaptation of the 
transnational movement as local daʿwa outfit that employs massive use of Borana 
language, face-to-face and contextualised daʿwa in their areas and explore the 
implications such mobility and networks on ethno-religious identity and imagination.  
 
1.4 Review of Relevant Literature  
In the following subsection, we shall sample some of the relevant literature that related with 
the subject of the research. These materials have been divided into three themes, namely: 
recent researches on religion and culture in northern Kenya; Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a global 
revivalist phenomenon and Islamic reformism. As there are numerous literatures under each 
of the chosen categories, care was taken to select the most relevant. 
1.4.1 Recent Researches on religion and cultures of the Peoples northern Kenya 
Communities that occupy the dry frontiers of northern Kenya are largely pastoralists and 
often are found across international boundaries, for instance the Borana and the Gabra in 
Kenya and Ethiopia and the Somali in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The clashes are common 
over politics and resource use due to scarcity necessitated by rangeland degradation and 
frequent droughts and famine. The area was minimally governed and developed during the 
colonial period and suffered marginalisation in the subsequent post-colonial governments. 
Researchers among these nomadic communities that straddle the national boundaries have 
been fascinated by issues related to pastoralism, for instance, Dahl (1979) on subsistence and 
society of the Waso Borana and Hogg (1981 and 1987) on the socio-economic organisation of 
the Borana of Isiolo and changing property rights among the Borana pastoralists, Fratkin 
(2001), Fratkin and Roth (2004) et. al. on sedentatisation of pastoralist groups, Baxter (1975), 
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Cossins and Upton (1983) on impact of climatic variation on Borana pastoralism, Helland 
(1994) on pastoralism and development intervention. Some researchers such as Schlee (1989) 
and Schlee and Watson (2009) focused on kinship, changing identities and pastoralism and 
changing identification and alliances in northeast Africa. It is the topic of social organisation 
and indigenous structures like the Gada system that attracted a large number of researchers, 
notably Shongollo (1994) on the Gumi Gaayo Assembly of the Borana, Asmarom Legesse on 
the Gada (1973 and 2006) and Borana-Oromo indigenous political system, Marco Bassi 
(2005 and 1994) on the Borana political and juridical processes and Gada as an integrative 
factor of political organisation  and Baxter (1954, 1978  and 1990) on the social organisation 
of the Borana of northern Kenya and  Borana age-set and generation-sets and Oromo 
blessings and greetings. A notable contribution on indigenous Oromo religious beliefs 
includes Bartels’ (1983) Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia. 
Influence of Islam on the various communities of the northeast Africa has been documented 
by Trimingham (1964, 1976 and 1980) though little attention was given to northern Kenya. 
Setegn’s (1973) Shaikh Hussayn of Bale and his Followers and Ulrich Braukämper’s (2002) 
collected essays on the Sheikh Hussein cult of southern Ethiopia strengthened the discussions 
on the members of the cult in northern Kenya. Ayaana Cult, a possession cult affiliated to the 
Sheikh Hussein group was focused of Dahl’s book (1989) in a collection of articles on 
healing. Except Baxter’s (1964) chapter article titled ‘Acceptance and Rejection of Islam 
among the Borana of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya’ in Lewis’s (1969) Islam in 
Tropical Africa, considerable numbers of historical and contemporary writings have given 
little attention to the subject of Islam among the Borana.  
Exceptions include Aguilar’s Being Oromo in Kenya (1998) and Politics of God in East 
Africa: Oromo Ritual and Religion (2009). Both books are some of the most recent works on 
the Waso Borana. The books focus on the theme of religious diversification and change in the 
Waso region. In the first book, the author gives detailed ethnographic description of 
communal rituals of birth and naming (Bor. waqlal), wedding and burial and funeral. In the 
realm of Oromo domestic rituals, the writer analyses prayers, blessings, sacrifice of coffee 
beans (Buna Qalla) and the Ayaana Cult associated with the Sheikh Hussein group. The main 
thesis of the book is that the Waso Borana’s religious practices are diversified and complex. 
Conversion to Islam and Christianity has not resulted to the redundancy of the indigenous 
religious and cultural beliefs and rituals. The Waso Borana are hence seen as part and parcel 
of the Oromo polity despite years of separation and conversion to new religions. The second 
work is a collection of essays that covers diverse subjects such as religious diversification, 
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Buna Qalla, re-invention of the Gada, divinatory processes, ritual performance, and children 
among the Waso Borana and most importantly spatial and religious analysis of Isiolo and 
Garba Tulla towns. Both works are a significant contribution to the understanding of Islam 
among the Waso Borana. The works however make few inferences to other Borana areas such 
as Moyale and Marsabit. Field sites were mainly in Garba Tulla. Merti, a town that has 
emerged since the mid-1980s and early 1990s as centre of Islamic learning and religious 
revivalism has been outside the scope despite being a pivotal centre of the Waso Borana. 
Focuses of both works were on religious diversification hence it downplays the increasing 
pivotal role of Muslim institutions such as mosques and madrasa for instance the Garba Tulla 
Islamic Centre built by transnational Islamic humanitarian agencies from the Middle East. 
Hence this present research picks from where these previous researches left. There is a dearth 
of studies that document historical and contemporary Islamic trends among the Borana 
despite tangible transformation in the nature of religious institutions, leadership and 
adherence. 
1.4.2 Researches on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
There has been considerable growth of literature on the movement particularly in South and 
South East Asia and the Western Europe over the last decade, a pointer to its rising influence 
as a movement across the globe. A number of researchers have documented the growth of the 
movement in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Maghreb. Of importance to the growth of 
the movement in Africa is the role of South Asian diaspora. However despite existence of 
such groups in East and Central Africa, there has been lack of any tangible academic interests 
on the movement. This study hence heralds the beginning of focus not only on the daʿwa 
movement but various networks and interactions between local indigenous Muslims and 
diasporic communities that have often been least focused in academic research on Islam in 
Kenya. Studies that had traditionally focused on Islam in Kenya had more often prioritized 
the historically rich cultures and trends along the mercantile Swahili coast. Few if any pay 
particular attention to the Islam of the northerners or Muslims of South Asian descent 
(Salvadori 1989 and 1996; Herzig 2006).  
In the book Islam and Politics in Kenya, Oded (2000: 57) mentions that the Tablīghī 
movement came to Kenya from Pakistan in 1990 and established branches in Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Malindi and Watamu. The date given by Oded may be indicative of the time of its 
consolidation rather than establishment as reliable Tablīghī sources indicate of its initial entry 
into Kenya in mid 1950s. The author describes the followers of the movement as visible in 
public spaces by their beards, long gowns, prayer beads for men and modest black gown for 
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women. The Tablīghī movement as described in this book was one that did not shy away from 
socio-political activism such as protests against land alienation by non-locals, proliferation of 
recreational facilities such as bars and substance abuse and had worked towards unification of 
various factions within the local Muslim polity. The group was said to have assisted locals 
establish business and hence due to financial assistance it offered to those willing to dedicate 
themselves to life of religious piety, it was highly attractive to many youth. While the 
information given here is indicate of the innovative and pragmatic localisation of the 
transnational movement to suit the local Muslim concerns especially during its consolidation 
in the region, this appear far from the reality in current times. Later as the movement gained 
more membership, move towards standardisation of its practices and ideology occurred as 
committed members under the supervision of local representatives steered the local chapters 
towards ‘Tablīghī orthodoxy’. This kind of re-socialisation inculcates within such enthusiastic 
followers that matters of political and social nature are proscribed subjects of discussions or 
pursuit. However the author offers little on the role of local Muslims of Asian descent in the 
movement or various mobility-related practices that is its hallmark.  
Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a Transnational Movement for Faith 
Renewal edited by Masud (2000) is one of the most comprehensive works on the movement. 
The book is divided into two sections with the first part on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a daʿwa 
organization and the second part as a transnational movement. In the first part contributions 
from leading scholars like Masud, Metcalf and Talib tackled the growth and development of 
the movement, Tablīghī Jamāʿat and the women and Tablīghī ideology. In the second section, 
the book deals with historical spread of the movement on global scale (Gaborieau) and 
country case studies namely: British and Germany (Faust), Morocco (Tozy), Belgium 
(Dassetto), France (Kepel), South Africa (Moosa) and Canada (Azmi). The detailed 
contributions insightfully analyse and offer a comparative picture of the movement’s working 
in various parts of the world. Except articles on South Africa and Morocco, there is little that 
can be learnt from this book on the movement in other parts of Africa, especially East Africa 
which is home to millions of African Muslims and thousands of Muslims of South Asian 
descent.  
Sikand’s (2002) The Origin and Development of Tablighi-jamaʿat (1920-2000): A Cross-
Country Comparative Study is another outstanding work on the movement. In the initial 
chapters, Sikand lays the foundation for the subsequent country case studies by outlining 
Muslim daʿwa activism in the early twentieth century India. The author also grounds the 
reader by discussing Tablīghī concepts, principles and strategies. Sikand in great detail 
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describes the growth and consolidation of the movement in Mewat, its birthplace before 
moving to Bangladesh and then crossing oceans to Great Britain. The main contribution of 
this work to the study is its emphasis on the local concerns and religious traditions having 
fundamental role in shaping the establishment of the movement as we shall see in the thesis. 
The study like many other works depicts the movement as entirely South Asian.  
Haq’s (1972) The Faith Movement of Mawlānā Muhammad Ilyās is one of the pioneer works 
on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Haq initiates the discussions on the movement by tracing its roots in 
the Indian Ṣūfī traditions of the 18th and 19th Century. In this pivotal biographical study, the 
author traces the life and times of the founder, Muhammad Ilyās and explores his thoughts 
and contribution towards the growth of the movement. The remaining sections of the book 
covered the technique, strategies and the organisation of the daʿwa movement in India. 
Similar strategies, organisational structure and motivations are observed in the area of study 
as we shall see later in this study. It is common for the movement’s followers also to write 
biographical histories and contributions of founders and their successors. Hasani (1967) 
penned Sawanih Hadrat Māwlanā Muhammad Yusuf Kandhalawi on the second amīr (leader) 
of the movement. The book was written in Urdu. It had informative chapters on the gradual 
spread of the movement in various parts of the world including Africa. Based on oral reports 
of the pioneer Tablīghīs dispatched to East Africa, the author, in the chapter on Africa, 
pinpoints the role of the local South Asian Diasporas as hospitable and charitable hosts who 
not only welcomed the visiting Tablīghīs but offered to travel with them and facilitate 
establishment of the movement’ national chapters. Hasani traces the coming of the movement 
to Kenya in 1956 and offers some of most comprehensive details about its growth in Eastern 
Africa. However the period it covers are the formative years of the movement. 
Reetz (2008) has published on a number of topical issues on Islam in South Asia in general 
and on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in particular. Of the many articles by the author, the most 
insightful for the thesis was ‘The Faith Bureaucracy of Tablīghī Jamāʿat: An Insight into their 
System of Self-organisation (Intizam)’. In this book chapter the writer unravels the intricate 
faith bureaucratic structures of the daʿwa movement that is often invisible to outside scrutiny. 
The article guided the present research to pay attention to Tablīghī spatiality and territoriality, 
decentralised decision making strategies, local variations in recruitment and established 
networks that connects the members of the movement within and without the country. Other 
country and regional based studies on the movement include Horstmann (2007) in South 
Thailand, Janson (2005, 2014) in the Gambia, Vahed (2003) on the Sunni-Tablīghī conflict in 
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South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, Rory Dickson (2009) in Canada,  Zolkiple and Sukimi 
(2011) in Malaysia and De Feo (2007) in Cambodia. 
Other informative contributions include Metcalf’s (2002, 1993) articles on ‘Traditionalist' 
Islamic Activism: Deobandis, Tablighis, and Talibs’ and ‘Living Hadīth in the Tablighi 
Jama`at’. Ali’s (2006) doctoral thesis on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Australia is a recent addition 
to the growing literature on the movement. Ali (2010), in another article, also articulately 
explores the revivalist discourses of the movement as it aims to remakes its followers better 
Muslims. Nelson’s (2010) masters thesis shed light on another crucial aspect of the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, the delegation of authority. As it would be discussed later, Tablīghīs base most of 
their communal decisions at each administrative level through councils which are led on 
rotational basis by committed followers of the movement. This work hence enriched the 
present study. Tablīghīs also feature on books and articles on contemporary Islamic trends in 
Africa, for instance, in Østebø’s (2008) discussions on Islamic reform movements in Ethiopia, 
in Salem’s chapter on Islam in Mauritania, Brégand’s contributions on Muslim Reformists 
and the State in Benin and Loimeier’s chapter on Muslims in contemporary Tanzania in the 
book Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa edited by Soares (2007). Beckerleg’s (1995) article 
on ‘Brown Sugar' or Friday Prayers: Youth Choices and Community Building in Coastal 
Kenya’ discusses how the entry of the movement in the coastal settlement of Watamu led to 
religious revivalism and new religious identities and belongingness. Similarly Turner (2009) 
explores the discourses of Islamic revivalism in contemporary Zanzibar and examines the 
relations between the Tablīghīs and other competing Islamic movements and also asserts that 
the apolitical daʿwa movement has considerable following among the youth who display their 
membership in dressing and religious observance.  
 
1.4.3 Islamic Revivalism  
In series of collected works on fundamentalism titled Fundamentalisms Observed (1991), 
Fundamentalisms and Society (1993), Fundamentalisms and State (1993) and Accounting for 
Fundamentalisms (1994), Marty and Appleby present wide collections of comparative and 
informative works on revivalist movements in Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, 
Confucianism and Buddhism. The underlying motives of all these movements seeking to re-
enact a return to the fundamentals of the faith at time in which modernity has engulfed 
religious communities is not a return to the pristine past but a selective interpretation of core 
texts and teachings in order to forge a spirituality revitalised future for its followers. 
Charismatic leadership, selective text usage, formation of exclusivist faith-based 
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communities, the urge and efforts to recruit members from mainstream religious 
communities, strategies and approaches to preach and defend the new-found salvation 
formula and an elaborative organisational structures to achieve the aims of the movement are 
some of the common features that cuts across the fundamentalist movements from diverse 
religious traditions. Most fundamentalist movements are also demonstrated to have relations 
with the state and the society that ranges from accommodation, hostility, total avoidance to 
indifference. Fundamentalist movements are argued to be never static and their ideologies, 
structures and strategies not only change with time but also differ between areas of operation. 
These ground breaking series hence provide insightful information on how to approach the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, an Indian-borne faith renewal movement with pervasive global presence. It 
shaped my research tools and analytical skills to note of diverse strategies, trans-local 
networks, local variations, motivation and reception to the Tablīghī reforms in Kenya. Of 
direct relevance was an analytical article by Metcalf titled ‘Remaking Ourselves: Islamic Self-
Fashioning in a Global Movement of Spiritual Renewal’ in the book Accounting 
Fundamentalisms that explore the daʿwa movement’s ideology, practices and growth from 
global perspective. 
Zeidan’s (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in 
Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses set clear characteristics that cut across 
revivalist groups despite their diversity in various dimensions. These ‘family resemblance’ are 
rooted in the fact that fundamentalist Islamic and Christian movements are rooted in 
monotheistic, revelatory, prophetic traditions and are both reactions to modernism. Some of 
the family resemblance and difference explored in the book include reaction to secularism, 
theocratic worldviews, attitude towards scripture interpretation and use, stress on social and 
political activism, reminiscence of a golden past days and eras, eschatology and utopia, sexual 
behaviour and gender roles, whole area of morality and concept of separatism and relations 
with competing religious traditions. Some of these themes have been explored in the thesis 
with relevant field data. Zeidan (2003: 46) describes the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as unique 
fundamentalist movement as it maintains apolitical stance as politics is viewed by the 
members as morally corrupting.  The author notes: 
 
For the pietistic apolitical groups, the widespread renewal of individual Muslims as 
they imitate the pious example of the Prophet in their personal conduct will inevitably 
lead to the renewal of society and state without the revived members having to engage 
in the corrupting world of politics.  
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1.5. Justification of the Study  
As seen from the review of literature above there is clearly a dearth of detailed study of Islam 
in Kenya in general and on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in particular. Focuses of previous studies 
have been on historical as well as contemporary issues affecting Muslims in Kenya. The 
Swahili region that straddles the expansive coastline has undoubtedly attracted lots of 
attention. Muslims from the coast also played a pivotal role in the spread of Islam in major 
urban centres of Kenya except the northern region. The coastal Muslims also hold esteemed 
positions in religio-political leadership and are forefront in activism on behalf of the faith. 
However, Islam among the nomadic Cushitic communities of northern Kenya has a different 
historical and contemporary trajectory. It is linked with and still has a strong attachment to 
Islam of the Horn of Africa. Among the Borana, various studies has limited its focus to issues 
such as religious diversification, indigenous institutions, pastoralism, ethnic identity 
formation and resource management. None gives a clear role to the role of Islam as agent of 
religious transformation and very few links the Islamising trend to other sustained interactions 
beyond the confines of their ethnic boundaries. Various studies mention Islam among the 
Borana or the Muslim Borana in passing and often to highlight a few point. This is despite the 
fact that Islam among the community has a history of about 100 years. Investments in 
religious institutions in the last 30 years has resulted in establishment of numerous mosques 
and madrasas, increased conversion and adherence to religious obligations and growth of 
many locally taught religious specialists. 
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat arrived in Kenya in mid 1950s. It was received and nurtured by the 
Sunni Asians in Kenya. Tablīghīs from the Indian subcontinent frequented various parts of 
Kenya on their daʿwa tours. Later indigenous followers were recruited and in the last 30 years 
the followers have held massive gatherings in Nairobi, Mombasa and other cities. At any 
given time dozens of Tablīghīs are on various phases of daʿwa tours. They preach and sleep 
in mosques. They travel within and between countries in Eastern Africa but also to far regions 
in Asia and Europe. Despite such visible presence in religious public sphere, Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
has attracted very little academic attention in Kenya. As seen above, there have been studies 
on the movement in the Gambia, South Africa, Morocco, Cameroon and Nigeria in Africa and 
in various countries in South and South East Asia, Australia and Western Europe. No such 
detailed study has been conducted in Eastern Africa. This study hence attempts to fill in this 
existing research gap. The study shall, for the first time, illuminate, on the sociological 
organisation of the movement with insightful attention given to mobility related practices, 
decision making process, leadership, mobilisation and recruitment strategies, self-evaluation 
and distinct local adaptations of the movement in Kenya.  
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The Tablīghī Jamāʿat brings about a new kind of religious transnationalism in Kenya. The 
members regularly form travelling groups and travel that within and between countries. With 
this mobility come new forms of religious socialisation. New practices are adopted and 
adapted. Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya as in other parts of the world brings together various 
languages, groups, cultures and religious affiliation. It brings about a new form of religious 
cosmopolitanism rarely witnessed before. The movement avails a fascinating inquiry into 
creation and establishment of networks that serves religious as well as mundane purposes, 
mobility and congregations that redefine long held ideas about ethnic and religious identities 
and boundaries and loose but highly effective religious bureaucracy radically different from 
existing religious hierarchies. This study, hence, explore the less studied theme of religious 
mobility and its impact on localisation of a transnational Islam. Transnational religious 
movements like the Tablīghī Jamāʿat bring about new forms of religious change that deserves 
critical and detailed study. Tablīghī Jamāʿat is an appropriate movement to study as it is 
highly observable in terms of congregational gatherings, lay preachers on move, preferred 
literatures, dressings, manner of recruitment, a fluid chain of command that links the smallest 
unit to the international headquarters and mosque-based consultative forums. 
This work, being a seminal work on the transnational movement, it lays foundation for 
subsequent academic inquiry to focus on more specialised facet of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. It is 
incumbent upon interested scholars to explore in details themes such as ideology and 
changing practices of the movement in various locale in Kenya, competing voices within 
authority at the grassroot and national levels, how the Tablīghīs deal with crisis of indiscipline 
and uncertainty while on preaching tours and at the national gatherings and in changing socio-
political circumstances in Kenya.  
Mobility is currently emerging as one of the paradigm in social science. The thesis that the 
world is dynamic and constantly changing and hyper-mobile is increasing getting current in 
the global age. Networks and flows are some of the themes that have been gained attention. 
People, ideas, goods, and practices flow between regions. Technology and ease of transport 
has lessen costs and brought immense interactions between far flung regions. People are the 
main connectors in the world of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Face to face encounter has been the 
main factor behind its spread and growth in many regions of the world. This thesis is hence 
timely as it situates itself in the interdisciplinary approach that gives due attention not only to 
mobility but also related concepts such as social spaces, transnationalism, territorialisation 
and proselytism. 
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Though the thesis heavily draws from case studies from the Borana speaking regions of 
Moyale, Isiolo and Merti and among the Borana Tablīghīs at the regional and national 
gatherings and in travels with the Borana Tablīghīs, it is also about the Tablīghīs in Kenya in 
general. The members of the movement travel a lot for their regular activities held in various 
parts of the country. The region is intractably linked with other Tablīghī units in other 
neighbouring regions and with national and international headquarters. Through regular 
gatherings, inculcation of new directives from the national and international headquarters and 
consensual meetings at the grassroot level, the thesis serves to highlight the localisation of the 
movement and transnationalisation of religious practices and ideas among the Borana 
Tablīghīs. The thesis also highlights a new form of religious community that gathers and 
unifies Kenyan Muslims of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds as they preach, teach, 
learn, evaluate progress, socialise and network. It also explores how even despite such 
confluence of interests, the unified community of lay preachers allow for maintenance of 
diversities based on language, economic class, religious education and commitment to the 
ethos of the movement.  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya as it is elsewhere in the world shuns publicity. There are no 
official spokesmen though a well-defined ‘faith bureaucracy’ is in place. There are no records 
available to larger public for academic scrutiny. Unlike other Islamic movements and groups 
that ‘forcefully’ attempt to appropriate public space and voice the concerns of their religious 
constituencies, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat is avowedly apolitical and pacifist. Matters of political 
and social activism that often throws Islamic groups and personalities into public limelight is 
missing in the everyday practices of the movement. The goal of the movement appears to be 
spiritual revivalism through their own procedures and practices. The movement avoids 
doctrinal and sectarian controversies and is largely dominated by lay Muslims. It hence lacks 
‘dramatic’ features that would have made it visible within academic world despite its massive 
global reach and impact. This thesis therefore enriches the existing literature on Islam in 
Kenya and on the emerging studies on the presence of Indian-borne Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 
Africa. 
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1.6 Theoretical Framework  
Religious resurgence in the modern world is a common phenomenon. Secularisation theory 
that once postulated that adherence to religion will decrease as the world moves towards 
modernisation has been proved erroneous. Increasingly new Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Jewish 
and Buddhist groups emerge and old traditions are renewed as they target to keep their 
followers ‘pure’ in a morally indifferent world. New technologies such as the internet had 
made communication across remote places feasible and cheap. Religious texts are cheaply 
available. The right to read and interpret these texts, which once was the preserve of religious 
scholars, has become every day practice for ordinary believers as literacy levels rise.    
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat grew out of an uncertain socio-political environment of early 20th 
century Colonial India. It not only wanted to revive the faith among religiously non-observant 
Muslims but was also as a response to rival Hindu revivalism movements such as Arja Samaj. 
It certainly wished and worked towards a return to true Islam of the formative years (Haq 
1972). Given the heightened ethno-religious tension in British India the founders crafted a 
path of faith renewal minus political activism. This helped the movement to survive with 
relative ease the disastrous consequence of separation of India and Pakistan. However it is at 
the membership levels that the movement shows greater resilience. Ordinary Muslims form 
the bulk of membership. These followers often lack advanced religious education and are 
from middle or low class category of the society. Similar classes are attracted to the 
movement in East Africa. This raises three fundamental questions: why are certain categories 
of individuals attracted to the movement in Kenya? Does the membership within the 
movement provide something more than faith renewal? Last but not the least, why now? Why 
do we witness phenomenal growth of Tablīghī membership and resurgence now though the 
movement has been around for almost 60 years? 
Theorising these questions would lead us to some assumptions. One, proponents of 
deprivation theory postulates that deprived individuals gravitate towards groups that provide a 
sense of belonging, self-esteem and importance in an increasing alienating world. 
Deprivations, whether absolute or relative, may be economic, social, ethical or psychic and 
that each of these results to formation or attraction to different forms of religious groups 
whether it is church, sect, healing movement, reform movement or cult Glock (1964). Jean-
Paul Carvalho (2009) in an article titled ‘A Theory of Islamic Revival’ theorise that 
contemporary Islamic revivalism is based on two forms of relative deprivation, namely envy 
and unfulfilled aspiration and that raised aspirations, low social mobility, high income 
inequality and poverty are intricately related causes of Islamic revival. Religious activities 
produce religious values that make believers cope with envy and unfulfilled aspirations by 
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placing less importance on objects of envy/aspirations such as wealth and income. The 
satisfaction of moral superiority is hence argued to help agents cope better with relative 
deprivation. Carvalho (2009:3) therefore proposes that origin of Islamic revival can be traced 
to: one, a growth reversal which raised aspirations for upward mobility and subsequently left 
aspirations unfulfilled among the educated middle class and two, increasing income inequality 
and impoverishment of the lower-middle class.  
Can we say the same for the rapid growth in membership of the movement among the Borana 
speaking communities of northern Kenya? The northern Kenya witnessed rising levels of 
Islamic education since early 1980s and saw immense growth in places of worship and 
Islamic learning with help of Muslim charitable organisations from the Middle East. 
Increasingly the pastoral economy that once formed the way of life suffered immense loss due 
to frequent droughts and famine resulting in loss of incomes and forced large number of 
mobile cattle camps and nomadic families to sedentarise. The indigenous restocking 
mechanism such as Buusa Gonofa (Bor. mutual kinship assistance) that facilitated income 
recovery through welfare alliance between Borana clans and sub-clans is almost redundant 
and could not ease the burden of impoverishment. Large numbers of youth, often graduate of 
local primary and secondary schools, lack gainful and regular employment opportunities. 
Among this class of youth only a few have advanced levels of religious learning to qualify as 
religious teachers and prayer leaders. These groups of people unlike the generation of their 
parents can read religious texts written in Swahili and English. Movements that aspire to 
recruit among the lay would certainly find a favourable audience among such quarters.  
Furthermore, the followers may not only temporarily escape the class of deprived youth to be 
respected Islamic preachers but also have opportunities to redeem their religiosity, travel with 
fellow lay preachers to neighbouring towns, cities and countries and also raise their status as 
young men of piety among their peers. In fact as would be discussed further in the thesis, 
significant numbers of the movement’s leadership and members in some areas of northern 
Kenya are rehabilitated drug users, reformed thieves, government employees and civil 
servants sacked due to indiscipline case and new converts into Islam. While the relative 
deprivation theory may seem plausible to explain the attraction and recruitment into such 
transnational faith renewal movements, it fails to account for subsequent deprivation within 
the ranks of the movement and motivation to stay within the movement once such needs are 
adequately met.  
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While the above theoretical exposition explores membership and motivations, how can we 
theorise on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as mobile religio-social phenomenon? Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
literary means a preaching party. To preach one need to move from place to place and 
especially to the places of congregation and places of prayer. Therefore the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
is in all sense of word, a movement. Members are highly mobile. They cross borders. To be a 
full time committed Tablīghī is to be ready to move for preaching tours 3 days every month, 
40 days every year and to do weekly excursions around in one’s neighbourhood for religious 
mobilisation and recruitment. Every member is a recruiter. Every recruit must volunteer to 
move to affirm his belongingness to the party of lay preachers. Tablīghī mobility is also 
intimately linked with locality. A member must at all time belong to a self-operating local 
mosque-based unit (Ur. maqāmī)6 and must inculcate the reform agenda at home if he is 
married. Not all mosques are welcoming to these teams of lay preachers. They compete for 
mosque use with its custodians. Therefore for one to make better analysis of this movement, 
theories that deal with mobility, spatiality and territoriality are central within this study. 
Vertovec (2009: 145) posits that missionary religions such as Islam and Christianity spread 
through mobility of its proselytisers. Christian missions, Ṣūfī brotherhoods, traders and lay 
preachers have historically moved, migrated and settled in distant lands in order to convert 
new people and start new faith communities.
7
 To bring the ‘good news’ is always related to 
see new lands. Islam in Kenya, whether at the coast through mercantile trade networks and 
intermarriages or among the northern nomadic neighbours, has impacted on demographic 
patterns and settlements. One could state with certainty that some territories are 
predominantly Muslim or Christian or mixed. Towns in other parts of Kenya also have ethno-
religious patterns such as Kampi Somalis, Majengos and Eastleigh Ndogos. Nomadic 
pastoralism is one livelihood strategy with strong spatial connotations. In most of coastal and 
northern towns, urban spaces are marked by magnificent mosques and the day and night 
calibrated temporarily by five calls for prayer. People gather at least five times at their local 
mosques. According to Kong (1993) mosques and other places of worships hence not only 
form centres for spiritual congregation but also are sacred markers of religious identity for the 
local populace. Mosques, as mentioned earlier, have custodians and committees. Use of pulpit 
is a highly guarded duty. Not anyone can preach. It is in the use and appropriation of mosque 
                                                 
6 Maqām is a Arabic term that mean locality, locality, a point or station. In every day Tablīghī usage it refers to 
the mosque one frequents for prayer and where the followers of the movement constitute a mosque-based 
consultative council. 
7 For more discussion on the emerging studies on religion and spatiality, see Warf, B. and S.Arias. (2009) and 
Chris C. Park (1994). 
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as centre for Tablīghī mobilisation and congregation that contestation and negotiation over 
sacred space matters. Because Tablīghī activities are often related with spatiality, it is 
important to take Tablīghī space, sacred and mundane, with seriousness it deserves.  
Lefebvre in The Production of Space (1999) and Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday 
Life (2010), postulates that human beings produced and reproduce spaces in which they live 
and that this project is shaped by interests of class, expert, grassroot and other contending 
forces. Spaces are never neutral. Agents who constitute users ascribed it variety of purposes 
and symbols. Such ascription of meaning to spaces and its usages are characterised by 
relations that range from domination to appropriation. As Molotch (1993, 888) puts ‘people 
fight not only over a piece of turf, but about the sort of reality that it constitutes.’ Tablīghī 
sacred space use alters and competes with the alternative mainstream versions held and 
revered by the ordinary mosque-goers and custodians of mosques. For Tablīghīs, the mosque 
is no longer a place of congregation for five daily prayers and a revered canopy for the 
religious elites but a venue for daily consultation, a platform for religious indoctrination, a 
circle for religious learning and a space for individual and communal spiritual retreat. In fact 
new spatial names are ascribed to these spaces and spatial practices associated with it, for 
example markaz and maqāmī. 
Another aspect that runs deep within Lefebvrian works that shed some theoretical exposition 
in this study is the focus on the quotidian. Every day matters to a Tablīghī. The world is hence 
seen as a stage for performance of religiously sanctioned deeds on daily basis to earn pleasure 
of God and to secure an eternal life in paradise. Everything appears to be done at regular 
interval. The day has a rhythm even if one is not on a preaching mission. There are prescribed 
number of spiritual litanies for morning hours and more before retiring to bed. There are 
prescribed sets of supererogatory prayers. There are certain numbers of Qur’ānic chapters to 
be read. A certain numbers of Muslims are to be greeted on a daily basis. Some practices are 
daily such as text reading at home or consultative meetings with fellow, others twice weekly 
like jaula (Ar. neighbourhood patrol around vicinity of a local mosque to call people to 
Tablīghī activities) or taʿlim (Ar. religious educational instructions), and others monthly like 
joint area consultative retreat for local Tablīghīs, while others yearly like annual gatherings. 
For those on preaching tours, the day is calibrated by standardised programme that maximise 
their time and space use. To recreate a ‘better’ Muslim, Tablīghī Jamāʿat has therefore 
immensely invested in temporal and spatial practices that reconfigure existing versions of 
everyday life. 
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Related with spatial practices is territoriality. Religious groups have for ages created zones as 
territories of influence and jurisdiction (Hervieu-Leger 2002). Governments have states, 
counties and districts. Religious denominations have territorial units, parishes, dioceses and 
vicariates. Religious groups strategise to network the grassroot to the top through elaborate 
territorial structures run by selected individuals. This re-territorialisation may appropriate 
existing geographical and state administration boundaries or create new groupings. For 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya, re-territorialisation strategies had seen the movement create loose 
spatially defined units that links mosque-based units (maqāmīs) all the way to the 
international headquarters in Nizamuddin, New Delhi.  
In the book Transnational Muslim Politics Mandaville (2002) theorizes on what happens 
when ideas become portable and travel. Mandaville identifies that in translocal spaces, that 
are often multidimensional and fluid, it is not just people and institutions that travel, ideas and 
theories do too. In the cultural politics of becoming, that which ‘is’ in one place becomes 
undone, translated and reinscribed. Exploring Edward Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ in The 
World, the Text and the Critic, Mandaville postulates that ideas and theories travel from 
person to person, situation to situation, period to period and that cultural and intellectual life 
of a society depends on circulation of ideas. The process of ideas becoming translocal is never 
smooth or unhindered. Just like humans and goods, ideas are noted negotiate borders a 
process that involves representation and institutionalisation different from those at the point of 
origin. This complex process, hence, has immense implications for transplantation, 
transference, circulation and commerce of ideas and theories. Mandaville further outlines the 
four stages of travelling theory as theorised by Said. The first being, the point of origin, where 
the ideas is originated, elaborated and enter everyday discourse. In our case, we may identify 
Muhammad Ilyās initial religious experimentation with his Mewati disciples in then British 
India. Second, the act of travel itself as theories or sets of ideas move from place of origin into 
different time and space. The ‘vessel’ could be migrant communities or exiled intellectuals. In 
our case, upon initial establishment of the movement, what can be called ‘the way of doing 
IIylasi daʿwa’ spread within the Indian subcontinent and then to Hejaz the land of pristine 
Islam, then to the United Kingdom and then finally to Africa. The time between initial 
elaboration of Tablīghī ideas and its arrival into East Africa is about 40 years. Who were the 
vessels? Tablīghī lay preachers took the new message to their fellow diasporic South Asians 
first. Third, the sets of ideas encounter conditions that mediate its acceptance, rejection or 
modification in new real time and space. Competing versions of similar ideas already in 
circulation front challenges for the new ideas. In our case, South Asians hence further 
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negotiated and culturally translated the revivalist ideas for themselves and later for their host 
communities. This process of transference and transplantation is shaped by the pre-existing 
Islamic ideas among the diverse South Asian Muslims and within the mainstream traditions 
followed by indigenous host societies. Finally, an idea transformed by its new use emerges. In 
our case, Tablīghī becomes a new Islamic tradition with considerable following at the 
grassroot level. As we shall discuss later within the thesis, this process of transplantation is 
continuously shaped and reshaped by various forces and local variations of ‘being a Tablīghī’ 
differs between zones and areas. In a sense, to follow the Ilyās ideas for a Borana Tablīghī in 
Mega in southern Ethiopia may be completely different from that of a Pakistani Tablīghī in 
the city of Raiwind.  
To recap our discussion on the theoretical framework, we need to ask, how can we classify 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a religious and social movement? Is it a sect or a cult?  How does it fit 
in the vast array of Muslim groups and organisations? To answer this we need to sample the 
literature on church and sect theories as expounded by leading scholars such as Weber, 
Troeltsch and Niebuhr among others. Nuri Tinaz (2005: 63) states that social scientists have 
despite of diversity of religions attempted create categories to theoretically explain different 
forms of religious movements, organisations, beliefs and ideologies formulating typologies 
such as church, sect and cult. These categorisations are based on different teachings, 
objectives and perspectives, meaning systems and forms of organisations, orientations 
towards the world, and relations with society at large. Quoting Peter Berger (1954) Tinaz 
summarises the Weberian formulation of church and sect in this manner. Church is said to be 
an institution that administers religious sacrament in manner of a government ministry with 
membership, at least in theory, being compulsory and hence proves nothing about the 
qualities of its members. Sect on the other hand is argued have voluntary  membership based 
on certain religious and ethical criteria. The distinction between sect and church is on the 
basis of charisma and its routinisation where in the former charisma is attached to the 
religious leader and the latter to the office. The process of growth of a sect to a church occurs 
with routinisation of charisma (Tinaz 2005: 66, Chalcraft 2008: 35). Sect has hence been 
defined as an exclusive tight-knit group that admits new members only once specific criteria 
have been fulfilled and in which membership implies both ‘good character’ and a monitoring 
of behaviour to ensure compliance with high moral standards (Kalberg: 2005; xxviii). 
Examining the rise of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the mid-1920s in precarious political and social 
circumstances and laxity in religious observance faced by Muslims in British India, can one 
make a conclusive categorisation of the movement as a sect in relation to the mainstream 
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Sunni Islam predominant in the area? How about close resemblance of sect definition to the 
movement’s stringent qualification as members based on commitment to travel regimes and 
retinue of unique social and religious pratices, emphasis on puritanism and return to 
fundamentals and  its voluntary nature? Before we answer these, let us examine post-
Weberian definitions and conceptualisation of church-sect theory especially by Ernst 
Troeltsch among others.  
Troeltsch’s (1931) The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches goes a step further than 
Weber’s church-sect category to add mysticism (later theorised by subsequent scholars as 
cult) in the understanding of religious groups and shifts from focus on organisation to 
behaviour of members within each cluster (Swatos and Kivisto 1998). Troeltsch is argued to 
have posited that the church is overwhelmingly conservative, accepts the social order and 
dominates the masses; hence, in principle, it is universalistic while sects are comparatively 
small aiming for direct personal fellowship between members and renounce the idea of 
dominating the world and with attitude to the surrounding society being one of avoidance, and 
may be characterised by aggression or indifference (a characteristic of the movement under 
study). While churches utilise the state and the ruling classes and become part of the existing 
social order, sects are connected with the lower classes and the disaffected, a feature also 
observed in the field research on the movement. In church, asceticism is a means of acquiring 
virtue and of demonstrating a high level of religious achievement, whereas in sect it 
constitutes merely the principle of detachment from the world and opposition to established 
social institutions (Tinaz: 2005). Niebuhr’s The Social Sources of Denominationalism (1929) 
approach the church-sect categories from the perspective of a continuum determined by 
dynamic process of religious history rather than distinct and independent groups (Swatos and 
Kivisto 1998). Others such as Howard Becker reformulated the typologies in form of four 
categories: the ecclesia, the sect, the denomination and the cult (Becker 1932). Yinger in 
Religion and the Struggle for Power (1946) increased the limitations for specific points along 
the continuum, extending Becker's four types to six: cult, sect, established sect, class church/ 
denomination, ecclesia, and universal church in respect to the relations of the category to the 
social order mainly depicted in range of attitude such as acceptance, avoiding or aggressive 
(Swatos and Kivisto 1998, Tinaz 2005). In contemporary times, leading sociologists such as 
Wallis (1975), Beckford (1976), Stark and Bainbridge (1979) and Bird (1979) have tended to 
move away from the church-sect typology to focus on more sects and cults/New Religious 
movements and resultant typologies (Tinaz 2005).  
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A notable application of the church-sect theory to sociological study of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
was Ali’s doctoral thesis (2006: 54-63). Ali reviews a host of literature tracing the gradual 
development of the Church-Sect theory and raises three shortcomings. First the theory is 
noted not to take into account the fact that not all religious movements start off as sects first. 
Secondly, citing Stark and Glock (1965), the author posits that many religious movements 
emerge without having the characteristics of a sect and they need not, contrary to the theory, 
draw their membership primarily from the lower class. The final point has direct implication 
on the study of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Ali (2006: 62-63) states: 
Thirdly, in reference to other religions where there is no Church and sectarian 
cleavages are based on politics, the theory falls short of providing a comprehensive 
explanation for the origin and development of religious movements. For instance, 
within Islam the division between sects such as Isma’ilis and Jafaris is premised on 
politics. Furthermore, many Islamic movements such as the Tablīghī Jamāʿat do not 
seek to progress toward the “Church” form. And in the Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s seventy-
five year history it has always worked, as a distinct religious movement, within the 
broader framework of Sunni orthodoxy. Despite these limitations of the Church-Sect 
theory, it is still a useful framework and if supported by Deprivation theory, the 
development of religious revivalism in contemporary modernity becomes much easier 
to understand. 
 
In conclusion, while the church-sect theory is plausible theoretical framework that can 
facilitate better understanding of religious revivalism and particularly the growth and 
establishment of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat especially with respect to membership, attitude towards 
society, avowedly apolitical stance, in-group solidarity, withdrawal to religious travel regimes 
as ways of inculcating ethical and spiritual self as well as public display of puritanism and 
stringent private and public religious practices, often most proponents of the above versions 
of the theory had formulated them with empirical data from Judeo-Christian traditions and 
that history of sectarianism within Islam has often been initiated by factors such as political 
differences, historical peculiarities and varying interpretation of core texts of Islam. The main 
two divisions within Islam, Sunni and Shiite, are in essence initially separated by succession 
debates and political schisms that later expressed itself in divergent attitude on some core 
doctrine of Muslim leadership during the first century of Islam. The members of the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat sees themselves as a ‘missionary’ wing of the Sunni orthodoxy and their vast array of 
practices as a revival of the pristine Islam. It is common for mainstream religious traditions to 
declare new groups unorthodoxical and delegitimate their practices as innovative departure 
from the path laid down by the pious ancestors of the faith. However despite apparent 
inapplicability of the theory, polemical discourses levelled by mainstream Sunni leadership in 
various part of the research area often depict the movement as a heretical sect or even a cult. 
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This debate shall be revisited in the main body of thesis. Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s foray into 
northern Kenya is not free from such depictions, for instance as in the quote below:  
 
We were fought very much. We were called names, all sorts of names. They said we 
brought a new religion from India. We were denied a chance to preach in almost all 
mosques in the area. Not only that we were called a sect that is interested in destroying 
Islam instead of building it. They even said that we were being paid by our foreign 
masters to destabilise the religion and that what we were doing is nothing but bid'a.
8
 
 
1.7 Scope, Limitations and Challenges  
The Borana straddle the Kenya-Ethiopia border. In Kenya they are found in Moyale, Sololo, 
Marsabit, Isiolo and in a number of informal settlements in and around Nairobi. In Ethiopia, 
their ancestral home, they are found in the southern districts of Oromia Regional State. In 
most of these areas, the Gabra, the Burji, the Garre and the Sakuye are their neighbours. Their 
language, Borana, is largely spoken by most of residents in this upper eastern region of 
Kenya. Because the region is vast, two research sites were chosen, namely, Moyale in 
Marsabit county and Merti in Isiolo county. 
 
 
Map 1 Map of Kenya showing the research field sites 
                                                 
8
 Group Discussions with Mamed Roba, Mamed Arero and other Tablīghī s, September 2009, Moyale.  
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Moyale is right on the border of Kenya and Ethiopia. Moyale town and its environs is highly 
cosmopolitan. It is also a site of confluence of cultures and Islamic traditions. It was once a 
bastion of Ṣūfī brotherhoods and now fertile grounds for growth of reformist Islam, including 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. It has a different historical trajectory unlike the other selected field site. 
The Borana in Moyale area are close to the revered centres of Borana culture such as Dirre 
and Liban. The Borana in this area often travel across the international borders for varieties of 
reasons ranging from attendance of traditional ceremonies to preaching among their kin. They 
also compete with other Cushitic communities for resources, symbolic and real. This field site 
hence avails a different Tablīghī growth trajectory and strategies as well as position the 
Tablīghīs in this area as a bridge for other Borana speaking adherents opting to preach among 
the local Borana and the Borana in Ethiopia. 
The other research site chosen is Merti. The area is located in Isiolo north constituency and is 
largely occupied by the Waso Borana. The Waso Borana were once separated from their kin 
in Marsabit county and Ethiopia due to restriction imposed by the British colonialists. This 
separation resulted in their faster adoption of Islam and Somali culture from their neighbours 
the Somali (Baxter 1954). The Waso Borana also experienced firsthand the brutal repression 
of post-independence secessionist struggles – the so called shifta war – initiated by the Somali 
and sections of Borana. In post-colonial era and especially after the mid-1980s massive 
investment by Muslim charitable institutions from the Middle East resulted in the construction 
of numerous mosques and madrasas and subsequent growth of a local religious elite and an 
increased revivalism of moderately reformist Islam among the local masses. The Borana of 
Waso also travel to and have increasingly settled in ethnically mixed northern frontier town of 
Isiolo.  
Merti is also home to the first Tablīghī-built mosque (markaz) in the Borana speaking region. 
The Tablīghīs strategically chose the town’s markaz to serve as the operational headquarters 
for one of the larger territorial units of the movement called the Waso sub-ḥalqa. Each sub-
ḥalqa is composed of several qaryas (Ar. a village, in the Tablīghī usage, it refers to an area). 
Each qarya is constituted by a handful of mosques. Individual Tablīghīs are required to be 
members of a semi-permanent council that meets daily in the local mosque. This re-
territorialisation strategy that seeks to establish the movement in the national landscape places 
the Waso sub-ḥalqa under the Nairobi ḥalqa. Moyale on the other hand is a sub-ḥalqa under 
the Garissa ḥalqa. The three regional ḥalqas of Mombasa, Nairobi and Garissa constitute the 
Kenya national ḥalqa. Therefore Moyale has been chosen as a Borana majority sub-ḥalqa 
under Garissa regional ḥalqa and Merti as one of the most important centres in Waso sub-
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ḥalqa that fall administratively under the Nairobi ḥalqa. These two sites despite having 
different histories of the spread of Islam are today re-linked by religious mobility established 
by the movement. The sites offer a viable representative sample and case studies to explore 
the localisation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the Borana speaking area of northern Kenya. 
Though these two sites were chosen, national and regional Tablīghī activities that require 
regular participation of members from Moyale and Waso has been given special attention. 
Detailed description of the growth and expansion of the transnational Islamic movement in 
western part of Kenya, the towns in the Rift Valley and at the coast is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Special attention has been given to the Orma of Tana River. The Orma are the 
southernmost Oromo speaking group. Their language, Orma, is mutually intelligible to the 
Borana and culturally similar in terms of social organisation and way of life. Tana River falls 
under the Mombasa ḥalqa. As we shall discuss later, the Borana speaking Tablīghīs 
frequently travel to Tana River and the Orma and Wardhey adherents preach in the Borana 
majority regions.  
Finally these sites were selected for practical reasons. I speak the Borana language and have 
access the history, cultures and the topography of the region. I have done previous field 
researches on different Islamic research themes and have established reliable network of core 
informants and gained confidence of the religious leaders and ordinary believers. I have 
excellent proficiency in the Borana and Swahili; the two most important languages used in 
proselytism among the Borana speaking communities and hence can comprehend and analyse 
the various teachings and informal discussions with great ease. Because of close relations I 
have built with the local Tablīghīs I have had unrestricted access not only to the national and 
grassroot gatherings but also had numerous one-on-one detailed discussions on various 
aspects of the movement with relative ease.   
1.8 Challenges and Limitations 
One of the major challenges of doing research on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya is its fluid 
and secretive nature. As mentioned earlier, with a loose network of committed members 
running the various grassroot, regional and national territorial units on rotational basis, it is 
hard to identify clearly the chain of command and important persons to contact at the 
beginning of the research. Decisions concerning whether to grant interviews or avail 
information must often be discussed in local mosque-based consultative councils. This at time 
delayed the flow of information. Individual Tablīghīs are also wary of non-Tablīghīs 
interested in their affairs for any other reasons apart from participation in their daʿwa tours. 
The history of the movement in Kenya appears to matter less as a topic of discussion. 
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Fortunately there are a number of Borana speaking Tablīghīs who willingly labour to discuss 
various practices and teachings of the movement despite cautious attitude of some of their 
counterpart. Anonymity has been maintained throughout the thesis. It was the request of most 
informants that their identity be kept confidential. Except when stated otherwise, pseudonyms 
have been used.   
Furthermore, my initial contacts and relationship with some of the prominent Tablīghīs from 
the field sites allowed me to access and attend national leadership forums, general gatherings 
in Nairobi and other towns, visits to Borana speaking groups on daʿwa tours and accompany 
travel groups for specified number of days. Some of these forums revealed hitherto 
unobserved sides of the transnational movement such as group and individual evaluation and 
intricacies of collective decision making that is not free from rivalry, domination and tension.  
It is unfortunate that despite the fact that the movement in Kenya generates tons of crucial 
statistical data on performance and growth on regular basis, such data are rarely availed to 
non-Tablīghīs. The movement meets at different territorial levels to evaluate of past activities, 
arrange for execution of present events and plan for future prospects on weekly, monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annually and annual basis. In these intricate and often bureaucratic appraisals 
customised forms are filled and sent to higher offices until it reaches the national office and 
then it is summarised and sent to the international headquarters in Nizamuddin in New Delhi 
in India. The lack of access to pivotal data on movement’s growth in totality has however 
made me more observant in documenting data on progress during the national and regional 
public gatherings and in specialised national leadership conventions over the period of the 
research. A number of times I was lucky to get the concrete duly filled forms. This, coupled 
with real time observation of the appraisal sessions, have enriched the field data and filled the 
missing classified information. 
As mentioned earlier, the movement in Kenya shuns publicity. It stays clear of the formal and 
modern ways of advertisements such as radio, posters, internet and television. Events are 
publicised through the word of mouth via networks of committed followers based in various 
mosques in the country. However being based in Germany for my studies placed me in 
precarious position as I do not get to observe announcement and mobilisation of Tablīghīs and 
non-Tablīghīs for national and regional events except during extended field researches. 
Fortunately I have been able to travel on short notices to Kenya for varying lengths of time to 
participate in these events. I have been able to make calls to close informants who kindly 
update me of upcoming events and developments. In a sense, despite being away from Kenya, 
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modern means of communication has facilitated continuous and engaged participation in the 
day to day activities of the field sites. It is as if one is in the field always. 
One of the tools that best captures the essence of transnational gatherings and other 
observable phenomena of the movement is photography. However, the movement in Kenya 
explicitly bars taking of pictures of the gathered congregants. Those who break this rule are 
often brought before national leadership council for further investigation. Such persons may 
be handed to the security agencies that covertly provide logistical support or just banned from 
attending any of their subsequent meetings. Except a few important shots, much of the data 
has relied on deep description, formal interviews and informal conversations and spatial 
reconstruction of Tablīghī gathering and sacred space usage.  
It is also important to note that despite enormous growth of the movement in Kenya, Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat is still continuously evolving and becoming complex. New directives from 
international headquarters are conveyed on regular basis. New forms of mobility such as 
masturat Jamāʿat for women are gaining currency. 9  Lists of approved books and their 
preferred use are continuously re-evaluated. More and more Borana speaking Tablīghīs are 
spending months at Nizamuddin centres and in other parts of the Indian subcontinent bringing 
with them new embodied practices and teachings. This thesis is therefore not an exhaustive 
description of the movement among the Borana. It is limited to attempts to reconstruct the 
history and contemporary trends within the movement in the last 10 years and its relation with 
other Islamic traditions within the same period. Any subsequent developments after February 
2012 may not be reflected within its pages.  
 
1.8. Methodology 
This study is interdisciplinary in nature, as it has incorporated methodologies from disciplines 
such as anthropology, geography, sociology and religious studies. This has helped in 
presenting a holistic picture to the subject under study. The basic approaches used in the 
research were historical, analytical, ethnographic and comparative. Historical approach was 
used to trace the history of Islam in the northern part of the country and also to reconstruct the 
trajectories of growth of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the country. Ethnographic approach was 
particularly insightful as the study had to rely on thick description of various facets of the 
transnational movement. The approach strengthened materials collected through other 
                                                 
9
 Masturat is an Arabic word that implies ‘the chaste’, the concealed, the hidden, the masked, and the invisible. 
In Tablīghī Jamāʿat circles the term is used in reference to the women travel teams. These specialised teams are 
composed of married couples. The rules of decency and modesty (Ar. 
c
awra) are maintained.  
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approaches. Tablīghī phenomena differ between field sites and hence the need for 
comparative approach in capturing the diverse manifestation of the movement. Primarily the 
historical trajectories of Islam among the Waso Borana and Isiolo and that of Moyale Borana 
are different and so was the spread of the movement, membership and contemporary 
structures. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) confirms that ethnographic work has the 
following features: people’s actions and accounts are studied in everyday context rather than 
settings created by the researcher, data are collected from range of sources including 
documentary evidence of various kinds but primarily participant observation and informal 
conversations, data collection for most part is relatively unstructured in that it does not 
necessarily involve fixed and specific research design and categories for interpretation are 
generated out of data analysis, focus is on fairly small scale setting or groups of people, and 
finally analysis of data involve interpretations of meanings, functions and consequences of 
human actions and institutional practices and how these are implicated in local and wider 
context.  
Purposive sampling technique was used to identify the key Tablīghī and non-Tablīghī 
informants. A number of Tablīghīs are particularly cautious in discussing matters and 
maintain reservation to take part in formal interviews. This is mainly the case among non-
secularly educated adherents. Informants from former research projects were among the initial 
contacts and they facilitated inclusion of more qualified informants through snow-balling 
technique. Tablīghīs chosen included both regulars and novice members. Care was taken so 
that the sample group was not affected sectarian, ethnic, age or educational bias. 
Informed consent was sought before any formal and informal interviews, an important step in 
field research (Mauss and Allen 2007, Vanderstoep and Johnston 2009: 14, Berg 2001: 50). 
Anonymity and confidentiality was maintained so as to protect the identities of informants. To 
most Tablīghīs what matters is how to strengthen the movement’s programmes rather than 
document its contemporary history and trends. One informant explicitly expresses why 
Tablīghīs are wary of documentation, whether by followers on its various practices or by 
outsiders as academic research, about the movement:  
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In the Tablīghī Jamāʿat there is no documentation. Wazee, the elders, discourage 
documentation. They do not approve of even these things we are doing done for 
studies. They refuse. For example, the sitta siffat, one can write the whole thing that I 
have told you in a book form so that it can be read for future. The elders say no. Those 
are dead words. Once something has been written it becomes dead. That is what they 
say. It is said that the activities become less once it has been written and the efforts  to 
implement would be less. But if it remains oral and practical, you learn it through 
mobility and effort of daʿwa.10 
 
Then he makes claims for need for writing and research saying that: 
Though the elders have discouraged the writings, we have learned about the life of 
Muhammad Ilyās through the books. It is important to write. The reason for refusing 
documentation is that it lessens activities and brings about laziness and this is disliked 
by the jarole (Bor. the elders of the movement). They say that they want people to 
move. The kundi (Sw. a travel team) that is encouraged in the movement is not the one 
that moves with planes but the ones who go out on foot. Because it is more involving.  
 
Obtaining consent is one of the thorniest issues for ethnographers and participant observers as 
it involves seeking approved, at times from a few representatives of a group so as to observe, 
participate and record words, thoughts and behaviours of individuals (Murchison 2010:61, 
Hume and Mulcock 2o4). My first field visit was in April 2009. I was lucky to participate for 
three days in a Tablīghī convention that brought together movement’s members from Isiolo, 
Waso and Meru areas. I was fascinated by the active participation of the Waso Borana 
Tablīghīs at the convention as the region was one of my prime field sites. One of my close 
informants introduced me to the amīr (Ar. leader) of the Waso sub-ḥalqa. The amīr, an 
elderly popular lay preacher, then fixed an appointment for me in an hour so that I could brief 
the Tablīghī consultative council of the Waso sub-ḥalqa about my identity, my research aims 
and my final objective. The council composed of about seven individuals listened to my 
personal history and academic introduction as well as the reasons why their movement 
constituted an interesting subject. As the introductory meeting was held in open mosque 
space, other Borana Tablīghīs kept joining in. It was a hospitable reception as I was offered 
fruits and drinks and informed that the best way of learning about the movement is not by a 
pen and paper to jolt points but travels with the Tablīghīs. My subsequent interactions with 
the Waso Tablīghīs were hence smooth and cooperative. Similar introduction and consent was 
sought in Moyale and among the Borana speaking circles at national conventions. By the time 
of the end of field excursions, considerable numbers of Tablīghīs from Moyale, Marsabit, 
Isiolo and Waso were acquainted to me.    
                                                 
10 Group Discussions with Abdi Rashid, Abdi Hakim, and Galgalo, July, 2010, Moyale. 
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The sample population was categorised into three clusters namely, Tablīghīs, Ṣūfīs and 
Salafīs. Each of the clusters was composed of informants from three field zones:  Moyale, 
Merti and Isiolo and Nairobi. In each of the clusters care was taken to include leaders as well 
as ordinary followers of the religious traditions. Another special sample was the Borana 
traditional elders whose knowledge of the social and religious change within the community 
was crucial in capturing reliable data on conversions to Islam. Informants were much more 
than interview partners and providers of insider insights, they served throughout the research 
periods as teachers, mentors and guides and an archive for reference and clarification of 
concepts and practices. 
Qualitative methods of data collection were utilised. Interviews, formal and informal, were 
conducted. The interviews conducted are categorised into two types: individual and group 
discussions. Semi-structured and unstructured questions were availed to the key informants. 
Unlike the structured sets of questions that delimits the depth and direction of interview data, 
semi-structured and unstructured sets of questions allowed for flexibility and freedom of the 
informants to include fundamental issues initially not included in the discussion. Informal 
interviews/conversations were especially crucial source of primary data. In total 46 interviews 
were conducted. See the table below.  
 
 
 Data  Moyale  Merti-Isiolo Nairobi Total 
1. Interviews with Tablīghīs 5 4 4 13 
2. Interviews with Salafīs 3 6 - 9 
3. Interviews with Ṣūfīs  6 3 - 9 
4. Interviews with Borana 
elders on history  
8 4 - 12 
5. Events attended  3 5 4 12 
6. Group discussions  4 2 2 8 
Table 1 Lists of interview information. 
 
  
Apart from interviews, participant observations were done at various Tablīghī and non-
Tablīghī congregational gatherings. Participation and observation are two different things and 
may appear as hardly possible to simultaneously execute. Can one observe without 
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participation? It is hard to maintain objective stance as a detached observer. Murchison (2010: 
84) notes that that in order to learn about the complex dimensions of society and culture in 
action, the ethnographer almost necessarily has to become involved on a personal level to one 
degree or another. Hence one must balance observation and participation. It is only through 
participation that one can gain the emic (insider) perspective of the research subjects. 
Complete observer may appear to maintain detachment and distance from the research subject 
but would certainly miss on the experiences of the informants but complete participant may 
grow closer to the research subject and lose academic distance. Care was taken so that 
participation and observation did not compromise the ethnographic subject.  In our case, both 
observation and participation were merged as an approach.
11
 Being a Muslim, I participated in 
regular daily prayers while attending Tablīghī events and when in company of Tablīghīs. 
Because hundreds of non-Tablīghī Muslims are encouraged to attend Tablīghī gatherings at 
mosques and markazes around the country, I gained unlimited access to Tablīghī activities. In 
order to blend with my research subjects and gain acceptability and confidence of my 
informants, I at times wore Tablīghī-style short robe, loose trousers and a Muslim. Whenever 
I travelled with the Tablīghīs or attended ijtimāʿ (Ar. national congregational convention) or 
jor (zonal convention), I carried with me moderate beddings and Tablīghī texts. I slept like 
the rest of the Tablīghīs on the floor of the mosque. I also ate and drank same food after 
payment of my stipulated daily contribution. I affiliated myself to members of the Borana 
Jamāʿat from Waso or Moyale sub-ḥalqa at the national gatherings. In fact I slept among the 
Tablīghīs from these regions, some of whom were close informants. Events attended ranged 
from national ijtimāʿs to local mosque Tablīghī tours. These events not only allowed for fresh 
data collections but provided opportunity to observe repetitive patterns in practices and 
schedules as well as diverse innovations and variations of similar events between regions and 
across time. This kind of data is crucial in making analysis on dynamism and resilience of the 
movement within Kenya. The table below summarises the nature and the location of events 
attended. 
 
                                                 
11 During the national ijtimāʿ of the year 2010, a close informant I met asked me a puzzling question on 
participation-observation issue. He jokingly inquired, are you here today for your books (implying my current 
research) or for spiritual nourishment?’ I answered him, certainly both. Then he went ahead and encouraged me 
to go register for international travel to the centre in India or to Pakistan where according to him I shall see the 
‘proper’ Tablīghī Jamāʿat. When I objected to being still novice in matters of the movement, he asserted that I 
was part of 
c
ulamā’ though a secular one and that my travel would open more avenues of understanding for my 
research.  Personal conversation with Muhamud Bonaya, May 2010, Baitul Maal Markaz, Nairobi. 
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No Event participated 
in 
Location Host unit Nature of event Congregants  
1. Isiolo Jor  Isiolo Jamia  
Mosque 
Isiolo sub- ḥalqa Regional gatherings for 
Waso, Isiolo and Meru 
sub- ḥalqas 
600 
2. Waso sub-  
ḥalqa Shūra 
Isiolo Jamia  
Mosque 
Isiolo sub- ḥalqa Consultative meetings for 
Waso Tablīghīs 
30 
3.  Majma Jor  
for Qudamā’  
Baitul Maal  
Markaz, Nairobi 
Tablīghī  
National 
headquarters   
Leadership consultative 
forum for Kenya 
Tablīghīs 
500 
3 Nairobi ijtimāʿ  Baitul Maal  
Markaz, Nairobi 
National  
Tablīghī 
headquarters   
General gathering for all 
Tablīghīs 
15000 
4. khurūj fī sabīlillāh Moyale  Uran Qarya Travel with Tablīghīs  10  
5.  Jaula  Taqwa Masjid Merti Qarya  Neighbourhood patrol and 
sermons  
40 
6. Visit to Tablīghī  
I’tikāf session 
Ansar Masjid  Isiolo sub- ḥalqa 10 day spiritual retreat 
during the month of 
Ramaḍān 
50 
7. Kitab al- ẓuhr Meru  
Jamia Mosque  
Meru sub- ḥalqa  Text reading after mid-
day prayers 
40 
8.  Purana Saathi jor  Baitul Maal  
Markaz, Nairobi 
National  
Tablīghī 
headquarters   
Leadership consultative 
forum for Kenya 
Tablīghīs 
3000 
9. Bayān Maghrib,  
Taʿlim  
Osman  
Qorane Mosque 
Moyale  
sub- ḥalqa 
Sermons, recruitment of 
travel teams 
30 
10. Nuṣra to a Borana 
speaking Jamāʿat 
Kwa Njenga  
Mosque, Nairobi 
A Borana  
speaking  
preaching team  
Courtesy call, hospitality 
visit to a Borana travel 
team 
10 
11.  Ziyārāt to Mukuru 
Quarry Mosque   
Mukuru  
Quarry Mosque   
A Borana  
speaking  
preaching team 
Visit to a neighbouring 
mosque, courtesy call on 
local Borana Muslims in 
Nairobi 
6 
Table 2 List of events participated in field research 
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The table below summarises the information on field trips and its duration  
No Nature of Field Trip Dates of field visit Areas visited  No of 
days  
1. Pilot Study  April 2009 Isiolo, Nairobi 20 
2. First Field Trip August-October 
2009 
Nairobi, Isiolo, Moyale, Meru, 
Merti, Sololo 
90 
3. Second Field Trip May-July 2010 Nairobi, Isiolo, Moyale, 
Marsabit, Merti, Kinna, Garba 
Tulla, Meru,  
90 
4. Comparative Field Visit   October 2011 Dewsbury Tablīghī Markaz, 
the United Kingdom 
3 
5. Follow-up Field Visit December 2011 
January, February 
2012 
Nairobi, Isiolo, Mombasa  40  
Table 3 List of field visits 
 
Tablīghī events were a rich source of informative primary data. Field journal was maintained 
and observation summary were taken on various practices of the movement after events. 
Except with informed consent and mostly in individual and group interviews, tape recording 
was avoided. Note taking especially during Tablīghī gatherings were avoided. No one wants 
to stand out even if he is granted privileged access. It is important to note that in some 
contexts, however ‘well socialised’ the hosts, open and continuous note-taking will be 
perceived as inappropriate or threatening, and will prove disruptive. In other contexts fairly 
extensive notes can be recorded without undue disruption (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 
143). Participation in and observation of taʿlim (educational session), bayān (motivational 
sermons), jaula (neighbourhood tours), ḥirāsa (sentry during gatherings), khidma (cooking 
and related services) and istiqbāl (reception team) was enriched by congregational activities 
such as communal eating, shopping and informal discussions. Care was particularly given to 
how the Tablīghīs deliver their messages to various ethnic groups. In a sense, observations 
centred on the place of the Borana and other communities from the north in both national and 
regional events as well as their integration within the national structures of the movement. 
Special attention was given to Tablīghī practices of place making and use. 
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Tablīghī practices are largely centred around mosques. In Kenya, there are a few mosques that 
were built and managed by the movement as their own centres. These are called markazes 
(sing. markaz). In places where they do not have a markaz, local Tablīghīs identify and use ‘a 
friendly’ mosque as their base. During the research, the following markazes were visited:  
1. Ansar mosque Isiolo 
2. Masjid Ali Mombasa 
3. Baitul Maal Nairobi 
4. Masjid Quba Merti 
5. Prison Masjid Moyale  
6. Dewsbury Tablīghī Markaz, the European headquarters of the movement, the United 
Kingdom 
 
A rich array of Tablīghī prescribed literature also were used in the study. These materials are 
widely used and were available at subsidized prices at Tablīghī gatherings. The literatures 
include Fazā’il Aʽmāl, Muntakhab Aḥadīth, Riyāḍ-al-ṣāliḥīn, dhikr pamphlets and 
biographical books on founders of the movement. Audio-visual materials related to the 
fundamental questions of the research were also collected and analysed. These include audio-
visual polemical talk by Sheikh Said Bafana and audio-cassette recordings by Sheikh Umal of 
Eastleigh Nairobi. Both materials contained polemical information against the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat. Recorded audio and audio-visual sermons by Borana speaking sheikhs such as 
Sheikh Hussein Abdalla, Maalim Dabaso Dogo and Sheikh Adan Doyo were consulted for 
historical and contemporary Islamic trends in the region. Arga Dageti, a popular Borana audio 
cassette on predictions of future events and social change among the community was 
analysed. The themes in the cassette allude to Borana conversions to missionary religions 
such as Islam and Christianity in an eschatological fashion. Some of the eschatological 
messages contained therein had been sparingly utilised by Muslim daʿwa groups in attempt to 
convert followers of the Borana traditional customs and religion. Secondary comparative data 
include books on the movement, on the Borana and various ethno-religious communities in 
Kenya, on concepts such as mobility, transnationality, revivalism, spatiality and on Islamic 
history in Eastern Africa were collected and incorporated into the thesis argumentation. 
Data collection, interpretation and in-depth analysis were a continuous process throughout the 
field research. Transcription of interviews and other translated materials and field description 
and summaries provided some of the primary data for analysis. Oral data were transcribed and 
translated from various languages like the Swahili and Borana into English. Spaces and 
movements are essential components of ethnographic studies (Murchison; 2010:131). The 
Tablīghīs occupy transnational space. They move between spaces and within spaces. Most of 
their practices rely on spatiality for its success. Spaces at national conventions are demarcated 
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on territorial and linguistic origin to allow for customised cultural translation of the Tablīghī 
ideas. Hence, within this study ethnographic maps have been given high priority. The 
ethnographic maps were used to describe the territorialisation strategies that curve up the 
national landscape into spheres of influence, to explore politics of sacred space use during 
Tablīghī conventions, to examine politics of Tablīghī mobility for daʿwa tours and to analyze 
politics of Tablīghī mosque appropriation and contestation at the grassroot levels. 
Organisational charts were also drawn and incorporated as part of the analysis of the Tablīghī 
faith bureaucracy in Kenya. Themes that run through interviews and conversations were 
categorized, coded, sorted and typologies that emerged were merged with comparative data 
from secondary sources and infuse within the body of the thesis.  
 
1.9 Conclusion  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat remains one of the least researched religious phenomena in Kenya. This is 
largely due to its quietist stance. However it is one of the most active daʿwa outfit with 
immense presence even at the grassroot levels. The members are renowned for frequent 
mobility and large scale annual congregations. In Kenya, membership is fluid, diverse and 
multifaceted. It brings together the Somali, Swahili, Borana, Digo, Muslims of South Asian 
origins and even fellow Tablīghīs from neighbouring countries in engaged interactions and 
networks. These interactions have led to resilience of this transnational movement. The 
question that forms the central theme of this thesis is, what happens when such a movement 
crosses international and national borders in order to preach, recruit and grow among rapidly 
Islamising communities. Taking the Borana as the starting point, this study attempts to 
describe, document and analysis the localisation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya in general 
and in the northern part of Kenya particular. In the following chapter, we shall focus on the 
history of Islam among the Borana speaking communities of northern Kenya. Chapter Three 
delves into the historical and contemporary issues pertaining to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the 
country. Basically it is divided into two sub-sections. The first part focuses on the origin and 
expansion of the movement across the world and explores the history and ethno-religious 
composition of the Kenyans of Asian descent, a heterogeneous group that has come to play a 
pivotal role in the establishment and expansion of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya. The second 
part outlines a brief history of the movement in Kenya before examining its emerging faith 
bureaucracy that governs decision making and daʿwa strategies. Chapter Four explores three 
themes that make the movement a unique revivalist group, namely, Tablīghī sacred spaces 
such as mosques and markazes, Tablīghī regime of reform like ideology, mobility-related 
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practices, congregational gatherings and the place of gender within the movement in Kenya. 
Chapter Five positions the experiences and aspirations of the Borana Tablīghīs within the 
national chapter of the movement and analyses the strategies applied by the local Borana 
followers in order to revive the faith among their co-ethnics. The chapter interrogates the 
concepts of contextualised daʿwa. It examines the participation of the Borana followers in 
national events and daʿwa tours within their own regions and in neighbouring countries. It 
especially analyses the cultural translation of the messages of the movement to fit the interests 
and concerns of the Borana speaking communities and how the movement has re-linked 
culturally similar communities through the platform created by the Tablīghī networks. In this 
chapter, we also focus on descriptive case studies of the Tablīghī evaluation sessions in which 
the followers gather on regular basis to exchange and deliberate on matters of past progress 
and future prospects. Because these appraisal sessions brings together local Borana Tablīghīs 
with their counterpart from various parts of the country and the world in mutual exchange 
about the past, present and the future of the movement, it offers perhaps the best case study to 
explore the interface of the global and local in the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in northern Kenya. 
Chapter Six focuses on the Tablīghī relations with other Islamic traditions in the region. The 
relations though is characterised externally by mutual co-existence and co-operation, there 
exist growing polemical and counter-polemical discourses between the Tablīghīs and the 
earlier traditions. In Chapter Seven, we go back to the main focus of the study and in the first 
part of the chapter explore how the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the northern Kenya is both intimately 
local and intricately global through an analytical prism. The chapter also summarises the main 
arguments of the thesis and forge the way forward for further academic inquiry into the 
growing influence of the transnational movement in the 21
st
 century Africa. 
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Chapter Two 
Islam among the Borana  
2.1 Introduction 
In his seminal work on the social organisation of Borana of the then Northern Frontier District 
(NFD), Baxter (1954) makes an insightful observation. He notes that ‘almost all of the Sakuye 
and the Boran of Isiolo District are Mohamedans; almost all the Borana of other districts are 
Pagans’ and that the former being partly detached from the rest of the Borana, have adopted 
Islam with Somali tinge.
12
 Today, 60 years since this written work, the Borana from Marsabit 
County are largely Muslims, a trend that begs a thorough scrutiny. It is not only among the 
Borana of Kenya that Islam made foothold, Gayo Boru, a Borana Muslim elder from Sololo 
recalls praying in congregation with visiting delegates and with some membership of Yaa, a 
semi-permanent residential resettlement of the Gada Council, the highest decision making 
body of the community. He notes of presence of mosques, churches and schools in towns and 
settlements in the vast rangelands of Dirre and Liban.
13
 While we may not be able to give a 
detailed historical account for the reasons for conversion, in this chapter we shall trace the 
gradual spread of Islam and regional and ethnic dynamics of the religious change within the 
larger northern Kenya.  
The Borana, a semi-nomadic Cushitic cattle-raising community, found across the national 
frontiers of Kenya and Ethiopia are renowned not for the membership within global Muslim 
polity but as ardent followers of their age-old institutions such as duo religio-political system 
of Qallu and Gada and adaptive rangeland management practices. Their abode, shared with 
other culturally similar communities, stretches from the southern plains of Dirre and Liban in 
Ethiopia to riverine regions along Uaso Nyiro River to Isiolo in Kenya. Because of 
observation of their customary laws and their indigenous institutions, they have come over the 
years to symbolise the archetypical Oromo group. As their livelihood depended largely on 
management of livestock, the community has historically moved from one place to another in 
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 Gayo Boru opines ‘I have been to Yaa. We did prayers in congregations with some attendances from the Yaa 
settlement. Our meat was even slaughtered and cooked separately. In Southern part of Oromia regional state, 
there is increased sedentarisation along main roads. Many have abandoned the bush nomadic life. In many 
settlements, there are schools, mosques, water dams and  churches.  There are no Borana settlements in which 
you do not find a mosque. Some may miss churches though. I have prayed in mosques in places like Borbor, 
Dhaas, Sood, Mega, Nagelle, Dubluq, Diid Hara (in two to three places), Silal, Melbana, and Boku Lugoma. 
Personal conversation with Gayo Boru, Sololo, June 2010. 
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search of pastures and water. This meant continual interaction with other pastoralist 
communities through alliance and networks of trade and exchange but also clashes over 
resources. The colonial period separated the Kenyan Borana from their Ethiopian co-ethnics 
but also put permanent boundaries between them and other pastoralist groups hence 
constructing ethnic enclaves in post-colonial and Kenya (Aguilar, 1996: 352). This however 
did not prevent social exchanges and changes initiated during the colonial period, prime being 
their mass conversion to Islam. It is to this point that which shall return as we explore the 
history of the research area. Islam among the Borana as a mass religious phenomenon is a 
relatively recent development. This conversion, though gradual in the colonial period and 
intensive in the post-colonial period, deserves a detailed academic scrutiny. The questions 
worth asking are: who were the proselytisers that carried out these conversions? What 
are/were the motivations for the conversions? How were the conversions carried out? What 
impact do the conversions have on being a Muslim and Borana at the same time? Are there 
global trends impacting on Islam among the Borana? How does their membership in the 
umma impact on their relations with other ethnic groups that are Muslims and with fellow 
Borana who are either followers of indigenous beliefs or Christians?  
 
2.2 Northern Kenya: the history of land and People 
 
Oromo belongs to the Cushitic branch of Afro-asiatic language family along with Somali, 
Afar and other languages such Rendille, Burji and Konso. In terms of geographical extension 
and number of speakers, Oromo is one of the five or six important languages of Africa. It is 
spoken as a majority language in west-central and southern Ethiopia with exception of 
Ogaden area in the east and the Omo River area to the south-west. (Stroomer 1995, 1987: 1) 
The language has five varieties namely: Orma (Kenya), Borana-Guji-Arsi 
(Ethiopia/Kenya/Somalia), West Central (Ethiopia), Eastern (Ethiopia), and Waata 
(Kenya/Ethiopia).
14
 Borana is widely spoken in Kenya and Ethiopia by Borana Gutu 
(‘proper’), Gabra, Garre, Sakuye, sections of Ajuran and Burji. The majority of Oromo 
speaking groups in Kenya are found in Marsabit, Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, Tana River and 
Nairobi regions. 2009 Population and Housing Census Results indicate that in Kenya Borana, 
Gabra and Orma number 161,399; 89,515; 66,275 persons respectively. The Census also puts 
the figure of the Kenyan-Somali as 6
th
 most populous ethnic group in Kenya with 2,385,572 
persons, a figure that elicited debates about accuracy of the demographic survey. The Census 
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th
 October, 2011 at 09.00. 
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results do not give figures for Burji, Garre, Ajuran, Konso and Waata even though the census 
enumerators manual allocate codes for each of these groups. It is also possible that bilingual 
Garre and many of Borana speaking Ajuran were counted under the code of Kenya-Somali 
and that Sakuye, Burji, Konso and Waata could have been counted separately but their 
number was never indicated in the general results. Isiolo and Marsabit are among the least 
populated counties in Kenya with 143,294 and 291,166 inhabitants. In Isiolo, apart from the 
Borana, Meru, Turkana and the Somali constitute significant numbers. Borana predominate 
the northern dry hinterlands on both sides of the Uaso Nyiro River, mainly Merti, Sericho, 
Kom, Garba Tulla, Kinna and Modogashe while Meru and Turkana are found in the 
commercial hub of Isiolo town and Ngare Mara and Kipsing respectively. Marsabit County is 
home to Samburu, Rendille, Turkana, Dasanech, Gabra, Konso, Burji, Somali and Borana. 
There are descendants of Somali, Indian and Hadrami Arab merchants in urban centres of 
Moyale and Marsabit. Apart from Borana widely spoken by many residents and smaller local 
languages, the inhabitants of the region, especially the educated generation, speak Swahili and 
English. The use of Borana is particularly pronounced in Moyale, Sololo, Marsabit, Garba 
Tulla, Kinna, Maikona, Butte, and Isiolo urban centres.  
Borana descent system, notes Bassi (1994: 18), is patrilineal and segmented and that at no 
level of segmentation are descent group bound by residential norms, so that members of any 
section may be found in local communities. The group is divided into two exogamous 
moieties: Sabho and Goona. The moiety and clan system of the Borana, observes Baxter 
(1954: 75-78), is as a system, neat and arbitrary and the members of both moieties are 
distributed throughout Borana country and neither moieties nor clans of which they composed 
are territorial groups. Moieties are further segmented into gosa, then into mana, then into 
balbala. (Bassi, 1994: 18) Sabho moiety is divided into Digalu, Mattaari and Karrayyu clans 
while Goona is composed into Harroresa and Fullellee, each further subdivided into seven 
clan descents.
15
 Each moiety has a Qallu, a revered ritual specialist (‘priest-king’) believed to 
be of divine origin and it is this institution that distinguishes the Borana from ‘junior’ groups 
such as Sakuye, Wata and Gabra. Pilgrimages to the Qallu are known as muda. Historically 
the moieties have co-opted ‘junior tribes’ into an alliance that maintains the Peace of Borana 
(Bor. tiriso). For instance Sakuye and Wata, Gabra Algana and Dolio were associated with 
Sabho, Gabra Sarbana, Odolla, Gara and Galbo with Goona (Baxter 1954: 13-14). This 
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 Harroresa are composed of the following clans: Hawattu, Qarcabdu, Warri Jidda, Malliyu, Dambitu, Nonitu 
and Arusi while Fullellee are composed of Daccitu, Maccitu, Galantu, Sirayyu, Oditu, Konnitu and Baccitu.  
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arrangement enhances alliance building, mutual assistance and ritual exchange. Nagaa 
Borana ‘the Peace of Borana’ is expressly defined by Baxter as follows:  
The ‘Peace of the Boran’, is not a merely passive absence of strife but an active 
principle of cooperation and commonality. This is most obvious in the fact that this 
warrior people, with a name but no settled habitations, dispersed very thinly over a 
country that extends for nearly four hundred miles from north to south, throughout 
recognize and obey a common law, though there is no centralised political or judicial 
authority which can impose direct sanctions or enforce that law. 
 
Legesse (2006: 97) observes that in historic form, the Oromo polity was organised as three 
principle institutions: the generational organisation (Gada), the dual organisation (Qallu) and 
the national assembly (Gumi).
16
 Gada refers to a generation-set organisation typical of Oromo 
people in which a succession of named generation-sets passes through a series of named grade 
and in which individuals are to be enrolled in the set five positions below their father’s set 
(Bassi, 1994: 15). The institution of Gada has been invested with different layers of 
interpretations and meanings by scholars and the commoners alike, emerging over time to 
become the ‘very symbol of Oromo ethnic identity’ (Bassi, 1998: 150). Unlike Legesse who 
gives prominence to the political role played by the institution, its leadership including yaa 
gadaa, the six hayyuu aduulaa, the three abbaa gadaa, Bassi emphasises the different 
qualities of ritual and political powers of the institution under the framework of assembly 
organisation and consensual decision making. Decisions, adds Bassi, are reached by general 
consensus and members of political elites such as jallaaba, jallaaba abba qa’ee, hayyu, abba 
gadaa and qallu. Borana communities in Moyale and Sololo near the Ethiopia border have 
greater knowledge and direct connection to the institutions of Gada and Qallu of the 
Ethiopian Borana than most of their kinsmen in other parts of Kenya (Legesse, 2006: 96).  
Before the sixteenth century, the scholars postulate that, the Oromo were once divided into 
two great moieties called Borana and Barretuma. On this theme, Legesse (2006: 94) offers 
the following thesis: that the ancient moieties were politically poised against each other and 
competed with each other for the top gada office of Abba Gadaa; that the moieties had 
separate cradlelands and shrine for muda pilgrimages but took part in the same political-
military organisation; that after breakup following the great Oromo migration the moieties 
were replicated in some cases such as Goona and Sabho among the Borana, Irdida and 
Barettuma among the Orma, Borana and Gabaro among the Maccha, Sikko and Mando 
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recruitment, succession to office, nature of their authority and terms of their office. The Gada leaders are elected 
and have authority over all Borana for eight years and the office of Qallu is hereditary and has authority over 
half of the Borana (each  moiety) and that the two institutions compliment and confront each other in different 
circumstances.  
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among the Arsi, Ania and Qallo among the Barentu, Saglan Borana and Torban Barettuma 
among the Tulama; and that the re-establishment of the duo-moiety system among each group 
served in ritual and political balancing a central feature of the Oromo political life. The author 
lists the current Oromo groups such as the Borana and the Maccha as being the  groups that 
descended from the ancient Borana moiety while, the Arsi and the Oromo were among the 
groups that descended from the ancient Barettuma moiety. The former are currently 
represented by the Oromo groups in northern Kenya and in southern and south-eastern 
Ethiopia while the latter by groups in north-western and western Ethiopia. The ancient 
Borana-dominant groups such the current Borana and the Maccha are observed to be more 
conservative in their migration and adherence to traditions whereas the Baretumma-dominant 
groups are argued to have been pioneers and explorers who have taken the Oromo nation to 
its further reach as in the case of the Orma in Kenya and Rayya in the far north in Ethiopia.  
However despite common origin, until recently the Borana, the most conservative 
representative of the Oromo do not call themselves as such but only recognise the name as 
referring to their kinsmen who are spread far and wide. They are noted to call themselves 
Boran, their language afaan Borana and their country laf Borana (Baxter 1954: 170-171). 
The history of the migration and conquest of the Christian kingdoms in the north or narratives 
of common origin is not prevalent among the Borana. The quotes below summarise the pre-
colonial history of the Borana, their attachment to the Dirre and Liban and their relations to 
other related groups (Baxter 1954: 20):  
Though they have knowledge of people who speak similar languages such as Arussi 
etc, they are ‘not interested in distant historical incident…yet they do not call each 
other brothers, what profit is there in such a knowledge? Boran are not interested in a 
past that has not relevance to the exigencies of the present. History for them is divided 
into two periods -‘before’ and ‘now’.  
Boran do not know and do not care how, or when they came to live in those parts of 
southern Abyssinia which they call Dirre and Liban, and which they now regard as 
Borana country proper; what is important is that they have lived there for longer 
period than can be remembered, that their ritual chiefs lived there and that it is a fine 
country for cows. It is Dirre and Liban that God is supplicated to make prosperous and 
peaceful; there that God gave them their first ritual leaders, Qallu, and from whence all 
good things have their origin and present proper commemoration.  
 
During the pre-colonial period and up to date, the Borana have shared common borders with 
neighbouring communities, at time assimilating and mostly co-opting them into their cultural 
milieu through alliance such as tiriso. Notably closest to the Borana were and still are the 
Gabra, a camel herding community. The Borana were the dominant force in southern Ethiopia 
and northern Kenya from the sixteenth to the threshold of the twentieth century and that their 
decline began when the Menelik’s army arrived from the north and the British from the south 
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(Schlee and Watson 2009: 204). Prior to this decline, the Borana were able to maintain some 
form of ‘hegemony’ incorporating within their alliance the Gabra, Ajuran, Garre, Konso, 
Burji and Sakuye at different times and with varying degree of inclusion (Schlee and Watson, 
1989).  
The ancestors of the Gabra, the Garre, the Sakuye and the Rendille i.e. Proto-Rendile-Somali 
(PRS), are categorised by Schlee (1989: 6), as having common shared culture reflected 
particularly in their calendrical system and related set of rules for proper camel management.  
With exception of the Rendile, the rest were at different times integrated into Borana-centred 
alliance and are said to have adopted Borana dialect as their main language and certain 
aspects of culture. At one time the PRS groups formed one continuous region in the northern 
part of Kenya until the Wardey (War Dayya/Wardeh) whose descendants, the Orma of Tana 
River, pushed from Liban by the Borana, established themselves over the rangeland of the 
region stretching from northern Kenya to Juba. The Wardey were later raided almost into 
annihilation by Darood Somali expansion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
17
  
As most of the communities that roamed the vast areas from southern Ethiopia to northern 
Kenya to central and south Somalia are pastoralists, migration, forced and otherwise were 
common. Competition for pastures and water were intense and often pitted incoming groups 
against those already in an area. Writing in 1912, when the first administrative and military 
posts were first established in the Northern Frontier District (NFD), Robert Otter, a British 
officer notes about that phenomenon said: 
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The Darod, having consolidated their gains from Wardeh and the Boran, were once 
more on the move. The Mohamed Zubeir and the Aulihan aimed at the complete 
control of Buna, Wajir, the Lorian Swamp and the Uaso Nyiro; and the Telemuggeh 
were bent on crossing the Tana, just as they had already crossed the Web Shebelli and 
the Juba, and on pasturing their flocks and herds in the eastern part of Ukambani. The 
Boni-probably the only representatives of the indigenous peoples of the area – had 
become the serfs of the Abdalla; the Wardeh, pathetically huddled into a corner of 
their former kingdom, had to be moved across the Tana by the Government to protect 
them from total extinction at the hand of the Somali. In the north the Gurreh had found 
themselves unable to hold to the country from which they had helped to expel the 
Boran; threatened by the Marehan on the east, and by various Ogaden elements on the 
north, they compelled to add to their fighting strength by means of an alliance with 
Degodia Somalis. Within thirty years these Degodia were to expel the Gurreh from 
much of the country which they – the Gurreh – felt to be exclusively theirs.  
To the west, Ajuran (to whom, some two hundred years before, the Boran had given 
sanctuary) appeared to be in a position of relative security. But they too were subject 
to the south-westward drive of the Somalis. By a skillful campaigns of family and clan 
alliance and by individual infiltration, the Degodia were rapidly assuming a 
dominating position in the Ajuran; and before long, as a result Somali pressure 
coupled with the duplicity of the very people they befriended, the Boran were to find 
themselves ousted from the waters, of which, for two hundred years they had been 
masters.
18
  
 
Describing the rapid migration in the region and the resultant demographic shift and balance 
of power, Castagno (1964: 167-169) asserts that the Somalis crossed the Juba between the 
years 1842-48 and by 1885; the Ogaden had broken the supremacy of the Orma in Juba. They 
marched south-westward and by 1909, having ousted the Borana from the wells of Wajir and 
Orma further to the edge of River Tana, the Somali clans such as Telemugge and Aulian in 
Garissa, Muhamed Zubair and Degodia in Wajir and Ajuran in parts of Moyale consolidated 
their positions. These historic expansions were bolstered by search for better pastures for their 
livestock and their fighting prowess and assimilation under the banner of Islam.  
The late nineteenth century was characterised with colonial expansion. By 1897, the French 
were in control of present day Djibouti, the British in East African Protectorate and the British 
Somaliland, the Italians were in control of the region stretching from Juba River to Gulf of 
Aden (Castagno: 1964). Southward expansion of the Ethiopian Empire absorbed the regions 
of Bale, Sidamo and Ogaden into present day Ethiopia. In the north, between 1905 and 1910, 
the international boundaries between the emerging Ethiopian state and the East African 
Protectorate were twice delineated. The relations between the two powers were often not 
cordial due to cross-border raids by outlaws from Ethiopia on the British subjects and forced 
                                                 
18
 Papers of Robert Otter ‘The Impact on East Africa of the Galla and the Somali’, Rhodes House, Oxford, 
MSS.Afr.s.520. pp. 8-9. 
49 
migration of the Borana, Gabra and Garre escaping harsh Ethiopian taxation into the British 
East Africa. Moyale, initially called Fort Harrington, was established as the far-most border 
post in 1905 under the command of a Greek called Zaphiro. The NFD was administered with 
minimal resources in terms of administrative post, presence of personnel, establishment of 
law and order and infrastructural development. The region was viewed at best, as desolate 
wasteland devoid of any economic potentialities and at worst, as a burden to the British tax 
payers. The NFD was hence maintained as a vast buffer zone against the threats to the railway 
and the white highlands by the expanding Ethiopian and Italian rule in the Horn of Africa.  
The British facilitated the establishment of small urban centres such Moyale, Isiolo as a site 
for settlement of alien Somalis (Herti and Ishaq) and later the headquarters of the NFD and 
Garba Tulla as an administrative centre and a fledging livestock market in 1940s and 1950s. 
Other towns included Marsabit, Wajir, Habaswein, Garissa, and Mandera. The emerging 
towns were centres of cultural exchange. These towns attracted descendants of Yemeni Arabs 
who have historically participated in the pre-colonial trade connecting Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Somalia and northern parts of Kenya; urbanised Somalis; enterprising Indian traders and 
colonial clerks; labourers and casual workers from Ethiopia especially Burji and Konso and a 
few wealthy Borana cattle owners who settled in towns to take opportunity of thriving 
livestock markets. 
The British in 1930s also moved the present day Waso Borana from the regions around Wajir 
to the present day Isiolo County and the Tana Orma across the Tana River and delineated the 
Somali-Galla lines to keep the inter-ethnic raids minimal and check west-ward expansion of 
the Somali. These lines obstructed mobility of herds in times of drought and famine and led to 
permanence of ethnic boundaries that marks Somali and Borana occupied zones. However as 
these lines were not policed well, people found various ways of transgressing them. The NFD 
was a closed zone, special permission was required to enter or leave the region and even 
within the region, various ethnic groups were not allowed to graze their stock outside their 
designated rangelands and water-points. These colonial restriction on mobility of pastoralist 
group, especially, the confinement of the Borana of Isiolo from their kinsmen in Marsabit and 
Moyale and southern Ethiopia affected their participation Gada ritual and observation of aada 
sera Borana in totality. Many cultural norms that connected them with their ancestral 
homelands underwent transformation and the sustained interactions with the Somalis who 
were predominantly Muslims made a large number of them convert to Islam between the 
years 1920-1950.  
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However, the history of the region before the advent of British colonialism and establishment 
of the international borders was not just that of alliance making or inter-ethnic skirmishes. 
Migration, peaceful coexistence and interdependence allowed for various form of local and 
long distance trade. Manger (2006) states that Borana, alongside Swahili, Somali and Arabic 
were the lingua franca for the flourishing trade route that linked Borana region to the Benadir 
coast of the Somalia through Luuq, Biedowa and Baardheere. The caravan trade attracted 
merchants from among the Somali, Borana and Hadrami Arabs from Yemen. This trade 
decline with the establishment of British administration and was replaced with duka-centred 
shops in the nascent urban centres in the NFD.  
 
2.3 Islam among the Borana during the colonial period  
The spread of Islam among the Borana and Borana speaking communities has five distinct 
characteristics: first, it was initiated by contacts with waves of westward migrating Somali 
speakers and hence subsequent association with somalisation (Baxter, 1954, 1966); secondly, 
proper penetration of Islam was consolidated during the colonial period; thirdly, it is the 
sedentarised Borana rather than the nomadic kinsmen who found adherence to the new faith 
easy and promising; fourthly, those at the farthest end from the ancestral homelands of the 
community were more predisposed to convert to the new faith rather than those who kept 
active participation in Gada cycles and aada sera and finally, contemporary adherence to the 
faith differs between the Borana territories but there is a visible trend towards reformist 
tendencies through heightened translocal linkages beyond the old Somali Ṣūfī Islam. This 
hypothesis may appear broad and general but as we discuss subsequent spread of Islam in the 
region, we shall be able to qualify its correctness.  
There is no single theory that can account for the overwhelming conversion of, say, Waso 
Borana within a span of thirty years, between 1920-1950 or the gradual expansion of Islam 
among the then largely strict adherents of Borana indigenous religion in Moyale and Marsabit 
in post-colonial era or current trends in conversion among the Ethiopian Borana, a group that 
still symbolise borantiti in toto and the esteem icon of ‘Oromoness’ due to their adherence to 
their pristine culture of Gada. While it is easy to accept that the mass conversion among the 
Waso Borana during the colonial period was facilitated by increased contacts with Somali 
clans in the NFD and that being cut off from the kinsmen in Marsabit, Moyale and Ethiopia 
weakened their attachment to indigenous customs and culture and made them embrace the 
new faith, what is usually hard to discern from this hypothesis is the question of not why but 
how. In simple terms, for this accepted explanation to make sense, we need acceptable 
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description of medium and means of conversion as well as tangible evidence that we are not 
falling into a trap of reductionism. Who were the preachers? Or more specifically, were there 
active dāʿis among the Waso Borana who facilitated this wave of conversion? How was this 
preaching done? What was the nature of adherence to new faith by the new Borana Muslims? 
Were there instances of resilience of the aada sera or admixture of the old customs and the 
new faith?  
Trimingham, Fisher and Horton’s theories of conversion offer some form of explanation for 
the conversion of Africans to Islam. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. 
Trimingham (1964, 1980) offers ranges of reasons that account for conversion chief among 
them being trade relations, immigration and ‘tribal’ movements, political conquest and 
subjugation cultural assimilation. He points out more four crucial subjective aspects for 
spread and penetration of Islam in Africa. First, Islam appears to offer religio-political 
reintegration for people whose cultural and social cohesion were broken up by conquest, 
forcible removal, slave raiding and disintegration through modern changes. Can we say the 
same in the case of the Waso Borana in the colonial period following their separation from 
their kinsmen and declining adherence to the aada sera Borana and the maintenance of the 
‘Peace of Borana’? Partly yes, but subsequent academic research argue to the contrary as 
certain forms of the old culture continue to survive and modified to suit present concerns and 
ascription to ethnic, regional and religious identities co-exist and are instrumentally used 
(Aguilar 1998, Tablino 1994). Secondly, Islam’s system of intellectual and material culture 
offered a feeling of superiority and enhanced the status of the new converts. This is especially 
so when the converting communities are relatively prosperous. Thirdly, Islam was seen as 
accommodative of the old culture and did not offer a cultural rupture with the pre-existing 
norms and tradition as it ‘does no violent uprooting but offers values without displacement of 
the old’. This thesis makes sense especially among the Borana in the early days of the spread 
of the faith as we shall see later. Often the Ṣūfī Islam among the neighbouring Somali groups 
was often themselves a mixture of local cultures and was largely accommodative of the 
cultures of the new converts provided some basic rituals of Islam were observed on daily or 
regular basis. Finally, new converts were indeed attracted not merely to social and cultural 
advantages but to a religious system that offered better meaning to life. This point assumes 
that the pre-existing indigenous beliefs systems are localised, unlike the new faith that has 
consistently similar practices and ideology.  
Trimingham’s three stages of conversion to Islam, that is, germination, crisis, and 
reorientation had often been critiqued as generalising as isolating general patterns in the pace 
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of conversion to Islam among different socio-economic groups is equally difficult. Often even 
in one single locality, one might see manifestation of the three stages or even ‘return’ to early 
stages of conversion. In essence, Trimingham (1964: 44-45) postulates that the first stage of 
germination is restricted to contacts, visit and settlements of traders and clerics and that this 
initial contact may involve adoption of certain Islamic culture such as amulets and dress. The 
second stage coincides with the assimilation of practical elements of religious culture of ritual 
prayers and certain categories of halal and haram. The people are classified as religious 
dualists, consequent concomitant weakening of indigenous culture lead to the third stage, the 
crisis. In this stage the old religious authority is rejected, the clergy take the place of the priest 
of communal cults as the guide of religio-social life. The model, though critiqued in 
subsequent theories such as Fisher and Horton, makes sense when the Waso Borana 
conversion is viewed through its prism. Trimingham (1964:  44-45) states that: 
The process takes more than one generation and is reciprocal interaction between 
generations. We may express it this way. A pagan family (generation I) is subjected to 
Islamic radiation. This affects their children (generation 2) who become Muslims in 
name, without discarding much of the old, but their children (generation 3), under the 
influence of clerics, learn to despise the old inheritance, and generation I, in order to 
preserve its authority and maintain the unity of the family, now become Muslims. So 
the cycle is complete. 
 
Fisher (1985) on the other hand proposed a similar three phased path to conversion of 
Africans to Islam, namely: quarantine, mixing and reform. In the first stage the new faith is 
restricted to specific groups such as traders. In the mixing phase, conversion to Islam by local 
population is accompanied by mixed practice of the old indigenous belief system and Islam. 
The phase of reform represents the consolidation of the new faith as strict observances of the 
religious rituals become the norm. This model just as that of Trimingham offers insightful 
explanation for the gradual conversion of Borana in Kenya to Islam. The unfortunate 
dimension is that it is lineal and uni-directional and does not allow for relapse between stages 
or resilience and return of certain indigenous beliefs and practices due to historical reasons. 
For instance after the shifta wars of 1960s and 1970s, the Waso Borana who were 
predominantly Muslims felt ‘cheated’ by their co-religionists, the Somalis, to bore the brunt 
of the secessionist civil war and this dissatisfaction were observed to be accompanied by a 
kind of return to certain indigenous Borana rituals, re-identification with other Borana and 
willingness by some of their kinsmen to convert to other faiths such as the Roman 
Catholicism. However as we shall see, the stage of reform or reorientation as envisioned by 
Fisher and Trimingham, took off early in Waso area than other Borana regions in Kenya and 
Ethiopia.  
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Horton’s model (1971) basically suggests that under pressure from macrocosmic world view 
of daʿwa religions such as Islam and Christianity, the microcosmic world view of indigenous 
African religions slowly suffers deterioration and later become replaced by universalistic 
ideology and rituals of new faiths. Aguilar (1998) finds this model as plausible explanation 
for religious change among the Waso Borana who after being separated from their kinsmen in 
Ethiopia came under increasing reconstruction of the world views through influence from 
predominantly Somali Muslims and the colonial experience. Their old worldviews were 
subsumed under the new Islamic one and syncretistic practices such as ayaana cult. They are 
argued to have been ‘Somalised’, as their cosmological order was transformed with 
establishment of political and tribal boundaries separated them from their kinsmen and their 
own perception of the new Somali culture as an alternative model which is successful, 
attainable and vigorous (Baxter 1954).   
 
2.3.1 Retracing the common Islamic History among the Borana 
Aw Hussein Ilowle is an extra-ordinary Islamic teacher from Garba Tulla. The elderly 
disabled man, does not have the contemporary ‘four walled’ madrasa institution to teach in. 
He does not have the established curriculum used by the formal Islamic schools. However his 
students come from far and wide. Most of them are not even the local Borana. This Somali 
teacher is in charge of the last remnant of the old Sheikh-centred learning institutions that 
once dotted towns in the Northern Frontier District and Somalia. The most famous centre of 
learning that aspiring students flocked to during the colonial period was in Baardhere, 
Somalia.
19
 This form of residential training involves the classic Ṣūfī master-disciple 
relationship. In Garba Tulla, as in old times, the students gather around the Sheikh in the local 
main mosque in a circle called halka and learn varieties of disciplines such as memorisation 
of the Qur’ān, exegesis, biography of the Prophet, jurisprudence and moral values. He still 
runs his traditional way of Islamic learning despite existence of a thriving Kuwaiti built 
modern Islamic educational complex barely 500 metres away. He represents the old phase of 
the Somali Islam among the Borana to which we shall turn to. It is for this reason that to 
understand the spread of Islam among the Borana, one has to understand its spread and 
consolidation among the Somali groups from whom the Borana and other Borana speaking 
communities came under intense religious and socio-cultural influence. Hjort (1979) reaffirms 
Islam among Borana is largely linked with the Somali rather than the coastal Arabs and the 
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Swahili. He averts that the Muslim influence of the northern Kenya is connected with the 
Islam of the Horn of Africa.
20
 
The spread of Islam among the Somali speaking communities that have shared common 
borders with the Borana preceded the conversion of the latter. The Garre and Ajuran Somali, 
both, were more or less part of the pan-Borana alliance during the pre-colonial period but 
were exposed to Islamising influence of westward migrating Somali clans as mentioned 
earlier. Both were bilingual and re-appropriated commonality with the other Somalis and 
Islam as part of their identity after the ascendancy of the latter in the late part of the 
nineteenth century. Primarily, the Somali occupy a region that is not only close to the Hejaz 
but also historically had long coastal settlements that maintained interactions with the people 
of that region and beyond. For instance Mogadishu was one such city founded between eighth 
and tenth century that later blossomed into a sultanate, as did Brava and Merca and such 
examples like the Islamic Ajuran confederacy between 1500-1700 CE in the hinterland of 
Benadir coast attests to the nature of state formation in the region. (Kapteijns 2000: 228). It 
worth noting that by the thirteenth century many of the nomadic peoples, who did not form 
part of any state, such as the Afar and the Somali, had became Muslims. Lewis (1969) 
observes that within such as acephalous societies such as the Somali with a strongly 
delineated clan and lineage organisation Islam appeals as a way of bonding unity with 
minimal criteria of Muslim identity such as the five daily prayers adopted and adhered. Lewis 
aptly puts: 
Among such egalitarian and habitually warring pastoral nomads, especially in conditions of 
acute pressure of population on resources, and consequent expansion and migration, Islam, 
acquaintance with which is rapidly diffused by high degree of geographical mobility and 
interaction characteristic of these societies, has been warmly embraced as an enhancement to 
tribal solidarity and exclusiveness. And with its appealing summons to the jihād, the new faith 
has readily been accepted as both a spur to, and a justification for, further expansion and 
conquest. Thus, tribal congeries, such as the Somali, lacking any single fount of political 
authority but possessing a string diffuse sense of cultural identity, have found in Islam new 
support for their traditional sentiments of ethnic exclusiveness and superiority.
21
  
 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Borana who grazed their livestock over large parts of 
the NFD and moved between Dirre and Liban, in alliance with the Ajuran, drove the Orma 
out of areas such as Wajir towards the Tana River. Ajuran who had until then paid tribute to 
the Qallu of the Borana changed alliance (‘Ajuran became Somali’) and aligned with the 
                                                 
20
 Schlee (1989: 26) indicates that the Somali have a putative genealogical system traces the patrilineal descent 
of every single Somali alive today back to the Quraish, the tribe of the prophet Muhammad and the African 
ancestry visible in their features exclusively to the female links. This project of identity making is not of a 
reality but a massive ideological construct.  Hjort, Anders. 1979, p. 40. 
21
 Lewis, I. M., 1969,  pp. 33-34. 
55 
incoming Somali in a series of battles that resulted in the removal of the Borana from some 
areas in the region, at the onset of  the arrival of the British. The border restriction on the 
Waso area was enforced through laws that forbade livestock and human mobility to the rest of 
the Borana areas in the north and in southern Ethiopia. This resulted in enhanced economic 
and socio-cultural interactions between the Waso Borana and their neighbouring Somali 
groups. This was largely reflected in their shift towards diversifying their livestock 
pastoralism (with  the addition of camel into their herds), their increasing participation in 
livestock trade in the emerging towns such as Garba Tulla and Isiolo, their adoption of Somali 
way of dressing and most significantly in their mass conversion to Islam (Aguilar 1998). 
While the conversion to Islam was largely after the transfer of the Borana to the Waso area, 
some primary data reveal that a few leading families of the Borana had converted to Islam 
during their time in Wajir.
22
 This conversion as with that of the colonial period did not lead 
into total abandonment of their Borana way of life. There were concurrent adherence to some 
aspects of new faith and maintenance of the aada sera Borana.  
With the consolidation of trading centres such as Moyale and emergence of new colonial 
administrative towns such as Garba Tulla, Marsabit and Isiolo, Somali, Arab and Indian 
traders established dukas (Sw. retail shops) supplying the colonial officials with manufactured 
goods and trading with local Borana communities in lucrative livestock trade. Most of these 
emerging towns reflected a confluence of cultures of the Horn of Africa and beyond. For 
instance, Moyale stands on an ‘open’ frontier, in a closed province, in which the inhabitants 
have been segregated in certain areas and whose movement outside the region was 
controlled.
23
 The Borana, Gabra and some Somali groups, based on agreements between the 
Ethiopian and the British authorities enjoyed some limited transfrontier grazing and watering 
rights (Hogg 1987). Though these movements often resulted to protracted conflict between 
the two governments, large numbers of Borana and Gabra who crossed the borders were often 
offered protection as British subjects. Towns like Marsabit and Moyale also attracted diverse 
groups of people (Simpson 1996). The surrounding Borana speaking communities supplied 
the town dwellers with livestock products such as milk, hides, skins and animals for sale.
24
  
Just like Isiolo, Moyale and Marsabit were also cultural melting pots. Colonial population 
survey in 1949 reveals an insightful analysis of the residents of Moyale District, a large area 
encompassing the present day Sololo, Moyale, Buna, Dabel and Uran. The total population 
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was by then 10,877 persons of whom 350 were government employees and their families. 
Among the non-native population, there were 9 Goans, of whom 7 were government 
employees and their families and 41 Indians of whom 6 were government employees. There 
were 35 Indians who presumably engaged in some economic activities. There were 243 
Arabs, including Barawa, in the town. None of these Arabs were in government employment. 
These Arabs played a pivotal role in the pre-colonial and colonial trades linking towns in 
Somalia, northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia and had established retail shops in Suftu, 
Nagelle, Mega, Moyale, Baardhere, Luuq, Kismayo, Mogadishu, Lamu and Wajir.  The 
indigenous population were as follows: Borana, 5073 persons with 93 related with 
government employment; the Ajuran, 3811 persons with 28 related government employment; 
the Burji and Konso, 642 persons with 18 related with government employment; the Sakuye, 
606 with 6 related with government employment; the Somali, 230 persons with 56 related 
with government employment; the Gabra, 23 persons with 6 related with government 
employment; the Garre, 50 persons of who 12 related with government employment; 
Abyssinians, 19 persons of whom 5 were  related with government employment; and some 
124 persons from miscellaneous ethnic groups of whom 113 were related with government 
employment.
25
  
While such statistical data may not reveal much about the interactions and exchanges between 
different groups within these emerging towns, it reveals that from the time of their 
establishment and growth, these towns were very diverse multi lingually and culturally. Many 
of the incoming groups such as the Arabs brought with them their religious traditions. Most of 
these towns had mosques established by these traders. Even in smaller towns such as Merti, 
the first mosques were constructed through the initiative of Somali traders. In Moyale, the 
first town mosque was constructed by the Arab and Somali traders. This old mosque, built 
during the colonial period, still stands adjacent to the present palatial Jamia mosque. In Garba 
Tulla, the first mosque was similarly put up by the town trading class. In Isiolo, the Herti and 
Ishaq Somali put up mosques. Colonial records notes of increasing trends of the Borana 
becoming Muslim. One report observes that the spread of Islam among the Borana was an 
important pacifying influence but the fear of encroachment of water and grazing rights was 
constant and any alteration of the present grazing boundaries would immediately inflame 
hostility. In many manyattas (Sw. village) there were one or two Islamised Boran and this 
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was seen as an important positive influence for peace.
26
 It related the conversion of the 
Borana with decreased inter-ethnic animosity between the Borana and the Somali groups such 
as the Degodia, Garre and Ajuran, who were predominantly Muslim.  
Were there Muslim dāʿis? Who converted the Borana of Moyale and Waso to Islam? How 
was it that within a span of thirty years, the Waso Borana embraced Islam enmasse? These 
questions raise fundamental issues on manner of proselytism in the NFD during the colonial 
period. We have mentioned that the emerging urban centres were the site of economic and 
cultural exchange and that the centres and its hinterlands were linked in networks of livestock 
trade and growing consumption of consumer goods by the largely pastoral Borana. As noted 
among the Orma of Tana River, it is plausible that the Muslim residents of these towns in the 
NFD as agents of islamisation ‘have primarily practiced their faith and paraded a higher 
civilisation incidental to their functions, and were missionaries only by the way.’ There were 
no mention of organized Muslim missions either among the Borana of Waso and those of 
Moyale and Marsabit. In areas where repetitive Borana cycles of Gada ceremonies were 
carried out, the conversion to the new faith was then piecemeal and in Marsabit and Moyale. 
In sum, the spread of Islam in the region was not facilitated by sustained campaigns of 
proselytism, no Borana Muslim elite to emulate and by then no local centres of Islam to act as 
stimulators. (Baxter, 1969: 245-246) The Waso Borana cut off, temporarily from their 
kinsmen, increasing converted to the new faith. Because the Borana the Somali version of 
Islam the only available version, observes Baxter (1954), so Islamisation has therefore 
necessarily involved Somalisation. This trend increased with isolation from the homeland and 
redundancy of the traditional cycle of ceremonies.  
2.3.2 The Good Old Days: Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya Ṣūfī Ṭarīqa in the NFD 
The role of Ṣūfī brotherhoods in the spread of Islam in Africa has been very significant. From 
Senegal to Somalia, from Morocco to Mozambique, various Ṣūfī orders were associated with 
the conversion of indigenous groups to the new faith of Islam. Ṣūfī orders led to state 
formation and transformative political and religious reforms as in the case of the Senegambia 
region and Sokoto in the present day Nigeria. The basis of ṣūfī orders on Islam (Ar.:, sing.,  
ṭarīqa, plur.: ṭuruq, path), posits Trimingham (1976, 1980), is the belief that the believer who 
desires to attain communion with God needs the guidance of one who is experienced in the 
path to act as an intermediary between the disciple and God. The founders of the ṭarīqas are 
believed to have special charisma or power (Ar. baraka), an inheritable or transferable capital, 
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which legitimises their spiritual authority. In East Africa, the Qādiriyya was the first order to 
be introduced into Massawa, Zaila, Mogadishu and the coastal region by Yamanite and 
Hadramawt immigrants. It was however from the nineteenth century that new orders were 
founded and old ones revived. One personality behind the resurgence of the Ṣūfī order in the 
region was Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris al Fāsī (1760-1837). A number of his students dispersed 
and established new orders, for instance Sanūsīyya by Muhammad ibn Ali as-Sanūsī (1787-
1859) in the present day Libya, Mirghaniyya/Khatmiyya by Sayyid Muhammad Uthman al-
Mirghani (1793-1853) in the Sudan, Rashidiyya by Ibrahim ar-Rashid (d. 1874) in Massawa 
and the surrounding region. Muḥammad ibn Ṣaliḥ, a pupil of Ibrahim ar-Rashid founded an 
order based in Makkah called Ṣaliḥiyya. The order, the most influential among the Somalis, 
was made popular by Shaikh Muhammad Guled ar-Rashidi who was appointed as a regional 
Khalifa (Ar. deputy/successor) by Sayyid Muhammad Ṣaliḥ. It spread to the NFD following 
migration of Somali groups into the region and also settlement of followers of this and other 
orders in the emerging urban centres (Trimingham, 1976: 233-236).  
Two main Ṣūfī brotherhoods made significant impact on the spread of Islam among the 
Borana, namely: the Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya. Ḥusseiniyya, a Ṣūfī brotherhood with origin in 
Bale, Ethiopia, also spread among the Borana of Waso and Moyale during both colonial and 
post-colonial periods. The first two were associated with the Somali and Arab residents of the 
NFD. Qādiriyya is one of the oldest and most widespread Ṣūfī brotherhoods in the world. 
Established by ‘Abd al-Qādir Jailānī (1077-1166), the order has had hundreds of offshoots 
dispersed all over the Muslim world. In the Horn of Africa, it was strong in Eritrea and Harar 
and became increasing influential in Somalia following the establishment of a farming 
settlement on the Juba by Sheikh Ibrahim Hasan Jebro (Trimingham 1976). This settlement 
grew into a flourishing Ṣūfī learning and an important commercial centre of Bardheere. The 
order later spread widely in southern Somalia through the efforts of Shaikh Uwais ibn 
Muḥammad al-Barawi. 
An active Ṣaliḥiyya sheikh with direct links to Kenya was Ali Nairobi (d. 1920), a Herti 
Somali of the Ṣaliḥiyya order. Ali Nairobi, was a stone mason by profession. He was 
appointed by Muhammad Salih as a Khalifa in Makkah though it is said that he was illiterate. 
His journey for ḥajj  is narrated by an elderly follower of the order, in the following way:  
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Said Ali Nairobi was a mason from Nairobi. He builds home. He was illiterate. He cannot read 
or write. He got some money and built homes and other buildings for Indians and with 
Indians. By then Nairobi was just new. He held money that he got like this and said 'Should I 
use this money for ḥajj  or should I use it to visit my mother in Las Anod (a town in 
Somaliland)?' He opted to go to ḥajj . After the ḥajj , he did ziyārāt to the house of Sayyid 
Muhammad Ṣaliḥ, the renowned sheikh. Ali joined in an ongoing construction of Sheikh’s 
home and without any pay helped in the work to the end. The sheikh asked him who he was 
and he answered that he is Ali from Nairobi. He came to be known as Ali Nairobi from that 
time. He was made a khalifa of the Somali. He complained that he cannot be a khalif of 
Somali as there are hundreds of educated scholars and that he was uneducated himself. He said 
he cannot face them. He was led outside by the Sheikh and was shown how to write 'alif'. That 
was all.
27
  
 
The Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqa was successful among the Herti Somali clan. Ali Nairobi was, however, 
succeeded by a non-Herti disciple called Sayyid Ali Abdi Nur, a Garre. As a disciple of the 
sheikh, Ali Abdi Nur, also known as Ali Garre, was sent on errands to collect tributes from 
followers of the order among the Garre. This kind of collection of tributes for Ṣūfī sheikhs 
were known as ziyārāt. The collections were to be used to settle the debts of the sheikh. 
However, even before he could return with the contributions, Ali Nairobi died. Ali Abdi Nur 
sold the livestock collected from the followers and settled the debts owed to the sheikh. He 
declared himself the successor and asked all the disciples and followers of the sheikh to 
recognise him as their leader. This resulted to opposition from a number of leading Herti 
disciples at the initial stages.  Later the differences were settled and reconciliation attained. 
Ali Abdi Nur and his disciples consolidated the spread of Islam among the Garre, the Ogaden 
and the Waso Borana. He was an avid traveler traversing the vast frontiers of Somalia and the 
NFD. His ziyārāt travels (that entailed collection of tributes) frequented pastoralist Waso 
Borana, the Ogaden, the Ajuran and the Garre Somali.  
These bands of ‘roving’ Somali Ṣaliḥiyya sheikhs often visited various parts of Waso. Often 
they returned with dozens of cattle, goats and sheep. They were said to have carried out mass 
conversion to Islam in areas they visited.
28
 Encouraged by the success of the ṭarīqa among the 
Ogaden and the Waso region, Ali Abdi Nur shifted his base to Habaswein. Several of his 
Garre followers joined him in the area. This prompted the Ogaden Somali to instruct him to 
return to his area of origin. He migrated back to Garre stronghold of Takaba, where he later 
died. The charismatic sheikh was succeeded by his son Sayyid Abbas. After the death of 
Sayyid Abbas, the ṭarīqa was left without a leader and there is no one to initiate new disciples 
into the order.
29
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The other most influential Ṣūfī sheikh in the region was Sheikh Sayyid Sharif Ali of Kismayu. 
He also came for ziyārāt as far as Moyale and Buna. One of his disciples, Ḥajj  Ali Sagari was 
sent to Buna. His proselytism efforts resulted to spread of Islam among the Ajuran and the 
Borana. Some of the followers of Ḥajj  Sagari, many of whom were the Herti clan, settled in 
Moyale and others migrated to Ethiopia.
30
  
The differences between Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya in Moyale and in towns like Isiolo were not 
wide. One of the most commonly cited difference is the nature of initiation formula (Ar.: 
ijāza), duration of seclusion for spiritual training, the varieties of recommended litanies to be 
recited on regular basis and nature of congregational gathering and recitations.
31
 Each ṭarīqa 
legitimate their authority by tracing back their chain of initiation back to Prophet Muhammad. 
Trimingham critiquing the nature of ṭarīqa initiation in the north-east Africa says that: 
 
No real apprenticeship was required before initiation. All that was demanded was the learning 
of the liturgy of the order, while initiation was simplified to the taking of the solemn oath of 
allegiance to the shaikh. Nor did they demand much discipline from the neophytes in the way 
of retreat, prayer-tasks, and fasting. On the other hand, mass performance of the regular 
services with dhikr songs and dances was exercised immoderately in the attempt to produce 
psycho-physical effects; the local shaikh of the order was venerated to a degree little short of 
deification.
32
  
 
The initiations into the Ṣaliḥiyya and Qadiriya ṭarīqas were common in Moyale during the 
colonial period. However such practices were often restricted to those already Muslims, 
Somali and Arab residents of the town. The display of rival congregation prayers and recitals 
on Fridays and Thursday between the Ṣaliḥiyya and the Qādiriyya were a common urban 
feature in Moyale until late 1980s. Sheikh Bulle, an elderly Ṣaliḥiyya follower recalls his own 
initiation to the ṭarīqa in the following way: 
Ijaza for me was taken by my father. Ali Abdnur came to Borana area for ziyārāt. My father 
invited him for a feast. He slaughtered an animal for him. I was made to sit in front of him. He 
then said ' laa ilaha illa lah, muhammadrasulu lah, fii kulli lam hatin wa nafasin, adadamaa 
wa nasihu ilmullah... All those gathered there also repeated after him. Some already have 
ijaza, so what they did was called tabaruq, (Bor. itt barakefat). It was like an oath of 
allegiance, an initiation into the ṭarīqas.33 
 
It would be erroneous to assume that there existed only a cordial relationship between the 
Qādiriyya and the Ṣaliḥiyya followers in these NFD towns. Hjort (1979: 41) mentions the 
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existence of considerable animosity between the two ṭarīqas in Isiolo town which sometimes 
resulted into physical violence. Each had its own mosque. The explanation given for the 
conflict was traced back to a difference between the two in their attitudes to the British 
colonial powers. Isiolo was a settlement for some ex-servicemen from Somalia who served 
under the British forces in the World War I. Some of these ex-servicemen did not actively 
support the Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqa which was once associated with the uprisings of Sheikh 
Muhamed Abdille Hassan (the ‘Mad Mullah’) and therefore they were looked down upon as 
traitors by those who considered the uprising to be a heroic nationalistic war. However the 
town’s Herti and Ishaq clans were not split into the different ṭarīqas according to any 
predictable pattern.  
Similarly in Moyale the relations between the Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya ṭarīqa during the 
colonial period and the period after the independence were not rosy. The two ṭarīqas had one 
mosque until members affiliated with the Qādiriyya split from the Ṣaliḥiyya-run mosque to 
construct their own. The members dissatisfied with the Ṣaliḥiyya elite moved en masse to the 
new mosque. The nature of disagreement was on the qualification of the imām of the town’s 
only mosque at that time. There were feelings among the religious elite that the main imām, 
Sheikh Said, though a man of exemplary religious zeal, did not have adequate religious 
knowledge to warrant such an esteemed office. The imām refused requests or rather demands 
to step down from the position, prompting a ‘walk out’ from some quarters.34  The conflict 
that led to the establishment of the new Qādiriyya mosque reflects much deeper ethnic 
animosity between the two main Muslim communities of the town at that time, namely, the 
Arabs and the Somalis, rather than clear cut doctrinal difference between the Qādiriyya and 
Ṣaliḥiyya. In fact, the pattern became clear as most Somali town dwellers prayed at the 
Qādiriyya mosque while most Arabs attended their prayers at the Ṣaliḥiyya.35 There were 
some Somali elders associated with the Ṣaliḥiyya but still preferred to do their prayers at the 
Qādiriyya mosque due to the strength of ethnic solidarity. With time, these clearly ethno-
religious patterns were blurred as the young adherents from the two communities and growing 
                                                 
34 This was due to disagreement between jarole (Bor. Mosque elders). Sharif Nur, the father of Sharif 
Barigi and other looked down upon the imām of the first mosque, Sheikh Said. There were of the opinion 
that he should step aside as he was not well educated. He refused. So they decided to build this one here 
and called it Qadiriya. It was constructed using Dhiri twigs, iron sheets and nails and coins. Personal 
conversations with Sheikh Bulle, Moyale, June 2010. 
35 There was disagreement between elders here then. Sheikh Said was not very educated but was a man of 
great religious zeal. My father was an expert in Islamic law. We were all Ṣaliḥiyya.  Most Somalis moved to 
the new mosque. Many Arabs remained within the old mosque. My father became their imām too upon 
request. One of the early imāms was buried there. He was called Sheikh Nur.  Personal conversations with 
Sheikh Bulle, Moyale, June 2010. 
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body of Borana Muslims pragmatically attended the congregational gatherings at either of the 
two mosques.  
Some local sheikhs in Moyale did daʿwa activities among the Borana in and around Moyale. 
Sheikh Said Barawi and Sheikh Salih (also called Sheikh Salah) were among the pioneers. 
Others like Ibrahim Kanso also converted Borana especially around Helu area of the town. 
Sheikh Ibrahim Sefder was among those who settled among the Borana populace and carried 
out similar daʿwa works especially in nomadic settlements in Mansille, Helu, Obbu and 
Moyale. In Sololo, Shiekh Ibrahim’s son, Muhammad Sheikh Ibrahim converted a number of 
local populace in the period after Independence. Conversions were mainly common during 
the Muslim month of fasting and on the days of Muslim festivals.
36
  
As mentioned earlier, during the colonial period, a number of Borana perceived conversion to 
Islam as ‘becoming’ a Somali. Converts were often required to change their names and even 
adopt the name of the sheikh as their father’s name. One almost ceased being the son or 
daughter of his biological father. This reinforced the feeling of alienation felt by the pioneer 
converts as they were seen as Somali. An interesting example was that of the late Ḥajj  Wario, 
a pioneer Borana Muslim elder in Moyale. Upon conversion he was officially referred to by 
the name of Mohamed Farah.
37
 
In Waso, the leading Somali sheikhs who frequented the areas and carried some form of 
religious travels included Sayyid Ali Abdi Nur, Sheikh Timaweiyn, Sheikh Abubakr, Sharif 
Adey and Maalim Ilowle. The spread of the faith should not be seen as organized daʿwa 
outreaches to Borana villages and homes, rather a gradual exposure of the local Borana to the 
religion and Muslim culture. Traders, government employees and travelling sheikhs often 
engaged in every day interactions with non-Muslim residents. There were also instances of 
intermarriages between the Muslims and non-Muslims.
38
  
Duksi, traditional Somali Islamic schools, were one of the ways through which the children of 
Borana converts gained knowledge of Islam. Duksis were found not only in the towns like 
Garba Tulla, Merti, Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Sololo and Kinna but also in smaller semi-
nomadic settlements in Waso. The curriculum of duksi essentially focused on memorisation 
of the Qur’ān. The starting points are Arabic alphabet and were taught in Somali rather than 
Borana. Teachers were mainly Somali sheikhs who settled in Borana settlements and 
                                                 
36 Personal conversations with Abdi Shakur, Mzee Ibrahim and mosque elders of Helu Mosque, June 2010, 
conversations with Mzee Suleiman, Sololo, June 2010. 
37 Personal conversations with Mzee Suleiman, Sololo, June, 2010.  Conversations with Jama and Jeylani, 
September 2009. 
38 Group discussion with Sheikh Hussein Abdallah and teachers at Garba Tulla Islamic Centre, conversations 
with Sheikh Hussein Ilowle, Garba Tulla, October 2009.  
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emerging towns. The wealthy cattle owning Borana converts in Waso, at times employed 
Somali Qur’ān teachers for their children and those of kinsmen. It was also common for some 
pioneer Borana converts in Moyale to send their children away from home to budding duksis 
in the region. Upon completion of their education, graduates of these institutions served as 
imāms in mosques and teachers at the same or new institutions. Pupils used smooth wood 
boards known as lohi to write the verses of the Qur’ān as dictated by the teacher. The writing 
ink, called anqasti (Bor. black ink), was made out of ground charcoal and water and the pen, 
qalinki, was made from a small flat-headed stick. Classes were done under the shade of trees 
or in temporary structures. Often all duksi pupils sat together as they recited different verses 
of the Qur’ān. Those at the same level sat close to each other. The teacher moved among them 
dictating and supervising their progress.
39
 To keep harmony and order, duksi teachers often 
meted harsh punishment against errant pupils with sticks, archumme. This kind of punishment 
at times scared pupils and entrenched high dropout rates and truancy. After memorising a 
portion of the Qur’ān, the pupils wash their lohi and proceed to the next level until they finish 
their studies.
40
 These outdoor classes did not require tables and chairs as pupils sit on the 
ground. Classes are conducted early in the morning after Fajr prayer to mid-morning, late 
afternoon and in the evening around bon fire. There were no classes on Thursday evenings 
and Fridays. After every juzu (1/30 of the Qur’ān), the parents were expected to give gifts 
(animals) to the teacher and also reward the pupil. Upon completion of the memorisation of 
the Qur’ān, a graduation practice known as qalinki chapsa (Bor: ‘breaking of the pen’), were 
conducted. The parents of the graduands, the pupils and the teachers of the duksi participated 
in a communal feast.
41
 The institution however offered little if any specialised Islamic 
sciences except the memorisation of the Qur’ān. Aspiring graduates of these institutions opt to 
pursue specialised knowledge in more advanced centres of Islamic learning such as Baardhere 
in Somalia.    
For the adults, religious education was offered through the institution of the mosque. It is 
however not a structured learning curriculum, and only emphasised the procedure of prayer 
performance and basic religious recitals. In Waso, the duksis gained prominence in 1940s. By 
1952, there were approximately five duksis in Merti and Sericho. Some of the pioneer duksi 
teachers in Merti included Maalim Mukhtar and Maalim Abdub Happi.
42
 In Moyale, Isiolo, 
Marsabit and Garba Tulla towns these institutions were mainly patronized by the children of 
                                                 
39 Duksi, anqasti, qalinki, and lohi are loan words from  Somali into Borana language.  
40 Personal conversations with Aw Kulo, Sololo, June, 2010. 
41 Personal conversations with Maalim Abdub Happi, Isiolo, May 2010.  
42 Personal conversations with Sheikh Bulle, Moyale, June 2010. 
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Muslim town dwellers.
43
 Duksis were the main means of religious education and socialisation 
until 1980s and 1990s when with the establishment of formal madrasa schools their influence 
waned.  
The strategy embraced by the Somali and non-Borana teachers and sheikhs, was to invest in 
religious re-orientation of the young Borana speaking pupils so that they emerge as forces of 
communal transformation. These sheikhs and other Islamic teachers largely tolerated the local 
customs; to the extent it did not radically contravene the dictates of the new faith. It is also 
important to note that the sheikhs of these periods though were highly successful in 
converting local Borana with minimal efforts, they were not themselves well entrenched in 
advanced Islamic sciences. The communal nature of the ṭarīqa practices and the moderate 
attitude of the Islamic teachers to the Borana customs and traditions meant that, while a 
number aspired to carry out religious reform, vast social norms and worldview remain largely 
indigenous.  
The phase of duksi education suffered a drastic set-back in the early 1960s and the 1970s with 
the impact of the secessionist conflicts that pitted a section of the Borana and the Somali 
against the newly independent government of Kenya over the fate of the NFD. Most Somali 
sheikhs were displaced by the ensuing conflicts.
44
 Most Borana of the Waso areas had voted 
in pre-independence referendum, opting to be part of Somalia rather than staying within 
Kenya while a large number of Marsabit and Moyale Borana opted for unity with Kenya. 
There were splits within non-Borana Muslim residents of the NFD towns, with the Somali 
favouring secession. Increased political awareness among the populace was manifested by 
formation, recruitment and consolidation of regional political parties. Some were locally 
formed; some supported by the new government of Kenya and others were regional branches 
of Somalia’s political organisations (Arero 2010, Turton 1972). The rallying grounds for the 
Muslim Waso Borana were the commonality that they shared with their co-religionists, the 
Somali. Therefore for those who favoured unity with Somalia, they felt that they had common 
livelihood, similar Cushitic culture and common belief system and that the Bantu-led new 
Kenyan government was seen as not only Christian but also incapable of solving the unique 
problem of underdevelopment of the region as the area had been a closed zone. For those 
Borana favouring unity with Kenya, their historical relation with the Somali rather than 
                                                 
43 Kenya Police Papers, Marsabit Division 5
th
 November 1943 mentions of ‘A small Koran school  run by 
Sheikh Abdurahman in Marsabit Township and a Bible Churchmen’s Missionary Society mission not far from 
the Boma, which at present, has no European occupant, but a native teacher called Petro runs a small and very 
elementary school there. Kenya Police Papers, 1943, Rhodes House, MSS.Afr.s.1631. 
44 Personal conversations with Maalim Dabaso, Isiolo, April 2009. 
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religion seemed to be the source of their fear. They felt that their interests would be better 
protected under the new regime than under a state run by their long time rival and fellow 
nomadic pastoralists, the Somali.
45
  
The Shifta wars, as they were commonly referred to, had adverse repercussions on various 
facets of Borana life, including their attitude to the new faith. Kenyatta government declared a 
state of emergency in the NFD immediately after the independence, setting in a decade of 
protracted civil war. The government of Somalia took up an initiative, to raise the grievance 
of their fellow Somali and other aligned groups in international forums. However with little 
progress on peaceful resolution of the conflict, clandestine support to arm those in favour of 
secession took precedence. The Borana areas, especially the Waso, was the buffer zone 
between the predominantly Somali districts of Wajir, Mandera and Garissa. The government 
of Kenya established concentration camps in Waso area to curb nomadic mobility and ensure 
better surveillance of secession supporters and sympathisers. This period of heightened 
tension and persecution were recalled gaaf daba,’ which literally means ‘when the time 
stopped’ (Aguilar 1998). Immediate impact was massive loss of livestock and resultant 
deprivation of the once wealthy Borana and Sakuye in Waso. Hundreds of lives were lost on 
both sides as conflict became embroiled into a violent civil strife. Most of the dispossessed 
former pastoralists moved in large numbers to the towns of Isiolo, Merti, Garba Tulla, Moyale 
and Nairobi (Hjort 1979, Hogg 1987). The conflict was abated in the late 1960s, with 
concessions made by the governments of Kenya and Somalia. 
Aguilar (1998: 12-24) postulates that there are generational differences in religious change 
among the Waso Borana. He identifies four different historical periods between 1932-1992 
following their separation from the kinsmen in Ethiopia and Moyale and Marsabit. The first 
period was when the Borana were first moved to the area around Waso by the British. During 
this period, they became to be known as the Waso Borana with some converting to Islam. 
They were however still part of Gada system and were in touch with the Qallu. The second 
phase was when the children of the pioneers born in the area were raised as Waso Borana and 
as Muslims and did not experience the connection with Ethiopia or ceremonies of Gada. As 
new converts, they treasured and upheld the new faith though their knowledge was not deep. 
The third phase coincided with the shifta wars. Islam was religion of the majority. The young 
Waso Borana of this period bore the brunt. There was general dissatisfaction with Islamic 
faith as it was associated with the Somali. The fourth phase was that of those children born 
                                                 
45 Personal conversations with Maalim Abdub Happi, Isiolo, May 2010, Maalim Dabaso, April 2009, Isiolo, 
Mohammed Koricha,  Mzee Jattani, Merti October 2009. 
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after the shifta wars. The children of this generation though they assumed and labelled 
themselves Muslims were never close to the proper Islamic practices  as most of them were 
graduates of government or Catholic schools. It is important to add the next generations 
following this period were children who would be beneficiary of numerous Islamic schools 
established in the late 1980s and 1990s and would revert back to more refined path of 
religious observance and awareness.  
In sum, Aguilar identifies three generations having distinct attitudes towards aada Borana 
and Islam. The older generation, being descendants of the pioneer Waso Borana and converts, 
attach themselves to Islam and being more observant of Islamic religious practices as they 
exercise considerable control as custodians of Islam and respected for their knowledge of 
aada Borana. Those of the middle generation are torn between the Borana traditional customs 
and their own identity as Waso Borana and therefore as Muslims. They are more inclined to 
practice like Buna Qalla (Bor. ritual sacrifice of the coffee beans) and the syncretistic cult of 
Sheikh Hussein. The third generation, the ‘youngest’ during the time of his research, was 
argued to be even more estranged from Islam and more forceful in their re-enactment of 
practice of Buna Qalla and stress more of domestic traditional rituals than the communal 
Muslim ones. It is to the subsequent generation after this one that we shall focus on, in the last 
part of this chapter. 
One can discern similar development among the Marsabit and Moyale Borana. Though they 
were at all times in tandem with their kin in the ancestral home due to their proximity to 
Ethiopia, the trends of conversion to Islam faith were consolidated gradually during the 
colonial period and picked up momentum after the independence. Those Borana who settled 
in the towns like Moyale and Sololo were first among their kinsmen to embrace the faith. This 
generation constituted colonial casual workers, soldiers and employees. They also established 
retail shops in small settlements. Some enrolled their children into duksis ran by resident 
Somali sheikhs. Their children had strong attachment to their ethnic identity and constituted 
the voices of the community in the post-independence period. The Borana of this area 
participated in ceremonies of the Gada. 
Between 1970s to mid-1980s there was more conversion to Islam though this did not 
necessarily result in stricter observance of the religious practices.
46
 There emerged by this 
                                                 
46 One informant sums up the ambivalent attachment to the indigenous culture and the new faith with example 
such as appropriation of both Muslim and Borana rites of passages. He jokingly argue that the Borana 
accommodate the two by holding Waqlal (Muslim naming ceremony) during the day and Mogassa (Borana 
naming ceremony) at night. There are a host of similar accommodative practices. Personal conversations with 
Mzee Suleiman, Sololo, June, 2010. 
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period local Borana sheikhs who enjoyed wide popularity such as Sheikh Adan Golicha of 
Marsabit. He and other pioneer Borana sheikhs expounded Islam to their kinsmen. In the post-
independence era, there developed greater connection between the local Borana Muslims and 
non-Somali Muslims in the rest of the country. This demystified the long held belief, that 
Islam was part and parcel of the Somali culture as the Swahili and other Muslim clerics made 
contacts with local Borana Muslims. Emerging class of Borana Muslim elders were also co-
opted by the Somali and Arab religious class into mosque committees. In the post-
independence period, with the establishment of government schools, many Borana parents 
sent their children for secular education rather than full-time duksi education. This resulted in 
less representation in the religious leadership. 
2.3.3 Warra Gariba: The Followers of the Sheikh Hussein of Bale 
An influential Islamic group within the region was that of the cult of Sheikh Hussein of Bale. 
The spread of this ṭarīqa was not restricted to Moyale but had adherents even among the 
Waso Borana. Moyale is territorially close to Bale and the Arsi Oromo, the largest followers 
of the cult. Sheikh Hussein cult has ambiguous manifestation in the region as it has symbiotic 
relations with the followers of its constituent possession cult called Ayaana. In some areas 
like Moyale and Sololo, followers of Sheikh Hussein cult (Warra Gariba) are affiliated with 
the Ayaana cult but at times see themselves are separate entity. In Waso, the presence of the 
Ayaana cult is prominent. The cult here is seen as one and the same with that of Sheikh 
Hussein. The origin of the cult is not clear. Trimingham (1976: 257) posits that when the 
Oromo conquered Bale in the sixteenth century they took over the cult of the sheikh as it has 
been developed by the Islamised Sidama and assimilated into it many of their own beliefs and 
practices resulting to amalgamation of Islamic saint-cult and Oromo Abba Muda pilgrimage 
ceremonies.
47
  The pilgrimage to Abba Muda was an integral part of the Oromo religion. 
Among the Borana, muda ceremonies are made to the Qallu of each of the Sabho and Gona 
moieties.  
Setegn (1973) states that, Sheikh Hussein was the son of Sheikh Ibrahim whose family had 
earlier moved from Merca in Somalia to Bale. He was born in Ana Jina in the north eastern 
part of Bale approximately eight hundred years ago. He also notes that the origin of the 
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 Braukämper (2002) also mentions that that the intensification of the cult of Sheikh Hussein in the nineteenth 
century was to some extent due to the political and economic changes following the conquest by the Christian 
Ethiopian Empire. Introduction of Gabbar system subjugated the people as the gada system was adversely 
affected prompting a desperate search for new cultural orientation. The cult hence not only stimulated the 
spread of Islam and new cultural identity but also re-appropriation of the indigenous pilgrimage to Aba Muda 
at Hora Wolabo with that of the Sheikh Hussein. 
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sheikh, his religious training and orientation as well as the time of his existence is not clear. 
However despite historically sharing a common border with the Arsi among which the cult of 
Sheikh Hussein was popular, the spread of the ṭarīqa among the Borana was a relatively 
recent phenomenon. It was with the establishment of towns in southern Ethiopia in the late 
nineteenth century and in northern Kenya that different ethnic groups found abode in these 
thriving centres. These towns attracted different Ṣūfī ṭarīqas including the followers of 
Sheikh Hussein. Arsi followers of the Sheikh Hussein cults settled mainly in Moyale 
Ethiopia. Among the roving bands of Warra Gariba sheikhs, that not only frequented Moyale 
but also travelled to towns like Nagelle, Mega, Yabello, Sololo and Hidi Lola included Said 
Roba Garbi, Bar Agal, Aba Kadir and Darban Gaab. The cult attracted mainly the urban poor 
and was often associated with women.
48
 Their main activities included celebration of the 
birthdays of their chief saints such as Sheik Nur Hussein, Soph Umar and Akko Makko. The 
annual pilgrimage to Ana Jinna attracted followers from Moyale Kenya, Marsabit, Sololo, 
various regions of Ethiopia and Somalia. The rituals of the pilgrimage also have semblance 
with the annual ḥajj  rites and hence to the followers of the cult, it is a poor man’s ḥajj  
(Trimingham 1976, Setegn 1973, Braukämper 2002).  
There are two important shrines of the cult in Moyale Ethiopia. Both shrines are tombs of 
popular saints, namely Abiya Agal (also known as Bar Agal, Abba Hargesa) and Aba Kadir. 
The two saints were presumably Arsi Oromo sheikhs who travelled widely in the southern 
Ethiopia and borders towns in northern Kenya. Abiya Agal was first to gather a group of 
disciples around him in the 1960s and early 1970s. He was revered for his healing powers. 
Local Moyale adherents as well as followers of the cult from other towns in northern Kenya 
and southern Ethiopia frequented his abode in Agal, north of Moyale Ethiopia. Also non-
Muslims Borana and other communities sought medical and spiritual help from him. Often 
once healed, non-Muslim patients converted to Islam and became followers of the cult of 
Sheikh Hussein. Abiya Agal preceded Aba Kadir in Moyale. When Aba Kadir came to 
Moyale, there was already an established settlement around the residence of Abiya Agal as 
adherents settled around him. Aba Kadir was observed to be an eccentric saint who exhibited 
unusual social behavior but at the same time yielded some potent karama (Ar. miracle that 
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 Braukämper also notes that in Bale, the cult is predominantly a cult of the poor and the downtrodden in 
material and as well as in social and political terms and it also has elements of revivalism and nativism. He 
observes that the cult of this nature tend to increase in importance in times of crises (Ulrich Braukämper. 2002, 
pp. 144-145).  
Hjort  (1979: 43) similarly notes that  recruitment to the cult is conducted both among the poor and destitute 
Borana and Somali Muslims in Isiolo following the forced displacement of once wealth pastoralists due to the 
insecurity and deprivation caused by the Shifta wars. The cult is in antagonistic relationship with mainstream 
Borana and Somali Muslims as it is seen as unislamic.   
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God works through a saint).
49
 He died in the late 1970s and was buried in Moyale Ethiopia. 
Around his domed tomb are dozens of houses in which the caretaker and other followers of 
the cult reside. Mzee Tadi, a khadim of Aba Kadir (assistant) is the caretaker of the tomb of 
his master. The tomb of Abiya Agal has however in recent past, fallen into disuse. The area in 
which it is located is in recent times inhabited by the Garre who have over years affiliated 
more strongly with more reformist ideology of Salafī Islam and have hence considered ziyārāt 
to the tombs as sacrilege and heretical. 
50
 
 
 
Picture 1 Mzee Tadi, the former khadim and caretaker of the tomb of Aba Kadir, Moyale Ethiopia. Picture: personal. 
 
Among the Borana speaking communities, despite condemnation from reformist sheikhs of 
the activities and practices of the syncretic cult, there are significant followers of Garib. In 
Moyale, Butiye, Somar, Helu and Manyatta Burji have considerable number of Garib-related 
activities such as Ayaan healing session and dhikr gatherings. In most of the northern Kenyan 
towns there were moolas or dargas, makeshift worship centres, which serve as sacred space 
for religious prayers and ceremonies. These centres are often managed by ardent followers of 
the cult and are on specific days of the week and months visited by the local followers. These 
sacred shrines are named after and dedicated to the chief saints of the cults. For instance, in 
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  He was often remembered for his lunatic outlook such as semi-nudity, public urination and residence in shop 
verendahs than for learning or performance of miracles. Adherents attribute miraculous traits such as being 
present at more than one location at the same time (bilocation) and healing powers. Personal conversations with 
Mzee Tadi (a khadim/a disciple of Aba Kadir), Moyale, June, 2010. Personal conversations with Hussein Ganna, 
Moyale, September 2009.  
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 Personal conversations with Mzee Tadi, Moyale, June 2010. 
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the town of Sololo, there are three such places, Mijasid Soph Umar named after the disciple of 
Sheikh Nur Hussein, Misajid Agal named after the Abiya Agal and Aboy, named after a 
female saint of the cult. Other popular dargas in Moyale area are found in Odda, Butiye 
(called Abal Qassim), Guto and Golb (near Bor), Helu (called Soph Umar). Some of the 
renowned local leaders of cult included Nageso in Butiye, Alake Oko in Somar, late Iyya 
Godana, Guyo Jattani, Hallo Tache, Sharif Mamad, Galgalo Adda in Manyatta and Dima 
Digge.
51
 In Waso the most prominent leader is Buuba Borana. These leaders often serve as 
Abayen, the Ayaan cult ritual specialist. They have assistants and retinue of followers and 
often travel to different places to serve ill clients in need of their spirit management 
expertise
52
.  
The relationship between the spread of Islam and the expansion of the cult of Sheikh Hussein 
is not clear. However one of the remarkable features of the cult is its association with the 
Ayaan healing activities. According to one Garib leader, the ayaan was given to Sheikh 
Hussein in order to facilitate the spread of Islam.
53
 An ill person who is not a Muslim is 
required to convert before commencement of the healing process. The followers of Sheikh 
Hussein pride in having converted many Borana through this method, a claim refuted by 
reformist leaning Muslim scholars.  
The rituals of the Ayaan sessions as well as the various religious ceremonies of the Garib 
have translocal influences and serve different purposes within this vast zone. For instance 
among the Waso Borana, a group that were at one time cut off from their ancestral home, the 
Ayaan cult is part of domestic or household ritual that provides a sacred space for the 
encounter of an Islamic ṣūfī cultic practices, Borana practices related to the Ayaan practices 
and an actualisation of the Borana traditions and sacred history. It also serves as a substitute 
for the lost traditional rituals that contribute in maintenance of the Nagaa Borana. Together 
with traditional Buna Qalla rituals, the cult is hence part of re-traditionalisation in absence of 
the break-down of generational set ceremonies and ritual. The Abayen takes the role of the 
Qallu. It hence mitigates the possibility of replacement of all traditional rituals by Islamic 
one. For the many women followers in Waso, it is said to provide them with ritual place in the 
society and for the many a number, it serves with the opportunity to be Muslims, even when 
they are not literate in the Qur’ān and in the Islamic law (Aguilar 1998, 2009). 
The relationship between the followers of Sheikh Hussein and Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya in 
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 Personal conversations with Mzee Tadi, Moyale, June 2010. 
52
 Personal conversations with Sora Baati, Yassin, Merti, October 2009.  
53
 Personal conversations with Mzee Tadi (a khadim/a disciple of Aba Kadir), Moyale, June, 2010.  
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Moyale in the late colonial period was moderately cordial. The followers of Sheikh Hussein 
were not welcomed to carry out their religious activities at the mosques. However apart from 
verbal condemnation by the sheikhs, the healing session and other religious gatherings were 
silently tolerated. These two mainstream Ṣūfī ṭarīqas though did not subscribe to the syncretic 
sheikh Hussein cult recognised the founder as a reputed saint but followers as having diverted 
from the proper teachings. Often they were accused not of tomb worship or mixed-sex 
gatherings but for non-observance of the five daily prayers. They were considered as 
unlearned in matters of religion. Similarly, Hjort (1979: 44) observes that despite being 
viewed by the sheikhs of Muslim Borana and Somali leaders in Isiolo as ‘something picked 
from the bush’ and hence unislamic, the cult had significant following.  
It is from mid-1980s to date that saw rise of polemics by the young scholars affiliated with 
reformist Islamic ideology against the cult of Sheikh Hussein. In order to navigate the tense 
contours of soured relations, members of the cult often ask for permission from local 
administrative officials such district commissioners and officers, chiefs and the police in order 
to conduct their activities. With such permission granted for purpose of traditional healing, 
the cult members cushion themselves against disruption from enthusiastic opponents who 
proscribe the gatherings as a mark of associationism and heresy. Currently with rising levels 
of Islamic education and awareness, the cult adherence is low. However Ayaan healing 
sessions are still sought as popular remedy for protracted illnesses. Because of limited 
communal entertainment opportunities Ayaan session in towns like Merti attracts local youth 
in dozens as it provide venue for socialisation, away from the ‘control’ of the elders. 
2.3.4 The Missions and the Muslims: Christianity among the Borana
54
 
There was limited pre-colonial and colonial presence of Christian missions in the NFD. 
Christian missionary activities were largely post-colonial phenomenon and largely linked to 
development projects such as schools and hospitals.  The government of Kenya set 
development efforts as condition for missionary activities and was said to have demanded that 
missionaries should not put pressure on the local population to convert to Christianity (Hjort 
46). The desire to carry out evangelism among the ‘Galla’ were very strong in the mid-19th 
century when the likes of Johannes Ludwig Krapf (1810-1881) and the Hannover Mission 
envisioned that once converted the group could become possible evangelizers of all eastern 
Africa (Tablino, 2004: 102). These efforts did not bear fruits as the furthest these missionaries 
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 For detailed study of Christianity among the communities of northern Kenya, see Tablino, Paolo. 2004. 
Christianity among the nomads: The Catholic Church in Northern Kenya. Nairobi: Paulines Publications 
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reached were the borderlands of the Pokomo and the Orma and it was among the former that 
conversion was successful. Tablino (2004) estimates the first missionary activities in the 
region were carried out by a group led by Father Dal Canton who stayed in Moyale for three 
years, from 1915 to 1918, in an attempt to reach Ethiopia. In the 1930s Protestant 
missionaries of the Bible Church Missionary Society (BCMS) preached and established 
schools and health centres in Wamba, Maralal and Marsabit. It was after 1948 that concerted 
Catholic missionary activities were carried out with the appointment of Mons. Cavallera as 
the Bishop of Nyeri with jurisdiction that included the NFD. Diocese of Marsabit, the 
prefecture apostolic of Garissa, apostolic vicariate of Isiolo, and diocese of Maralal were 
established in 1964, 1976, 1995 and 2001 respectively (Tablino: 2004 130-151).  
There were small Christian communities (Catholic, Protestants and Orthodox) among the 
Borana of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia.  It was in Sololo town that Bishop Cavallera 
opened a mission in 1966. The town had a large refugee camp catering for internally 
displaced persons following insecurity caused by shifta wars in early 1960s. The Catholic 
mission also constructed Sololo Mission Hospital with a capacity of 90 beds and a staff of two 
doctors and seven nurses. By 1999, the Catholic mission had baptised 1553 Borana. There 
was an initial rejection of the construction of Catholic mission in Moyale town for fear that 
the missionaries would proselytize among the predominantly Muslim populace. In 1987 the 
local county council granted a plot to the Catholic missionaries, who later put up a mission 
and a St. Mary’s primary school (Tablino: 2004: 201-210).  
In Isiolo district, outside Isiolo town, Fathers Pio Bono and Franco Givone were instrumental 
in establishing Catholic missions in Merti and Garba Tulla in Waso region. These 
missionaries carried out proselytism among the Waso Borana from later 1960s with some 
success. Under Father Pio Bono, the mission was able to construct a number of churches, 
health facilities, irrigation schemes and educational institutions.
55
 The Catholic mission is 
situated on the southern side of Merti town and is located in the Christian quarter called 
Manyatta Father. The town is hence subdivided into two portions with the northern side being 
predominantly Muslim and the southern side predominantly Christian. The church is hence 
the focal point for the local Borana converts. While conversions were gradual, the services 
provided by the catholic mission attracted a number of local Borana some of whom were 
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nominally Muslims. The relief services provided by the centre during the 1983-1984 famine 
was remembered by Borana Muslims as the time when a number of their kinsmen converted 
to Christianity. Those parents whose children studied at the mission school and were 
beneficiaries of its vast services, found it easy to profess the Christian faith. The missionaries 
not only tolerated the indigenous rituals that bind the community through ‘the Peace of 
Borana’ as Buna Qalla and Eeb but actively appropriated such practices in their church 
services under the rubrics of acculturation.
56
  
Islam among the Waso Borana until then relied on Duksi trained Qalole who were not able to 
reverse the tides of Christianization until later in 1986 when local Borana scholars educated in 
universities in Muslim countries were able to channel funds for construction of a rival Islamic 
centre in Merti to oversee similarly grandiose development projects. The stage in the early 
1990s was set for a clash between the Muslim and Christian Centres.  
In both Moyale and Merti field research sites, there has been considerably reduction in funds 
to maintain or expand the Catholic institutions.
57
 The bulks of the foreign missionaries 
managing these centres have left, leaving the centres under the care of Kenyan priests. There 
is, in a sense, a feeling of delusion among the enthusiastic missionaries as many of the 
converts to Christianity have tended to convert to Islam upon completion of their education 
for varieties of reasons. The Borana, whether Muslims or Christians, still largely follow 
exogamous marriage arrangement and conversions to Islam are common if one of the spouses 
is from the minority Christian faith. Others convert due to concerted efforts from Muslim 
daʿwa groups or due to pressure from peer and extended families. There is considerable 
growth in protestant missions in urban centres in Moyale, Isiolo, Sololo, Marsabit and in 
southern Ethiopian region bordering Kenya over the years.  
2.4 Reformist Islam in Moyale and Merti: 1986 to present
58
  
The period since the mid-1980s ushered in a new and lasting wave of Islamic reformism in 
northern Kenya. This period coincides with the spread and consolidation of what has been 
infamously called ‘petro Islam’. The period since 1970s saw growing influence of Islamic 
humanitarianism and proselytism funded by the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries like Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. This wave of reformist ideology has been differently called Wahabism, a 
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literalist authoritarian interpretation of Islamic texts that is fervently antithetical to moderate 
and tolerant Ṣūfī Islam that has for ages accommodate varied interpretation of texts and 
absorbed various local customs and traditions. The trajectory of Islam among the Borana 
hence strongly came under the sway of the contemporary Islamic trend in Muslim world of 
the 1980s and 1990s. However this wave of reform was to indefinitely overwhelming turn the 
tide on the Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya duo-poly in Moyale and ignite seed of religious 
awakening and growth of local class of religious scholars and institutions among the Borana. 
So deep was the impact of the religious transformation in Moyale that within a span of twenty 
years, almost all the mosques in Moyale and its environs were managed by graduates and 
scholars antithetical to the old Ṣūfī heritage. This wave of religious change was in some 
places, empowering for local Muslims as they were able to chart a path of religious re-
orientation and identity making but in more cosmopolitan places, the resistance of the elders 
who were in position of powers in matters of religious were strong and often an all-out 
generational physical and verbal warfare ensued. For better understanding we need to focus 
on regional peculiarities. 
2.4.1 Religious Reform in Waso Region: Less Resistance, More Religious investment 
One person who personifies religious revivalism among the Borana in general and Waso 
Borana in particular is Sheikh Abdullahi Golicha. He is son of a local Waso Borana from 
Merti. He attended primary school education and duksi in Merti before moving to Nairobi as a 
young man. There, he got the opportunity to travel to Sudan where he pursued advanced 
Islamic education in Khartoum. After a lengthy absence, he returned to his home area only to 
find, by his judgment, a society on the verge of religious decay. He was not impressed with 
the low levels of religious observance, religious education and adherence to the codes of the 
Islamic law. The locals, according to him, mixed their indigenous traditions and Islam with 
utter neglect. He was more so enraged by the rising trend in conversion to Christianity among 
once largely nominal Muslim Waso Borana. He decried the impact which the massive 
institutional investments by the local Roman Catholic mission had on the various facets of the 
Waso Borana life, from health, education, livelihood to religious beliefs. He foresaw that 
unless this trend is averted there would more pull towards the incentives offered by the 
Christians. He therefore embarked on an ambitious project of religious and socio-economic 
empowerment through his networks and contacts in transnational and national Islamic charity 
agencies. This project had considerable success within a span of ten years from 1986-1996. 
He, together with other elderly Muslims of the area were able to put up Merti Qur’ān Centre, 
the first entirely Borana-run Islamic educational and religious complex with multiple network 
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of satellite mosques and madrasas in the Waso region (Galgalo 2006).  
Prior to 1985, Merti had one semi-permanent mosque that was put up in the early days of 
town’s growth by migrant Somali merchants. Prayer attendance was minimal.59 Water for 
ritual ablution was fetched using donkey carts from the seasonal Uaso River, a distance of 
about two kilometres. The only duksi operational within the town was that of Maalim 
Mukhtar, a teacher who was temporarily employed by the Saudi Embassy after an appeal 
from one local Islamic education primary school teacher and a local Muslim leader through 
the initiative of the then local member of parliament.
60
 Here the Borana children were taught 
basic fundamentals of faith, some principles of Islamic law and mostly memorisation of the 
Qur’ān. There were also other locally initiated forms of proselytism with Ṣūfī influence. One 
such example was religious poetries and praise songs produced by local religious leaders like 
Malim Dabaso Ali Dogo in format of radio cassettes. Dogo and other local Muslim leaders 
attempted to reach out to the Borana through this medium. Often the poetry was in Borana 
and influenced by traditional Borana narrative genre. Unlike Moyale, Isiolo and to some 
extent Marsabit, the Merti religious landscape was devoid of institutionalized Ṣūfī leadership 
and culture. While the majority of the population, who were mainly Borana, were Muslim, 
there was no tangible impact of ṭarīqa affiliation. The locals are accustomed to the admixture 
of the aada Borana and relatively nominal adherence to the dictates of Islam.  
The first phase of religious change was herald when in 1985 Sheikh Hassan Jattani was 
employed as a full time madrasa teacher. Jattani was a local Muslim who had graduated from 
a Mombasa madrasa. He established the first formalised madrasa. He enrolled the duksi-
going children into different categories based on their progress and taught them an expanded 
Islamic education curriculum. That marked the foundation of fully fledged Merti madrasa. 
With funds from charity organisations such as Al Muntada Trust, African Muslim Agencies 
and assortment of individual donors from Middle East, Merti Qur’ān Centre put up madrasa 
classes, an administration office, a social hall, a machine operated water borehole near the 
river bank that directly supplied ablution needs and even a technical training school (Galgalo 
2006). These disparate humanitarian and daʿwa agencies lacked a uniform approach to the 
infrastructural development but were credited for successful construction of different range of 
institutions.
61
 The centre also operated daily feeding programme where orphans and children 
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from poor families ate lunch and supper. 
Perhaps it is the realm of Islamic education, which had greater impact on religious change. 
This was done among the adult population through lectures and sermons in the mosque and in 
various madrasas in the town and in surrounding settlements. In total, approximately over 
2000 children from the area have passed through the Islamic schools since its establishment. 
The availability of these madrasas reduced the need to pursue further elementary and 
intermediate Islamic education outside the town.
62
 Before this development, Al-Falah Islamic 
Educational Complex in Isiolo, established in early 1980s was a favourite destination for 
aspiring Borana Muslim scholars. Others headed to flourishing Islamic institutions in Kisauni 
and Manyankulo in Mombasa and in various madrasas in Nairobi. The structure of the 
madrasa in Merti reflected the standard format of similar institutions in Nairobi, Mombasa 
and Sudan, namely: ibtidai (primary school); idadi (intermediate school); and thanawi 
(secondary school). Upon completion of the thanawi, the graduates are ready to serve as 
prayer leaders and teachers in the lower level madrasas in the region or opt to pursue 
university education at International Islamic University of Africa in Sudan or other 
universities in Egypt, Uganda and Saudi Arabia or in constituent colleges of foreign Islamic 
universities in Kenya like Thika College of Arabic and Sharia Studies (Galgalo 2006). A 
dozen Merti madrasa graduates have pursued degree in various disciplines and returned either 
to join the class of bulging religious scholars or obtained gainful employment in government 
departments or in non-governmental organisations. There is a number of Islamic religious 
education teachers in government schools who were graduates from such educational 
institutions. The Thika College has in the last few years received accreditation from the 
Kenya’s Higher Education Boards and now has a university charter. The institution was 
constructed with local as well as foreign funding through Islamic charities from Muslim 
countries such as Kuwait.
63
  
The disciplines taught in Merti madrasas include Sharia, Fiqh, ḥadīth, Qurʾān Tilawa and 
Taḥfidh, Tafsīr, Tawhīd, Sira, Geography and Mirath. A remarkable feature of this institution 
was separation of sexes.
64
 While the young children below the age of 6 years are allowed to 
attend mixed-sex elementary classes, those above this age are required to attend either male 
only or female only classes. The religious leaders and teachers were able to institute a 
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pragmatic arrangement with local government primary school administrations to utilize the 
schools for madrasa use in the afternoons and during weekends to serve the staggering 
demands for Islamic education. This is in addition to established madrasa classes in the 
compounds of the main Jamia mosque, Taqwa mosque and at Khalifa mosque. Boys attended 
classes not only at the mosque attached madrasas but also at Obru and Khalifa Primary 
schools while girls did the same at Merti Muslim Girls Primary School.
65
  
Merti Qur’ān Centre through its translocal humanitarian assistance, was also able to help  to 
establish a number of mosques and primary and secondary schools within the town and in 
neighbouring settlements. In Merti town alone there are about eight mosques, established 
through local initiative and assistance from the centre, namely: Merti Jamia Mosque, Taqwa 
Mosque, Khalifa Mosque, Rahma Mosque, Gammachu Mosque, Olla Ganna mosque, Olla 
Father Mosque (also called Ansaar Mosque) in the Christian quarters, and Merti Secondary 
School mosque. In addition the centre was credited for construction of permanent and semi-
permanent mosques in Biliqo Marara, Biliqo, Bulesa, Goda, Awarsitu, Saleti, Korbesa, Malka 
Gala and Basa. 
66
 
 
 
 
Photo 2: In the background is the Merti Jamia Mosque. Source: personal.  
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During the booming era of Islamic voluntarism, the centre paid mosque and madrasa staff as 
well as provided prayer carpets, religious texts and maintenance of its various institutions.
67
 
Government funded primary schools on the Muslim side of the town were partly funded and 
constructed by the centre. Therefore there is a tendency among the local Borana Muslims that 
these government schools are ‘theirs’, as opposed to their Catholic counterpart. Muslim 
parents were castigated for taking their children to the Christian funded institutions and such 
debates often degenerated to heightened inter-religious tension. Some schools like Khalifa 
and Gammachu were almost entirely constructed by the centre. Gammachu primary school is 
unique in that the choice of the Borana word ‘Gammachu’ which means ‘happiness’ alludes 
to direct answer to choice of ‘Macci’ ‘joy’ that was used by the Catholic mission for most of 
their projects. The centre also extended its philanthropic assistance to Merti Secondary 
school, the only government institution of this calibre, by funding the construction of 
classrooms, dormitories and sponsorship of students whose parents are poor or those orphans 
who were graduates or current students of their madrasas. The students were also required  to 
attend madrasas in the late afternoons and during the weekend.  
As the level of religious re-orientation gained root, there were calls for separation of boys and 
girls in public primary and secondary schools and expansion of female education in an ideal 
Islamic environment. This gave rise to Merti Muslim Girls Secondary school. The religious 
scholars from the centre sit on boards and committees of various primary and secondary 
schools, health centres, water management, non-governmental agencies, security committee 
and disaster management boards in times of crisis. The influence of the religious leaders were 
felt during the recent constitutional debates and as ‘unbiased’ voice in protracted inter-clan 
rivalry in civic, parliamentary and presidential elections (Wario 2010).  
Of these budding Borana speaking religious scholars, the founder of the Centre, Sheikh 
Abdullahi commands great respect not only among the Waso Borana but also other Borana 
and non-Borana Muslims outside Waso. Often the local religious leaders coordinate with 
national Muslim leadership in making stands on topical issues and convey what they believe 
is the consensus of Muslims beyond the confines of Waso. Such coordination and networking 
has seen greater cooperation between Borana and non-Borana Muslim scholars in Merti, 
Garba Tulla, Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale and Sericho and other part of the country.
68
  
Since August 8 1998 when the United State Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were 
bombed, there had been a crackdown on Islamic charities operating in most parts of Kenya. 
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These agencies were accused of terrorism and given short notice to leave the country (Salih 
2004). This had direct impact on sustainability of the various projects funded by these 
agencies and also establishment of new ones. There were general decline in the religious 
fervour that marked the early and mid-1990s. Parents, for the first time, had to pay some 
small fees for their children’s religious education. Most affected institutions were the Merti 
Orphanage Centre that has over 200 children and was until then supported by Islamic 
humanitarian agencies. Also affected were dozens of secondary school and college students 
who were beneficiaries of the Centre’s scholarship programme. Madrasa teachers and imāms 
were to face tough times as funds for their salaries were drastically reduced.
69
 Efforts to raise 
money locally though ‘harambee’ (Sw. fund raising) has had mixed success. Despite such 
change of fortune, the Centre still runs various projects and continues to manage mosques and 
madrasas.  
The centre has had instrumental impact on religious observance in fundamental way. Prayer 
attendance had drastically increased over the years. In public, Muslim attires such as buibuis 
(Sw. dark coloured female dress) for women and kanzus (Sw. male robe) and kofias (skullcap) 
are popularly worn as markers of religious identity. The generation educated in the 1980s and 
1990s are more grounded in Islamic faith and are not socialised deeply in traditional customs 
and culture.  
As the Ṣūfī traditions were not fully established, there was not much resistance to the 
fundamental changes initiated by the Merti Qur’ān Centre. The few elderly scholars were co-
opted into the growing religious bureaucracy as mosque elders. The next generations of 
Muslim leaders were groomed from the hundreds of madrasa going children. The influence of 
the centre was pervasive as its leaders guided not only on religious but also socio-political 
issues. The only challenges to the monopoly of religious sphere in Merti were the Catholic 
mission and the syncretic Ayaan cult.
70
 The backlash on the Ayaan cult was strong. It was 
condemned as heretical. It’s free mixing of sexes was called conduit for sexual promiscuity. 
Its drumming beating labeled satanic and fake and their healing rituals and requirements, 
exploitation of the poor and the vulnerable.
71
 At the height of soured relations, the shrines of 
the cults were desecrated by enthusiastic madrasa going children. It is common for sermons 
to be dedicated to the ills of the cult. However despite the constant condemnation of the cult 
by the Muslim religious leaders, the cult is still active in the area. It continues to serve sick 
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clienteles in need of healing through trance dance. This is done during full moon.
72
 The 
religious scholars are also in competition with the Ayaan cult in spirit management venture as 
they offer a more Islamic way of expelling the spirit rather than the lifelong appeasement 
offered by the cult. Customers are spoilt for choice.  
 
Picture 2 A section of Waso Muslims attending Eid al Akbar prayers at the Khalifa Primary School grounds in Merti 
town in 2008. Source: personal. 
 
It is in the realm of Muslim-Christian relations that the impact of the centre is most felt. 
Following the massive investment in educational and development projects by the Catholic 
mission, the return of Sheikh Abdullahi heralded a rival and equally ambitious Muslim 
projects. A kind of transnational battle for the religious psyche of the Waso Borana was hence 
fought between the proxies of the Vatican and those of the Arab-Middle Eastern in this tiny 
town. At the height of this rivalry, plane loads of Italian missionaries and Arab Muslim daʿwa 
activists flew regularly to the area. The battle for ‘the soundscape’ is fought on every day as 
church bells and muezzin calls fill the air. The most imposing structures in even small villages 
like Bulesa are not schools or shops but the complex network of church buildings and 
outstanding white-washed mosque with minarets. The divide between Muslim and Christian 
majority areas was made clear. Schools and dispensaries were either ‘Muslim’ or ‘Christian’, 
though could be accessed by respective religious communities. Muslims were strongly 
encouraged to attend Muslim institutions and vice versa.
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 Tensions were high during Muslim 
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and Christian religious festivals. The most protracted of the inter-religious conflict was over 
the status of a cemetery. Both sides claimed that it was their hallowed grounds. It was located 
at the edge of Manyatta Father, the Christian quarters. The general feeling was that these 
grounds cannot be shared and that as in life, the dead Christian and Muslims deserved a 
separate resting place. In any case, while the graves of Muslims were marked with minimal 
features, Christian crosses erected at the gate of the cemetery and on individual graves 
marked a clear ownership of that space. This conflict turned violent when it was alleged that 
enraged Muslims torched the fence of the cemetery.  After a long court battle, the conflict was 
resolved. Within this period of heightened Muslim and Christian religious revivalism, two 
persons personified the faces of the two rival faiths, Sheikh Abdullahi and Father Piu Bono 
(Galgalo 2006).  
With rising levels of secular and religious education, other Islamic and Christian traditions not 
related with neither the Macci Catholic centre nor the Merti Qur’ān centre attempted to 
establish networks of followers within the respective religious communities. Among the 
Muslims, the transnational lay dāʿis of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat have been visiting the region 
since 1970s. In the 1990s it recruited a few local Muslims as their representatives and resident 
lay dāʿis. 74  It was to grow through the recruitment of more followers leading to its 
establishment of the first post-1986 mosque to be built entirely without the explicit support of 
the Merti Qur’ān Centre.75 The growth and mobility related practices of this lay movement 
shall form the bulk of subsequent sections of this thesis. On the Christian side, Pentecostal 
churches based in Isiolo have always been eyeing the lucrative Christian constituencies that 
were under the Roman Catholic Church. These churches have frequently sent missionaries to 
show religious films, play Christian songs, preach and distribute tracks and pamphlets that 
marketed their tenets. The most active of these churches were Life Ministries led by Ubshet 
Mengesha. Dissatisfied lay Catholics were attracted to the appealing message of personal 
salvation and charismatic preaching of the new church. The youth, especially school leavers, 
found an easy home in the gospel music and youth fellowship programme. A unique feature 
of this new church was its reliance not on the formalised Catholic songs but its use of Oromo 
gospel songs that appealed to the cultural roots of ‘culturally uprooted’ Borana youth.76 The 
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new church built a small worship centre within the Christian quarter just as the Tablīghīs did 
in the Muslim side. Both relied and continue to rely to translocal networks, enjoy popularity 
among the youth and are led by local graduates of the pioneer centres of Muslim and 
Christian traditions. 
2.4.2 Islam in Moyale since the mid-1980s: Ṣūfī -Salafī Crisis 
Ṣūfī-Salafī encounter in Moyale and Marsabit from mid 1980s was more dramatic and 
polemical. It displayed three characteristics. One, it appeared as if it was between the youthful 
Muslims dispossessed of leadership against the elderly Muslims in charge of religious 
authority and decision making. Two, it seemed to be driven by the madrasa and secular 
educated followers against the traditionally educated elderly Muslim leaders. Three, it 
appeared to be a war of ideology backed by more universalistic, orthodoxical and liberating 
claims against the old ‘rustic’, conservative and more localised Ṣūfī ideas. In simple terms, 
the ‘Saudi-backed’ new youthful Muslims sought public recognition and leadership 
opportunity away from mainstream Somali and Arab dominated Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya 
religious bureaucracy. This contestation was not a smooth one and involved subtle as well as 
overt challenge to the duo-poly of the two old ṭarīqas associated with the pioneer Muslim 
resident of this border town.  
The wave of Muslim reformers was referred to with variety of names: warr assalam aleykumi 
(Bor. the people of Assaalam Aleykum), Wahabi and ijole kitaab adhii (the youth of the white 
books). This new trend was headed by a multi-ethnic mix of secular educated youth and 
young adults from almost all ethnic groups within Moyale town, namely, Burji, Borana, Garre 
and Gabra. They are widely travelled. They have been exposed to contemporary religious 
discourses of their time and they felt disempowered by the largely ‘old-school’ Ṣaliḥiyya - 
Qādiriyya domination.77 The group was composed of those who stood to lose little and gain 
more to the challenge they posed to the old Ṣūfī hegemony. At that time almost all the 
mosques were associated with the Ṣūfī traditions and hence the new group lacked sacred 
spaces of their own.  
The first initial contestation for place was carried out not in public squares but right in the 
main Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya mosques. The Salafī affiliated youth, as a direct challenge with 
the Ṣūfī elders, started to conduct separate tarāwīḥ prayers during the month of Ramaḍān 
behind their own self-appointed leaders. This did not go well with the old Ṣūfī leaders. As a 
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show of strength and solidarity, the Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya sheikhs organised weekly dhikr 
sessions after Friday prayers. There were also impromptu sermons from the new group and 
counter-sermons and polemics by the Ṣūfī leaders. The atmosphere both in Moyale and in the 
neighbouring Marsabit reached fever pitch. The Salafī groups made much progress with co-
option of some old sheikhs.
78
 Some Arsi-Oromo Sheikhs were sent from Saudi Arabia to 
spread the new ideas. These sheikhs also brought with them youth from their home area, who 
were trained and instructed to preach in public in favour of the reformist ideas. These youth 
were target of police arrests at the request of the Ṣūfī elders. There were claims that the 
leading Salafī proponents were ‘bought’ with millions of Saudi monies.79   
As the conflict spiraled out of control and animosity stirred by polemics degenerated into 
open public disputes, each camp attempted to win the police, district commissioner and other 
provincial administration to their side. The public administrators and the police were in 
dilemma as to how to solve this conflict. On the one hand, they felt the elders were indeed on 
the right as the youthful followers were engaging them in face to face confrontation on 
matters dear to their beliefs and were turning the mosques and public spaces as sites of 
polemical sermons. But on the other hand, the youthful reformists have not broken any public 
laws that warrant their proscription. In fact most of their earlier members of this movement 
were reputable civil servants, teachers and budding businessmen. The youth armed with 
secular education, could convincingly state that the old sheikhs were resisting ‘inevitable’ 
religious change with futility.
80
 Furthermore, there were some claims that unlike the elders 
who were all talks, their youthful opponents were able to ‘lubricate’ the hands of the law 
enforcers with some hand-outs.   
With coordinated resistance from the custodians of Ṣūfī heritage in most of the town’s main 
mosques and the need to be independent of their constant criticism from such quarters, the 
new movement sought to establish their own sacred space and a marker of identity also 
adopted a distinct dress. One informant recalls that in this manner: 
Then the youthful followers built a small temporary prayer shed (moola) in the compounds of 
Ismail Aba Gala. They congregated here though there were enough mosques. They stood out 
by their distinctive long beard and Pakistani kameez. They were called the people of long 
beards and shaking fingers.
81
   
 
With progress of time, the movement transformed more and more along ethno-religious lines. 
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One group that became largely associated with the ‘Wahabi’ trend then was the Garre. They 
invested in construction of madrasas through funds from transnational Muslim daʿwa 
agencies. They hence put the first fully Salafī permanent mosque in an area of Moyale they 
predominate. This marked the birth of Taqwa mosque in Nyayo Road area. The management 
of this mosque and other Garre-led mosques sought complete attachment to the Ramaḍān and 
Eid schedules of Saudi Arabia unlike other mosques that often prayed and fasted according to 
the directives of the Chief Kadhi and other Kenyan Muslim leaders.
82
 It is also among the 
Burji that tangible cleavages started to show due to the rivalry between the Ṣūfī and Salafī 
followers. The main mosque in Manyatta Burji was managed by elderly leaders affiliated with 
the Ṣūfī  tradition. The informant recalls that: 
The youth followers could make much progress in spreading new ideas. But of all the 
people, the group that went deep within this movement was the Burji. In Marsabit the 
levels of animosity was so high as to even border on assassination of rival sheikhs. 
The old backers of the new group slowly withdrew. The conflict between the old and 
the young was violent in the Burji mosque in Manyatta leading to a death of man 
during the month of Ramaḍān.83   
 
Another angle to the Ṣūfī-Salafī rivalry was that of the alleged threats some sheikhs posed to 
regional peace as some of them, especially Arsi Oromo ones, were allegedly linked with 
Oromo nationalism and liberation movements. With the fall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia in 
1991 and the subsequent fall-out between various factions that fought that regime, some 
Oromo nationalist movements withdrew from the interim government and went back to bush 
to wage a war of liberation. The early 1990s saw heightened securitisation of identity and 
religious traditions such as Salafīsm. Salafīsm had been on the rise in Arsi region for 
considerable length of time (Østebø, 2008). Therefore the persecution of the Salafī sheikhs of 
Ethiopian origin led to their migration to Nairobi and other towns for safety.  
The discourses between the old Ṣūfī and the new Salafī followers concerned a number of 
issues. The core practices of the Ṣūfīs such as praise songs and congregational supplications 
for the Prophet and leading founders of their ṭarīqas (Bor. salawat), the celebration of the 
Prophet birthday (Ar. maulid), visit to tombs, shrines, and graves (Ar. ziyārāt), and weekly 
congregational gatherings and feasts were all declared by the Salafī proponents as 
associationism and heretical.
84
 The Ṣūfīs on the other hand, accused them of being literalist in 
their interpretation of the core Islamic texts, their rapid growth were attributed to Saudi 
money and proselytism among the illiterate and semi-literate Muslims and that their ideology 
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as being not anchored in any of the established schools of thought.
85
 The Ṣūfīs also 
rationalised that their practices has legitimacy in years of learning under reputed sheikhs and 
not in classrooms like the Salafīs and that their opponents were not proper Muslims as they 
did not love the Prophet and his companion. The Ṣūfīs also linked the origin of Wahabism to 
alleged early ‘European-Saud Family-Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab pact’ to destroy the 
religion of Islam.
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 The quote below sums up some the feelings among the Ṣūfī about the new 
religious movement:  
Wahabi was brought about by the Europeans to divide the unity of the umma. They destroyed 
5 things that bring people together: salawat, dua jamaati, ziara at tombs and graves, maulid. 
They also interpret the verses of the Qur’ān that were revealed in relation to the kufar (Ar. 
non-believers) for fellow Muslims like us. The Prophet did ziara in the graves of the fallen 
companions for dua. They say all these are shirk (Ar. associationism). The Prophet asked us to 
visit graves for ziara to pray for the departed. They say people were worshipping graves. They 
hide all these truth.  They were given a lot of money. There was a lot of fitna and debates. 
They could answer the old sheikhs so they targeted to spread their ideas among the semi-
literate and illiterate peoples.
87
   
 
The Ṣūfī hence displayed themselves as men of learning and moderation and as a tradition 
anchored in the right school of thought and the most orthodox religious heritage. Because 
they preceded the new reformist in the region, they argued that their opponents were indeed 
the innovators in religions. The above informant continues:    
Have you seen how we raise our voices in praise of Allah and his prophet; we recite duas in 
congregation. We do wardigi (Bor/Somali. Ṣūfī chants) every Friday. They say all these are 
wrong.  They say that we the old scholars are not learned. But this is a lie. But was the prophet 
not among the old scholars? Were the companions not among the old scholars? Who are 
innovators? They are they came recently! They learn their ideas on blackboard and were told 
to say this and that. The old sheikhs learnt under great sheikhs. These new people use their 
own opinion in interpreting verses and ḥadīth s. We the old scholars use old renowned books 
to do that not our heads. 
They do not have ʿilm. They cannot do tafsīr. They do not consult books. They do not respect 
any madh’hab. We are Shafi’i. They are not in any of the madhhab and that is being in a state 
is bid
c
a. They do whatever they wish or desire. These Wahabis are like that. Their du
c
as are 
not maqbūl (Ar. accepted). They do not even do du
c
as for any one as they know they are not 
acceptable. Their ‘aqīda is faulty.88   
 
Salafīs on the other hand, buoyed by investments of translocal network of wealthy Islamic 
daʿwa agencies, established new madrasas and mosques. Students were sent not only to 
leading madrasas in Kenya but also to Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The younger generations 
were attracted to the youthful vibrant religiosity and opportunities availed by the Salafī Islam.  
In the late 1980s and 1990s demographic shift unrelated to the religious change moderately 
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increased the population of Moyale Kenya and Ethiopia with the discovery of gold in Bethe 
area on the Ethiopian side of Moyale and the refugee crisis caused by the fall of the Mengistu 
Haile Mariam regime. This large populace provided fertile ground for the germination of the 
new religious movement. Within a span of 10 years the celebration of maulid, common Ṣūfī 
gatherings, congregational du
c
as after obligatory prayers, various Ṣūfī readings and dhikr on 
Friday, ziyārāt and  Ṣūfī affiliated recitations in Tarāwīḥ prayers started to wane in every day 
religious practices. These changes were also visible in other towns such as Marsabit and 
Sololo. The Ṣūfī traditions backed by aging descendants of the pioneer Muslims of the towns 
could no longer hold its own against the new religious movement. One Ṣūfī informant sums 
up their ‘lose’ this way:  
Currently the mosques that uphold Shafi’i system and ṭarīqa religiosity are too few. 
They are Qadiriya mosque and Masjid Quba in the town and in Manyatta Burji 
respectively and the Jamia Mosque of Moyale Ethiopia. The rest have all been taken 
over by the Wahabi associated 
c
ulamā’. The Manyatta Burji mosque is a contested 
space. They have tried to turn it to their side but we resisted it and will continue to 
resist.
89
  
 
Among the bastion of Ṣūfī traditions in early days of Islam in the region to give in to 
reformist Islam was the Ṣaliḥiyya mosque which now functions as the town’s Jamia mosque. 
Today Moyale town has over 15 mosques. The town’s residential area itself has a rough 
ethnic settlement patterns. Mosques in most of these ethnic enclaves are led by 
c
ulamā’ from 
the surrounding communities. Jamia and Qādiriyya mosques in the town are the largest and 
are patronized by the all ethnic groups and still managed by descendants of pioneer Muslim 
families of the town. Ittisam mosque led by Sheikh Adan Doyo is especially popular with 
Borana Muslims. The imām regularly lectures on topical issues in Borana. Borana majority 
areas like Butiye, Helu and Sessi has a couple of mosques. Garre majority areas such as Al 
Huda, Nyayo Road, and Biashara Street have a number of mosques. There are at least two 
mosques in Manyatta Burji and a mosque in Ola Gabra near Helu. Prison mosque, at the edge 
of compound of the provincial administration, serves government officials, prison warders, 
the police teachers, traders and travelers. This mosque is also frequented by the members of 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat.   
There are at least seven madrasas in the town, namely: town, Kuwaiti, Al Huda, Sessi, Itisam, 
Khulafa ur-Rashideen, and Manyatta Burji madrasas. These madrasas offer classes up to 
intermediate levels after which aspiring students seek further education in Mandera, Isiolo, 
Nairobi or Mombasa. Garre pupils constitute a majority in enrolment in town’s various 
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madrasas. There are tendencies for Borana parents to emphasise their children’s pursuit of 
secular education at the expense of madrasas and duksis that specialises in Islamic education. 
Therefore they are disproportionally represented not only in enrolment but also in the long-
term Muslim leadership within the town as they lack significant numbers of religiously 
educated class.  In neighbouring Sololo town, a Borana majority area, there are two mosques 
and a small madrasa. Similarly under-enrolment and lack of funds and personnel, affected the 
day to day running of the madrasa prompting its amalgamation into an integrated Islamic 
school offering both Islamic and secular education. The once vibrant Walda Islamic Centre 
that used to be funded by Muslim humanitarian organisations faces collapse due to lack of 
funds, students and disinterest of the largely nominal Muslims of the area. The centre has also 
been turned into an integrated Islamic primary school. This trend has also been extended to a 
once reputed centre of learning in Isiolo, Al-Falah Islamic Educational Complex. Al-Falah 
now serves as a primary school-cum-madrasa. The rise of integrated schools is not just 
necessitated by dwindling fund. Private entrepreneurs in Moyale, Isiolo, Marsabit, Sololo and 
Garba Tulla are experimenting with it to serve both the demands for secular and Islamic 
education under one roof.   
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2.5 Conclusion  
Islam among the Borana speaking communities has undergone a tremendous change. The 
transformative reformist wave initiated in the mid-1980s has endured in most places. The 
reformist tendencies have however in the recent years been steady and less confrontational, 
especially in contested towns like Moyale and Marsabit. Anti-ṣūfī polemics fronted by 
religious scholars from certain ethnic groups have subsided too. However while the old 
Ṣaliḥiyya and Qādiriyya popularity is almost over, resilience of the cult of Sheikh Hussein is 
sustained by proximity of Moyale to Ethiopia and the need for healing services offered by its 
specialists. Religious observance is on the rise buoyed by upsurge in religious educational 
establishments and mosques. This heightened religious awareness has resulted to an urge, 
especially among those who could not pursue madrasa education to advanced levels due to a 
competing pursuit of secular government education, to seek for greater spiritual fulfilment in 
alternative religious trends to the ageing Ṣūfī and reformist and confrontational Salafīsm. 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat appeared in the region at an opportune time. With dwindling funds being 
channeled to the religious establishment due to restricted operations of transnational Islamic 
charity agencies, the reformist Islam that swept the Ṣūfīs out of religious bureaucracy in the 
1990s have now to contend with rising challenge to the use of sacred spaces and legitimacy 
with new lay daʿwa movement originating from India. This new transnational apolitical 
movement with grassroot representation and presence among the Borana speaking 
communities of northern Kenya shall be the focus of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The question worth asking is, would the new wave be temporary like the preceding ones or 
will it have greater inculcation into the religious consciousness of the locals. Only time will 
tell.   
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Chapter Three 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat: Global-Local History of the Movement and its 
Internal Self-Organisation and Structure  
3.1 Introduction 
In July 2010, I conducted an intensive discussion about Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya with three 
Borana speaking regulars in Moyale. The informants having spent at least a decade within the 
movement were competent in expounding not only their every day practices as Tablīghīs, 
their continued motivation to be in the movement but also vast arrays of polemical discourses 
around the movement and accusations leveled against them by their local and global 
opponents. Whilst in the middle of the discussions, I felt it was the moment to break the ice 
and asked a critical question, whose answer has eluded most of my earlier informants. I 
innocently asked; describe in the best way possible the local, as well as the national history of 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. The three were drawn back by this question. Clearly it was not an 
‘innocent’ question with a simple answer, at least to them. After a pause of about a minute, 
Abdi Rashid raised one of the most remarkable explanations as to why there was no one 
among them willing or able to tell about the chronological growth of the movement in Kenya. 
He simply said:  
There is no one who can tell you chronologically the growth of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 
Kenya. In the movement there is no documentation. Wazee, the elders discourage 
documentation. They do not approve of even things were doing here for studies/ reference. 
They refuse. For example, the sitta siffat, one can write the whole principles that I have told 
you in a book form so that it can be read for future. The elders say no. Those are dead words. 
Once something has been written it becomes dead. That is what they say. It is said that the 
practices become less once it has been written and the efforts would be less. But if it remains 
oral and practical, you learn it through mobility and effort of daʿwa. 90  
 
The quote above raises three fundamental points. First, the leaders of the movement, whether 
national or global, do not encourage documentation of any kind, especially of materials seen 
not to be in any way useful in its growth. This does not imply that documentation does not 
exist. In fact the opposite is true as the whole business of coordination is practically 
impossible without registers of names of volunteers and routes, minutes of daily meetings at 
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different levels of organisation and other mundane data. Though such necessary 
documentation is done, the data/information is seldom accessible to outsiders. The 
documented information is also not seen as source of historical information but purely for 
planning and evaluation purposes. Secondly, though they were willing to speak to me about 
the movement, some informants were uncomfortable with such an exercise of documenting 
information about the movement, its history and practices as the elders do not approve of it 
regardless the reason, academic or not. The oral conversations revolving around the 
movement were allowed but written was met with reservations. Incidentally a number of 
recommended texts describe the practices and tenets of the movement and there exist also rich 
bibliographical works on the founding leaders of the movement and their successors.  Thirdly, 
there is a strong belief within the movement that action is better than written words and that 
documentation kills action. Diligent performances of religious practices are seen to be much 
beneficial than reading about them without actions. Words once written and published into 
books and pamphlet are seen as not ‘alive’ (dead, not actualised/ practised).  Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
is not only a movement but also a lifestyle hence deliberately kept oral, practical and mobile; 
to be elucidated face to face and to be emulated in everyday life. 
The chapter thus raises and attempts to answer some questions: How does a researcher 
document on the unfolding history of a movement that explicitly shuns publicity and 
maintains a public façade of voluntary and fluid organisation devoid of any bureaucratic 
trapping? What are the dynamics behind the upsurge of the movement, from a local response 
to faith renewal among Meos of India to being one of the fastest growing transnational 
Muslim movements in the world? How did the movement came to Kenya, spread and became 
established among the largely nomadic communities of Northern Kenya? Who were the 
‘brokers’ that facilitated the establishment and continued growth of the movement in Kenya? 
How is the ‘faith bureaucracy’ of the transnational movement organised in Kenya? 
Part One  
  
3.2 Tablīghī Inc: Historical Background of the Transnational Movement  
The foundation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat is intractably linked to earlier reformist trends in 
British India and socio-economic and political challenges that faced Muslims in that region. 
Since the middle of 19
th
 Century after the fall of the Mughals, the 
c
ulamā’ lost prestigious 
positions that they enjoyed and were persecuted on suspicion of instigating Indian revolts and 
as a result retreated into old institutions and even founded new ones. One such institution that 
later had tremendous impact on Islam in South Asia and particularly the global growth of the 
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Tablīghī Jamāʿat was Darul Ulum Deoband, Uttar Pradesh in India (Masud 2000: xlvi-xlviii, 
Haq 1972, Sikand 2002).  
Founded in 1867, the Deobandi institution trained preachers and prayer leaders, as well as 
scholars competent to take on the rising tides of polemical debates levelled against the 
Muslim faith by Christian and later Hindu missionaries (Haq, 1972). The institution was to 
produce over the years, prominent religious scholars of that era. Masud (2000: xlviii) notes 
that the influence of Deoband on the religious and political views of Indian Muslims 
flourished with the establishment of sister institutions, which were modeled on the same 
curriculum and thought such as Mazahirul Ulum in Saharanpur (where the founder of the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat was a student and later a worker/teacher). Other institutions that the 
Tablīghīs were to keep close contact and alliance with were mosques and seminaries like 
Nadwa seminary in Lucknow and Aligarth. The close affinity with Deobandi School often 
leads to the dubbing of the movement, especially by the opponents as a ‘Deobandi sect’ and 
characterizing of the movement’s mission as the spread of Deobandism - a purist Islamic 
reformist tradition (Masud 2000: xlvii). 
The founder of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Māwlanā Muhammad Ilyās (1885-1944) was a 
descendant of a highly respected and deeply religious family ‘tree’ of scholars from Doab 
area in Western Uttar Pradesh (Troll 1994: 117). His father, Muhammad Ismail (d. 1898), a 
reputed religious scholar, ran a small madrasa at Bangle Wali Mosque in Nizamuddin area of 
Delhi. His pupils, though a handful, were drawn from the largely nominal Meo Muslims 
(Haq, 1972: 80). Muhammad Ismail had by then established special spiritual ties with the 
Meos, the inhabitant of Mewat (Troll 1994: 117). Ilyās studied and taught in Mazahirul Ulum, 
Saharanpur and Darul Ulum, Deoband and was spiritually influenced by contacts and works 
of the leading Indian Muslim scholars of the time among them Khalil Ahmed Saharanpuri (d. 
1927), Mahmudul Hasan (1851-1920), and Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863-1943) (Troll 1994, Haq 
1972, Masud 2000). 
The late 19
th
 Century and early 20
th
 Century was characterised by intense rivalry among 
Christian, Muslim and reformed Hinduism missionaries. The competition was highly 
pronounced among the Muslim Meos of Mewati, whose adherence to communal and 
individualised religious duties, dressing and manners were perceived to be nominal. Meos 
were described by local Muslim scholars, as a people who practiced Muslim as well as some 
aspects of Hindu rituals and rites. They called themselves ‘Nau-Muslims’, a corrupted word 
for Neo-Muslims/New-Muslims. Due to religious syncretism among the Meos, the early 
founders of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat drew an analogy between them and the Arabs of Pre-Islamic 
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times. Hinduism prior to the establishment of Arya Samaj, a Hindu revivalist movement, 
remained a non-proselytising religion (Haq 1972: 19). Arya Samaj the founder of Pandit 
Dayanand Sarswati (d. 1883) realized that the only way to counter the ways of Islam and 
Christianity and the rising number of Hindu converts to the two religions was through Hindu 
missionary activities. This wave of reverse conversion gave birth to the widespread Hindu 
phenomenon known as Shuddhi (purification) (Masud 2000: l). The activities of Shuddhi 
movements were especially active in areas occupied by nominal Meos. Because Meos and 
other groups retained a number of earlier non-Islamic traditional practices, Arya Samaj aimed 
at ‘reclaiming’ these groups back to the ‘fold’ (hindu faith), into which they would be 
readmitted after ritual ‘purification’ – Shuddhi’ (Reetz 2008: 101). The rivalry born out of the 
contestations over religious space among the missionary groups of the three religions 
impacted on strained inter-religious relations, consolidated in-group solidarity and led to 
‘innovative’ and better strategies to reach to their targeted religious constituencies.  
Prior to the establishment of Tablīghī  Jamāʿat and afterwards, a number of similar daʿwa 
outfits operated in the region to call people back to religious observance and also as a counter 
to Shuddhi movements. One of these daʿwa organisations that worked effectively among non-
Muslim was the Tablīghī Mission of Khwaja Hasan Nizami (1878-1955) that sent preachers 
out and published religious literature such as books, pamphlets and tracts into Urdu (Troll 
1994: 117-118, Haq 1972: 41-42). Another was the Central Jamiyat al Tabligh al-Islam, an 
all-Indian organization with grass root presence, which sent preachers to expound on 
fundamentals of faith and also to counter Hindu and Christian missionaries. Himayat-I Islam 
was also one such movement that aimed to avert the ever-increasing polemical attacks against 
Muslim faith through publication of religious literature and teaching. Inayat-u’llah Khan 
Mashiriqi’s movement called Khaksars, that stressed social service and military discipline 
was also such movement (Haq 1972: 39-40). The Tablīghī Jamāʿat built on the successes and 
challenges that faced these ‘predecessors’ in forging pragmatic daʿwa approaches. 
Mohammad Ilyās was dissatisfied with the range of strategies used by individual Muslim 
scholars and daʿwa groups in bringing tangible religious change in the society. More so, he 
was disheartened by the minimal role madrasas had on the nature of spiritual reawakening. 
He himself had served as teacher in these schools and had firsthand experience on their low 
impact on the society. According to him neither the scholars nor the ordinary Muslims were 
doing something about the moral decay in the society and the unfortunate state of the faith.  
He strongly believed that the general public does neither require advanced Islamic sciences 
nor teachings that the madrasas offer to preach but just the basic fundamentals of faith that 
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when well understood by lay preachers can form the starting point of religious reawakening. 
He therefore had a vision of initiating a daʿwa group constituted by laymen that shall move 
from one area to another calling people to the fundamentals of faith. 
This vision was realised in 1925, when Ilyās and a few followers started Tablīghī tours in 
Mewat to propagate the fundamental tenets of Islam namely tawhīd (Ar. the doctrine of 
Oneness of God, the concept of monotheism in Islam) and namaz (Ur. prescribed prayers). 
The first Tablīghī tour was after his second pilgrimage to Makkah (Troll 1994). The question 
as to when the Tablīghī Jamāʿat formally started has bogged scholars studying the movement. 
Different dates have been forwarded: Troll 1925, Haq 1927, Metcalf early 1920s, Sikand 
1926. Tablīghīs are said to have adapted the idea of moving from house to house calling 
people to mosque to two reasons: Firstly, Ilyās was divinely ‘inspired’ to initiate the 
movement following a dream and the second account attribute the method to the Meos who 
had similar daʿwa outreach though not as systematic as the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Ilyās 
accompanied the early Tablīghīs for gasht (Ur. going out for outreach) and later proposed 
changes in content of outreach speeches and in the leadership structure of gasht groups. 
Initially, the movement enjoyed very little success; this did not discourage Ilyās and his 
followers who relentlessly expanded their operation to include towns with larger Islamic 
institutions and
 c
ulamā’ such as Deoband. Meo pledged to help Ilyās in furthering the renewal 
of faith among kinsmen and beyond their region. They became the foot soldiers of the 
movement and its most revered disciples to date. Sikand observes that: 
That Meos, whose Islamic identity had been of only the most nominal concern to them for 
several centuries, had, in matter of just few years, begun responding so enthusiastically to 
Ilyās’ effort at spreading Islamic awareness is certainly remarkable and merits an explanation. 
We have already alluded to the increasing importance of Islamic symbols of the Meos as 
community boundary markers to differentiate them from the Hindus, whom they were 
increasingly coming to see as responsible for their worsening situation. 
91
 
 
The formative years of 1920s and 1930s saw crystallization of some basic teachings and  
concerns of the Jamāʿat namely: the six principles (sittah siffat) and use of certain religious 
texts authored by scholars associated with the movement such as Fazā’il Tabligh, Fazā’il Zikr 
and Muslim Degeneration and its Only Remedy. Additionally it is possible that the movement 
strengthened strategies such as non-involvement in political matters especially at the time of 
heightened debates prior to the partition of India into Pakistan and India and non-sectarian 
affiliation despite being still grounded in the Hanafi school and Deobandi thought with a tinge 
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of South Asian Ṣūfī heritage and intense focus on faith renewal through preaching of the most 
fundamental tenets of Islam. Ilyās belonged to the Chishtiya Ṣūfī order and fused ṣūfī-inspired 
practices and rituals with purist teachings of Deobandi Islam (Reetz 2003, 2008).  Though, 
the turbulent years of late 1930s and mid-1940s were marked with heightened religious and 
political activism, Ilyās steered his movement from the protracted debates that cut across all 
the other contemporary Islamic movements about the fate of Muslims in emerging political 
power houses. He attributed the cause of the fall from grace of his fellow Muslims as a result 
of the failure to uphold religious obligations that included among others; return to the true 
faith and calling others to do good and avoid evil. He therefore encouraged each Muslim to 
allocate time, to participate regularly in daʿwa tours to refine their religious practices and 
remind others to do so too (Sikand 2002).  
By 1938, the movement had extended its activities to the merchant class of Delhi. It was 
observed that overwhelming majority of 
c
ulamā’ showed an indifference to the movement. 
Most of the 
c
ulamā’ also considered the Tablīghī method of Ilyās, as superficial in it effects 
and shun the simple-minded lay preachers from Mewat (Troll 1994: 119).  In 1944, while in 
his deathbed, Ilyās instructed a group of six of his closest disciples, to choose his successor 
from among several names he suggested (Sikand 1994: 147). The six included; the son of 
Ilyās Muhammad Yusuf Kandhlawi (1917-1965), I’namul Hasan, Sayyid Raza Hasan, Qari 
Daud, Maqbul Hasan and Ihtishamul Hasan. Sharing the charisma, esteemed reputation of 
erudition and piety, Yusuf was chosen as the natural successor to his father. Meos, the people 
among who the movement has taken root pledged to abide by the dictates of the movement 
and remain steadfast in the path of practical faith (Haq 1972: 97).  
The period prior to the partition of 1947 was particularly trying for the Meos. Many were 
displaced as a result of the religious violence that erupted following the partition. A large 
number of them crossed over to Pakistan, establishing migrant communities of Mewatis in 
Pakistan, while others remained behind despite the enormous and numerous challenges, to 
offer the ‘troubled’ Meos the much-needed leadership, in the wake of heightened insecurity 
and great sufferings. The tribulations faced by the community led to stronger in group 
cohesion and emphasis on Islamic identity (Sikand 2002: 153). Despite visible growing 
presence in India and newly created West Pakistan, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat had until then 
operated under two limitations: One, it was confined to South Asia (especially Uttar Pradesh 
and Punjab) and two, it propagated faith renewal among Muslims only (Gaborieau 2000: 
120). Ilyās avoided proselytizing among non-Muslims. This partially changed under the 
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leadership of Yusuf as the movement went global. Centres (markaz) were established in East 
Pakistan at Tongi and Kakrail and Raiwind in West Pakistan (Gaborieau 2000: 13). 
Under Māwlanā Yusuf (1944-1965), the movement, boosted by enhanced infrastructure and 
migration movement, rapidly spread outside the sub-continent. Lay preachers were dispatched 
from India and Pakistan to several countries: Hejaz (1946); Egypt, Sudan, Syria (1946); 
Malaysia, Singapore (1951); USA, England (1952); Japan (1956); Turkey (1956/1957); 
France (1961/1962), and Western Europe, Yugoslavia (1962). It is worth noting that sub-
Saharan Africa was ‘explored’ much later, though the region was critical in the spread of the 
movement to Western Europe. In 1956, the following African countries were for the first time 
visited by the lay preachers of the movement: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Mauritius, Reunion and most importantly South Africa. Between 
1961 and 1962, West African countries were visited (Gaborieau 2000: 128-138, Hasani 1967: 
504). These teams made initial assessment of religious needs of the areas they visited, made 
detailed observation of socio-economic and political life of the people and established 
contacts with leading religious leaders especially from the diasporic Muslims of South Asian 
descent. At the global level, the strategy, observes Gaborieau, was to establish presence in 
three important centres; Makkah and Medina (Saudia Arabia, the seat of Islamic orthodoxy), 
London (the heart of Western world) and South-Asia’s triple centres of Raiwind in Pakistan, 
Nizamuddin in India and Kakrail and Tongi in Bangladesh (Gaborieau 2000: 130-131). 
Māwlanā Muhammad Yusuf was particularly interested in the establishment of the faith 
movement in Africa, Hasani (1967: 504) on the biography of this second leader of the 
movement avers:  
Māwlanā Muhammad Yusuf was extremely interested in Africa and he had a clear 
vision that the proclamation of Islam in Africa will cause a great spiritual awakening. 
Therefore he started sending groups to Africa. And in a few years the local people 
adopted the daʿwa work. Especially the academics and the influential people and the 
local traders welcomed Islam and some of them devoted their lives for this mission.  
In 1956 the Tablīghī Jamāʿat began to mobilise in the following African countries: 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, East Africa, Rhodesia, 
North Africa, Mauritius and Re-Union etc. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat workers who went to 
these countries were from India and the dominant group was from Gujarat. Their 
leader was Mawlvi Musa Surti.
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 For detailed spread of the movement  see the biography of the second leader of the movement in Sayyid 
Muhammad Thani Hasani. Sawanih Hadrat Mawlana Muhammad Yusuf Kandhalawi. (Lucknow: Maktaba 
Islam Queen’s Road, 1967) p.504. The chapter ‘Mobilization in Africa’ was translated from Urdu to English 
for this research project by Iftikar Ahmad, Oxford, October 2011.  
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By the time of his demise, Yusuf had consolidated the achievements of the movement by 
carrying out extensive tours of India and Pakistan and several other foreign countries, 
conducting mass weddings and public initiation ceremonies in which the adept swore 
allegiance to him, inaugurating mass gatherings called ijtimācs that later became hall mark of 
the movement and heightening transnationalisation of the movement. (Masud 2000: 13-17) 
Yusuf was succeeded by In’amul Hasan (1918-1995) who instituted better and systematic 
organizational management within the movement, and positioned the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as the 
most widespread Muslim daʿwa group in the world.  In’amul Hasan was also credited for 
democratization of the movement as he moved to strengthen the role of shūra (consultative 
meetings) against the amīr and the role of daily work with mosque-based groups against 
ostentatious congregations (Reetz 2008: 109). 
From 1995 to 1996, collective leadership of three prominent leaders led the movement: 
Māwlanā Sa’d al Hasan (b. 1965, great grandson of Ilyās), Māwlanā Zubair al-Hasan (son of 
In’am, the second amīr) and Māwlanā Izhar al-Hasan (d. 1996, related to Ilyās). After the 
death of Izhar, Zubair and Sa’d formed the top decision-making body of the movement. 
Zubair is said to concentrate on the internal structure and organisation of the movement while 
Sa’d is seen as the new ‘theoretical’, spiritual and symbolic head of the movement (Reetz, 
2008: 109). Below is a diagram illustrating the leadership succession within the movement.  
 
Figure 1 Leadership succession within the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
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3.3 Ties that bind: Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Kenya Muslim Asians  
3.3.1 Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Africa  
As mentioned earlier, the pioneer Tablīghī preachers turned their attention to Africa after the 
movement became established in Arabia, Europe and South Asia. Between 1946 – 1951 the 
their established presence in Arabic speaking countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia. A number of Eastern and Southern Africa countries had first Tablīghīs 
visits, from in 1956 (Hasani 1967, Gaborieau 2000). Despite over 60 years of presence in 
Africa, Tablīghī Jamāʿat had eluded academic researches for two reasons: firstly, the 
movement abhors publicity and do not publicise their gatherings, preaching and programmes 
in the formal channels of communications media frequently used by other Islamic movements 
such radio, newspapers, internet or television. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat largely relies on face-to-
face communication and mobility of its members. Secondly, unlike other Islamic movements, 
the Tablīghīs have succeeded to a great extent to ‘divorce’ political activism. The movement 
focuses on individualised and communal commitment to religious obligations and shuns 
controversial and partisan positions in contemporary Muslim politics. In this way, they 
managed to keep low profile, which also complimented the nature of the movement as loosely 
organized hierarchies characterize the movement. The movement also relies on volunteerism 
of committed members.  The movement portrays an image of temporality and mobility that 
makes academic scrutiny challenging, if not impossible.  
Despite such a dearth of data on the movement, a number of scholars have written on the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Africa. In West Africa, the country with strong activities is the Gambia 
(Janson 2005, 2014). This tiny Muslim majority country is a former British colony and uses 
English as its official language, was an entry point for Pakistani and Indian Tablīghī s who 
share similar history. Tablīghī Jamāʿat appear to attract youthful Muslims, who utilise the 
mobility/travel experience availed by the movement and the alternative religious ideology as a 
counter to the traditional ṣūfī oriented traditions dominated by the elderly sheikhs. With fully 
functional markaz at Serrekunda, the movement not only made in-roads into the national 
landscape but also expanded beyond the borders. Over the years, the Gambia markaz emerged 
as a hub for the annual regional gatherings of Tablīghīs from the Gambia, Senegal, 
Mauritania, Mali, and Guinea. 
Tozy (2000) observes that in Morocco the movement locally known as Jamāʿat al-Tabligh 
wa’l-Daʿwa (JTD) though introduced into the country at the beginning of 1960s, officially 
came into existence on 6
th
 July 1975 when it statutes were framed and an old church 
purchased and converted into al-Nur Mosque in the Moroccan capital, to accommodate the 
98 
movement. The Moroccan branch of the movement, just like its South Asian original, 
attempts to remodel the everyday life of its followers through daʿwa tours and group and 
individual rituals. He adds that the life of Tablīghī is a permanent ritual, and his conduct is 
regulated in its minutest detail so that it conforms in every detail to the life of the Prophet 
(Tozy 2000: 171). 
Beckerleg (1995), analyzing social changes and the youth along the coast of Kenya, notes that 
there are many challenges facing the young generation in Watamu village. These include drug 
abuse, unemployment, HIV-AIDS, generational conflict with parents and the need to maintain 
the Swahili religious and cultural heritage. Some youth, were argued to be joining revivalist 
religious movement that radically shifts their relation with others and alter their dressing and 
mannerism to depict acquired new religiosity as a coping mechanism. Tablīghī Jamāʿat is 
observed to offer these youth, a new sense of identity and belonging in increasingly 
challenging times. Tablīghī phenomena in Watamu, observes Beckerleg, has brought a 
glimmer of social cohesion amidst chaotic life and commercialism that comes with unplanned 
tourism. Eastleigh area is cited as the headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya. The 
following areas are also mentioned to having active Tablīghī daʿwa presence; Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Malindi and Kizingitini. Halali Sunna, a group that calls for stricter and more 
orthodox religious observance is associated with the movement in the coastal area. The paper 
however, does not explore the Tablīghī phenomena at the coast of Kenya in detail. 
Discussing the Islamic reform movements in contemporary Ethiopia, Østebø (2008) identifies 
three Islamic movements that emerged following the new political atmosphere in 1991, which 
granted religious groups more religious expression and freedom of association. The three; 
Salafī, Tablīghī and Intellectual revivalist movements are depicted as critical for religious 
configuration and as channels through which many Ethiopian Muslims search for belonging 
and coherent meaning.  Østebø, while acknowledging scarcity of data on the early history of 
the movement in Ethiopia, points to the role of South African and Kenya’s South Asian 
Tablīghīs in the initial establishment of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 1970s. The movement is also 
indicated to be highly active among the Gurage community in Addis Ababa. The movement 
has grown to be transnational, with its headquarters in Kolfe area in Addis Ababa hosting 
local, regional and international Tablīghīs as they conduct daʿwa tours. 
Outside East Africa, the region with highly active and mobile Tablīghī followers is, South 
Africa. It shares with Kenya one vital element; Muslims of South Asian descents, translocal 
‘connectors’ between Nizamuddin and their respective adopted countries. Moosa (2000) 
considers the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, as ‘perhaps’ the strongest and fastest growing Muslim 
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religious movement in southern Africa and puts forth South African Tablīghīs as the most 
well organised and mobile Muslim lay preachers from the continent. Between 1830 and 1870, 
ten-thousands of Indians migrated to South Africa as indentured labourers and later as 
merchants. Among the immigrants, were Muslim Indians who later became the torch-bearers 
of the movement in southern Africa. Moosa argues that, a number of factors account for the 
success of the movement since its introduction through Saudi Arabia in the 1950s namely; 
strong reformist ideals that resonates with local blend of South Asian Islam, ‘natural’ and 
‘symbolic’ connections between the visiting South Asian Tablīghīs and Muslims of South 
Asian descent and the strong presence and support from pro-Deobandi seminaries, 
c
ulamā’ 
and graduates. Relative affluence of these Muslims helped propel committed Tablīghīs, to 
engage in extensive international daʿwa travels from Brazil to Bangladesh and beyond. 
Extended to the region also was the ‘primordial’ rivalry between Deobandi purist traditions 
and Ṣūfī-inclined Barelwi traditions. As the former is strongly associated with the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, followers of Barelwi Islam not only released polemical discourses against the 
movement but also welcomed similar Barelwi lay daʿwa outfits such as Dacwat-e Islami, as a 
counter-strategy. Tablīghī elders frequent the country and the association between the centres 
in the Indian sub-continent and South African Tablīghīs; extend to publishing of books and 
tracts needed for proselytism in Africa. For instance, Muslim owned publishing firms in 
South Africa often release copies of Fazā’il Aʽmāl in English, among other books.   
3.3.2 Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya: From Nizamuddin to Nairobi  
Undoubtedly as field data and participant observation reveal, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat is the most 
active self-organised daʿwa group in Kenya. Its annual national gatherings are attended by up 
to 15000 followers and ‘sympathisers’. These gatherings send out up to 120 preaching teams 
destined for different destinations and for varying length of time. Their central markaz in 
Eastleigh has among other facilities an enormous one storey mosque with the capacity to 
accommodate hundreds of people. The top leadership, known as Kenya Shūra is dominated 
by Kenyans of South Asian descent, though indigenous Kenyans are also members of the 
consultative committee. It is among these Kenyan Muslims, whose ancestors came from the 
sub-continent, that initial contacts and ‘converts’ were made This is similar to the case of 
South Africa, where the beginning of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat were said to be inextricably tied to 
the fortune of descendants of so –called ‘passenger Indians’, who arrived in the provinces of 
Natal and Transvaal toward the close of the nineteenth century (Moosa 2000: 207). Gaborieau 
(2000 133) confirms that, before reaching the local population, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat first 
‘aims’ at migrant South Asian populations as a more accessible target. Before tracing the 
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history of the movement among the Borana speaking communities of Northern Kenya, it is 
essential to outline the initial establishment of the movement among the Kenyan Asians. 
However, it would be erroneous to consider the so-called, Kenya’s Muslim Asians or Muslim 
Indians, as a monolithic entity. The communities of Muslim of South Asian descent are 
diverse groups of ethnic and religious communities that are microcosms of communities in  
the Indian sub-continent. For better comprehension, it is important to attempt to explore the 
history of Asians in Kenya and the break-down of Muslim of Indian descent and then, finally 
examine the dynamics of localisation of the transnational movement in Kenya. 
3.3.2.1 Wahindi Wakenya: Kenyans of Asian Descent  
We shall start with the semantics of the terms ascribed to Kenyans of Asian origin. In Kenya, 
generally people use the Swahili term ‘Wahindi’ or Indians (English). Another term 
commonly used to refer to them is ‘Asians’. Salvadori (1989: 5) recognising the ambiguity 
that the term creates especially to the non-East African readership, clarifies that it is used in 
her work as used in Kenya,  ‘to refer to a person (or anything, for that matter) from the Indian 
subcontinent’. Herzig (2006: 1) affirms that while the term ‘Asian’ is an ascription used by 
Africans and Europeans, the Asians themselves rather identify with terms Kenyan Asians or 
Kenyans of South Asian origin. 
The notion of a monolithic ‘Asian community’, observes Salvadori (1989: 1), exists only in 
the imagination of non-Asians. They are differentiated by their places of origin, their 
languages, their religions and their occupation. Almost all of them come from northwestern 
India, mostly from Punjab, the Sindh, Gujarat (comprising Gurajat proper, Cutch and 
Kathiawar and Surat) and Goa. A few were from Rajasthan and Maharashtra. All major 
religions of India are hence represented in Kenya. Namely there are Punjabis who are Hindus 
(both orthodox Sanathan Dharmists and Arya Samajists), Muslims (both orthodox Sunnis and 
Ahmadiyyas) and Sikhs (both orthodox and Namdharis). From Gujarat there are Zoroastrians, 
Hindus of various persuasions, Jains (both Swetambers and Digambers) and Muslims (Sunnis 
and three Shi’te sects such as Ismailis, Ithnasheris and Bohras). From the Konkan and Goa 
there are Sunni Muslims and Catholic Christians respectively. 
Citing 1962 census, Salvadori points out that approximately 70 percent of the Asians in 
Kenya were from Gujarat, 20 percent from Punjab and 10 percent from Goa. Religious 
breakdown was as follows: Hindus and Jains 55 percent, Muslims 23 percent, Sikhs 12 
percent and Christians 10 percent. Of the 23 percent Muslims, 17 percent were Shi’ite 
Muslims while only 6 percent are Sunnis. By this approximation, one can conclude that Sunni 
Muslims among whom later the Tablīghī Jamāʿat found a base are a relatively small group 
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within the larger Muslim Asians (6%) (Salvadori 1989). Herzig approximates similar 
percentages as per research survey done in the year 2000; Hindus and Jains 57%, Muslims 
22.1%, Sikhs 9.5%, Christians 2.3%, others 7% and no religion 2% (Herzig 2006: 106) 
The Indian connection to Eastern Africa predates the establishment of colonial rule. They 
traded for centuries and sailed between India and the East Africa coast. They also served as 
ship-pilots, money-lenders and changers in the emerging East African city states (Herzig 
2006, Nanjira 1976, Bhatt 1978, Salvadori 1996). Between 1896 and 1901, 32,000 indentured  
labourers were recruited for the construction of the Uganda Railway. Of this figure, 16,312 
opted to return to India, 6,724 stayed on in East Africa, 6,454 were invalidated and sent back 
home and 2,493 died as a result of tropical diseases (Nanjira 1976: 4).  Apart from arriving at 
the shores of East Africa as indentured labourers to build the railway, some served as soldiers 
and others came to seek better economic prospects and open dukas (Sw. retail shops) along 
the railway line outposts and administrative camps. With rapid urbanisation during the 
colonial period, the Asians were able to set up businesses in almost all the administrative 
centres- from the coast to the arid Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) (Salvadori 1996).  
The wahindi enjoyed a relatively better position, in terms of access to education and business 
opportunities as compared to the Africans, but lower than European settlers and colonial 
officials. Through social and political activism, they were able to negotiate for better 
representations and rights and even had members in the Legislative Council (Legco). In 
Nairobi certain areas such as Pangani, Ngara and Parklands were reserved for them under the 
segregative colonial urban policy. The gains made in the political front were shattered after 
independence, as ‘Kenyanisation/Africanisation’ policies adopted by the African majority 
government did not favour them. The stereotypes against the Asians, as ‘exploiters’, 
discriminative and unpatriotic still lingers among certain classes of general citizenry. Mass 
out-migration from East Africa to Britain and North America occurred since 1964, so much 
so that statistics reveal that in 1989 that there were 89,000 Asians from a figure of 182,000 in 
1970 (Herzig 2006: 7). On average, the Kenyan Asians are urbanised and relatively wealthy 
and in most cases maintain social interactions within their diverse ethnic and religious 
communities.  
3.3.2.2 Wahindi Waislamu: Asian Muslims in Kenya  
Muslims of Asians descent are commonly referred to Wahindi Waislamu in Swahili. They are 
a diverse group, who primarily differentiate themselves based on their places of origin. 
Generally five of the groups are orthodox Sunni; the Baluchi (see picture of Mombasa 
Baluchi Mosque below), the Cutchi Sunnis (who comprise at least twenty different sub-
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groups), the Kokni Muslims, the Memons (comprising three groups), the Punjabi Muslims 
(with great internal diversity), and a few from Kashmir, Marwar, Sindh and Surat. Others 
include Ahmadiyya, who are considered by most Muslims as non-Muslims. Shi’a Islam is 
represented by the Ismailis, the Ithnasheris and the Bohras (Salvadori 1989: 187). For our 
analysis, we shall confine ourselves to the Sunni Muslims, who were at one point or the other 
attracted to the teachings of the Indian-originated Tablīghī Jamāʿat. 
 
 
Picture 3 Baluchi Mosque, Mombasa. Photo: personal. 
 
Some of these distinct Muslim groups formed jamāʿats (associations) for purpose of social 
events such as wedding, celebrations of religious festivals and socialization. Some also have 
mosques of their own or maintain those built by their jamāʿats, in most parts of the country. 
For instance there are Baluchi, Memon, Badala mosques in Mombasa. The degree of 
integration with the rest of Kenyans differs among them, with some having completely cut 
ties with the Indian subcontinent. Some at independence opted for British passports, instead 
of Kenyan identity opting to be British immigrants. The first two decades were of great 
uncertainty for the whole group. These Asian groups also prefer to settle close to each other, 
for economic support and social networks. For instance the Baluchis are found mainly in 
Mombasa and a few in Uganda, Eldoret and Nakuru (though a number have migrated to the 
United Kingdom). The Cutchi Sunnis are found in Mombasa (majority) and other upcountry 
towns such as Nairobi and are among the most ‘indigenized’ Asians, evident in their 
competence to Swahili use and friendly relations with local Kenyans. The Kokni Muslims, 
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who are sea-faring community, are also found in Mombasa but a large portion moved to 
Nairobi where they constitute a thriving business class. A handful Koknis are scattered all 
over Kenya. They ascribe to East Africa’s predominant Shafi’i School of jurisprudence unlike 
other Sunni Asian Muslims who follow Hanafi School (Salvadori 1989: 94-5). 
Most of the Sunni Muslims of Asian descents belong to the heterogeneous Memon 
community (about 5000). The Halai, the Akai and the Nasserpuria are the three groups of 
Memons in Kenya. The Nasserpuria to which the majority of the Kenyan Memons belong to, 
are a tightly knit community who have largely settled in Mombasa where they have well 
established networks of learning institutions, social halls and mosques. About 20% of the 
Nasserpurias, moved to Nairobi for commercial reasons. The Halai and the Akai groups, 
though the ‘smallest’, are mainly found in upcountry town of Meru and scattered all over the 
then Northern Frontier District towns such as Isiolo, Wajir, Garissa, Garba Tulla and 
Marsabit. Mohammed Moti, a pioneer Halai Memon had at one time 60 shops located in 
towns, in central Kenya to every little administrative centres in the NFD during the colonial 
period. He literally opened the North to other pioneer Asian traders (Salvadori 1989: 195).  
The Memon in Meru are also credited with the construction of the town’s Jamia Mosque and 
community centre. The few Halai and Akai Memons in Nairobi, maintain membership in the 
Cutchi Sunny Union rather than associate with the Nasserpurias. It is important to mention 
that, the Halai and Akai are among the first communities to give a home to the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat and were the earliest lay preachers in Kenya. Relatively wealthy and philanthropic, 
the Memon community in Meru also supports construction of mosques and small madrasas in 
rural Meru towns such as Lare, Kianjai, Muthara and Maua. Their assistances have often been 
extended to madrasas and mosques in Kinna, Garba Tulla and Isiolo. They also built the first 
fully functional madrasa in Kinna, a Borana speaking settlement near the Ameru urban centre 
of Maua. 
The Punjabi Muslims, just like their fellow Sikhs and Hindus, came as indentured, skilled 
artisans, clerical workers with the Railway and independent migrants seeking better life in 
Kenya. They are said to be the most amorphous of all the groups and ‘have taken to heart’, the 
Islamic injunction that all Muslims are brothers and are proud of their non-sectarian attitude’ 
(Salvadori 1989: 207). The Punjabi Muslims built the first Jamia Mosque in Nairobi and 
madrasa in 1900 and 1904 respectively. The community also built the Railway Landhis 
Mosque in Muthurwa. Both mosques and others they constructed were ‘open’ to all Muslims 
irrespective of ethnic and doctrinal differences. They said to have contributed greatly, not 
only to the Nairobi Jamia mosque but also a number of mosques and madrasas along the 
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Railway line and in other parts of the country (Salvadori 1989: 207-210). The Railway 
Landhis Mosque became among the ‘first’ mosques to be associated with the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat in Kenya.  
Other smaller Sunni groups include the Kashmiris, the Sindhis and Surati Muslims. For our 
discussions the last group, is of special interest. The Surati Muslims or Surtis, have their 
primary loyalties to Islam and to Kenya rather than form their own ethnic organisations. Most 
Surtis have departed from Kenya. Salvadori (1989: 213) notes: 
Relatively few Surti Khalifas moved up-country. Yet, although there were never more than ten 
to fifteen families in Nairobi (and hardly a handful elsewhere), they founded their own 
association there, and built their own community hall in the Eastleigh area where they 
clustered. This is opposite the Section One Mosque, which they frequented. When the 
community became so depleted by emigration as to be no longer viable, the Jamāʿat (the Surat 
Khalifa Jamāʿat) was deregistered and the building donated to the mosque. The five remaining 
families are now members of the (no longer exclusively) Cutchhi Sunny Muslim Union. 
 
The location of the mosque described in the quotation above, corresponds to the current 
headquarters of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya- Baitul Maal Markaz located in Eastleigh Section 
One. In the compound of the markaz apart from newly built expansive mosque, there is the 
old mosque and adjacent buildings that serve as offices, Qur’ānic memorisation school and 
boarding facility. It is likely that one of those buildings served, as the social hall of Surati 
Khalifa until early 1980s when it was handed over to the mosque. It is likely that, by then the 
mosque was not associated with the activities of the transnational Islamic movement as the 
Tablīghīs were still actively based at the Landhis Mosque in Muthurwa, Nairobi.  
3.3.2.3 Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya: Retracing the history  
An attempt to reconstruct, the history of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Northern Kenya is 
undoubtedly a challenging task. Documentation of the history of the movement, as mentioned 
earlier, was never a priority to the Tablīghīs. Reports from remote locations given by different 
travel teams, though collected for purpose of further tours may not be documented for future 
reference but rather implemented immediately as warranting actions. Communication has 
largely remained oral, and the word of mouth is the main means through which recruitment of 
new members, advertisement for upcoming events and reports about field excursion are 
shared. Tablīghīs, undoubtedly exhibit considerable ‘hostility’ to publicity, particularly about 
the movement by both outsiders and members (Sikand, 2002: 5). Low profile enables it to 
operate in any socio-political environment ‘go around’ government scrutiny. Therefore, as 
rightly noted by Sikand (2002: 8) the only history considered of substantive value: 
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is that of the Prophet and his companions, and to an extent, the amīrs or the leaders of the TJ. 
The rest of the long history of humankind is largely irrelevant, for it is but a story of growing 
deviation from ‘true’ Islam and so deserves no mention. In a sense, then, Tablīghī concept of 
time differs sharply from the linear notion of history as a succession of events in this-worldly 
realm. Because of this, Tablīghī texts rarely deal with actual events in its own history, and, 
therefore, as sources for historical research they are of little value. 
 
The above quotation, reminds me of an occurrence in my field research experience that 
particularly corroborates this worldview. I arrived at the national headquarters of the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, in the company of two senior Tablīghīs from Marsabit. They allowed me, to 
accompany them to a two-day consultative meeting of senior amīrs, on the progress of the 
movement. I accompanied them to get ‘the feel of the Tablīghī spirit’. The two, introduced me 
to a number of Tablīghī amīrs and representatives from different parts of the country. I noted, 
a middle aged man who appeared to be the chief coordinator and organiser of the event. He 
chaired most of the sessions and called upon each amīr, from different parts of the country to 
give an account of movement’s activities in terms of past performances and future targets. 
Notes were being taken. Tanzania and Uganda representatives were part of this high-level 
meeting with 300 plus representatives.  
Later in the evening, accompanied by one of my informants, we caught up with the 
‘coordinator’. After a lengthy introduction, about being an academic interested in 
contemporary Islam and the like, I enquired if he could be available for a brief discussion on 
the historical growth of the transnational movement in Kenya since the 1950s. He looked 
perplexed. He said, ‘there is nothing perhaps, that I know that your friend here does not know. 
This movement is about action. Just ask Ibrahim here, to tell you all he knows. Otherwise feel 
free to stay and observe how beautiful this spiritual work is.’ Then he turned to one of my 
informant, and added, ‘Please ensure that this “young sheikh” gets a place to sleep and food to 
eat.’ He did not understand why anyone should write such a history, as it does not add value 
to the daʿwa work. Despite such paucity of information at the beginning, through several 
interviews, formal and informal conversations, days of travelling with preaching teams and 
hours of listening to Tablīghī  talks in various national and regional gatherings, I was able to 
‘piece together’ bits and pieces of information. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the 
difficulties of obtaining data on the history of the movement in Kenya, I successfully put the 
available data together, and retraced the growth of the movement. 
Just like South Africa, the beginning of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat was tied to the efforts of 
Muslims of Asian descent. More precisely the success and failure of the new movement 
depended on various Asian Sunni Muslim communities residing in the urban centres such as 
Nairobi. Naturally, the visiting Tablīghīs from India and Pakistan sought to introduce the 
106 
movement to these fellow Asians due to the symbolic connection and relations between them. 
It is these local Sunni Asians that acted as guides for visiting groups. They were the first to 
learn the Tablīghī teaching, strategies and to undertake frequent visits to the centres of India 
and Pakistan. Gaborieau (2000. 137), quoting a biographical work on Māwlanā Muhammad 
Yusuf, the second  by Hasani (1967) confirms that after the introduction of the movement in 
1956 to East Africa, ‘some people devoted their life to Tablīgh and kept coming to the Centre 
of Nizamuddin’. I recall reference 1956 in one of the Tablīghī leadership gatherings as the 
year of its first entry into Kenya. The speaker, himself a committed dāʿi, was admonishing the 
gathered amīrs that since the movement ‘arrived’ in Kenya in 1956; there has been lots of 
progress, though not satisfactory. As mentioned earlier, the centre in India dispatched 
preaching teams mainly from Gujarat to several parts from Africa starting from 1956.  
However, it should be noted that 1950s, Kenya was characterised by heightened political 
discourses amid struggle for independence. It is likely that the activities of the movement, in 
terms of travels outside mosques in Nairobi, were largely limited.  Accessing or travelling to 
or from, the then Northern Frontier District were regulated by the colonial administration, as 
it was a closed district (Castagno 1964). The movement presumably remained a localised 
phenomenon in Nairobi and urban mosques in other parts of Kenya frequented by diverse 
Asian Muslims. One such mosque to be associated with the movement in Kenya for a long 
period of time was the Landhis Mosque, located in Muthurwa. As mentioned earlier, the 
Punjabi Muslims, a community of Asian Muslims whose interaction with other indigenous 
Kenyan Muslims was very cordial, built the mosque. They were non-sectarian, they 
contribute to construction of mosques and madrasas and their mosques were frequented by 
Muslims of various persuasions be they Wahindi Waislamu, indigenous Muslims or 
transnational lay preachers.  
Another section of Kenya’s Muslim Asians, among whom the pioneer Tablīghīs formed a 
base, was the thriving Halai and Akai Memons of Meru. Some of the first local Tablīghīs 
were recruited from among them. Some informants even indicate that the movement, first 
found foot in the town, before moving to the Landhis Mosque. It should be noted that to date, 
the Tablīghīs from Meru constitute, one of the most active units with outreach programmes to 
surrounding towns such as Isiolo, Nanyuki and rural Meru countryside. It is common to find 
visiting local or foreign jamāʿats preaching in the town’s Jamia Mosque or at Makutano 
Mosque. As mentioned earlier, the Memon business community extends financial support to 
for the running of mosques and madrasas in Meru and some parts of Isiolo region. A 
renowned person, among the Meru Memon community, closely associated with the early days 
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of Tablīghī Jamāʿat is Ḥajj  Wali. A frequent traveler, the respected elderly Tablīghī, is said to 
have traveled as far as China, in 1967. Aw Boru, a pioneer Waso Borana Tablīghī, recalls 
traveling with foreign as well as Kenya’s Asian Tablīghī s, in 1970s and 1980s within Kenya 
and to Somalia and Ethiopia. The quotation by Hasani (1967: 505-508) below gives detailed 
picture of the state of the movement among the Wahindi Waislamu in the 1960s:  
The local Indian traders welcomed them (Tablīghīs from India and Pakistan) and 
supported the spread of the daʿwa. After this, by 1965 in the East and North Africa 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat work continued and was highly resourceful and committed people 
were produced. These people devoted their lives for this mission and repeatedly 
visited the Nizamuddin Centre in India. They took some Indian Jamāʿats from there 
and mobilized them in Africa. And large gatherings (ijtimāʿs) were organized in 
various cities and areas, and created the system of foot patrols (paidal jamāʿats). 
One of the large gatherings of these series was organized in Kenya. Many people came 
from the adjacent African areas. One old and devoted worker has written his 
comments like this. 
“Praise God our last month’s gathering in Kenya was the largest in the East Africa. 
The local Muslim community is small but 250 people came from outside. Some people 
came from far areas. Some had to travel about 4000 miles both ways to join the 
gathering. People were travelling through ships, buses, and private cars. One car 
from Lusaka (Zambia) travelled day and night to join the gathering. From this you can 
guess the passion of the people. The whole gathering from beginning to end went 
according to plan: After the Fajr Salah teaching, then the breakfast, then from 10 to 
12:30 halqa wali ta
clīm (religious educational instructions), after ẓuhr prayers (lunch) 
meal was served and teaching on its etiquettes delivered, after 
c
Aṣr prayers teaching 
on virtues of zikr (remembrance of God) was given and expressions and (Tablīghī) 
experiences of people who came from other various areas was given, and some 
teachings on the akhīra (afterlife). From Maghrib to cishā’, there was Bayān wa 
tashkīl (teachings and mobilization). And after the dinner discussion about next day’s 
program. There was translation in coastal language for the local people (Swahili). 
And it was decided that the next year’s gathering would be on 10th, 11th, and 12th 
March 1966, in Zambia which is the capital of Malawi.  
 
The quote above also reveals that during this period, South Asian Muslims from countries as 
far as Zambia participated in the gatherings and that the venues of the annual get-together 
were shifting between countries in East and southern Africa. The programme outline reflects 
similar arrangements today. It also reaffirms the pivotal role the Kenyan Asian Muslims play 
and reveals that even during this period indigenous Muslims whose knowledge of Urdu was 
limited attended the gathering and to cater for them translations of the teachings and sermons 
were done into Swahili.  
During the formative years of the movement in Kenya, the procedures and practices were not 
standardized or well followed. Most of my informants believe that, the current emphasis on 
organizational structure and thus tablīghī bureaucracy was not there in the ‘past’. The 
ambiguity in carrying out tablīgh, allowed for ‘innovative’ practices by the enthusiastic 
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Kenyan followers, especially in Nairobi. The foreign jamāʿats from India and Pakistan did 
not stay long enough and seemed not keen enough to impact on the nascent Kenya Tablīghīs 
the proper Tablīghī ways of proselytism. The rift within the Tablīghī cycle emerged in 1970s 
and 1980s, in Nairobi and other towns. Some informants speak of an emergence of a splinter 
group, that carried out daʿwa in ‘an unorthodox’ way. The ‘new’ group was accused of 
disregarding gender boundaries by traveling in the company of women and sleeping in 
mosques. They were accused of free-mixing of sexes while on daʿwa tours or rightly put, 
carrying out their vision of masturat jamāʿat (Ur. spousal preaching tours), decades before it 
was introduced into Kenya. Masturat jamāʿats, were later introduced and strictly 
demonstrated by foreign jamāʿats through examples, before the locals were allowed to 
emulate and carry out three day spousal tours. These types of jamāʿats, were recently 
introduced to the Waso Borana Tablīghīs, through practical examples from a Bangladeshi 
masturat jamāʿat, touring Kenya.  
The new group therefore was accused of not following directives of the international 
headquarters and hence shun by the emergent Nizamuddin leaning Tablīghī group. While the 
splinter group maintained their practices despite opposition from the mainstream Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, their activities remained strictly localized within Nairobi and to some extent Kisumu 
and Dar es Salaam. There are ambiguities, as to who was the leader of this splinter group but 
opinions points to one Darwesh, an early adherent of the movement in Kenya. When I put 
across, the question of the existence of a splinter group within the movement, most of the 
informants appear to be unaware of such the movement’s ‘rocky history’. However, it is clear 
that the movement has shifted from being an Asian- oriented movement to a highly ethnically 
mixed daʿwa outfit, in the last two and a half decades. 
The shift of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, from Landhis mosque in Muthurwa to its current 
headquarters in the expansive Baitul Maal Markaz in Eastleigh Section One of Nairobi, was 
necessitated by among others issues enormous growth in membership. Hussein Dima, one of 
my informants, however offers a different explanation. He reveals that, the group led by the 
late Darwesh, remained active at the Landhis Muthurwa Mosque and extended their daʿwa 
zeal to Kibera, one of the largest informal settlements in Nairobi.
93
 If this perspective is to be 
taken into consideration, the move from Landhis to Eastleigh was hastened by many other 
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 Personal conversation with Hussein Dima, Isiolo, April 2009. Dima notes that in this splinter group, women 
activities are prominent. It is possible that these two different visions of Tablīghī  proselytism existed 
‘harmonious’ side by side until the mainstream Nizamuddin leaning group found a larger venue to accommodate 
their expanding numbers leaving the ‘indigenous’ group behind.  
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reasons; the resolve to maintain mainstream Tablīghī practices formed the core of it. Below is 
a picture of the Baitul Maal Markaz, the national headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. 
 
 
Picture 4 Baitul Maal Markaz, Eastleigh, Nairobi. Photo: personal. 
 
Abdi Roba, a former Tablīghī, and now a Salafī scholar, recalls that in 1988 he traveled to 
Uganda for a forty days tablīghī tour, from the then operational base of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, 
Landhis Mosque, Muthurwa.
94
 At the time, there were rising demand that there was an urgent 
need, for a more spacious compound and a bigger mosque to host an ever-increasing number 
of participants in the annual gatherings. Muthurwa was very close to the Nairobi Central 
Business District and large public facilities such as Machakos Country Bus Station, thus could 
not offer a ‘calm’ environment for the movement activities. It also undoubtedly threw the 
quietist movement into public limelight.  Furthermore, the Landhis Mosque was only offering 
their facility to the emerging movement on a ‘friendly’ basis and was never a Tablīghī-owned 
markaz. Therefore Baitul Markaz was built, a Tablīghī-managed massive mosque with wide 
compounds, that acts as spacious venue for ijtimāc gathering, offices for coordination of 
incoming and departing local and foreign jamāʿats, a store for records of preaching teams 
within the country, a space for regular consultative meetings of the Kenya Shūra (National 
administrative council) and amīrs from different parts of the country and a madrasa for 
Qur’ān memorisation. The compound hosts, up to 15,000 people during the national ijtimācs. 
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 Personal communications with Abdi Roba, Kinna, October 2009.  
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There are two mosques within the compound: the old mosque that existed prior to the 
establishment of the movement and the newly built, one-storey massive mosque with capacity 
of up to ten thousand persons. It is probable, that the mosque was built and maintained 
through contributions from among others, the Sunni Muslims of Asian descent within Kenya 
and with the blessing of the elders in Nizamuddin.  
The other part of the country, which witnessed rapid growth of the movement, was Mombasa. 
Masjid Ali, in Mombasa city served as the centre for the coordination of the Tablīghī 
activities. Every Thursdays, a dozen preaching teams departed to various towns in the coastal 
region and mosques around Mombasa. Congregants come from as far as Voi, Malindi to 
Msambweni.  
Among the Borana speaking communities, pioneer Tablīghīs to visit the area were foreign 
jamāʿats from India and Pakistan. The local Muslims referred to these itinerant preachers, 
appearing every few months at their mosques as Qalole Pakistani (Bor. Pakistani religious 
scholars) and later with the establishment of the movement, warr tabliqa (Bor. the Tablīghī 
group). They stayed for two to three days at a mosque and moved to the next. These foreign 
Tablīghīs did not understand local languages and often stood to make speeches in Urdu. Abdi 
Aziz recalls these early days of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat amongst the Borana:  
It is these people from IPB (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Tablīghīs) who brought the tablīgh 
here. When they came, people did not know what they wanted. All they knew was that the 
group preached, slept in mosques and said inshallah. Then the locals would also say inshallah 
and this is how it continued for some time. In the first place the language this pioneers 
preached in is not local language and not even the international Arabic, thus all the locals 
heard was inshallah. Whatever is said in the mosque with inshallah, is something good 
remember. The language was foreign; the approach is unique in that we have not seen people 
staying in one mosque and then move to another and like that.  Ten years later, the fruits of 
inshallah inshallah came out, it is now the locals that were going out and doing what the 
jamāʿats from IPB were doing.95  
 
It must be noted that the present well organised nature of the movement in Kenya, was a 
gradual build-up of, years of commitment that saw it from being a movement patronised by 
Muslims of Asian origin to a mass lay movement in which indigenous Kenyan Muslims play 
a greater role in daʿwa travels. However decision-making and day-to-day running is still done 
under the supervision of Asian Muslims, whose financial and logistical support still remains 
pivotal. The pioneer foreign Tablīghīs among the Borana speaking regions of Isiolo, Waso 
and Moyale seemed less interested in recruitment of locals into the movement. The directive 
or to be specific, the motivation to recruit local Kenyan Muslims rather was a move that was 
popularised in the later 1980s and early 1990s. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number 
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of local Muslims who accompanied foreign, Meru and Nairobi Asian jamāʿats were growing. 
They had learnt, the way of conducting daʿwa as approved by the movement. They became 
the new proselytisers. Abdi Galgalo adds: 
The few local recruits were trained through travels, on the fundamentals of the movement 
through the travels. They were compelled to concentrate on the qubul or the change of the 
heart of the people here. That they worked only on the fundamentals. The jamāʿat chose 
certain individuals and they were exposed to transformative change through travel and 
training. These individuals were able to supersede the divisive 'we' problem and abandoned all 
the “we the Borana, we the Gabra” and so on to focus on self-reform. What I am doing for this 
religion and not what can society do for us was their main motivation.  
The established guys became the link between our brothers in IPB and Nairobi and this 
society. It is like the link between village and the globe. Every year the sheikhs hold 
mudhākara, a kind of workshop sometimes in Pakistan sometime in Nizamuddin. The few 
representatives in the country would go there. These would be trained and bring back the ideas 
of reform back home. They would hold ijtimāʿ and the knowledge are transferred to the zone 
and national and regional levels.
96
  
 
The few emerging Borana speaking Tablīghīs, invested time and resources in the movement 
becoming reliable representatives, to be contacted by visiting foreign jamāʿat. Over time, they 
recruited local preaching teams in the vicinity of towns such as Moyale, Marsabit and Merti. 
Though the Qalole Pakistani never alarmed the local religious scholars, they were not amused 
by the newly emerging local daʿwa groups appearing to usurp their social and religious 
capital. Mamed Roba describes the initial reactions from the 
culamā’ in this way:  
We were fought very much. We were called names, all sorts of names. They said we 
brought a new religion from India. We were denied a chance to preach in almost all 
mosques in the area. Not only that we were called a sect that is interested in destroying 
Islam instead of building it. They even said that we were being paid by our foreign 
masters to destabilize the religion and that what we were doing is nothing but bid'a.
97
 
 
At one moment, the term tablīgh was so much associated with the Urdu speaking pioneer 
Tablīghī s of 1970s and 1980s that it developed ambiguous connotation, which prompted the 
local Tablīghīs prefer the term kundi daʿwa (Bor./Swa. daʿwa group).  However despite such 
latent tension between the local Tablīghīs and their sheikhs who managed mosques, certain 
mosques became slowly dominated by the Tablīghīs. The national and local Tablīghīs 
envisioned bringing consensus and building momentum for the renewal of faith among the 
Borana speaking Muslims of the Northern Kenya, through bringing together all parties 
interested in the revival of Islam. The strategy was to hold regional ijtimācs in small towns 
and mobilize religious scholars from Nairobi, Isiolo, Moyale, Marsabit and other smaller 
towns, as a forum to brainstorm on the condition of faith among them. These ijtimācs to some 
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extent facilitated consensus building on matters of faith and successfully led to the 
recognition of the lay preachers as a legitimate authority concerned with religious changes. 
These gatherings, though it remained a Tablīghī affair, had an abundant benefit for the ailing 
madrasas and mosques; the visiting Asian and Kenyan Asian Tablīghīs pledged to give 
financial support. Ijtimācs held in Sololo, Moyale, Merti, Isiolo and Marsabit in the late 1990s 
and early 2000 attracted up to three to four thousand attendants. These gatherings as are other 
ijtimācs remain men-only affairs. 
One could not approximate how many people belong to the movement at any time in Kenya. 
This is due to high turnover of members. Joining and exiting the movement is ‘fluid’. For 
instance, if one could do a survey of the number of men who have travelled in Moyale for any 
specific number of days for daʿwa tours, the percentage could be as high as 70 but this is not 
an indicator of membership as the core regular members who commit up to 40 days per year 
remain immensely small. These regulars meet through mosque-based units, and aspire to 
carry out certain routine Tablīghī practices such as text reading, motivational speeches, 
neighbourhood tours and recruitment for local preaching tours leading to permanence of 
Tablīghīs in the Northern Kenya’s religious landscape.  
The gradual establishment of the movement in the north, as in the other part of the country 
was facilitated by strategies such as preaching in non-controversial manner the fundamental 
tenets of Islam, avoidance of politics and doctrinal debates, self-finance that encourages 
individual commitment, regular local, regional and national gatherings, frequent daʿwa tours 
and above all a loosely organised faith bureaucracy that allows for smooth running of reform 
agenda of the movement. In the next section of this chapter, the focus shall be on 
contemporary organisation of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya.  
Part Two 
 
3.4 Tablīghī Bureaucracy in Kenya: Contemporary Self-Organisation of the 
Transnational Movement  
 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat characterises itself as a grassroots lay movement, devoid of hierarchical 
power structure and authority. It markets itself as largely voluntary, politically neutral and 
devoted solely to spiritual revivalism among individuals. However, it is correct to argue that 
such a definite goal of revivalism requires and creates a ‘faith bureaucracy’.98 It may seem to 
wrestle or contest with 
c
ulamā’ of mainstream Islamic traditions for the right to speak about 
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Islam to the ordinary believers but it also establishes alternative forms of religious career path 
complete with hierarchy. Reetz (2008: 99) posits though, the Tablīghīs insist that the 
movement has no special administration hence emphasising its lay character, its internal 
administration has become highly hierarchical and even rigid with clear in- and out-group 
distinction. He adds that such, is not observable to an outsider, there is indeed an unwritten 
rule that determines what issues are to be confronted, how to organise preaching tours, how to 
attract new members and retain the old ones, and how issues of leadership and guidance are 
resolved.  
This section therefore, addresses some organisational and ideological aspects of the 
movement that guides its functions, brings about coherence of aims and practices and enables 
its growth. While local variations occur in Kenya, the Tablīghī phenomenon on global level 
has largely maintained (almost consistently) similar modes of preaching, self-organisation, 
worldview, dressing, text use and interpretation, consensus building and travel modules.  
However, it should be mentioned that the structure expounded in the section relies largely on 
field interviews, personal participations in various Tablīghī gatherings and teaching sessions 
and personal observations with traveling jamāʿats.99 The East African Tablīghīs look up to the 
centres in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (IPB) for constant guidance and smooth operation 
of the movement. It is not uncommon for the local Tablīghīs, to say that there are some new 
communications from ‘wazee’ or the elders in IPB.100    
3.4.1 Religious Leadership and Authority: the case of Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
On 20
th
 -21
st
 April 2009, I accompanied an informant to Baitul Maal, Nairobi for a majma jor 
(Ur. consultative forum for leaders) of the senior Tablīghīs in Kenya. The agenda were to 
evaluate the successes and challenges of the daʿwa efforts in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
and preparation for a forthcoming national congregation at the venue. Out of the 300 Tablīghī 
men gathered there, I stood out. Almost everyone knew the other because of the frequent 
traveling tours that they have undertaken. It was indeed; not just a pre-Ijtimāc meeting of 
leaders (amīrs) or their representatives from each of the Tablīghī zones but also a reunion of 
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 Mohamed Tozy (2000, 167) outlines four different conceptual usage of the term jamaat: Jamaat as a 
community of persecuted faithful who defend the faith; jamaat as a community of the Faithful as the true 
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 These elders of the movement are also called akabir.  Borana speakers use the term jarole which roughly 
means the same. Among the Borana, age is a sign of wisdom and elders are custodians of traditions. 
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qudamā’, a rank that these committed dāʿis101 accrue due to their hundred of days on road for 
the sake of the movement.  
As soon as I walked into the spacious mosque that also serves as the national headquarters of 
the reform movement, I was asked a series of questions by the chief sentry (ḥirāsa) at the 
door, as to my mission. Convinced that my attendance was purely for academic research, I 
was allowed to sit among the top echelon in the long hours of deliberations and negotiations 
over the growth of the movement, discussion on the minutest details of the upcoming 
congregations and hours of supplications and lectures on how to be a good dāʿi. It is hard to 
pinpoint the national head of the movement due to endless and overlapping councils (shūra) 
at national and regional levels. In fact a common picture that conjures in the mind of an 
observer is that rather than an individual, it is a group of selected seniors that have delegated 
themselves the office of the national leadership under the auspicious arrangement of Kenya 
Shūra. 
Religious authority, as argued by Krämer and Schmidkte (2006:1), can assume a number of 
forms and functions: the ability (chance, power or right) to define correct belief and practices, 
or orthodoxy and orthopraxy, respectively; to identify, marginalise, punish or exclude 
deviance, heresy and apostasy and their agents and advocates. In the world of the Tablīghīs, 
where in the spirit of pristine Islam all has the right to preach, not everyone has a right to lead 
a group or zonal territory. Preaching or rather the mobility for daʿwa work is a delicate job. It 
needs months of apprenticeship and confidence building so as not to divert from the 
established norms and procedure of the movement’s theology. Religious knowledge (cilm) is a 
desired characteristic. 
c
Ulamā’ within and without are indeed a revered category. While 
having ʿilm has been the distinguishing feature among other competing religious traditions, 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat gives every Muslim a chance to preach. The movement encourages their 
recommended texts as source of religious knowledge and guidance and as a determinant of 
proficiency in their core teachings and practices. This does not mean that classical sciences 
such as fiqh, ḥadīth or tafsīr are not appreciated; rather for daʿwa these are too advanced for 
the ordinary people and for transformation of religious life. Individuals are encouraged to 
pursue that kind of knowledge in their own free time. 
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 Dāʿi is literally a person who calls others to the path of a faith, a preacher. It is a word that is derived from 
daʿwa, the act of reminding Muslims to be steadfast in their prayers and calling non-Muslim to the faith. The 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat prioritizes intra-ummaic daʿwa (within the Muslim community) as more urgent than extra-
ummaic daʿwa. For more detailed discussion on daʿwa, see, Racius (2004).  
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How is the Tablīghī Jamāʿat organised in Kenya? Who heads the different territorial and 
zonal administration units? How are the councils at each level composed? How are leadership 
and other responsibilities delegated within a traveling group and the mosque-based group of 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat? Who decides where a travelling team should go or are most needed? 
How is communication maintained and exchanged between a local mosque groups, say in 
Sericho in Waso and Nizamuddin in India? To answer these questions, we first have to 
explore the topography of Tablīghī phenomena. It is appropriate to outline where the Jamāʿat 
is most active. The spread and establishment of the movement in Kenya, is related to the 
relative spatial distribution of Muslim communities. The regions predominantly occupied by 
Muslims such, as the Coast, North Eastern and upper East Province are zones that have 
witnessed strong Tablīghī presence. Major towns with significant Muslim minorities such as 
Kajiado, Kisumu, Nakuru, Namanga, Eldoret and Narok are also featured in its activities 
though not pronounced as around Nairobi, at the coast and in northern and eastern part of the 
country. Nairobi is an exceptional example, for the city is the home to the national 
headquarters and the national consultative council.  
Hervieu-Leger, commenting on ‘the geopolitics of the religious’, argues that the conquest of 
souls is inseparable from practice for reconquest of space. The author notes that, to the 
followers, the geographical spread of religion and every new conversion is a sort of validation 
of the truth of the message and establishment of the kingdom of God on earth.
102
 Hence once 
certain areas are overwhelmingly affiliated with a certain religious ideology, it is often labeled 
Muslim region, Christian region etc. It is not uncommon to hear local members narrate how 
the efforts of their proselytism are gaining or losing ground in an area.  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat leaders divided the country into three major ḥalqas 103  and each with 
approximately 11 sub-ḥalqas. The progress of each ḥalqa and each sub-ḥalqa is periodically 
collected and analysed by followers and leaders so as to gauge the geographical spread and 
progress of their reform programme. ‘Halqalization’ is a simple administrative strategy 
centred on conquest of souls for the movement and also a practical modality of occupation of 
‘the spatial’ centred on mosques and markazes.   
Garissa ḥalqa covers the whole of present day North Eastern Province and the County of 
Marsabit (formerly Moyale and Marsabit Districts). The communities that are found in this 
                                                 
102
 Hervieu-Leger, 2002, pp. 102-103. 
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 Ḥalqa means a circle, it refers to a group of student studying under a learned person, it also refers to a 
collective liturgical exercise by a group of member of a ṣūfī order. H. Wehr & J. M. Cowan, pp.235-236.  
Alexander Horstmann (2009: 42) adds that these circles are the rings of a symbolic chain, which constitutes the 
force of the Jama‘at. 
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ḥalqa are various clans of the Somali such as; Garreh, Murale, Ajuran, Degodiya, Ogaden, 
Harti, and Ishaq in North Eastern Province (Chau 2010) and Borana, Burji, Garba, Garreh and 
Sakuye in Moyale and Marsabit. Rendile and Samburu, also found in Marsabit are largely 
Christians. The ḥalqa is further subdivided into sub-ḥalqas such as Moyale, Marsabit, Sololo 
sub-ḥalqas in Borana dominated regions and about eight others in the North Eastern Region. 
The headquarters of the ḥalqa is in Garissa, where the Tablīghīs have a markaz called Masjid 
Quba. 
Mombasa ḥalqa starts from Kitengela, taking the lower part of Eastern Province and the 
whole region of Coast Province. They are about 10 sub-ḥalqas in the zone. Masjid Ali is the 
central markaz of the movement in the ḥalqa. Tablīghīs from the Mombasa ḥalqa constitute a 
significant proportion of the congregation, at the annual ijtimāʿ gathering. Insightful for this 
research, is the active participation of Orma and Wardhey communities from the Tana River 
who fall under the ḥalqa. Originally part of Oromo entity, these two have been pushed south 
by years of migration, conflicts over grazing lands and intra and inter-communities raids, 
from the connection to their linguistically and culturally related Borana and other Oromo 
communities of the Horn of Africa.
104
 Orma and Borana as languages are mutually intelligible 
and hence the two communities cluster under the same translation circle at national events of 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. The brotherhood cemented by the pan-Islamic egalitarianism of the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, to an extent reinforces the ‘ethnically derived’ long lost ethnic identities. 
They come from towns like Hola, Garsen and Bura. Other coastal groups are Digo, Duruma, 
Swahili, Pokomo, Giriama and Taita.  
The rest of the country, save the Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas falls under Nairobi ḥalqa. This 
includes various towns in Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces, Central Kenya towns 
such as Nyeri and Muranga, Embu, Meru and Isiolo regions in Eastern Province. The ḥalqa 
just like the other two ḥalqas is further divided into sub-ḥalqas. The ḥalqa’s main markaz is 
Baitul Maal. The most active sub-ḥalqas are Nairobi, Meru, Isiolo, Waso, and Kisumu.  
The strategy of reterritorialisation was arranged and implemented by the Kenya Shūra in 
consultation with committed Tablīghīs from various zones. Asked why such a lay movement 
requires such an innovative ‘faith bureaucracy’, an informant asserts that it is purely for 
effective administration of daʿwa work. ‘The objective of having arrangements like ḥalqa is 
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to make the work of daʿwa easy and effective.’105 The arrangement also, of course also allows 
for proper evaluation and create religious career path for committed individuals. Another 
informant was quick to add that those who are condemning such organisational strategies do 
not understand both secular and religious schooling systems are all put in place for effective 
learning and never existed during the time of the Prophet.  He laments:  
No one complains about the structure and genesis of our school and madrasa system. 
Tablīgh is something that was formulated as a method of religious revival long after 
the death of the Prophet. There is indeed a wide gap between the time of its initiation 
and Prophet’s time. Daʿwa has been there even then but it not was systematised. 
Tablīghī as daʿwa was lost and forgotten until it was revived. So there is a lot of 
resistance to it.
106
  
 
Isiolo County is home to Isiolo and Waso ḥalqas. Waso sub-ḥalqa has its central markaz at 
newly Tablīghī built Masjid Quba in Merti. It serves as regional headquarters for Merti, 
Sericho, Madogashe, Garba Tula and Kinna areas (qaryas). Isiolo and Waso sub-ḥalqas have 
much in common with Garissa ḥalqa. Garissa ḥalqa contains the ethnic Somali and Borana. 
Moyale and Marsabit, home to their Borana co-religionists fall under Garissa ḥalqa. This 
prompted some local Tablīghīs to suggest spatial realignment so that they can be with their 
‘Cushitic’ brothers. One informant puts it this way:   
Recently there was an argument about Isiolo Jamāʿat to be grouped under Garissa so that all 
the Northern Kenya can be under one roof but the sheikhs said no. The elders refused because 
it will incapacitate Nairobi. Nairobi would be very small…’107  
 
While geographically Nairobi ḥalqa is expansive, in terms of daʿwa activities it is less active. 
Therefore Isiolo and Waso are crucial zones of Tablīghī presence, which cannot be moved to 
another region. Tablīghī spatial management utilizes the already existent historical and 
political administrative boundaries. Waso sub-ḥalqa corresponds with areas occupied by 
Waso Borana living around the Waso Nyiro River covering; present day areas of Merti, 
Sericho, Garba Tulla and Kinna and excludes more ethnically heterogeneous Isiolo Central 
Division. Isiolo sub-ḥalqa stretches from Isiolo to Logologo near Marsabit. Despite the 
enormous size, the sub-ḥalqa activities are centred in and around Isiolo town.   
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Map 2 Map of Kenya showing the three ḥalqas. The eastern and upper northern area is Garissa ḥalqa, Mombasa 
ḥalqa is the area bordering the Indian Ocean and the rest of the country falls under Nairobi ḥalqa. (Source: personal 
re-constitution of spatial map from ḥalqa arrangement, oral reports and conversations) 
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Figure 2 Organisational structure of the movement in Kenya indicating the positions of Moyale and Merti adherents 
from grassroot to top levels. 
 
3.4.2 Local, Regional and National Councils (Shūra) 
There are two levels of leadership and self-organisation: At the level of the traveling 
preaching group and mosque-based group. The former is a temporary assignment for the 
duration of khurūj (Ar. tour) and the leader (amīr), is in most cases appointed or selected. For 
the mosque-based group also called maqāmī, the committed Tablīghīs constitute a council 
that meets regularly and carries out certain stipulated daʿwa activities at the mosque and its 
environs. Members of such a council are called ahl al-shūra.  
A cluster of mosques in an area would constitute administrative and consultative council 
called Qarya Shūra (zonal council). A number of Qaryas would form the sub-ḥalqa. Take the 
case of a mosque in Helu, a settlement at the eastern side of Moyale town. The local members 
of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat would conduct meetings, recruitments and preaching as a maqāmī at 
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the Helu main mosque. They would arrange and meet with other Tablīghīs from neighboring 
mosques in Helu on weekly basis as a Qarya shūra and meet with all the Tablīghīs at a central 
mosque for Moyale monthly consultative meeting (monthly sub-ḥalqa shūra). Moyale sub-
ḥalqa may send preaching teams, evaluate past activities and attend national and regional 
gatherings as a constituent unit of Garissa ḥalqa. If Garissa markaz holds an ijtimāʿ 
(gathering), the sub-ḥalqas must participate and contribute through volunteer workers to 
perform duties in various departments and send to preaching teams to be dispatched at the end 
of event. Garissa ḥalqa also keeps in touch with the Kenya Shūra based at the movement’s 
headquarters, through sending of dāʿis for national leadership consultative forums such as 
majma jor and attendance of different zonal and regional council meetings during the annual 
Nairobi ijtimācs. 
Kenya Shūra is the top decision making body in the Tablīghī structure in Kenya. Members of 
the council oversee the day to day coordination of the different zonal and regional units, 
receive, accommodate, and arrange travel routes of foreign jamāʿats, organize national 
ijtimāʿs and meetings of senior Tablīghīs, coordinate travel arrangements of Kenyan Tablīghīs 
traveling for foreign tours e.g. passport, visa and air or bus tickets and vet such volunteers, 
process oral and written field reports from various ḥalqas and sub-ḥalqas and represent 
Kenya’s Tablīghī Jamāʿat chapter at Shūra al-cālamī at Nizamuddin international 
headquarters. The Kenya ahl al-shūra are composed of 12 or so individuals, who majorly hail 
from the Kenya’s Asian Muslim communities and selected influential Tablīghīs from Somali, 
Swahili, Garreh and Borana communities.
108
  
Kenya Shūra members have gained this rank courtesy of numerous hours of commitment to 
the movement’s activities through frequent travels, endless hours of deliberations and 
management of various logistical supports. Kenya shūra as mentioned earlier, present the 
country report at the annual shūra at the Nizamuddin Markaz in Delhi, India. Kenya Shūra 
also see to it that high-ranking elders of the movement are invited from South Africa, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and United Kingdom for national and regional gatherings. Just above 
the level of the Kenya Shūra are the various councils of the movement in IPB and the most 
important central Tablīghī shūra at Nizamuddin (Reetz 2008:108). Crucial in the whole 
global leadership structure is a small shūra composed of Māwlanā Sa`d and Māwlanā Zubair. 
The two directly relate with the family of the founders of the movement. (Reetz 2008: 109). 
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The sheikhs of the movement are also revered and given title of ‘elders’. It is not uncommon 
to hear Tablīghī speak about what the ‘wazee’ have encouraged or forbidden while on travel. 
For instance, I was informed that the ‘wazee’ or its Borana equivalent ‘jarole’ have 
encouraged the duration of shūra (meetings) at all level, not to be more than 15 minutes.  
At the sub-ḥalqa levels of Moyale and Waso, where the research was conducted, the ranks 
and files of the leadership reveal three characteristics: One, the leadership positions are 
dominated by individuals who have dedicated most of the time to travel tours and to mosque-
based Tablīghī  activities; leadership strategy differs between zones where some areas prefer 
monthly amīr ship while others favour weekly or daily arrangement and finally, leadership 
oportunity is linked with one’s knowledge and competence of the objectives, procedures and 
spiritual benefits of diverse Tablīghī  practices, oratory and coordination skills. As they 
volunteer more time, network with fellow dāʿis and undergo transformative self-reform, 
committed local Tablīghīs are recruited. These new Tablīghī dāʿis link local units with their 
ḥalqa headquarters and the national and other affiliated sacred spaces of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. 
Abdi, a one former Tablīghī amīr, summed it up in this manner: 
When it comes to decision making, the people who attend and convene are called ahl al-
shūra. Mostly there are senior regulars who know the way of the daʿwa. Some areas elect 
their amīr on monthly, weekly, yearly basis or sometimes just for a session only. It depends on 
the arrangement of local dāʿis. The amīr is faiṣala, the decider. Mostly of the time he does not 
have an agenda of his own. The agenda comes out of the discussion…For Moyale Qarya, the 
amīrship is monthly and for our mosque it is monthly too. Helu also has its own amīr and they 
select it on monthly basis.
109
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3.5 Conclusion  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, a reformist group originally founded to revive religious observance amongst 
the nominal Meos of Mewat of colonial India, grew exponentially to become one of the 
fastest and most widespread daʿwa Muslim movements. The core of the movement’s strategy 
is to make every Muslim by default, a lay preacher. Everyone who joins the group travels for 
specific number of days so as to ‘reform’ and consequently ‘change’ others. Politics and 
doctrinal debates were also proscribed. Over the years and through continued network of the 
local Tablīghīs with centres in South Asia, the Kenyan branch of the movement has grown to 
be well established with connections and networks that link mosques in rural areas to Nairobi 
headquarters through loose but dynamic Tablīghī bureaucracy. Kenyan Muslims of Indian 
descent, a heterogeneous group, played and continues to play pivotal role in the movement 
activities in the country. Revivalist movements of various religions often in attempting a 
return to the path of the founders often invest in innovative structures, selective interpretation 
of core teachings, charismatic leadership and pragmatic recruitment and mobilisation of new 
followers and motivation strategies to keep the present membership within its fold. It is 
perhaps by examining the contemporary practices of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat that we shall obtain 
the dynamics of a transnational Islamic revivalist movement and understand how such groups 
introduce new practices and re-interpret old ones in order to impact on the everyday religious 
and social life of its followers. Therefore the next chapter shall examine three fundamental 
issues of the transnational movement: space and place making strategies, communal and 
individual religious practices and gender-specific tours of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya.  
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Chapter Four 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya: Positions, Places and Practices 
4.1 Introduction  
When I met in mid-February 2012, Harun Galma was a worried man. He had just returned 
from his first forty day Tablīghī tour. He volunteered for this form of tour at the end of the 
December-January Purana Saathi jor, a special gathering for regular Tablīghīs and was part 
of a Borana speaking team that did a travel circuit within Nairobi’s informal settlements with 
significant Cushitic population. His worries concern his ability to remain on the reformist path 
of the movement. There are a lot of things to be done on a regular basis. He needs fellow 
Tablīghīs for guidance and support. He was informed that upon return to his place of work, he 
needs a maqāmī, a mosque-based council composed of regular Tablīghīs to carry out certain 
practices and remain steadfast on the path of lay ministry. His worry emanates from the lack 
of such a team in a small urban centre in Nandi Hills where he works as a police officer. 
Without such a team composed of experienced peers, a novice is seen to lack the ability to 
sustain and practice the various practices that he learnt on his first tour. The above scenario is 
a pointer to the role of the mosque-based groups as a pivotal gear within the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
Kenya Chapter. In this chapter we shall explore the space and place making strategies of the 
movement, its various mobility related, congregational gatherings, communal and individual 
obligations, teaching and learning programmes, and finally explore women-based travel 
arrangement called masturat jamāʿat. These practices and place making strategies are the 
forces behind the rapid spread of the movement and resilience of its revivalist agenda in 
different parts of the country.  It should be noted that due to firm establishment of the 
movement through close interactions with the translocal networks, practices and politics of 
space and place making as well as strategies of proselytism of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya 
are undoubted similar to those of their South Asian or South East Asian counterpart. There is 
certain consistency in Tablīghī practices despite its global spread though subtle differences in 
motivation, adherence, and interpretation of varied practices. The practices discussed in this 
chapter are however prevalent within the Kenyan chapter of the movement.  
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4.2 Managing Sacred Spaces: Mosques and Markazes  
 
Mosques form the central venue of Tablīghī Jamāʿat proselytism and recruitment. A mosque 
is an Islamic institution that conducts prayers and organizes other religious activities to serve 
the Muslim population. It is also commonly called masjid (pl. masāajid.). It has been pointed 
out that in Kenya local as well as foreign sponsors undertake the building, maintenance and 
management of mosques. Most mosques however were constructed, sponsored and under the 
management of local communities, including local groups and organizations. Local sponsors 
of mosques comprise about fifty two percent (52%) of all sponsors of mosques in Kenya 
(Mwakimako 2007: 25-28). In Northern Kenya most mosques are managed by 
c
ulamā’ 
affiliated with Salafīst ideology though few purely Ṣūfī mosques exist. Not everyone can lead 
prayer, call for prayer or be part of management committee. Kong (2001: 405) asserts that 
mosques fall under sacred spaces, spaces that are characterised by hierarchical power 
relations of domination and subordination, appropriation and dispossession, involving 
entrepreneurial, social, political and other profane forces. One can agree with Kong that 
sacred space is indeed a contested space just sacred is ‘a contested category’. To the believers 
mosques whether old or new, small or large, in town or in the village, are extremely 
inviolable and sacred.  
Without accommodation at various mosques in the country, travelling groups on khurūj 
(Tablīghī tour) have no venue for preaching to other Muslims and learning the faith among 
themselves. For a Tablīghī residing in an area, he is expected to transform the quality and 
quantity of religious practices that can be conducted at his local masjid through a mosque-
based group. There is a strong bond of attachment that is built between a regular Tablīghī and 
his local mosque so much so that it forms part of identification at national and regional 
gatherings. For example, one may introduce himself as Ali of Sololo Jamia Mosque, Bashir of 
Khalifa Mosque, Merti, Jarso of Rapsu Mosque, and Abdurrahman of Al-Rahma Mosque and 
so on. As mentioned earlier Tablīghīs are encouraged to either join or constitute a maqāmī, a 
mosque-based jamāʿat with sets of communal and individualised Tablīghī practices to be 
executed on scheduled basis. A maqāmī especially where a resident mosque is not affiliated 
with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat would run their activities through negotiation with mosque 
custodians. It is common to find these mosque-based jamāʿat carrying out shūra with explicit 
support of mainstream Salafī inclined culamā’. Such culamā’ may not attend these 
consultative meetings but would condone them as long as tenets of orthodoxy are not 
infringed.  
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In each ḥalqa there is a central markaz to coordinate Tablīghī activities. Examples of these are 
Masjid Quba in Garissa ḥalqa, Masjid Ali in Mombasa ḥalqa and Baitul Maal markaz in 
Nairobi. In each sub-ḥalqa, there is a markaz or a ‘Tablīghī-friendly’ masjid that would serve 
as the zonal base for the movement. Examples include Al-Ansar mosque in Isiolo sub-ḥalqa 
and Prison mosque in Moyale. In Waso, Masjid Quba in Merti is the markaz of the 
movement. A markaz serves several purposes. It is a place for departure and return of 
travelling teams going out for scheduled number of days. It serves as accommodation for 
foreign as well as local jamāʿats en-route. It can act as store of valuable items of travel teams 
and also a venue for recruitment of new members. Monthly ḥalqa or sub-ḥalqa consultations 
are carried out at these venues.  Regular zonal or regional gatherings such as jor and ijtimāʿs 
may congregate at these centres. On Merti Markaz, a maqāmī member asserts that: 
Markazi Merti can accommodate 400-600 people. Though it is new, it is now a fully 
functional markaz. In that, it is a place where a travel team (Sw. kundi) will find 
accommodation, storage for their valuables such as money and passports. It is also a 
place for receiving and taking ḥidāya (Ar. guidance before and after travelling for 
daʿwa). All kundis leaving from the area must ḥidāyat from here and all kundis 
coming back from tour must take ḥidāyat from here.110  
 
The guidance (Ar. ḥidāyat) is set of instructions on how to carry out daʿwa while on travel 
and how to carry out spiritual reforms at home upon return. The Tablīghīs state that ḥidāyat 
are of two type: ḥidāyat kharijin and ḥidāyat raji’in, i.e. guidance for departure and guidance 
upon return (Ar.). Before departure, certain ground rules of preaching and self-reform are 
imparted to the volunteers including how to introduce the group in new places, how to behave 
en-route, spiritual supplications to be frequently recited, how to approach 
c
ulamā’, how to 
preach mosque congregants, how to take care of visited mosques, the powers and duties of  an 
amīr and what is expected of the group and a host of motivating narratives, ḥadīths and 
Qurʾānic verses to bolster these teaching. Upon return, the team breaks up and heads home. 
Each is expected to disseminate what he has to learn in a gradual and consensual manner with 
his nuclear family members and also be an active participant in the local mosque-based 
jamāʿat. 
A markaz is a hub for Tablīghī activities and often there is a class of experienced Tablīghīs 
that oversees the day to day chores such as security, reception of foreign and local traveling 
teams and guests and delivery of ḥidāyat on rotational basis. These individuals who such 
duties delegated to are called ta’mir jamāʿat. The jamāʿat is composed of local Tablīghīs who 
volunteer for 10 to 20 days to oversee the affairs of a markaz. Ta’mīr jamāʿat help in giving 
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ḥidāyat and nuṣra (Sw. support or aid) for the travel teams that arrive at the markaz or 
masjid.
111
 They also offer on-spot translation services (Ar. tarjama) to foreign jamāʿats that 
cannot speak local languages in case need arise. It is not uncommon to find an Urdu or Arabic 
speaking travel teams being assisted by local dāʿis to translate sermons and teachings into 
Borana or Swahili. Frequent preaching tours to IPB or numerous travels with travel teams 
from South Asian region has seen a rise in basic proficiency of Urdu among local Tablīghīs. 
Many times a Kenyan kundi heading to IPB would spend at least four months and that is 
enough to pick a few words and phrase. Urdu is particularly the main language used by 
invited elders during national and regional gatherings and a source of terminologies for 
varieties of Tablīghī practices and travel modules. Some Tablīghīs joking argued that because 
the message is essentially the same; it is quite an easy task to make a rough recap of idea 
being delivered in Urdu into local languages. The ta’mīr jamāʿat also provides dalīls (Ar. 
guides) for visiting preaching teams wishing to conduct jaula (Ar/Ur. a neighborhood outing) 
to call people to the mosque for daʿwa. The team also assists visiting jamāʿats in duties such 
as culinary and hospitality services (khidma) and act as ushers (istiqbāl) to welcome such 
preaching teams when they arrive and depart.  
Every markaz is expected to have security all round the clock. Ḥirāsa teams are designated 
for this responsibility.
112
 Foreign as well as local travel teams bring with them valuable goods 
such as travelling documents, personal belongings, phones and books. Ḥirāsa keeps unwanted 
persons and animals out of the markaz compound. The ta’mir jamāʿat also carry out 
instructional teachings on daily basis such as taʿlīm, recitation of Qurʾān, delivery of bayān 
(inspirational religious talks). This is to ensure that every 24 hours the religious practices 
expected of a Tablīghī mosque are prevalent and sequentially carried out. Lamenting on how 
the non-Tablīghīs used the mosque only as a place of five daily prayers, Aw Kombola once 
remarked that ‘people have turned the masjid into a prayer mat and that Tabligh Jamāʿat is 
attempting to revive all the functions of the mosque as taught to us as the noble Prophet. A 
mosque must be alive for the whole day and the whole night.’113  Metcalf notes that the use of 
mosque instead of a separate building is understood as a reviving the multiple roles of a 
mosque as place of accommodation, seat of council and a forum for organising daʿwa 
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campaigns.
114
 In areas and mosques that they attend their prayers, Borana speaking Tablīghīs 
have revolutionised these sacred spaces to have more functions than the five daily prayers.   
In mosques that do not have Tablīghī presence, save the prayer times, the place is largely 
deserted except very few personnel such as imām or his assistant muezzin.  
An emerging trend in Tablīghī management of sacred space is establishment of Qur’ān 
memorisation schools (Ar. Tahfīdh madrasa) in markaz compounds. At Baitul Maal there is 
such a well-established institution which is patronised by the male children of regular 
Tablīghīs. The boarding institution prioritises the recitation and memorisation of the Qur’ān 
above the other Islamic sciences. Such children join their fathers in bayān and taʿlīm sessions 
during the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ. In Merti’s markaz, establishment of such an institution was 
at an early stage. 
Tablīghī sacred space has certain characteristics. Every maqāmī teams are encouraged to 
carry out specific practices in their resident mosques. The practices facilitate the Tablīghīs 
occupy these spaces through performance of practices on regular basis. To do that, Tablīghīs 
carry out what is referred to as five deeds or as popularly known panch amaal (Ur. the five 
deeds)/amali tano (Swahili)/amal shanan (Borana). These practices are claimed to manifest 
characteristics of the mosques of the Prophet time and those of the rightly guided caliphates. 
Once the practices are fully sequenced and consistently carried out in one’s own local masjid, 
committed Tablīghīs are encouraged to extend it to neighbouring mosques. These practices 
unlike the travel team modules reinforce mosque-based jamāʿats as the transformative link in 
the growth of the movement. It leads to resilience of the movement as a religious revival body 
having far reaching consequences on long term mosque and household management. The 
panch amaal are:- 
a. Mashwera (regular consultations) done daily with fellow Tablīghīs. 
b. Taʿlīm (Religious instructions) done at least twice a week. 
c. Jaula (local neighbourhood outings to call people to mosque to listen to sermons and 
talks) done once or twice weekly.  
d. fikr al-dīn (deliberations on the state of affairs of the community) conducted once a 
week and it brings together maqāmī teams from different mosques for collective 
debates on movement’s progress and challenges. 
e. Khurūj shahrī (monthly excursions for daʿwa activities) initiated by the maqāmī team 
to recruit and mobilise their members and general public for proselytism. 
 
Attempts by mosque-based jamāʿats to introduce and carry out these acts have been received 
at times with hostilities and at times with indifference. The nature of this appropriation and 
resultant contestation of space shall be discussed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.  The 
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nature and procedure of the panch amaal and other practices of the movement shall be 
discussed in the subsequent section. Below of a diagram that summarises the role of the 
maqāmī  in redefining mosque usage. 
 
Figure 3 Spatial characteristics of a Tablīghī maqāmī. 
 
4.3 Regime of Reform: A Guide to Practical Daʿwa à la Tabligh 
4.3.1 Ideological Teachings of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya 
Listening to Tablīghī talks and educational sessions in field work in Kenya, I observed that 
the teachings of the Tablīghīs revolve around establishing ‘sincere belief’ in their lives and 
the question of how to go about this explains all the various religious practices constructed to 
achieve it.
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 The aim of the Tablīghī  Jamāʿat, notes Ali (2010: 149) is not directly to change 
the world, which it claims has sunk deeply into the ‘time of ignorance’ which existed before 
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Islam was revealed, but to contribute to the rebuilding of the Muslim community and a new 
Muslim identity through the remaking of Muslims. Masud (2000: 77) points out that viewing 
Tablīghī literature one will notice that the ideology of the movement gradually progressed 
from general emphasis of religious duties (as defined in Māwlanā Ashraf Ali Thanawi’s 
books) to a socio-political programme as envisioned in the writings of Māwlanā Ihtishamul 
Hassan to current concerns with spiritual revival of Muslim consciousness as reflected in 
Māwlanā Zakariyya’s Nisab. Masud (2000: 79) adds that there has been no official statement 
of ideology and that one can nevertheless discern major teachings from books written about 
the Jamāʿat by people associated with them, books recommended by the Jamāʿat for reading 
sessions and finally available statements and letters by the movement’s three amīr s and other 
speeches by the elders of the Jamāʿat.  
Faza’il-e-A’maal (Virtues of Practices) formerly called Tablīghī Nisab (Curriculum of 
Tabligh) by Māwlanā Muhammad Zakariyya is one of the most popular texts used in Kenya.  
English translation of the book is readily available at highly subsidized prices in Kenya. One 
can buy the book for less than 10 Euros at varieties of temporary bookstalls that are erected 
by enterprising Tablīghīs during congregational gatherings such as jors or ijtimāʿs. It remains 
one of the most utilized books for instructions and preaching while on khurūj and for readings 
at home with the family. It comprises of six to seven books depending on the edition: Stories 
of Sahaba (Hikayat-i Ṣaḥāba); Virtues of the Holy Qur’ān (Faza’il-i Qurʾān); Virtues of 
Ṣalāt (Fazai’l-i Namaz); Virtues of Zikr (Fada’il-i Dhikr); Virtues of Tabligh (Faza’il-i 
Tabligh); Virtues of Ramaḍān (Fada’il-i Ramaḍān) and Muslim Degeneration and its Only 
Remedy (translation of the Urdu Book Musalmano-ki-Mawjoodah-pasti-ka-Waahid-Ilaaj by 
Māwlanā Ihtishaamul Hasan Kaandhlawi). 116  Faza’il-e-A’maal is currently available in 
Swahili under the title of Fadhila za A’maali. It was translated by Maulid Kayanda of Daawat 
Ilalkhair Markaz. It was first published in 1992 and the second edition issued in 1996. The 
constituent chapters are the same as the original English and Urdu versions only in Swahili 
namely: Visa Vya Maṣaḥāba, Fadhila Za Qur’ani, Fadhila Za Swala, Fadhila Za Dhikr, 
Fadhila Za Tabligh, Fadhila Za Ramaḍāni, and Kuvunda Kwa Uislamu Na Tiba Yake Ya 
Pekee of Māwlanā Ihtishaamul Hassan Kaandhlawi. It was published by Samnawi 
Enterprises, Nairobi.  
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 A copy that I obtained at Isiolo jor contains the six books except ‘Muslim Degeneration and its Only 
Remedy’ by Mawlana Ihtishaamul Hasan Kaandhlawi. It was the 5th South African Impression published by 
Waterval Islamic Institute in Johannesburg.  
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Another popular text is Riyāḍ-al-ṣāliḥīn (The Garden of the Righteous) by Abu Zakariyya 
Yahya ibn Sharaf An-Nawawi. It is a collection of verses of Qur’ān and ḥadīth from major 
ḥadīth collections (al-ṣaḥīḥ al-sitta). Its simplicity and relevance to the core teachings of 
Tablīghī daʿwa makes its usage widespread. Small pocket-size booklets with range of 
supplications and remembrance for many occasions are widely circulated among the 
Tablīghīs in Kenya. Muntakhab Aḥadīth  compiled by Māwlanā Muhammad Yusuf 
Kandhlawi is a book that is currently gaining prominence especially among senior Tablīghīs 
travelling for longer khurūj tours of four months. The book is a selection of verses of Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth relating to the six qualities of daʿwa and tablīgh. The sole authorised translation of 
the text from Arabic to English is indicated to have been done under personal supervision of 
Māwlanā Muhammad Sa’d Kandhlawi, one of the two senior elders of the movement and 
who also is the grandson of Mohammad Yusuf Kandhlawi. It was posthumously published by 
Annayyar in Karachi, Pakistan in 1997. The book has also been translated into Swahili for 
local use. The six qualities (also called the six fundamentals/virtues/principles) or sitta siffat 
are what the beliefs and practices of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat rests on of which the first two are 
also the pillars of Islam, they are: 
1. Faith and firm belief in “lā ilāha ilá l-Lāh, Muḥammad rasūl Allāh” (Kalima  Ṭayyiba) - 
None is worthy worship but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.  
2. Concentration and devotion in Prayers (Ṣalāt) 
3. Knowledge and remembrance of Allah (ʿIlm wa Dhikr) 
4. Generously fulfilling the rights of a Muslim (Ikrām-al-Muslim) 
5. Sincerity of intention (ikhlās al-niyya) 
6. Inviting towards Allah and conveying the message of Allah (Daʿwat wa Tabligh) 
 
In addition to the six principles, Muntakhab Aḥadīth lists the seventh one which is ‘avoiding 
the irrelevant’. Also known as tark-e-laya’ni in Urdu which means rejection of pointless, it 
includes all those acts that take a believer from the commands of Allah. It has been 
interpreted as a companion principle of Ikrām-ul-Muslim and concerns guarding one’s tongue 
from excessive and vain talks that may lead disharmony, rivalry or rejection of the teachings 
of the movement by the public. Over years tark-e-laya’ni has not been consistently included 
in the sitta siffat but the spirit is said to be pervasive in Tablīghī literature (Nelson 2010: 14-
15). 
Sitta siffat forms the bulk of basic teachings at home and in teaching sessions of the Tablīghīs 
on khurūj. The Tablīghīs argue that these principles were attributes that were manifest in the 
lives of the companions of the Prophet and therefore extracted by the sheikhs of the 
movement as desirable traits to be adopted for success in this world and the hereafter. Each 
siffat is expounded for the followers on three levels and with various ḥadīth s and Qurʾānic 
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verses in support of it: its purpose (Ar. maqṣad ); its virtues (Ar. fada’il) and benefits or 
achievements (Sw. faida) that can be accrued by the performance of that principle. The first 
two principles are as mentioned earlier part of the pillars of Islam alongside Zakāt (Ar. alms-
giving), Ramaḍān (fasting) and Ḥajj  (pilgrimage to Makkah). The sitta siffat are geared 
towards revival of faith in the life of an individual believer who shall, through travels and sets 
of practices at home and at mosque, institute himself as an agent of change for himself, his 
family, his neighbourhood, his community, his region, his county and finally the whole 
world.
117
 On this path of reform, an individual believer is obliged to use his resource and time 
on the work of reminding himself and others of the fundamentals of Islam. The Tablīghīs are 
hence perpetually concerned with how to make the faith visible in the lives of individual 
Muslims: Daʿwa hence according to one informant is an obligation with certain aims: 
Daʿwa has three aims. First, it is to reawaken the faith in every Muslim so that he can 
live the religion as done by the Prophet. Second, it is to unify Muslims irrespective of 
their race, sex, tribe, gender, sect and age and so on into one united umma. Nowadays 
Muslims are so separated and divided that such a unity is worth a try. Third, aim of the 
daʿwa is to make the whole community embrace Islam fully today and forever.118 
 
The first principle of Kalima Ṭayyiba, the shahada i.e. ‘lā ilāha ilá l-Lāh, Muḥammad rasūl 
Allāh’ is divided into two with the first section embracing the concepts such as Allah as the 
creator of all, helper and the only one worthy of worship while the second part acknowledge 
the prophethood of Muhammad and emphasizes the need to emulate the teachings, sayings 
and actions of the Prophet in toto. Horstmann (2009: 42), observes that the life of a Tablīghī 
is a permanent Ḥajj , and his conduct is regulated to the minutest detail so that it conforms in 
every aspect to the Prophet Muhammad’s life, imitatio muhammadi. Imān yaqīn or sincere 
and concrete faith is cultivated as a virtue of a true dāʿi. Ali notes that for the Tablīghīs, the 
inner struggle and self-purification denotes the awareness of the existence of God at all times 
in all places.
119
  
Ṣalāt (prayers) are diligently performed. What is however important is that the Tablīghīs are 
consistently asked to cultivate an acute sense of presence of Allah while prayers. In a taʿlim 
session at a zonal gathering of Tablīghīs in Isiolo, Aw Kombola defines this kind of ṣalāt is 
that in which ‘the heart and soul’ is fully involved; a prayer in which mundane thoughts does 
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not infiltrate and weaken it.
120
 The best prayers are argued to the congregational one and in 
which a person shows devotion and concentration as done by the Prophet. Sunna 
(Superorogatory) prayers are highly encouraged too. 
To further remodel their spiritual life through ‘ilm wa dhikr’, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat require that 
members dedicate time on daily basis to recitation of the Qurʾān; varieties of tasbihat (Ar. 
spiritual litanies) such istigfār, durūd sharīf, subhanallah and so on; and different forms of 
duat (supplications). This inculcates in the members a feeling of spiritual self-awareness. It is 
common for such Tablīghī individuals to gradually withdraw from participation in social 
activities such as miraa (a leafy stimulant) chewing or watching of English premier league the 
two most popular past time activities in Northern part of Kenya. 
Ikrām-al-muslim and ikhlās al-niyya outlines the rules of cordial relations within the 
movement and with larger Muslim community and also emphasises the need for proper 
intentions when carrying out myriads of recommended practices of the movement. Respect 
for and hospitality to elders, the amīr, and fellow Tablīghīs and to the culamā’ is emphasised. 
Such acts of simplicity, selflessness and egalitarianism that characterise the movement are 
anchored in this principle. However some non-Tablīghīs point out that ikrām exists only for 
members of the movement and that preferential treatment exists within its ranks and files.
121
 
Da’wat wa Tablīgh is the most defining principle of the movement. It is here that the 
movement outlines its idea of daʿwa as obligatory upon every Muslim and not a preserve of 
the 
c
ulamā’. The notion is informed by the teachings that the work of ‘enjoining good’ (Ar. 
amr bi’l-macarūf) is immediate and compulsory upon all believers as the daily prayers are. 
Every individual is encouraged to give his time, pay his travel expenses and accompany a 
travelling team for stipulated number of days or month. The movement sees the umma in 
general and more specifically itself as the successors of the companions of the Prophet and 
places the duty of reminding fellow Muslim on every novice and regular in the movement. 
More so verses of the Qur’ān as those listed below inform that the Tablīghī beliefs and 
strengthen their zeal to mobilise more followers to undertake the work of daʿwa. 
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 He said that if you have misplaced something and could not find it, just do ablution and pray two rak
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within few seconds, a voice would say to you ‘the book that you misplaced is on the shelf and so on’ and that as 
long as such voices are there the prayers are null and void. Taʿlīm Session at Isiolo Jor, April 2009, Isiolo. 
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Be a community that calls for what is good, urges what is right, and forbids what is 
wrong: those who do this are the successful ones. Surāt Al-‘Imrān, verse 104122 
 
[Believers], you are the best community singled out for people: you order what is 
right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God. Surāt Al-Imrān, verse 110 
 
The believers, both men and women, support each other; they order what is right and 
forbid what is wrong; they keep up the prayer and pay the prescribed alms; they obey 
God and His Messenger. God will give His mercy to such people: God is almighty and 
wise. Surāt al-Taubah, verse 71 
 
4.3.2 Mobility Related Practices  
 
Tablīghīs as we have seen so far are a group of well organised lay preachers who ground their 
teaching to the idea that for reform to occur, an individual must leave home and try to change 
his ways for the better. The individual must then come home and change his home and 
society. In other words, mobility matters, but the question is what does this mobility means? 
If society is in a state of decadence why do the Tablīghīs choose for temporary separation and 
re-socialisation rather than out-right separation and formation of ‘pure’ societies of faith like 
other movements influenced by hijra narratives? How do the Tablīghīs conceptualise ‘leaving 
home and returning home’?   
As a movement in literal sense, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat is renowned for their emphasis on 
travelling for purpose of self-reform and reform of others. The very word ‘tablīgh’ denotes 
conveyance; its root word balāgha means to convey or to make something reach another 
stage. Daʿwa, the idea that the message of Islam should be relayed to new people, reminded 
to the nominal Muslims and re-emphasised for the steadfast one, is used interchangeably with 
tablīgh in the world of Tablīghī Jamāʿat. The movement asserts that there is no better way of 
carrying this daʿwa than meeting fellow Muslims in streets and in their own mosques. Metcalf 
(2003: 140) mentions that the Tablīghīs insist that preaching must be face to face and that 
intellectuality and arguments are irrelevant to influence lives and that what counts is the 
meeting of heart. In fact, the most picturesque image of the movement is that of groups of 10 
to 15 men, young and old, travelling as itinerant preachers on foot, from one mosque to 
another, reminding Muslims and mobilising new fellow travellers in faith. The members carry 
minimalist belongings for such travels and are often self-reliant while residing a mosque and 
only ask for audience from the local Muslim communities.   
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To legitimate the novel idea of systematically travelling for the sake of Allah, the movement 
reinterprets their invitation to practical Islam as done by the Prophet in the same way. The 
Taif motif is a favourite narrative. This was a journey made by the Prophet and one of his 
companions in the early days of Islam from the hostile and unresponsive city of Makkah to 
the city of Taif for proselytism. The incident was done on foot. Unfortunately the results were 
not positive as the residents insulted and threw the two out of the city. The undesirable results 
aside, the story form the basis on which mobility for the sake of faith is grounded. Going, 
especially on foot is hence perceived as a noble and blessed endeavour. The conversion 
stories of early pioneer Muslims to Islam by the Prophet and his few companions are also 
often re-narrated with Tablīghī terminologies such as tashkīl (Ar. formation and mobilisation 
of new members) taʿlīm (Ar. religious instructions) and ziyārāt (Ar. visits). One sees a 
deliberate effort to re-tell the early history of Islam in the light of Tablīghī worldview. For 
instance, a preacher may remark ‘when the Prophet did tashkīl among his friends, 
Abubakr…they did shūra at the home of so and so and all the Ṣaḥābas present took takaza 
that there to do the work of Allah…’ and so on.  
Every religious practice and actions of the early Muslims are re-narrated with a Tablīghī 
flavour hence legitimating the new movement as based on the core teachings of Islam. The 
ship narrative is often invoked to show the need for excursion from every day space that is 
interpreted as corrupting to a life of religious re-socialization on travel retreat with fellow lay 
preachers. (Tozy 2000: 166). Abdirahim, a regular Tablīghī asserts that a ship in the high seas 
that develops mechanical problem can only dock ashore and get repair and similarly a 
believer must leave home and travel with fellow Tablīghīs and practice faith intensively for 
days so that he can reform his inner self.
123
 The underlying argument is that the nature of the 
current state of Muslim communities is deplorable and contaminating for any progressive 
spiritual reform to occur. Just like the ṣūfī practice of solitude to gain inner peace and 
spirituality, the Tablīghīs advocate for a temporary separation from the society is not just 
commendable but a necessary practice that must be done to revive faith.
124
 Some Tablīghīs 
compare the effects of the mobility experience to a phone recharge for functionality.  The 
narrative below gives perhaps the best rationale of ‘leaving home’:  
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paper is that as a typical reform movement from South Asia, the Tablīghīs combines numerous elements of 
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When a person is sick, he is taken out of the home environment and put into hospital. 
The new place will allow for change, proper treatment and recovery. The more sick 
the patient is, the deeper he goes, from the general ward to special care to intensive 
care. Thus, a person who is spiritually not well also needs to go out, to change his 
environment, to go to better surroundings and in better company to be with those 
performing Salaah, making Dhikr, thereby getting proper direction in life. He should 
be with those who are trying to gain closeness and proximity unto Allah, who are 
trying to reform, change and link themselves to Allah. He should be with those who 
are inviting towards good and doing the good, who are invited to good rather than to 
bad and evil. Thus one needs to go out.
125
  
 
The above quote show that reforming the inner self as envisioned by the movement is best 
done in company of fellow Tablīghīs who have mastered the techniques of personal devotion. 
It is hence seen as an apprenticeship for an alternative religious career and experience. This 
travel and subsequent work of preaching is argued to be compulsory on every one, male and 
female. A popular Prophetic saying ‘ballighu anni walau ayah’ (Ar. transmit from me even if 
it is one verse) that commands that believers should convey to others even if they know a 
verse legitimizes recruitment of lay preachers. There are three main mobility related practices 
among the Tablīghīs in Kenya khurūj, ziyārāt and jaula. Let us briefly examine them.  
4.3.2.1 Khurūj (Preaching Tour) 
Khurūj fī sabīlillāh denotes the travelling for the sake of Allah. These travels are systematized 
travelling modules with elaborate time plan and routes. Individuals engage in this excursion 
for two reasons: first, to strengthen and refine their religious practices and hence mould their 
character and commitment to practical Islam and second to inform their fellow Muslims to be 
steadfast too and may be get one or two members into the fold of itinerant preachers.  
Kundis (Sw. travel teams) can be formulated in four different settings. It could be organized 
during the frequent zonal and national gatherings of ijtimāʿs and jors.126 Many kundis depart 
to different directions in Kenya at the end of such gatherings. Second, it may be formed as a 
result of successful mobilization by a travelling team in an area. A kundi can literary give 
birth to another kundi as local dāʿis and non-Tablīghīs are encouraged to volunteer and form a 
team after a visiting travel group leaves the area. Third, a mosque-based group may organize 
local Muslims to volunteer time on a monthly basis to tour the locality for three days or so. 
Fourth, committed members at times dedicate a certain number of days every year for tour. 
All these possibilities of group formations mean that at any time, a jamāʿat from a local 
mosque jurisdiction, far towns within a sub-ḥalqa, other sub-ḥalqas or ḥalqas or even from 
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to a preaching team on travel (a travelling jamāʿat). 
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foreign countries (such as Pakistan, Egypt or Tanzania) are doing their travelling tour. These 
frequent travels and visits strengthen local Tablīghī units connecting them in sustained 
interactions with the world of Islam beyond their mosque jurisdiction.  
Through consultative meetings a kundi is often given a route to take, sets of mosques to visit 
as based on need assessment obtained from monthly progress reports and an amīr to guide on 
the principles of daʿwa. As the movement eschews dependency, each individual is required to 
contribute a stipulated amount of money needed to cover food and travelling expenses for the 
period of the tour. The amount varies between countries but it is relatively low as costs are 
kept bare minimum.  
Committed members are hence required to allocate three days per month, 40 days per year 
(chilla) and four months once in a life time to do preaching tours.
127
 In practice the travelling 
modules are dynamic, flexible and customized to the needs of regular members and at time 
novices. A teacher who has only thirty days of leave may negotiate with the amīr of a four 
months travel team before departure and exit from the team after his allocated time is over. 
There are also ten day jamāʿats for busy regulars and interested non-Tablīghīs who want to 
‘jumpstart’ their imān. One could also volunteer for a twenty day tour in case he has other 
urgent matters to attend to.  
Regular followers give more time especially once they take pledge that they shall dedicate 
certain numbers of days per year on the works of the movement, a pledge called sanawi. 
Recruitment into the movement is a gradual phenomenon. An individual would be convinced 
to volunteer to join a team of 10-15 people for a three day tour. He may volunteer for many 
three day tours and may then go for ten day tours hence enriching his Tablīghī experience. He 
would then be motivated to go for a 40 day tour.  Once such a person travels for a number of 
40 day daʿwa tours, he may, by then, rise also in rank among the local Tablīghīs holding 
rotational amīrship or other duties. He would then be self-motivated or convinced by his 
fellow Tablīghīs to travel for a four month tour. His selected friends would by then be largely 
being drawn from among fellow Tablīghīs and his family who would at the same time 
undergo albeit slow but gradual religious transformation. Such numerous travels would make 
him to go beyond the borders of his local village to cities and towns in Kenya and Southern 
Ethiopia and some time to far places as South Asia or Nigeria or South Africa. He becomes 
truly translocal maintaining networks across ethnic, regional and national borders.  
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When a travel team arrives in a region, it ideally does a kind of ‘reconnaissance’ to get 
familiar with the territory, meet the ‘notables’ such a chiefs, culamā’, senior resident dāʿis of 
the movement for acknowledgement, recognition of their importance and to get their 
blessings, and significantly reduce any resistance to their plan of stay and preaching. Once 
duties are allocated, the team embarks on routinised day to day chores that range from 
teaching lessons within the team, excursions to local mosque community, preaching to 
mosque attendants to individual religious practices.    
Through the nature and depth of teachings one is exposed to gradually increase as one 
progress from three days to four months travel teams. While in three and 10 day tours, 
superficial understanding and memorisation of the six siffat is taught. More elaborate 
Qurʾānic verses, Prophetic traditions and other Tablīghī narratives in support of the six siffat 
and principles of daʿwa are expounded in lengthier tours of 40 days and four months.  
One such principle is the popularly quoted uṣūl cishirīn (Ar.) or the twenty principles. These 
principles set the boundaries of what is allowed and desirable, what is encouraged, what is 
detested and what is ‘no-go zone’. Uṣūl cishirīn sets out the priorities of practices for a travel 
team as what is to be done in plenty; what deeds are to be reduced significantly; what 
practices one must force himself to do; what actions must refrain from and what issues must 
not even talk about.
128
 The principles are for easy memorisation and practise arranged in sets 
of four. The first four are actions or practices that should be done in abundance: One, daʿwatu 
nas ilallah i.e. calling people to Allah or in other words, dedicating time for daʿwa efforts 
whether one is at home or through regular volunteering for travels. Second is ta
clīm wa 
ta
c
llum (Ar. to learn and to teach) which prepares the Tablīghī to learn and to teach others 
essentially through teaching modules called taʿlīm conducted at home, at local mosque and 
while on travel tours. This second principle ensures that a novice learns the tenets of the 
movement and with time and exposure to the different materials and lectures rise to the rank 
of being an accomplished lay preacher. Third is 
cibāda maca dhikr (Ar. religious obligations 
with remembrance) in which a Tablīghī is required to conduct varieties of religious duties 
(worship) such as prayers, zakāt (alms-giving), saum (fasting) and ḥajj  (pilgrimage to 
Makkah) in combination with hours of practices of dhikr such as recitation of the Qurʾān, 
du
c
as and tasbiḥāt. Four is khidma (service to others). While on travel tours, the individuals 
are motivated to perform acts of sacrifice such as cooking on behalf of others, washing 
clothes for the co-preachers, running errands for the team, drawing water from wells and so 
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on. Such acts are argued by the Tablīghīs as spiritually rewarding as it enhances brotherhood, 
respect and sense of humility.  
The second set of principles are those which one is required to reduce. First among them is al-
naum (Ar. sleep). While on travel or at home, a Tablīghī is required to reduce his hours of 
sleep to bear minimal. Some put it at six hours a night. More time is hence set aside for hosts 
of individualised and communal practices. Second is al-ṭacām (Ar. consumption). Eating food 
and drinking beverages or water is also regulated. They are seen as just means to furthering 
the preaching and performance of religious deeds rather than for nutrition or other purposes. 
Food consumption is kept basic and minimal especially while on travelling tours to cut costs. 
Food is arguably bonding when eaten in communal manner as the team does while on travel. 
Third is kalām dunya (Ar. mundane talks). According to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat teaching, a lay 
preacher to talks less about the present world but more about death, the tribulation in the 
grave, God’s judgement and rewards and punishment accrued for various actions. More so, 
mundane talks are argued to distract the travelling team from the goal of their retreat: self-
reform. Fourth is restricted departure from mosque premise without any urgent needs. While 
on travel, one is expected not to leave the team to attend to private matters without permission 
of the amīr. It may be a pressing but simple matter as the urge to go to the wash room while 
some form of teaching is going on but permission must be asked. This creates a sense of self-
discipline and obedience.  
Third set of principles are those that one should force himself/herself to perform. First among 
those is ta
c
aṭū al-amīr (Ar. obedience to the leader), unquestionable obedience to the leader of 
the travel team or local unit. The amīr is also expected to be consultative, polite, responsible, 
ready to take extra burden on behalf of the travelling team, diplomatic and ready to listen to 
diverse views and be a good decision maker. In return the members are to demonstrate 
complete obedience in as far as his instructions or commands are in line with the teachings of 
the movement. Second is aʽmāl al- ijtimāc (Ar.), performance of communal practices 
requiring participation of more than one person. The Tablīghīs broadly classify religious 
practices into two: a’mal ifradi (Ar.), individualised deeds such as Sunna prayers, dhikr and 
recitation of Qur’ān and a’mal ijtimāc, congregational practices such as jamāc prayers, ziyārāt, 
jaula and shūra among others. One is expected to be co-operative not miss any 
congregational deeds while on the travel tour. Third is ṣabr wa-taḥammul (Ar.), patience. 
Given the fact that these groups of travellers hail from different social upbringing and must 
cooperate with each other and divide labour among themselves, conflicts however latent are 
bound to erupt. Patience is hence marketed as a virtue to be emulated. Fourth is adab al-
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masjid (Ar.), observing the etiquettes of the mosque. The travelling teams temporarily stay in 
a number of mosques during their tours. They must ask for permission to use such facilities 
for accommodation, cooking of food and as venue of proselytism. Care is taken so that the 
facilities are not destroyed and the place kept ritually sacred. The sacrality of the mosque is 
hence guarded and respectability of the itinerant preachers maintained for the ease of future 
visits.  
The fourth set of principles concern those acts that one must be refrain from. The first is isrāf 
(Ar.), extravagances. A travelling team travels on shoe-string budget.
129
 To cut costs, drastic 
measures are often taken and any unwanted expenses kept minimal. In fact even bargaining is 
encouraged and legitimised as a prophetic tradition. Teams sent to market must buy what is 
required. Alternative goods are sought if the cost of a wanted item is seen as high. In the same 
line, the travel teams tend to cut excessive usage of electricity (sometime lighting candles at 
night) and water of a mosque that they temporarily stay in. Second is ishrāf, coveting other 
peoples goods. Jealousness and envy are discouraged and contentment and self-satisfaction 
promoted a virtue. Third is su’āl al-nās, begging. Self-sufficiency and contentment are 
expected to be characteristic of a travel team and individuals are highly forbidden to beg 
either as a team or as a person. Fourth is principle concerns taking other people’s items 
without their permission. Members of a travel team are expected to seek each others consent 
in order to use personal items. Personal space and respect for properties of fellow Tablīghīs 
on the move is hence inculcated firmly from the very beginning.  
The fifth and last sets of principles are four things that are highly proscribed. First and the 
most significant is siyāsa, politics. Politics is seen by the movement as highly divisive and 
distractive to the urgent need of the reform of the umma in general and the individuals in a 
travel team particular.
130
 Individuals at personal level may hold whatever views they wish but 
on travel missions, in gatherings and the discussions of the maqāmī groups, matters of 
political nature are highly proscribed. This is extended to a social and political state of affairs 
of Muslim communities that one lives in and visits while on khurūj. The Jamāʿat curiously 
sees that the solution to all the problems that the society face lie in establishing sincere belief 
in the heart of every Muslim. The socio-political plights of Muslims at local regional, national 
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or global levels are undoubtedly ignored and re-spiritualisation of facets of life yearned and 
worked for. To politick is seen as addressing mere symptoms of social problems. Second, 
cuyūb nās (Ar.), to discuss people’s faults. Backbiting and discussions concerning faults in 
other Muslims is proscribed within the movement in general. Third is ikhtilāf al-culamā’, 
arguments with scholars. To bolster their chances of acceptance and legitimacy, the Tablīghīs 
concern themselves with preaching simple religious obligations and avoid doctrinal, 
jurisprudential and ideological matters as the preserve of the scholars. To the Tablīghīs, 
scholars are interpreters of religious deeds and belief while the movement members are but 
reminders. This is because the movement draws members from among the laity. The 
Tablīghīs are acutely aware of the contestation that they create with the ʿ culamā’ in terms of 
quest for authority and power over encouraging or sanctioning religious practices of the lay. 
Being aware of this potential duel with 
 c
ulamā’ meant that they had to put in place strategies 
to avert a show-down. Fourth and the last principle is pride. The members are forbidden to 
claim that they are better than the rest of the Muslims. Humility is promoted as desired trait 
and pride frowned upon as unislamic. To some the fact that the Jamāʿat claim that there is no 
other way to salvation except through itinerant preaching is a sign of elevated sense of 
spiritual self-importance. Polite language is often used to approach people. Insults and 
unresponsive audience to the message of reform are excessively tolerated.  
4.3.2.2 Ziyārāt (Ar. Visits)  
Ziyārāt is another Tablīghī practice with strong spatial connotations. Ziyārāt are geared 
towards reaching out on a one and one basis to establish formal relationship and presence, to 
garner support for Tablīghī work and tours, to advertise the Tablīghī methodology of reform 
and most importantly to acknowledge different categories of specialised professionals 
residing in an area. The fact that the society is stratified into different classes, a ‘one size fits 
all’ strategy is seen as misleading and each category are pragmatically approached in 
carefully customised way. A business man is hence approached in a different way from the 
c
ulamā’ or fellow dāʿis. The Tablīghīs argue that like all their practices, ziyārāt must be done 
with sincere intention (Ar. niyyah) and proper procedure. Ziyārāt is elaborate exercise with 
aims (Ar. maqṣad ), procedure (Ar. tartīb), virtues (Ar. faza’il) and benefits (Ar. fā’ida). In 
northern Kenya, the Tablīghīs conduct six types of ziyārāt: 
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1. Ziyārāt Qudamā’ (visit to regular Tablīghī s) 
2. Ziyārāt khalf al-dāʿi (visits to a home of a fellow Tablīghī  on tour) 
3. Ziyārāt khawāṣṣ (visit to merchants) 
4. Ziyārāt al- culamā’ (visit to scholars) 
5. Ziyārāt al-ʿammat al -nās (visit to the general populace) 
6. Ziyārāt al- tabaqaat (visit to professional) 
 
Ziyārāt Qudamā’  
Qudamā’ are senior dāʿis. They are stated as individuals who have done the work of 
proselytism for lengthy periods of time. These individuals may have travelled cumulatively 
for months or even years, attended hundreds of Tablīghī gatherings, participated in 
management and expansion of mosque-based groups and have held various leadership 
positions and sat in many local, zonal or national councils. They are a resource of the 
movement and hence key promoters of the Tablīghī proselytism in an area. These categories 
of persons are hence seen to be continuously visited to keep them within the movement.  
The visit to the qudamā’ may be necessitated by many factors. May be the dāʿi appears 
inactive in his commitment to the movement or just plainly uninterested in its affairs as 
before. Or maybe he needs further support and goodwill from his fellow committed Tablīghīs 
so as to make longer and foreign khurūj to the centres of the movement in the Indian 
subcontinent or neighbouring countries.  
According to the Tablīghīs, caution must be exercised to approach such an esteemed dāʿi. If 
he is directly known to the Tablīghī mandated by the council members of the local mosque-
based group to visit him, then he is approached and conversed with politeness and won back.  
Hussein, an informant clarifies further that: 
If he is a friend or an acquaintance, you proceed directly to him and speak to him in 
person. If you do not know him directly, there are procedures to be followed.  First of 
this tartīb is tacrruf (getting to know the person), then comes come ikrām (extending 
hospitality and courteous deeds for him to show kindness), then you do tashkīl (regain 
and bring him back to the fold).  
If it is a person who has ‘backslided’ or left the movement, this qudamā’ must be 
treated with care and great concerns. You use words that elicit kindness. Like: 
‘Brother you have become weak in the juhd (efforts) of daʿwa…’ 
You do not say ‘what the hell is wrong you? Since you left the work of tablīgh is still 
on even though you just decide to follow miraa over the faith! This kind of castigation 
is completely forbidden. We are encouraged at all time to use ḥikma (wisdom).131 
 
In other words, ḥikma or wise counselling is administered to win back non-committed 
members. The bond of network gained through travel experience and administration of 
preaching work through the mosque-based group is viewed as lifelong. The movement hence 
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tries to counter tides of defection through customised appeal to negligent dāʿis acknowledging 
the possible reasons for non-participation on human weakness in the contaminated social 
environment of modern world rather than ostracising such former Tablīghīs. Therefore such 
‘call back messages’ are voiced in a manner to demonstrate to the former dāʿis that they are 
indeed a very important part of the daʿwa group and that his colleagues in the movement 
dearly miss him. 
To win back a non-committed Tablīghī, a maqāmī group at times coordinates with a visiting 
regional or foreign jamāʿats in the area to make a visit to such a person. A local Tablīghī acts 
as the guide (dalīl) for the visiting jamāʿat and show them the home of the identified 
individual to be visited. The team would then talk to him and motivate him to start giving 
time for Tablīghī tours and activities within the area. These strategies are believed to create 
bonds of global brotherhood and concern and attract the former Tablīghī back to the active 
participation in the everyday religious practices. The individuals see themselves as being 
members of a truly unified group of preachers who can fall back on strategies availed by the 
translocal connections of the movement in order to bolster and strengthen local participation. 
With improvement in mobile communication in most parts of Kenya, direct calls and text 
messaging are made to inactive individuals by his Tablīghī colleagues on regular basis until 
the person yields to the demands of such in-group mobilisation. 
The strategies used in the ziyārāt qudamā’ raises some fundamental questions about voluntary 
nature of the membership of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. It has often been stated that one may join 
and leave at any time they want and that there are no official registers of membership. 
Regular Tablīghīs know each other. They know who among the local Tablīghīs are active and 
who is not. They know how many travel tours have been made in the areas, when and by 
whom and with what results. One can however carefully discern that though entry is free and 
actively sought after by the regulars, as individuals volunteer more time for travels and 
partake in myriad of Tablīghī activities, he becomes indispensable to the very growth of the 
movement. His friends would in most cases be drawn from local maqāmī, his daily rota keeps 
him away from other social activities beyond the concern of the movement and tablīgh 
activities becomes his lifestyle. Such individuals are often convinced about the authenticity 
and orthodoxy of the tenets of the movement and would not easily quit. Therefore if he 
lessens his commitment, his fellow Tablīghīs would use such practices as ziyārāt to win him 
back.  
 
Ziyārāt khalf al-dāʿi (Ar. visit to a home of fellow Tablīghī who is on tour) 
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This is a kind of ziyārāt organized by the members of the mosque-based group to the home of 
an active qudamā’  who has spent many forty days and four months tours and is currently on 
khurūj fī sabīlillāh (preaching tour). The shūra of the mosque based group would identify 
which among the homes of local dāʿis en-route that should be visited and by whose family. 
Abdi, a Tablīghī from Merti outlines this visit this way:  
When we execute this visit, we visit or go to the home of the dāʿi with our wives. We 
must never go alone. We do ikrām for their wives and kids by bringing sweets and 
other gifts. We give it to our wives who will present it to them. 
Our wives will inquire about the ahwāl (Ar. conditions) of the homestead of the dāʿi. 
For example my wife would ask ‘Sister, how are you? How are the kids? How is 
everything?’ Maybe they have certain difficulties. Maybe they wish to eat meat or 
something delicious. May be one of the kids is not feeling well. The visited women 
share domestic ahwāl with our wives. 
Our wives then will share the ahwāl of the home of qudamā’  in our home shūra and if 
we as a family can do any nuṣra (assistance), we do ikrām for them. If the problem is 
big, we take it to our markaz to deliberate over it.
132
 
 
It is important to note that there is clear separation of sexes and certain gender ramifications 
in such visits as the movement gets entrenched in an area. For instance, Abdi and his wife 
Nasibo would visit the home of Boru. Boru may be away for a four month preaching tour in 
Ethiopia at that time, maybe he has finished two months and remaining with two more. He 
may not be able to communicate with his family and cannot attend to all their needs. Help 
may be plenty from clan and extended family members but the assistance from fellow dāʿis is 
privileged for they consider themselves as united by bonds of brotherhood. Abdi and Nasibo 
would arrive to the home of Boru together. The reason Abdi goes with the wife for such a 
planned visit is to reinforce the notion that the dāʿis are there for each other. He has to 
accompany his wife as ideally recommended by Islamic law as a woman is not allow to go 
out of her home alone. They bring with them small gifts such as sweets, sugar, and some 
vegetables and meat for supper and so on. Such gifts would be remembered and its sweet 
memories relayed to Boru once he is back thus strengthen his bond of commitment to the 
movement and gratitude to fellow dāʿi.  
Nasibo would have in-depth conversations with Boru’s wife about the state of the affairs of 
the home of Boru. Nasibo would share the proceedings of her conversation with the wife of 
Boru with her husband. As a family they may then solve the immediate problem of the Boru’s 
family but if it is beyond them, Abdi would raise it as an urgent matter at the next day’s 
morning shūra of his maqāmī for deliberation. It is imperative to note that just as networks of 
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purpose and friendship develop between the Tablīghī men in an area, their wives increasingly 
interact and share ideas. This network that slowly emerges from among the womenfolk would 
then be utilized for subsequent gender-based Tablīghī practices. It is also clear that a Tablīghī 
man is forbidden to make such a visit on his own as it is considered as harām. Neither do two 
or three couples make a visit; it is kept at the level of house to house, family to family visit. 
Multiple levels of shūra as we shall see later keep the flow of information, consistency of 
practices and reconfiguration and delegation of decision making a transformative feature of 
the movement in areas where such actions never existed before. 
 
Ziyārāt al-khawāṣṣ 
Khawāṣṣ refer to class of merchants in an area. A rich person, tajiri (Swahili) or dures 
(Borana) are perceived as a special category in need of personalized visit. Business people 
have different time plans and may not be willing to leave their businesses for the days for 
spiritual revitalization and tours. However wealthy individuals are among the prominent 
personalities whose decisions and opinions shape local discourses. In most cases, the rich 
Muslims often demonstrate and attempt to cultivate a sense of piety and generosity through 
prompt payment of zakāt, ṣadaqa, contributing to building of mosques and other social 
facilities. To win over the merchant class is a valuable asset worth trying as far as the local 
Tablīghīs are concerned. Their implicit support of the movement through their presence at the 
Tablīghī gatherings and short interval travels boost the much needed support for social 
respectability and religious legitimacy.  
A visit to the home of a businessman requires adequate preparation. Tablīghīs within the area 
may appoint a few of their members to make such visit a local ‘tycoon’. Abdi cautions that 
the sheikhs of the movement warn us not to go to such homes on empty stomach: 
 
If we do not have anything to eat, we should drink water to full stomach. But if we 
come and he start offering juices and nice food for us, first and foremost, the people of 
the area would interpret our visit wrongly and secondly and most important, it will 
distract us from the main objective of the visit. We must dress in good clothes too.
133
 
 
The fear here is that the merchants being men of means may enjoy playing ‘the generous host’ 
to such visiting preachers. Being kind to a group of pious lay preachers may make some of 
their blessings rub off to him. He may also raise his status as a man of faith by lavishly 
providing food and drinks for such a group. Adorning good clothes also downplays the image 
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of desperation and dependency and visually inform the merchant that the group is self-
sustaining and independent and not in need of consolation. The Tablīghīs being aware of 
subtle implications of generosity of the wealthy, they try to play down the enticements and 
other offers and embark on preaching systematised pep talk on religion and the immediacy of 
its propagation. 
Such talks would start the greatness of Allah moving on to the challenges faced by the 
prophets and their companions in bringing the faith. The talk would drift to themes about 
salvation in this world and hereafter being not in acquisition of wealth but in commitment to 
the faith. Relevant narratives would then be given to back up on the importance of using 
wealth to buy janna (Ar. paradise) and some negative consequence of not doing so. Favourite 
of such narratives with positive results are that of Abdurrahman bin Auf, Abu-Bakr As-
Siddiq, Umar bin Khattab and Prophet Muhammad who were as selfless personalities who 
used their wealth for the purpose of God and the ones with negative consequence include the 
story of Qarun who was to have suffered the wrath of God due his misuse of the wealth 
bestowed on him. 
After such heart softening moral stories, the team will immediate try to convince the merchant 
to give his time for the sake of his own religious reform. If the mobilisation is unsuccessful, 
the team may ask him to dedicate few hours to sit with the group at the mosque from time to 
time. If he is adamant to sacrifice his time, the team may wisely counsel him to send one of 
his sons or other men under his care for stipulated travel tours. Then the team may make a 
common dua and bless him and tell him to make intention (niyya) that in near future that he 
shall join a preaching tour.  
 
Ziyārātul al- culamā’ (visit to religious scholars) 
There is an unwritten law that the Tablīghīs must avoid mobilizing the culamā’ for preaching 
tours. This does not mean that they do not join such teams. As a matter of fact, some 
 c
ulamā’ 
in northern Kenya would use such platforms to preach, meet fellow believers in remote areas 
of the region and attempt to guide the members of the movement gradually. The visit to the 
c
ulamā’ has one major aim: obtaining their blessing, permission and goodwill to conduct 
daʿwa in an area. One informant puts it this way:  
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We must visit the Qalole (
c
ulamā’) to get their dua. Qallu irra ebbifatan 
(Borana)…We seek their blessings to make our daʿwa lighter. We tell them that what 
we are doing are the works that were done the anbiyā (Ar. prophets) and we 
acknowledge that they are the successors of the prophet as the scholars. So as the 
teachers of faith, we ask them for their blessings. We do ikrām for them. For this 
reason, we take along head scarves (Bor. imama/surre), kofia (Sw. caps), tusbahi (Bor. 
prayer beads) etc as gifts.
134
 
 
There is a deliberate move to recognise the importance of 
 c
ulamā’ as the teachers of faith. 
The Tablīghī literature is replicate with ideas about noble treatment and respect for the 
c
ulamā’. They are hence viewed as the custodian of knowledge especially that deals with 
jurisprudential and doctrinal matters. Given that theʿ culamā’ and the Tablīghīs all target to 
influence and reform religious priorities of local believers, the relation between the two are 
anything but cordial. This shall be discussed in details in subsequent chapters using tangible 
examples from the area of research. The Tablīghīs in simple terms need the culamā’ to get 
permission to use the mosque and other facilities for preaching, accommodation, cooking and 
washing. The 
c
ulamā’ are in most cases the managers of these facilities. Their tacit support 
would save the members of the movement from rejection and unwarranted wars of legitimacy 
and authority. The 
c
ulamā’ hence are be won over as a category of religious specialists. Gifts 
are given in this case as a gesture of kindness, a sign of sociability and acknowledgement. The 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, in these circumstances, comes to term with the laity that characterises much 
of its cadre but at the same time make a clear stand that everyone must preach Islam and 
remind others about it. 
 
Ziyārāt al-ʿammat al -nās (visit to members of the general public) 
This is a visit made to the ordinary people. The visit may be to their homes or in the streets. 
For this category, the mobilisations for the purpose of preaching tours are done directly. Abdi 
points out that: 
We inform them that the purpose of our presence here on earth is to worship Allah and 
that if we do these recruitments, we shall succeed in the life here and hereafter. We 
then inform that all of us must invest time and resources to reform ourselves and share 
the faith with others while on travel.
135
 
 
Like all the other ziyārāt, the visit to the ordinary believers is legitimized with selected verses 
of Qur’ān and Prophetic traditions. The main target of these kinds of visits is recruitment and 
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mobilization for formation of travel teams. Related to ziyārāt al-ʿammat al-nās a mobility 
related practice called jaula that shall be described shortly later.   
 
Ziyārāt al-Tabaha (Ar. visits to professionals) 
Ziyārāt al-ṭabaqāt targets those professionals in a locality whose service impact on social 
upbringing such as teachers, ritual purity such as laundry workers and barbers, and honesty 
and morality such as civil servants.
136
It is considered crucial that these professionals carry out 
their work as per the requirements of Islamic law thereby averting societal crisis. Abdirahim 
argues:  
We do the ziyārāt al-ṭabaqāt (professionals) to the barber shops and some dhobis (Sw. 
laundry). If these professionals are not guided well on how to remove the najās (Ar. 
impurities), our prayers will be null and void. 
Take the case of teachers. They are the ones in charge of our children’s education. If 
these teachers have no foresight and that they are in the work only for material gains, 
what kind of generations would we have? Their thoughts must be cleaned and be 
guided by morality. Same case with civil servants. They deal with people daily. They 
serve them. If they do not fear Allah, corruption will continue. If they have imān, they 
shall do work fī sabīlillāh not fī sabīlil corruption!137 
 
All these visits and their objectives show that the Tablīghī Jamāʿat  goes beyond the concern 
with revitalization of sincere beliefs among individuals. It is falling short of a complete 
overhaul of society through its comprehensive sets of practices that consistently reach out to 
Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs. These spatial practices enhance their contacts with prominent 
individuals, common people in the streets, artisans and small scale traders, professionals such 
as government workers and with fellow Tablīghīs.  
4.3.2.3 Jaula (neighbourhood outing) 
Jaula
138
 is closely related to ziyārāt. While ziyārāt is not time-bound practice, jaula is mostly 
conducted between the two prayers of 
c
Aṣr and Maghrib and specific days of the week.139 It 
may be conducted at two levels. Visiting preaching jamāʿat carry it out to call local residents 
to the mosque to listen to them. Another possibility is that a maqāmī group makes it a weekly 
practice as part of the panch amaal of their local mosque.  
The main aim of jaula is to convince ordinary believers to accompany the jaula team back to 
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the mosque where certain teachings are at time going on. Jaula is also called gusht (or gasht) 
in Urdu. However in Kenya, jaula is commonly used terminology in reference to these 
neighbourhood outings.  Broadly speaking, the Tablīghīs in Kenya talk of two kinds of jaula: 
1. Jaula maqāmī - outing to one’s own local mosque community  
2. Jaula itiqādī – outing to a neighbouring mosque and surrounding community 
 
The former is also called in-gusht and the latter out-gusht.
140
 In Waso sub-ḥalqa jaula is often 
conducted on Wednesdays. Often it is used to recruit  members for three day jamāʿat as 
fulfilment of one of the panch amaal: khurūj shahrī. Every month a mosque-based group are 
expected to send out a team for three day preaching tour in their locality. In fact jaula is seen 
as the main strategy of entrancing the panch amaal: 
The maqṣad (objective) of this jaula is assasu khamsa aʽmāl. It is the foundation or 
the origin of the panch amaal. We lay the foundation for the panch amaal in our 
mosque and all the mosques in our area. This is to ensure that all our mosques become 
like the prophet’s mosque and so that in each house there is nur (light).141 
 
Even more specific objectives are: 
The maqṣad  of jaula is kharaju jamāʿat. The objective of jaula is how can a jamāʿat 
be found and mobilised. We have to do fikra (deliberations) so as to make us achieve 
the jamāʿats that are needed for daʿwa.142 
 
Ordinarily, the maqāmī group leader would delegate one of their members to give a kind of 
motivational talk called targhīb.143 The person immediately after the cAṣr prayers would ask 
the local imām (Ar. prayer leader) if he could be allowed to say one or two things to the 
congregants. There are no Sunna prayers after 
c
Aṣr and so the congregants are urged to spare 
few moments for the sake of Allah. Targhīb is meant to fire up the congregants and appeals to 
non-Tablīghīs as well as experienced dāʿis.144 According to informants145 this motivational 
speech though very brief must cover five issues: 
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1. The talk must be about the primacy and significance of the word of Allah. 
2. Juhūd anbiyā’ – it must mention the deeds of the prophets in carrying out daʿwa among the 
people they were sent to. 
3. khātam al-anbiyā’ – it must state the finality of the prophethood through Muhammad and how 
he conducted daʿwa among his umma and the challenges he faced in it. 
4. Juhud ṣaḥāba – it must also mention the efforts of companions of the Prophet in respect to 
daʿwa, their trials and tribulations that saw the faith reach the congregants. 
5. Juhūd ummat al-rasūl – it must state the urgency and immediacy of the efforts of the Muslim 
umma to carry out daʿwa as the successors of the companions of the Prophet. 
 
Then the speaker in normal circumstances announces that there shall be a short jaula tour in 
the area around the mosque and that people should volunteer time to accompany the jaula 
team. A few people would ordinarily turn up. The remaining congregants would be urged to 
cluster around a speaker who carries out some form of teaching called kalām julūs  (Ar. 
‘sitting talk’) where imān, sincere faith is the main topic of discussion. In a number of 
instances it has been observed that a section of the congregants would neither participate in 
kalām julūs  nor jaula despite the customised appeal to the common goal of daʿwa. Often 
between eight to nine persons may volunteer to accompany the team while up to 10 - 15 
persons may opt to stay on for kalām julūs . The amīr of the kalām julūs  session would 
delegate two more specialised duties: one is a person to engage in dhikr and the other an usher 
or receptionist (istiqbāl) to receive and guide the ‘catch’ of jaula to the mosque. Hussein 
comments on the dhikr person in this way:  
While there is kalām julūs  going on in the mosque, the amīr instructs one person to sit 
at the corner of the mosque to conduct dhikr. This person is said to be doing adhkār 
(sing. dhikr). He seeks blessings and mercy on the jamāʿat and the community. 
Another person is stationed outside the mosque on the veranda with bottles of water 
for ablution for the gathered crowd that will come with the jaula team. He will usher 
in the arrivals in his capacity as the istiqbāl. He will provide the arrivals with water, 
with ritually clean clothes such as kikois and kanzus in case it is needed, and any other 
requirements for prayers needed. Hospitality is prime concern here.
146
 
 
Four main activities must be well coordinated and synchronized: jaula, kalām julūs , istiqbāl, 
and dhikr. On this temporal management and sequence, Abdirizak, adds that:  
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The first one is targhīb. Then kalām julūs . Jaula and kalām julūs  happens 
simultaneously. There are two others persons engaged in related religious duties. One 
is called ṣahib al-dhikr who does supplications (dua) and dhikr at the corner of the 
mosque and istiqbāl who receives the 'catch' and ensure that those who do not have 
clean clothes get one temporarily, the water for ablution is ready and then welcome 
them into the mosque.  All the four are all simultaneous. None ends before the other. 
All shall end when the jaula team comes back. The jaula is also to be lengthened so 
that it just comes back just shortly before the ṣalah (prayers). Then everyone takes 
Wuḍū’ (Ar. ablution) and joins the Jamāʿat for the Maghrib prayers. 147 
 
The jaula team usually meets outside the mosque before departure for dua and route planning. 
The procedure of the jaula as prescribed by the movement teaching is often outlined to the 
volunteers. Two persons among them take responsibilities of mutakallim (Ar. speaker) and 
dalīl (Ar. guide). In most cases, these two are appointed in an earlier consultative meeting of 
the mosque-based maqāmī group. In case of jaula by a visiting jamāʿat, mutakallim is often 
from the visiting jamāʿat while the dalīl is normally a sources from among the local 
Tablīghīs.  
Tartīb (Ar. an arrangement or procedure) of the jaula includes how to walk, what routes to 
take, what to say when you meet people, who should speak first, what spiritual litanies to 
recite while going and while coming back, how to behave while on the jaula and what to do 
upon coming back. Some of the ground rules of the spatial practice are: keeping the eyes on 
the ground, allowing only mutakallim to speak on behalf of the team, getting out of the 
mosque with the right foot, making dua before departure, keeping the tongue engaged in 
dhikr, walking in sets of twos and leaving the mosque compound using a path that goes in the 
right direction and coming back using a path is in the left direction. The dhikr that each 
individual is expected to recite silently while doing the jaula includes subhanallah, 
walhamdulillah ilallah allahu akbar (Ar. Glory be to God and Praise to God, and there is 
none worthy of worship but God, and God is the Greatest) and the ones of return leg is 
astagfirullah (I ask God for forgiveness) for forgiveness.  
The actual formulae used to appeal to the local residents to accompany the jaula team back to 
the mosque are also standardised in almost every part of the world as asserted by one 
informant. This standardisation of approach leads to near universal consistency in practice. 
First the dalīl introduces the jaula team and set the pace for the mutakallim to appeal to the 
audience. One informant notes:  
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Dalīl in most cases is a local guy... For dalīl, there are some wordings that they must 
say all over the world. A dalīl who is in Pakistan, a dalīl who is in Tokyo and a dalīl 
here in Moyale must use the same formula. The statement or the wording are: ‘we are 
a jamāʿat based at the masjid, we came here for the sake of Allah… just because of 
kalimatu la ilaha illalah and that Allah has given us the responsibility of taking this 
message. Now we are alive and soon we shall pass away and which we must all 
prepare for. As you see we never came with anything for you and we do not expect 
anything from you either except your audience and we only want you to assist us in 
this work. Therefore would you mind if we go to the mosque.’ That is the 
internationally used approach.
148
 
 
By the time the jaula team returned with a number of local residents, it is often Maghrib early 
evening prayer time. After the prayers, a Tablīghī would often arise and inform people not to 
rush home because there would bayān maghrib. This brief teaching often results in appeals to 
constitute a three days to four months travel teams. We shall discuss how bayān is conducted 
and mobilisation for formation of a travel jamāʿat done (tashkīl) in the subsequent section of 
this chapter. The jaula to some extent also serves to establish spatial presence of the local 
Tablīghīs as valid and legitimate religious group with rights to gather believers and reform 
their religious practices a task that they complement and compete with 
 c
ulamā’ to 
accomplish.  
Jaula functions in the same breath as a form of advertisement to the locals about the presence 
of visiting jamāʿats or activities of the mosque-based groups. The movement shuns 
conventional means of publicity such as posters, radio and television announcement, flyers, 
internet communications such as web-based advertisement and email communications. The 
publicity, Tablīghīs argue, has to be kept simple, practical, personal and oral as done in the 
time of the Prophet and ṣahabas. Abdirizak opines that: 
Even publicity is not allowed. We are told not to do daʿwa through emails and the rest. 
Coordination is through practical efforts. If it means a person leave Pakistan to do 
efforts here, so be it. Islam is a movement. The prophet did not sit down and wait for 
people to come to him. He did jaula. He went out.
149
 
 
Below is a spatial reconstruction of a jaula outing around a mosque neighbourhood within 
urban centres of northern Kenya.  
                                                 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid. 
152 
 
Figure 4 A jaula maqāmī around a mosque’s neighbourhood 
 
The individuals who participate in the jaula are informed that the benefits of jaula are 
achieved in the hereafter. The rewards (Ar. thawāb) are said to be immense. This makes the 
urge to accompany the team a rewarding experience. Hussein notes that:  
The fā’ida of jaula is narrated to us by the Prophet in this way: he who goes out one 
morning or one evening for the sake of Allah, his rewards worth more than all that is 
in the world and all that is in it. And the feet that travel for the sake of Allah and dust 
touch them, the fire of jahannam (Ar. a type of hell) shall be forbidden to it.
150
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4.3.3 Congregational Practices 
aʽmāl al-ijtimāʿ as mentioned earlier are diverse. This section shall discuss the most 
prominent of the Tablīghī congregational practices: ijtimāʿ and jor (gatherings) and shūra 
(consultative meetings). Congregational practices as used here only refer to those Tablīghī 
activities that involves gathering of Muslims for purpose of the advancement of movement. It 
does not analyze other conventional Islamic congregational practices such as jamaa daily 
prayers, Friday prayers, Eid festivities, tarāwīḥ during the month of Ramaḍān and so on.   
4.3.3.1 Ijtimāʿ and Jor
151
 
The apex of Tablīghī gathering in Kenya is the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ. It used to be held in the 
month of August before but the last four years have seen a shift to early May. The earlier and 
the current scheduled days coincide with the school holiday allowing teachers and students a 
chance to participate in the three day event. The Nairobi ijtimāʿ attracts up to 15,000 people. 
Participants hail from all the sub-ḥalqas of the three main ḥalqas in Kenya, a number from 
Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia (via Moyale), Rwanda, Burundi and parts of Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo. In essence, the annual Nairobi gathering is the biggest 
Tablīghī calendar event in Eastern Africa.  
Ijtimāʿs bring together different classes of people including the senior Tablīghīs, the members 
of the Kenya Shūra, various amīrs from different ḥalqas and sub-ḥalqas, novices, potential 
recruits, enthusiastic non-Tablīghīs out to get spiritual nourishment from the gathering, 
invited elders of the movement from IPB, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malawi and at times ʿ 
c
ulamā’ not directly associated with the movement. In Kenya, the annual ijtimāʿ is purely men 
affair. For three days, the mammoth crowd gather, network informally, eat and sleep at Baitul 
Maal Markaz. 
The programme of the ijtimāʿ and jor are similar with that of a travel team. Such teaching 
modules as bayān, taʿlīm, consultative meetings such as shūra, delegation of duties e.g. 
khidma, ḥirāsa are all carried out. Each sub-ḥalqa in Nairobi ḥalqa contributes the personnel 
needed for the success of the ijtimāʿ. There are five duties to which each ḥalqa contributes 
volunteers, namely: khidma (cooking and other services); tarjama (translation); ḥirāsa 
(security); istiqbāl (reception) and tashkīl team (mobilises/recruiters).   
Prior to the ijtimāʿ, all the logistical requirements are put in place. The Kenya Shūra would 
invite representatives from most of the sub-ḥalqas in the three ḥalqas to a national 
consultative forum. Tanzania and Uganda national branches often send representatives to this 
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high-levelled consultative forum usually called majma jor. Unlike the general ijtimāʿ called 
awami ijtimāʿ (public gathering), majma jor is classified as khususi ijtimāʿ (Ar. specialized 
gathering). The details about approximate attendants and confirmation of the attendance of 
the akābir (Ur. invited Tablīghī elders) for the awami ijtimāʿ are also discussed.  
As mentioned earlier modern means of publicity is shunned for oral advertisement of an 
upcoming event. Members of local mosque-based maqāmī group take the responsibility of 
informing the mosque attendants of events like a jor or an ijtimāʿ. They note down the names 
of those who wish to attend the congregation. Later volunteers would hire a means of 
transport and head to the venue of the ijtimāʿ under the amīrship of a local senior Tablīghī. 
They remain under the command of their local amīr during the entire period. Some Tablīghīs 
on preaching tours would make it a priority to attend the gathering as part of their en-route 
stops. A common strategy to have widest impact on disseminating information about an 
upcoming ijtimāʿ in Nairobi or any other part of the country is formation of special mobile 
publicity teams. Hussein notes: 
Before any ijtimāʿ, there is a practice called taasil where a special jamāʿat (jamāʿat 
taasil) or a number of people could be sent around to convey the details about an 
upcoming congregation that is in preparation. They do what is called juhd qalba juhd 
(preparations). 
In Kenya before the ijtimāʿ, a kundi is sent from every ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa to do juhd 
qabla juhd (Ar. preparatory programme) and to do i
clān (Ar. announcement). Jamāʿat 
taasil does the broadcasting of the information about the upcoming event.
152
 
 
The main objective of an ijtimāʿ according to the Tablīghīs is mobilisation of as many travel 
teams as possible to be sent to different areas and countries. At the end of an ijtimāʿ hundreds 
of jamāʿats are often obtained including several four months teams for regional and foreign 
tours, 40 days kundis, hundreds of 10 and three days kundis. During the ijtimāʿ, each language 
group forms a ḥalqa of their own i.e. Borana speaking Jamāʿat, Somali speaking Jamāʿat, 
Swahili speaking Jamāʿat, Urdu speaking Jamāʿat and so on. The volunteers are mainly sent 
back to their area of origin or neighbouring regions to ensure language barrier is not an 
impediment for daʿwa tour.  
Consultative meetings of the senior Tablīghīs decide where the team would be sent. The route 
that a team takes is identified to ensure that each kundi strengthens the already existing 
Tablīghī networks and practices in a targeted area. For instance if 90 Somalis volunteer for a 
forty days jamāʿat, the group may be split into six different kundis of fifteen persons. The 
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shūra would ensure that of the fifteen persons, at least four to five are regulars. It is from 
among the regulars that the meeting shall choose the amīr. Hussein posits that:  
For the amīr certain traits are needed. We ask, is the person an experienced dāʿi with 
many years of travel experiences? Has he led a travel team before? Can he take care of 
the kundi well if it is placed under his care? Does he have patience, confidence and 
creativity to carry out taʿlīm?153  
 
While all these negotiation and deliberations are going on in the consultative meetings of the 
senior Tablīghīs, many volunteers are vague unaware of the regions that they would be sent to 
or if they shall travel with their colleagues whom they are attending the ijtimāʿ with. It is 
indeed a moment of considerable excitement for appointed amīrs and the members 
anticipating the amount of challenges and responsibilities ahead in the anticipated tours. The 
regulars are put in each kundi to guide the new members on proper practices. Hussein put the 
roles of these experienced persons in this way: 
In each kundi there should be ‘wazee’ or experienced persons. We also require a 
person with experience of istiqbāl and khidma. Khidma experience is especially 
important. There should be a person who is creative, patient and able to make quick 
decisions about urgent matters as required. We need people with good public speaking 
skills who can move the congregation to volunteer time. So to make a kundi we ensure 
that we put in it various individuals with varied abilities and novices.
154
 
 
A jor is a mini ijtimāʿ. It is usually held at ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa levels. The organisers invite 
the ‘elders’ from Nairobi, Tablīghīs from each of the mosque in the sub-ḥalqa and visiting 
jamāʿats currently going their rounds of tour in the region. Just like the ijtimāʿ, the movement 
uses the occasion to mobilise travel teams to be sent on preaching tours. A jor lasts three to 
four days beginning normally on Thursday afternoon until Sunday morning.  
The Bishwa ijtimāʿ in Bangladesh attended by over two million attendants remain one of the 
most cherished gatherings to attend among the Kenyan Tablīghīs.155 The individuals wishing 
to travel to the Bishwa ijtimāʿ, the Indian subcontinent and other foreign countries coordinate 
their travel plans through the national headquarters. They must well known to the national 
office as committed and experienced Tablīghīs.  
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At least twice a year, the qudamā’ jors (also called majma jor or purana saathi jor) are held 
in Nairobi. These senior Tablīghīs would take stock of the movement successes and failure 
and deliberate measures to keep the growth figures up.  
 
4.3.3.2 Shūra (Ar. Council) 
Shūra  ‘council’ refers both to the elite council that oversees the Tabligh Jamāʿat's central 
activities and local councils that direct the organisation's local branches (Nelson; 2010, 65). 
Shūra is conducted at family level, by the maqāmī teams in a local mosque, by the qarya 
levels, at the sub-ḥalqa, at ḥalqa level, at national level and at international level. A kundi on 
move also conducts daily shūra to make decisions and delegate duties. At the ijtimāʿs and 
jors, shūra helps in decision making concerning review of past Tablīghī activities, planning of 
routes of travel for lay preachers and appointment of group leaders among other functions.  
The consultative meetings at home and at the level of mosque-based jamāʿats are done on 
daily basis. The time for family shūra is fixed by the stakeholders i.e. the husband, the wife 
and the kids. The subject of discussion is also decided by the shūra members at home. This is 
an innovative practice in largely patriarchal pastoralist communities as the Borana. Mashwera 
f’il-bayt (Ur.) facilitates consensus between the family members on a number of issues 
including upcoming preaching tours have direct impact on their wellbeing. Hussein asserts 
that  
Mashwera f’il-bayt discusses also the ahwāl (Ar. conditions) of anticipated khurūj. 
You have to inform your home that you intend to go for khurūj at specific time. This is 
kind of travels must be discussed, agreed upon and consensus obtained.
156
  
 
Shūra duration is encouraged to be brief and precise. The agenda of  the daily maqāmī shūra 
is endless and may include pertinent issues such as implementation of panch amaal of which 
shūra is one of them, welcoming of foreign and regional jamāʿats from outside, ‘disciplinary’ 
actions against the Tablīghīs contravening the rules of engagement while on travel, solution to 
domestic challenges facing a family of fellow Tablīghī on preaching tour, personal issues of 
the maqāmī members such as impending marriage, planning and mobilization of kundis for 
travel, election or appointment of amīrs and deliberations about an upcoming jor, ijtimāʿ, 
national qudamā’ shūra, local monthly shūra and so on. 157  At all levels shūra is often 
attended by committed regulars and may not be open to the public at all times. A qarya unit 
holds a collective shūra for a number of mosques on weekly basis. Abdirahim of Moyale adds 
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that ‘there is a daily shūra of your masjid which you must attend if you are a member of the 
movement. Then there is a weekly shūra of the area mosques in one mosque. Each mosque 
sends a representative.  It is mostly on Tuesdays.’158 The management and arrangement of 
shūra is almost the same between the two field sites. Hussein confirms that in Merti:  
On Tuesdays, there is shūrat usbūc (weekly shūra). The activities of the week is 
planned. Ahwāl of the week is taken. All the mosques in the qarya (area) are invited, 
their representatives give their ahwāl of the week about daʿwa efforts in the mosque 
i.e. how many four months, how many 40 days, how many 10 days, how many three 
days, how many foreign jamāʿats to IPB; how many jamāʿats to neighbouring 
mosques, etc
159
 
 
Wednesdays are set aside for jaula. Abdirizak observes that on Thursday mornings there is 
fikr al-dīn (discussions on matters of faith) where the dāʿis meet at one mosque and discuss 
daʿwa. Fikr al-dīn is a meeting done to also fulfil one of the panch amaal earlier mentioned. 
It is deliberation on how to revive and intensify daʿwa among the residents. Those mobilized 
for khurūj through the jaula on Wednesdays would be required to assembly at one central 
mosque or markaz on Thursday. Hussein outlines that:  
On Thursdays, all the jamāʿats for three, 10, 40 days and four months gathered by 
different mosques meet at the markaz.  Their route of khurūj is planned. There are 
given jemedar ( Ur. commander or amīr). They receive ḥidāyat and leave for their 
specified days on scheduled route.
160
 
 
Each sub-ḥalqa holds monthly shūra. This helps the different maqāmī groups compare notes 
on methods of countering slow growth. The different dāʿis in the sub-ḥalqa would identify 
areas that need urgent daʿwa attention as well as coordinate the Tablīghī activities for greater 
efficiency. The venue of the sub-ḥalqa shūra is intentionally set on rotational basis to enhance 
participation and fairness among all the different areas. Each ḥalqa council does consultation 
with senior representatives from each of the sub-ḥalqa.  
Commenting on the significance of shūra in the decision making and growth of the 
movement, an amīr  interviewed legitimated these multiple levels of councils as a prophetic 
tradition. He said ‘shuura echan, mura Rabbi gudda, sunna rasula, siiffa warr mumina!’161 
Which simply means that shūra is a blessed decision of Allah, a Prophetic tradition and a 
mark of piety among the righteous. He added that as a sunnah, shūra is a procedural practice 
that was carried out by Prophet Muhammad and that shūra is also defining trait of other 
prophets (anbiyā). He authenticated the need for shūra on the basis that Allah has instructed 
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believers to consult among each other.  In simple terms, the Tablīghīs ground such multitude 
of consultation that brings coherence in decisions made as authentic Islamic tradition. 
Consultations done at all these levels of Tablīghī administration facilitate flow of ideas, 
networking of senior workers as a leadership class within the movement, evaluation of day to 
day running of practical daʿwa on the ground and link each unit and individual preachers in 
binding relationship with fellow Tablīghīs. From morning to evening, a Tablīghī  is engaged 
in one or the other of movement’s recommended activities whether the activity in question is 
individualised  chores such as adhkār, or congregational such as mosque-based and family 
shūra. The week is also punctuated with similar communal commitments from weekly shūra, 
fikr al-dīn, jaula, khurūj mobilisation among others. The fact that it is voluntary and self 
organised makes the whole endeavour tasking for a regular Tablīghī. 
Shūra has the right tartīb, the right maqṣad  and the right benefits. The maqṣad  of a shūra is 
ambitious. Omar reveals it in this manner ‘the maqṣad  of the shūra is to deliberate on how 
the true faith can be found within the life of a person, of his home, of his neighbourhood, of 
his town and of the world in general.’162 Each sitting of a shūra is headed by an amīr. The 
amīr as faiṣala or decider may be selected on basis favoured by the council members, be it 
weekly, monthly or daily. Each individual is ideally given a chance to give his opinion (ra’y). 
Ra’y is perceived as amana (Ar. trust) and hence must be shared with others. Respect for 
opinions of others and sincerity in giving one’s own is part of the etiquettes of the shūra. The 
amīr sums up all the points raised and make decision. He is not bound to follow the suggested 
ideas and may come up with alternative decision based on his own understanding but 
purportedly guided by wisdom, foresight and the common good. To counter waves of 
dissatisfaction and mistrust following unfavourable ruling from the amīr, Hussein warns that:  
You should not celebrate if your raʿy is taken. It should elicit strong prayers for 
forgiveness that Allah shall make good and if your raʿy is not taken say 
‘alhamdulilah’ (thank you oh Lord) for you do not know why it was not taken. You 
should not make a case out of it.
163
 
 
Tablīghīs believe the benefit of shūra is that it brings unity of the hearts of the believers and 
the community (maḥabbat  al-jamā c). Shūra if it becomes part of societal decision making 
mechanism, the Tablīghīs believe that, it withholds calamities from descending on the people 
of an area. 
164
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4.3.4 Tablīghī Teaching Modules  
It should be noted that each of the Tablīghī practices discussed here are highly interlinked 
with each other and should not be seen as distinct and independent. For instance shūra 
organises preaching teams which in turn organise other teams as they travel. The preaching 
team does shūra to delegate duties and make other decisions. At each level certain forms of 
teaching modules are employed. Such flow and overlap of practices and strategies make it 
increasingly hard to give a good descriptive ethnographic account unless handled under 
analytical categories as done here. In this section, the teaching modules to be discussed are 
taʿlīm, bayān, ḥidāyat and tashkīl. The modules are intricately fused and at times one cannot 
discern when one starts and the other ends. Sardar in his book Desperately Seeking Paradise: 
Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim narrates at the beginning of the text his encounter with the lay 
preachers of movement. On taʿlim, he hilariously observes that:  
I was assigned to join the taʿlīm, an educational session by another name. For all their 
simple faith Tablīghī s seemed to have inordinate talent for developing a whole host of 
technical terms to distinguish between phases of their repetitive procedures.
165
  
 
4.3.4.1 Taʿlī m (Instructional/Educational Session) 
Taʿlim is one of the main teaching modules employed by local Tablīghīs in Kenya to educate 
people about Islam. One can basically classify this educational session into two: Taʿlim f’il-
masjid and taʿlīm f’il-bayt. The former is organised and coordinated by the local Tablīghīs 
through the maqāmī group and the latter is carried out by the Tablīghīs at home hence linking 
the mosque and home. During the congregational gatherings of jors and ijtimāʿs, the morning 
sessions between 9 am-12 pm are set aside for a taʿlīm session. Every travelling jamāʿat 
conducts taʿlim for their team members in the morning session.  
The taʿlīm sessions heavily utilize the Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Aḥadīth and at 
times Riyāḍ-al-ṣāliḥīn. Hussein lists the maqṣad  of taʿlīm as follows: ‘it is concerned with 
how the word of Allah and the message of the prophet be found within us, it instils the fear of 
Allah within our hearts and  inculcate genuine desire for janna as our lifetime goal. It is meant 
also to make us avoid sinful deed.’166 
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Taʿlīm f’il-masjid  
Each mosque-based group fixes a time within the week when this educational session would 
be carried out. The speaker normally asks the imām after prayers for permission to talk to the 
congregation and give a small announcement referred to as i
clān so that people would stay 
behind for the taʿlīm or bayān. One informant observes that:  
 
If you have noticed well before any bayān or taʿlīm, there is something called iclān. 
I
clān is the saying that ‘for the sake of the life today here and in the hereafter, we 
should uphold the obligations bestowed upon us by Allah and follow the Sunnah of 
the Prophet'. Then people realised that we the Tablīghīs are not calling people to 
themselves but to a power bigger than them to Allah.
167
   
 
The focus of taʿlīm is again on faza’il rather than masā’il. The tartīb and adab (etiquettes) of 
taʿlīm are numerous. Individuals are encouraged to sit as close as possible to the speaker who 
is seated among them, have wuḍū’, be attentive to the teachings and should leave the session 
only with permission of the speaker who is also the amīr . Often regular Tablīghīs would turn 
up for these sessions with small bottles of perfume that passed around to be applied by the 
attendants.
168
 Taʿlim accordingly is listened to with four aims:  
1. Tādīm - to praise, to revere, to exalt the Almighty. When you hear ‘wa qala lahu ta’ala’ you 
say ‘jalla jallalu’ or allahu akbar. This is gudisa (Bor. exaltation). When you hear the name 
of the prophet, you say ‘allahu salli ala…’ ‘alleyhi ṣalātu wa salam’. When we hear the name 
of the ashabas ‘radhiallahu anhu’ for male, ‘radhiallahu anha’ for female.  
2. Tasdīq- to believe sincerely that the message you are listening to is the words of Allah and the 
teachings of the prophet. 
3. Taṭbīq - to put all these messages into action, into to practice. 
4. Tablīgh- to convey the message to others. Baligh to take the message to the rest of the 
humanity.
169
 
 
These aims apply to all forms of taʿlīm. The rhythmical nature of the first syllable of each aim 
aids in memorisation.
170
 In the taʿlīm of a travelling Jamāʿat, after reading of few ḥadīth s 
from Faza’il-e-A’amaal and commentaries and reciting siffa sittah and the group splits into 
smaller units of two persons and memorise short chapters of the Qur’ān from Sūrat al-Fātiḥa 
to Sūrat al-Fil. Emphasis is placed on correct pronunciations and flow. This session, more 
than any other, builds the religious capital of a novice especially if he did not attend madrasa 
                                                 
167
 Group discussions with Tablīghīs (Abdirizak, Omar and Molu) in early July, 2010. 
168
 Angels are said to love nice smell. In most session I attended, I witnessed the passing around of small bottles. 
The audience will rub slightly on to back of their hands. Most kundis make a point of buying a few bottles from 
sprawling informal markets that sprout next to the venues of Tablīghī gathering.  
169
 Conversations with Hussein Boru, April 2009, September 2009, Isiolo.  
170
 Reetz (2008, 110) notes that rhyming of first letter a common feature in the tenets of the movement aid in 
memorisation, guide uniformity and coherence of it practices.   
161 
in his childhood. Other topics for discussions are often drawn from the book include Fazā’il 
Qurʾān; Fazā’il Dhikr; and Fazā’il Ṣalāt.  
 
Taʿlīm f’il-bayt 
This educational session is focused on gradual transformation of homestead. The target is to 
refine and revive the adherence to Islamic obligations and duties required of the family 
members. Taʿlīm f’il-bayt is topically concerned with themes of proper Islamic upbringing of 
children (Ar. tartīb al-awlād) and home management including etiquettes of sleeping and 
eating (Ar. adab al-naum and adab al-ṭacām). Secondly it is concerned with how a woman 
can fulfil her duties to her husband and thirdly how she can fulfil responsibilities to her 
neighbour and fourthly how she can fulfil the duty of five daily prayers and reminder of other 
obligatory deeds (Ar. mudhākara al- aʽmāl) in her home and fifthly how she can preserve and 
cover herself (decency) at home and away through hijāb (Ar. satar).171 The Tablīghīs have 
increasingly focussed on the prime significance of the nuclear family as not only a unit in 
need of reform but also decision making. It ignores the extended familial relations when it 
comes to teaching and deciding on matters of faith. Molu affirms that:  
At house level there is taʿlīm fi bayt, you take what you were taught in the mosque to 
house. The father is already transformed and the women picks up and then the kids. It 
is mostly targeted to the nuclear family. Your father and mother can be inside but 
mostly it is the nuclear family.  Immediate family members matter.
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The procedure of the taʿlīm is that the family gathers for a quarter of an hour or so on daily 
basis. After giving thanks to Allah, there is reading of two to three ḥadīth s from a Tablīghī 
text that touches on Qurʾān, dhikr, ṣalāt, or modesty and then the spiritual benefits of such 
gathering is mentioned.
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  This reinforces the practice and motivates the family members to 
attend. Abdirahim comments that:  
You mention the rewards of such a gathering. This will motivate the household 
members to keep attending. They are driven by the statements that if you attend you 
shall gain this or that from Allah. You also add that the deeds that Allah loves most 
are deeds that routinely carried out. When you add this they house members would 
want it more and more. It becomes a regular thing.
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 Bayān at Merti Jamia Mosque, September 2009. The speaker informs the audience that ‘the fadhila of taʿlīm 
is much more. The Prophet said that if his people gather in a mosque for sole purpose of the faith, the sakina 
(tranquillity) and blessings shall descend on them. The angels will descend to listen to the teachings. There will 
be maghfira (forgiveness) or one’s sins.’ 
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Tablīghīs argue that they conduct taʿlīm f’il-bayt through consensus and fairness. Tablīghīs 
caution that the session’s leadership must be rotational with husband, wife and the children 
given chances to chair the session and read the text. This inculcates gives sense of recognition 
and responsibility to each member of the family. It also delegates some of the authority that 
has always been the preserve of the man as the father and husband. While bonding the family 
closer, the religious practices of the family members are transformed.  
One can discern that taʿlīm sessions require certain levels of literacy. Reading and 
comprehending from English, Swahili or Arabic versions of Fazā’il Aʽmāl and other Tablīghī 
texts presupposes considerable proficiency of one of these languages. These texts are readily 
available and used in most of these teaching sessions. This leads us to look at the nature of the 
membership of the movement with respect to their educational background, proficiency in use 
of English or other languages that the texts are written in and the educational background of 
their spouses and children. For instance in Moyale town the movement appeals to largely 
secular and to some extent madrasa educated Muslims. The same case applies to Merti. 
Among members are teachers of primary and secondary schools, government employees and 
self-employed youth. Their marriage partners often have at least basic primary education.  
4.3.4.2 Bayān (Religious Talk) 
Bayān refers to brief religious talks that are given to mosque attendants immediately after 
obligatory prayers for inspirational purpose. Bayān mostly ends with the mobilisation and 
formation (tashkīl) of travel teams. There are two favourite times for bayāns: Bayān fajrī 
(after the early morning prayers) and Bayān Maghribī (after the evening prayers). A maqāmī 
would gather people through the jaula on Wednesdays after ‘Asr prayers and at the end of 
Maghrīb prayers, they offer a bayān talk. Names of volunteers are noted down. they are then 
informed to turn up for travel the next day. Often the volunteers meet a local mosque or a 
central markaz awaiting departure for missionary tours.  
The main emphasis on most bayāns is the need for each and every Muslim to volunteer time 
to remind others of the obligations of the religion as done by the Prophet and his companions. 
Bayān also features as one of the outreach strategies by a travelling jamāʿat to the mosque 
attendants of the area that they visit. Such a team also does tashkīl among the attendants. 
Tashkīl at times involves one on one chat with the audience to volunteer time or make future 
intention for the same. Normally tashkīl strategies begin to ask volunteers to give the 
maximum possible time for travel of four months. A few senior regulars would set the pace 
by raising their hands. Then the audience is asked to allocate just 40 days of their time for the 
sake of Allah. More regulars who have intentions of the travel raise their hands and a few 
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non-Tablīghīs may offer to join. The tashkīl team writes down the names of the volunteers for 
each travel module in a special form, see a sample filled forty days travel module with names 
of volunteers below. The audience would be told to do ‘soul searching’ and just sacrifice a 
mere 10 days travel experience to reform their practice and remind others of the faith. 
Ordinarily many of non-Tablīghīs and a number of Tablīghīs with busy work schedules would 
opt for this travel module. By then those who have volunteered for four months, 40 and 10 
days have been moved to sit aside. Then final tashkīl appeal is to the large crowd of non-
committed attendants to at least try a life changing three days khurūj just in the neighbouring 
villages. The appeal is also fused with great creativity and convincing appeals to the common 
good of umma. Depending on the oratory skill of the main speaker, it is not uncommon to get 
more than half of such reluctant audience to commit to some forms of travel modules.  
 
Tashkīl Form – 40 days Jamāʿat 
S/NO NAME TOWN/MOSQUE 
(maqāmī) 
TIME 
SPENT  
(before) 
REMARKS 
1. Mohamed Farah Jarso Helu 40 days  Regular  
2. Jattani Ibrahim Boru Butiye  10 days  Good  
3. Abdrahman Abdirahim Nur  Helu 4 months  Regular  
4. Abdimajid Musa Harun Somar  3 days  New 
5. Adan Mahmud Mohamed  Helu 40 days  Active  
6. ……….. … … … 
Table 4 A sample of duly filled tashkīl  form. 
 
4.3.5 Other Tablīghī commitments: Aʽmāl al-ifradi (Ar. Individualised Practices) 
This refers to individualised practices required of a committed dāʿi. A regular member of the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, ordinarily, has full daily and weekly schedules of activities. Some activities 
are individual while others are communal. Hussein
175
 based on his own experience in the 
movement observes that: 
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The life of a dāʿi is the life of ‘ibadāt. Since morning until the time of sleep, he must 
punctuate the day with certain practices. Even at night it is glorified to wake up for 
ṣalat al-Layl. In the morning he does dhikr, then he may dedicate 2 ½ hours daily to 
reciting the Qur’ān or other daʿwa efforts, he may converse or greet at least 25 persons 
per day with assalam aleykum, do ziyarāt etc.  
 
As these individuals give more and more time to the Tablīghī activities, his knowledge and 
perfection of Qurʾān, dhikr, fardh and sunna prayers increases and he becomes a regular 
feature at mosque meetings and even be associated with the 
c
ulamā’ of mainstream traditions. 
Dhikr, the remembrance of God is one the most recommended aʽmāl al-ifradis. As an aʽmāl 
al-ifradi, dhikr according to the Tablīghīs is legitimised by verses of the Qur’ān in which 
Allah commands the faithfuls to remember him in the morning and in the evening. Therefore 
Tablīghīs divide adhkār into two: adhkār al-masa’ (Ar. evening dhikr) and adhkār al-sabāḥ 
(Ar. morning dhikr). 
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4.4 Masturat Jamāʿat: Women on the Move  
So far, with the exception of taʿlīm f’il-bayt, there has been little focus on the programmes 
targeting women. The questions worth asking is, can women travel for preaching tours? If 
yes, how is their tour organised? How long are they allowed to travel? What are the nature 
and the composition of their jamāʿat? Who preaches? Who listens? Who among the 
womenfolk in the Muslim community are allowed to go for such tours and who shall not? Are 
there codes of dressing? First and foremost, it is imperative to state that masturat jamāʿat is a 
travel preaching arrangement designed for women. Before women would go on the masturat 
jamāʿat, the educational sessions of taʿlīm f’il-bayt must be well established so that the 
womenfolk are well accustomed to such the fundamental teachings as six virtues, uṣūl  
cishirīn, rules of decency and tartīb of shūra among others. Taʿlīm f’il-bayt, notes one 
informant, is crucial because:  
Taʿlīm f’il-bayt is all about the word of Allah and his messenger and how it can be 
found in the lives of all people at home, so that the desire of janna (Heaven) and the 
fear of nār (Hellfire) is found in the lives of women at home. It is after that women 
and men plan to go for three days masturat.
177
 
 
In an ideal case, it is the women of the senior Tablīghīs that are targeted for this unique travel 
experience. Women do not travel for daʿwa tours alone and must be accompanied by their 
husbands. The minimum number of days allowed for the practice of the masturat jamāʿat is 
three days and it is after many successful jamāʿats of this type that a ḥalqa or sub-ḥalqa is 
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allowed to carry out 15 days or 30 days travel jamāʿats. Such restriction places great 
emphasis on the embodiment of the new practice and guard against corruption of the tartīb 
and maqṣad  of such tours.  
Certain categories of women are often restricted from undertaking the masturat jamāʿat: One 
is expectant women who are about to delivery or with complications; divorced women unless 
accompanied by a maḥram; unmarried girls; breastfeeding women and co-wives cannot go for 
the jamāʿat at the same time. Married women experiencing menstrual periods are not 
restrained from going for the jamāʿat. These types of kundis give a chance to the wives of 
senior dāʿis to partake in what their husbands have done numerous times. On average the 
number of couples in the masturat jamāʿat is limited to four to five. Strict rules of decency 
are expected to be adhered to. Guyo Hassan asserts that:    
The wife must accompany the husband for masturat jamāʿat with clear adherence to 
the rules of 
c
awra (concealment).  She should wear even socks, have niqāb (veil), have 
hijāb (headscarf) and so on. Women on these tours should be guarded by decency and 
simplicity. They are urged to wear hijāb and simple Muslim dresses and not jewellery 
and expensive cloths. Their clothes should be simple and down to earth.
178
 
 
While it is geared towards reforming women, the masturat jamāʿat is strictly supervised by 
the Tablīghī men. Reetz (2008, 100) notes that the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in South Asia is 
predominantly male oriented although such women activities are organised on limited scale. 
He observes that given the nature of traditional gender roles, these activities can be 
considered as emancipatory. One of the men is selected as the amīr. The jamāʿat takes 
ḥidāyat  (advice/guidance) before the departure which outline the principles of proselytism so 
that the team can accrue spiritual rewards and succeed in the novel Tablīghī practice. The 
jamāʿat then travels in one vehicle. Once they arrive at their point of destination, the whole 
team heads to a home of a local senior Tablīghī who would have be informed much earlier of 
the impending team’s visit. The men including the man of the homestead head to the local 
mosque for accommodation while the women reside at the home. For the period that the team 
is on the tour the couples would not be able to enjoy conjugal rights or have privacy with their 
spouses and may converse with them for a few minutes every day. 
The host is required to construct separate bathrooms and toilets for the women for privacy is 
he can. He also prepares the venue where invited local Muslim women can sit and listen to 
taʿlīm and other educational sessions. The host acts as the guide (Ar. dalīl) of the men’s team 
and ḥirāsa (Ar. security) of the women team during the day. The team is expected to live to 
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the movement’s ideals of self-sufficiency and non-interference in the affairs and resources of 
the host family. In case the masturat Jamāʿat is 15 or 30 day travel module, then it is 
‘advisable for the team to move to different dāʿi homes after every three days period so as not 
to put strain on a single homestead.  
The men team conducts a shūra and deliberations would then be brought conveyed to the 
women. Duties of the day would then be delegated as to which couple should cook, who 
among the men should conduct bayān for the women team and the local women. The taʿlīm 
and bayān of the women dwell on fazā’il Qurʾān (virtues of Qurʾān), fazā’il dhikr (virtues of 
supplication),  fazā’il ṣalāt (virtues of prayers) and the six fundamentals. 
The duty of cooking is interestingly shared by a couple at a time. For instance a husband 
prepares the main meal at the mosque while the wife prepares the stew. The unity of family in 
carrying out khidma ensures collective responsibility for the success of the services. It also 
averts disagreement that may arise if mixed couples undertook the khidma responsibilities. 
Special food is often prepared for this kind of travel teams. One informant shares his 
experience that: 
I heard from the elders from one of the jamāʿats from India that women should be 
served with food containing meat throughout the period that they are on the masturat 
jamāʿat. This is because unlike men women have challenges and needs, so to take care 
of that their khidma must be special.
179
 
 
Tashkīl is done among the women from the neighbourhood. In that:  
Women from the neighbourhood should be invited and tashkīl done among them. The 
local women may suggest their names and their husbands’ names which is handed 
over to the men team based at the mosque for further deliberation. The women can 
take the message to their husband back home and say that they have volunteered to go 
for these numbers of days and ask her husband to accompany her for the next masturat 
jamāʿat.180 
 
Once such new volunteers are recruited, the masturat jamāʿat gradually becomes established 
and refined for perfection by subsequent teams. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat is a reform movement on the move. Individuals give time and resource to 
reform themselves and others. This reform has had a direct impact of entrenchment of the 
movement as a parallel religious tradition with its organisational structure, preferred practices, 
favourite texts, innovative management of sacred and mundane spaces. The establishment of 
the transnational Islamic movement of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya has been characterised by 
different trends in spatial reterritorialisation. New geographical imaginations tended to 
institute a faith bureaucracy that links the individual Tablīghī and his home to the mosque, a 
mosque to a collection of area mosques, area mosques to a zonal unit of a sub-ḥalqa, sub-
ḥalqa to a regional unit of ḥalqa, ḥalqa then to the national Tablīghī unit, and the national 
Tablīghī unit to Nizamuddin Markaz, Delhi. To facilitate these flows and networks, the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat has strategised performance of certain practices in the Muslim sacred spaces 
of mosques in most areas. These practices are comprehensive and require that the itinerant 
preachers’ time is fully preoccupied with perfection of spirituality. There is something for 
everyone. At home, the homestead is targeted for reform. Visits are made to different class 
people to mobilise for reform. The 
c
ulamā’ are approached for acknowledgement and support. 
Basic knowledge is taught in routinised and repetitive manner that appeals to ordinary 
believers who are constantly targeted for recruitment. In the next chapter, focus on how the 
Borana have adopted the movement as their own thereby strengthening bonds of ethnic and 
religious affinities with their co-ethnics in different parts of Kenya and Ethiopia and utilise   
the network of transnational movement to participate in religious revivalism through travels 
among their kins and beyond their borders.  
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Chapter Five 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana: Translocal Networks, Gatherings 
and Owning a Transnational Movement  
5.1 Introduction  
Malim Dabasso, a one-time opponent turned Tablīghī supporter, offers this advice to the local 
Tablīghīs. He posits that ownership of the movement by the local Borana is what is needed 
now. The best way to own the movement according to him is by translating the terminologies 
of the movement into Borana. He adds that if there are no equivalents, the leaders of the 
movement must invent them. Comparing the joy of ownership with that of what an old man is 
to his children, he suggests that the movement that is already reviving the faith would get 
more impetus. Dabasso advises: 
Once local terms are used and accepted, the message will sink even further. There is a 
difference in levels of thoughts between the old and the young. The elders love 
ownership. For example if an old man has a young wife, she would make him glad by 
mentioning 'look at your child'. Same case when the terms are localized, they would 
own it and inculcate it. When it is ijtimāʿ and jor they don’t own it.181 
 
These groups of sheikhs who give moral support to the local Tablīghī activities view it as a 
phase in religious revivalism, a trend that has been on for several years now. Mobility for 
religion in Northern Kenya until recently largely involved certain classes of individuals: 
pilgrims heading to Makkah and to variety of Ṣūfī shrines in Southern Ethiopia; students 
travel to acquire religious education and apprenticeship in places like Bardhere in Somalia in 
the past and to madrasas and universities in Merti, Thika, Mombasa, Nairobi, Isiolo, Sudan, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The entry of the Tablīghī phenomena has radically changed 
conceptions of religious travels. Now everyone can travel for religion. Now there are regular 
gatherings and meetings at most mosques, within the region and in places like Nairobi.  
Ordinary Muslims with basic knowledge of the faith are being recruited before literally hitting 
the road. The Tablīghīs market the idea that everyone can travel and preach and learn religion 
provided they are able to pay the travel costs. Men are the targets. Travels are systemized. It 
takes these lay preachers from Borana speaking communities to different places, places that 
they would not have imagined going to. Testimonies abound among the Tablīghīs of travels to 
international destinations in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria and 
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Somali; to regional towns both in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia and to the Orma 
speaking area of Tana River near the Coast of Kenya. At any given time there is a number of 
international, regional and local preaching jamāʿats in any area.182  Such interchange has 
resulted in a varied growth of translocal networks that reinforce the adherence to Islamic faith 
and reconfigure identity formation.  
In this chapter, the focus shall be on how socio-cultural compatibility and common ethnic 
narratives of change and belongingness of the Kenyan and Ethiopian Borana have been 
appropriated by the Kenyan Borana Tablīghīs as an entry point for conversion to Islam in 
areas, where earlier attempts by rival ethnic groups have relatively failed. Traditionally, 
Muslim communities such as bilingual Garre who have in recent past adopted relatively 
conservative salafī ideology shun participation and membership in the movement for variety 
of reasons.
183
 The chapter explores the ethnic dynamics in relation to identity formation, 
membership and ownership of the movement as vehicle of religious change and expression of 
religiosity in a competitive environment. It also relies on case studies to illustrate how the 
Tablīghī phenomena have heightened networking across national, cultural, linguistic borders 
linking regions that as far as Tana River to Moyale and Waso thereby reviving pre-colonial 
connections between regions. The place of Borana and other Borana speaking communities in 
the transnational Islamic movement is best explored by examining their participation in 
national and regional ijtimāʿs and jors. The questions explored therein include: Where do the 
Borana jamāʿats sit, eat and sleep in the multitude of the congregants gathered at the annual 
Nairobi ijtimāʿ? Who does the translation of the sermons given by the senior elders of the 
movement into Borana? What are the composition of the Borana speaking jamāʿats at ijtimāʿs 
and jors?  How do they arrive and depart from the national gatherings of Tablīghīs? The 
chapter ends with a brief description of a ten days travel with Tablīghīs in the Moyale sub-
ḥalqa and two case studies of the evaluation sessions of the activities of the movement that 
accounts for its phenomenal growth in Kenya.  
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5. 2 Converting Co-ethnics: Contextual Daʿwa of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the 
Borana   
 
In November 2010, a delegation of Ethiopian Borana elders came to Merti. They were not on 
a mission to emphasise adherence to the long lost traditions and customs of Borana, aada sera 
Borana, neither were they on pan-Borana mission to mobilise resource for the defence of the 
community against perennial ‘foes’ such as Somalis nor ask to use vast Waso rangelands for 
their cattle.
184
 They were coming from towns near Dirre and Liban, the ancestral seat of 
Borana culture for a different kind of help; they want Islamic teachers to educate their 
children and they want to send their children to madrasas in Merti so that they can later take 
over the management of Islamic institutions as teachers and imāms. The Borana in Ethiopia 
are the custodians of the traditional customs and were until recently largely followers of 
indigenous religion and subjects of twin system of religious political governance of the Qallu 
and the Gada. However over the years there has been heightened competition between 
Muslims and Pentecostal groups over them.
185
 Histocally they strategise to approach and co-
operate with the Somali or Arsi sheikhs for Islamic institutions but increasingly look further 
south to their kin in Kenya.
186
 The recent visit by this delegation crossed over 600 kilometres 
into Kenya, passing towns like Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo to the final destination of Waso, a 
Borana stronghold. Merti was optimally chosen as it has a renowned madrasa school system 
running from nursery to secondary school, it has a large cluster of Borana 
c
ulamā’ led by 
Sheikh Abdullai Golicha of the Merti Qur’ān Centre and it is also a host to the only Tablīghī-
built markaz in Borana speaking sub-ḥalqas of Northern Kenya. The delegation led by 
prominent Muslims like Ḥajj  Haro Tuto and Ḥajj  Boru were on an appeal to fellow Muslim 
Borana. Consulting both the 
c
ulamā’ of the Merti Qur’ān Centre and the Tablīghīs, the 
Ethiopians sought to know how they can establish Islamic schools and how they can source 
for teachers for these schools from the area. Often Waso Tablīghīs come back with 
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pp.75-81.  
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testimonies about the state of their fellow non-Muslim Borana in Ethiopia. Sometimes such 
jamāʿats leave behind two to three individuals to teach the Borana about the faith.  
A favourite destination for Borana Tablīghīs aiming for a four months khurūj is the Southern 
part of Oromia Regional State. Negelle, Mega, Yabello, Dillo, Dubuluq, Tuqa, Hidilola, Dirre 
and Liban are some of the towns that these lay preachers have targeted in recent years. 
Through testimonies like ahwāl and karguzari (Ur. field reports), tales are abound about the 
deplorable state of their fellow Borana and the urgent need to win them over fellow Borana to 
Islam. Enthusiastic Tablīghīs compare it with the pre-Islamic Arabia’s jāhilīya period (era of 
ignorance) due to strong attachment to aada sera Borana. 
The Tablīghīs have hence targeted to revive adherence to the faith among Muslims.187 The 
Borana speaking Tablīghīs however proselytise among Muslim and non-Muslim Borana. By 
targeting to convert the followers of indigenous Borana religion to Islam and revive 
adherence to religious obligations among the nominal Muslim co-ethnics, the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat optimally choose to rely on networks of Borana Tablīghīs to capitalise on 
commonalities such as language, livelihood, clan networks, and membership in gada polity, 
socio-political challenges and mutual concerns about the welfare of fellow Borana. In the 
past, the Ethiopian Borana exposure to Islamic faith has been via Somali, Garre, Arab and 
Arsi Oromo sheikhs. These sheikhs and their families settled in urban areas creating networks 
of Islamic schools, mosques and Ṣūfī shrines. Oba (2009) writing on town formation in the 
Borana areas of Ethiopian notes that settlement of Borana in towns has resulted in their 
conversion to Islam as a social strategy where monetary economy weakens the bond of 
attachment to aada sera Borana and conversion facilitated commercial networking with 
Somali traders.  
Kenya Borana Tablīghīs making rounds of tours to the Borana Ethiopian area lament about 
the laxity of the community and place the blame on the superficial nature of introduction and 
teaching of the faith. Mamed Roba, a Kenyan Borana Tablīghī points out in an informal 
conversation that the main reason behind the poor state of adherence to Islam among the 
Ethiopian Borana is due to a lack of fikra (consultations) between them and Arsi and non-
Borana who are mainly in position of Muslim leadership.
188
 These sheikhs belonging to rival 
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ethnic communities are argued by the Borana informants not to be a good role model for the 
new converts. In one interview, one Tablīghī citing the move to airlift selected Ethiopian 
Borana converts for ḥajj , summed up the alleged lack of foresightedness of the non-Borana 
sheikhs this way: 
 An interesting incidence recently is that, some Arsi 
c
ulamā’ and some sponsors from 
Middle East took about 100 Borana men to Ḥajj . While there, they were asked if 
religion has not reached them now. I think such an approach is not very effective. 
There must a follow up, a change of hearts, fikr al-dīn for people to change. We 
cannot absolve our responsibility to spread the faith through such crude methods.
189
 
 
In perceiving themselves as the ‘menders’ of an Islamisation process gone wrong and the 
local members of movement armed themselves with what they perceive as correct 
methodology and sincere concerns and embarked on cross border travels. These Tablīghī 
dāʿis assert that the religion can only with established if it is owned by the locals and if it is 
presented to them in their language and with sincere concerns for their welfare. For them, 
professing Islam and having pan-Borana identity despite coming from hundreds of kilometres 
away from ancestral lands, puts them in a strategic position to win over their fellow Ethiopian 
Borana. Rendering the earlier efforts of Islamic proselytism as inadequate and 
inconsequential, the Borana Tablīghīs point out to their fellow Borana that the problem was 
literally speaking not with the product but the sales team. Mohamed Arero positions the 
Tablīghīs work in relation to the earlier efforts this way:   
All in all, all these communities bring the faith in their own languages, historical 
heritage and even biases. They then believe that because they brought the faith, it only 
belongs to them. There has not been much effort by the Borana themselves to reach 
their own people and bring salvation. Tablīghī daʿwa is such an effort.190  
 
Through frequent daʿwa tours, the nature of religious practices has been gradually 
transformed. The Borana Tablīghīs from Kenya have re-established a different kind of 
connectivity between Borana speaking areas. The Tablīghī bureaucratic organization such as 
sub-ḥalqas and qarya and practices such as shūra helps in planning and review of travels to 
Ethiopia. Each group that makes excursions shares their experience of the travel with local 
preachers and advice specifically areas in need of urgent proselytism. Thrust to the region has 
been facilitated by the strategy of paying recognition to already existing network of leadership 
                                                                                                                                                        
Isiolo on similar lines of reasoning. He said ‘Borani diini mara mari kes dhab, ammo eggi tabliqi kun laf sene, 
mara marin yadebit’ (Bor. Borana Muslims have been lax because the missed in the faith the practice of 
consultations and deliberations, but since the entry of Tablīghī Jamāʿat, these consultations have returned.) 
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through ziyārāt. Every team that does khurūj into the Southern part of Ethiopia acknowledge 
resident sheikhs whether Ṣūfī or salafī, administrators and traditional Borana community and 
clan leadership such as jallaba, Qallu and Abagada (reigning leader of the Gada polity). The 
Gada council and Qallu adhere to the Borana indigenous religion. These jamāʿats from areas 
such as Waso and Moyale frequently visit the Abagada and other political leaders of the Gada 
to solicit their support in conducting daʿwa among the Borana of Ethiopia. Hassan confirms 
that many Borana speaking jamāʿats have targeted yaa Borana and Abagada several times 
and the preparation for the ziyārāt include appropriate introductions both Borana and Islamic, 
tashkīl, and gifts such as surre (bor. headscarf for men) and perfumes as ikrām. He adds that 
because they are elders of the community, they always ask for ebb (Bor. blessings). Hassan 
optimistically observed that:  
When we ask them to accept Islam, they always tell us that their time to become 
Muslims is not yet. They assure us that in the end, every Borana shall become Muslim. 
They permit us to convert every willing Borana, male and female. So we do daʿwa in 
the towns and villages of Borana area in Ethiopia. We help villages construct moolas 
(bor. temporary prayer structure) under big trees for prayers.
191
 
 
Similar narratives of ambivalent reception by Abagada and other prominent traditional 
leaders has encouraged more and more Tablīghī groups to seek audience with them to 
legitimate their heightened proselytism among Borana. The permission granted is taken as a 
validation of the truth of Islam and their appropriateness of the Tablīghī methods as the best 
way to Islamise the Borana. Informing the ease of conversion according to many Borana 
Tablīghīs and large section of Muslim Borana are commonly held ‘prophesies’ such as 
‘Borani sadiy chibrate sadiy Islane’ i.e. Borana shall in three cyclic waves adopt indigenous 
traditions and Islam. Chibra, a hairstyle common among traditional Borana women are used 
symbolically to refer to the customs and traditions of the community. The meaning of the 
saying is that waves of Islamisation and re-traditionalisation shall supersede each in one 
historical epoch. These and similar narratives are circulated for years orally as arga dageeti 
(Bor. oral history) by Borana historians and elders.
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 In a popular arga dageti audio-cassette recorded in Nairobi by Borana elders, one old man says ‘durana 
Borana fula lamat gargar bay, tok insafara, tok war il dunuffate waaq kadat taa. Guyya sun warr il dunuffat 
intaini jet jarolen. Warr il dunuffat gada Boru sadeni Boran kesaa dabani jet jarolen (bor. There shall come a 
time when Borana shall be divided between two forces: one section shall become Safar (Somali, meaning adopt 
Islam as religion) and the other section would be become the people who pray with their eyes closed 
(Christians). The elders who prophesize this cautioned people not to join those who close their and pray to God. 
Those who close their eyes to pray would disappear from the community during the gada reign of the three 
Boru.  
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Bassi and Tache analysing eschatological messages contained in prophetic utterance of 
Areero Boosaro and other renowned Borana ‘prophets’ (raaga) and such as Moroo Uchumaa, 
Turucoo, Amuu Areeroo, Hiboo Abbaa Harree, Waariyoo Uudati, Haweecee and Alii 
Boddee, note that the Borana society is exposed to profound social and cultural 
transformation that includes urbanisation, abandonment of important cultural rituals, adoption 
of alien culture resulting in reversal of social order and social stratification.
193
. The response 
of Borana to these alien cultures, note the two authors, is ambiguous with no active pursuit or 
resistance encouraged. They add ‘there is neither a refusal of nor an enthusiasm for the new 
ways. Never are these outside influences represented as antagonistic to the Borana; never are 
integration, fusion and syncretism actively pursued’.194 Envisaged is the end of the era of 
transition and beginning of a new social order paralleling the time of Horo the eponymous 
founder of the Oromo nation.
195
 It is important to note that in the arga dageeti audiocassette 
circulating in Borana speaking region of Northern Kenya, the emphasis is placed not only on 
the prophesies on social changes and resulting chaos but also on the role of Islam as a 
unifying identity for their community. Muslim Borana dāʿis, to counter tides of proselytism 
from Christian Pentecostal churches use these selected narratives popular among rural and 
urban Borana in Ethiopia.
196
 
In an interview with an elderly Borana Muslim in Sololo, the informant draws parallels 
between rituals of ḥajj  and that of the mata buffacha (graduation into elderhood) of gadamoji 
age-set of the gada grade. He mentions the state of ritual purity, the use of single loin cloths, 
use of polite language, and shaving of hair, invocation of blessing on behalf of the 
community, non-violence as some of the pre-aada Islamic survivals. He cites an incident in 
which a retired clan elder (an adherent of Borana indigenous religion) from Ethiopia almost 
refused to sleep at a fellow clansman’s homestead in Sololo because his host was a Christian. 
Admonishing the host for not taking heed from his father when he was alive, the retired clan 
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 In one group discussion with Borana youth in Moyale, I came across conversations purportedly held before 
the audience of Abagada council by Tablīghīs and Pentecostal preachers. The Tablīghīs were asked what they 
believe in and their mission. They were said to have noted that they believe that God is one and that Muhammad 
is his Prophet and their aim is to make Borana accept the message of Islam. The Pentecostals were asked the 
same question and were noted to have said that they believe that God is one and that the Godhood is composed 
of the Trinity of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit and that Jesus, the son of God died on the 
Cross for the sins of the humanity and that all people have to reach God through the Son. Then the elders are 
said to have interjected that one cannot ask the son for assistance in presence of the father and that the message 
of the Muslim team is truthful and that the one of the Christians is not convincing (Bor: Fula aban jir, ilm 
waingafatan, wani Islani jed dhugaa wani Kiristani jed fuul inqabdu). The story ends always with the triumph of 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as they are allowed to convert as many Borana as possible.  
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elder noted ‘mata fula dufef inwalaluu’ (Bor. that the head shall never forget where it came 
from). This implies according to him that the Borana were at one time in history Muslims and 
eventually all Borana shall embrace the faith.  The informant goes on to appropriate the new 
faith as not only compatible with being Borana but also as part of its past heritage, noting 
other myths such as the consumption of Borana Kitāb (‘Qur’ān’) by a cow, the names of the 
eponymous ancestors of the community sung during naming ceremonies such as Ali Guracha, 
Gurach Yaaya to legitimate the eventual spread of the faith.
197
   
Main reason for rapid expansion and activity of the movement among the Borana is due to 
pressure on regional and national units to produce tangible results expressed in numbers. 
Going to Ethiopia hence is a favourable option for Borana Tablighis as it is easy to not only 
convert many to Islam but also embark on membership recruitment drives. They can fill their 
quotas and display incredible results at evaluation sessions during congregational gatherings. 
5. 3 Ethnic affiliation and membership in a religious movement  
Relationship between various ethnic communities in the Northern part of Kenya, where the 
research was conducted constantly fluctuates. Conflicts are common due to competition over 
economic and political opportunities, contestation over land, limited water and deteriorated 
state of rangeland for their livestock. These conflicts impact on religious identities and 
patterns of proselytism. It is common for mutual ‘enemies’ not to take messages of faith from 
each other. These trends also affect to an extent, belongingness and support to the Tablīghī 
activities. Some communities have a longer history of Islamic identity while others are just 
partly indigenous partly Islamic. Let us examine the connection between ethnic affiliation and 
religious membership in the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and other Islamic movements.  
5.3.1 Ethiopia  
Borana in Ethiopia borders the Garre, the Gabra, the Arsi Oromo and Somali clans to the east, 
the Burji and the Konso to the west, and the Guji to the north. The relations with these groups 
have ranged from alliance making to violent ethnic clashes. With human and livestock 
population increase conflict over rangeland resources is intense putting pressure on inter-
ethnic relations. Increased clashes over water and pasture has seen the Borana pushed from 
areas that were once part of livestock rangeland during the times of drought such as wells of 
Gof and Laey that have been taken over by the Garre. In the past, the livestock raids and 
clashes with various clans of Somalis have made them to consider the latter as foes.
198
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establishment of the ethnic based federal government since mid-1990s saw disputes erupting 
over the boundary of the Somali National Regional State to which assortment of Somali clans, 
the Garre and the Gabra belong and that of Oromo National Regional State to which among 
others the Guji, the Arsi and the Borana belong to. Contested claims over Moyale by both the 
Oromo and Somali Regional States are classic examples of the protracted nature of the 
ownership struggle with duo system of governance established in the border town.
199
 The 
tarmac that runs in the middle of the Moyale Ethiopia hence has been used as the marker of 
the boundary with the east belonging to the Somali Regional State and west to the Oromo 
Regional State. The Garre and the Gabra in Southern Ethiopia are largely Muslims and 
emphasise their Somali identity, though linguistically they mainly use afaan Borana (Borana 
language).
200
 With such levels of mistrust, the Borana especially in the rural area find it 
relatively hard to accept efforts of the Garre and Somali sheikhs to preach among them and 
considered the faith as a Somali culture. The non-Borana groups have a longer history of 
Islamic education and practice and as one informant jokingly puts unlike borantiti (bor. 
‘Borannness’) there is no garrititi (bor. ‘Garreness’).  Explaining the point, the informant 
argues that 
The people who brought the faith to them are their traditional foes whom they consider 
as inferior to them. They despise these Somalis. They do not consider what they bring 
to them as worthy of their time. When these people come to them to propagate Islam, 
they are cautious to guard against them as enemies. So they cannot trust to take ideas 
from them very much. Furthermore if you check properly, the reason why Garre and 
these other groups took up Islam so easily is because they do not have strong customs 
and cultures. For a Borana to be a Muslim, he has to convert. Garre don’t. Garre are 
born into it.
201
  
 
However it should be noted that in the urban centres such as Negelle, Mega and Yabello, 
Borana dwellers largely belong to Islam and their conversion predates the current Tablīghī 
foray into the area. It is to these classes of the Muslims that the Tablīghīs first propagated 
daʿwa to, encouraging establishment of self-sustaining mosque-based jamāʿat s and khurūj 
circuits touring the zone. Tablīghī conventions such as jors are slowly gaining popularity. For 
instance Dillo an area with up to 6 mosques with the panch amaal, held a successful jor on 9
th
 
March 2011.
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Depending on the target audience, the Tablīghī daʿwa moulds the message in an appropriate 
way. For the new converts and in areas with little adherence to the practices of Islam, the 
Tablīghīs teach on how to recite the kalima, how to do wuḍū’, what to wear for prayers, how 
to pray and how to instil consistency in prayers. In areas with considerable mosque attendance 
the talks are modelled to deliver the need for consistent performance of sincere prayers and 
the need to enhance that deep concentration in prayers and the urgency to move out of one’s 
home to strengthen religious practices. The target is that the regular mosque attendants must 
constitute a travel team to tour neighbouring villages and mosques and return to establish the 
panch amaal in their local mosque and with time aim at making every mosque in their locality 
entrench Tablīghī associated practices. Most jamāʿats sent from Kenya to these areas are four 
months teams. In the year 2010, two teams departed from the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ held in 
early May to the region. One of the jamāʿat was composed of the Waso Borana and the other 
a Borana speaking jamāʿat from Moyale. The former headed to Mega and its environs while 
the latter toured Negelle area.  
5.3.2 Moyale  
Moyale District is composed of Uran, Obbu, Moyale Central and Golbo Divisions. The first 
two areas are largely Borana ‘proper’ settlements while Moyale Central is highly 
cosmopolitan and Golbo has a significant population of Sakuye and significant numbers of 
Garre, Gabra and Ajuran. The Tablīghī activities are most active in Moyale Central and in 
Obbu’s main town Sololo. Except the ethnically mixed central part of Moyale town, the 
outlying areas and suburbs reveal ethnic patterns. The Borana mainly settle in Sessi, Butiye 
and Odda, Biashara Street is largely a Garre zone, Manyatta is mainly Burji area, and Old 
Town is where the town’s pioneer Somali and Arab families reside.  Mosque leadership often 
hails from the surrounding ethnic group.  
The families of the early pioneers of the town manage the two oldest mosques in the town, 
Jamia and Qādiriyya mosque. Though Jamia was initially affiliated with the Ṣaliḥiyya ṣūfī 
brotherhood, it has since early 1990s transformed to salafī affiliation while the Qadiriya 
mosque also known as Misajid Usman Qorane remains Qādiriyya as the name suggests. The 
attendants in both mosques are heterogeneous. Qadiriya attendants are largely elderly 
Muslims of various ethnic origins with Ṣūfī inclinations while youthful Muslims from the Old 
Town and nearby areas frequent the Jamia. Masjid Quba, the Manyatta Burji mosque is partly 
Ṣūfī, partly Salafī with intermittent clashes between the elders’ defence of its Ṣūfī heritage 
and youthful sheikhs’ contestation of its management and religious practices favouring 
moderate Salafīsm. The clashes between the camps have in a number of instances been 
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violent. A fresh addition over the years to the Muslim sacred spaces in the town is Ittisam 
mosque, also of Salafī persuasion. Locally it is sometime referred to as, ‘Misajid Borana’. The 
assumption is Borana like the charismatic, simple and informative sermons given by Sheikh 
Adan Doyo, the imām. Al Huda and Taqwa mosques are in the Garre areas. Together with 
other smaller mosques, they exhibit strict salafī traditions. A host of smaller mosques in the 
suburbs such as Helu, Butiye, Sessi though salafī affiliated they do not display strict 
conservatism. Most of the major mosques have elementary and intermediate madrasas 
attached to them. The prominent madrasas in the area include: Al-Huda, Kuwaiti, Khulafaa-
ur-Rashideen, Ittisam, Manyatta Burji, Helu, and Sessi. The Borana are observed to be the 
least attendants of the madrasas, as most of them place more emphasis on secular education.  
Until a few years ago, the Tablīghīs used the Jamia mosque as its central base. It constructed a 
small office to store items for visiting jamāʿats and to serve as coordination venue for its 
daʿwa activities. Disagreement that ensued between the custodians of the mosque and 
Tablīghī leaders resulted in the latter’s eviction and demolition of its office. Afterwards, the 
movement sought shelter at the rival Qadiriya mosque where they were welcomed to operate 
freely. Prison mosque built to cater for the staff of Moyale GOK Prison, members of the civil 
service and security forces such as Kenya Police and Administrative Police and the general 
public have became de facto markaz of the movement in Moyale. Youthful congregants 
drawn from all ethnic communities with Tablīghīs constituting a significant minority frequent 
the mosque. It is one of the main venues of the monthly shūra, when Tablīghī mosque-based 
maqāmīs from most of the mosques in Moyale Central send in representatives to review 
daʿwa activities, plan for the month ahead and elect the amīr of the zonal unit. Each of these 
mosque-based groups as discussed in the previous chapter carry out certain activities such as 
panch amaal in the local mosque. Members are encouraged to establish shūra f’il-bayt and 
taʿlīm f’il-bayt.  
Of the entire town’s mosaic of ethnic mix, Burji and Garre are singled out by some Tablīghīs, 
as the opponents to the movement in the region. Amborn (2009) notes that the Burji are a 
complex social group dispersed both in Kenya and Ethiopia with its original homeland in 
southern parts of the Amaro Mountains located in eastern side of the Ethiopian Rift Valley. 
Large population of the Burji are noted to be Muslims, with a sizeable number being 
Christians of evangelical persuasion.
203
 The group dominates wholesale and retail trade in 
Moyale town. Burji lorries ferry goods and livestock to and from Nairobi monopolising trans-
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border trade in Kenya’s industrial goods such as plastics, cement, iron sheets, mattresses, 
clothes, sugar and steel. They are relatively well off as they do not rely on livestock keeping, 
unlike other local communities; livestock are vulnerable to drought, famine and theft. 
Networks that they built and maintain have enhanced their acquisition of wealth and status 
among the residents of Moyale. Like Borana, the Burji are arguably attached to traditional 
customs. Amborn quotes Woche Guyo (Burji informant) who points out that Burji in Moyale 
and Marsabit are at the forefront of the Tablīghī movement. 204  Abdi Galgalo however 
mentions that: 
One of the biggest opponents of the movement is the Garre. The second one is the 
Burji. If you look at history, the Garre were the first people to do the Tablīghī daʿwa 
in the area. Burji too participated in the Tablīghī activities so much. They have the 
largest number of four months and 40 days brothers. But when they come back they 
did not perform more amaal (practices) related to the daʿwa. The maqṣad  (objective) 
is not just to go and come back but to continue with the efforts of proselytism in the 
area. They just look it blindly and took the line that if you work for daʿwa you do not 
work for dunia (Sw. the world). So what happened was that a person, who was known 
to have a barber shop or a kiosk, just closes it and continues with the daʿwa alone. The 
mosque (maqāmī team) itself was by then not strong enough to offer guidance. So he 
losses network (becomes destabilised). Then people would just say 'look at what 
tablīgh has done to this man or that'.205 
 
The Garre just like the Burji are traders. The time spent on travels for tablīgh, according to 
some Tablīghīs, is hence perceived by large numbers of Muslim Burji and Garre as plainly 
uneconomical. This does not imply that the Garre or the Burji Tablīghīs are non-existent. On 
the contrary a significant number of committed Burji and Garre Tablīghīs are part of Tablīghī 
lay preachers. Abdi Rashid, himself a Garre Tablīghī attests to the challenge of his 
community to the movement in the following way:  
The other thing is that and I am saying that as a person born of them, the two 
communities in Moyale, the Garre and Burji, they are very enterprising. If you for 40 
days or four months, who will be searching for wealth and livelihood?  
To them, if you do not struggle for survival to make it in life you are as good as dead. 
The Burji and the Garre are very aggressive entrepreneurs. A Burji houseboy or ‘turn 
boy’ (driver assistant) would work hard to own a small kiosk, then a shop until he 
makes it. They cannot leave their work for anything. Then he will soon own a lorry. 
Their lifestyle does not allow for khurūj.206 
 
Of the two, the Garre due to strong salafī affiliation, not only refrain from participating in the 
travels but also at times sanction the use of their mosques by local dāʿis for proselytism. A 
Borana speaking jamāʿat may feel less welcomed to do a bayān at the Taqwa mosque. 
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Relatively more learned in Qur’ān and other Islamic sciences, large section of the Garre 
c
ulamā’ feel that the local Tablīghīs have less to offer to them in terms of ‘enjoining good and 
forbidding evil’. They find the lay preachers as not grounded in advanced Islamic learning 
and oppose them for allowing every person the right to preach. For instance, sometimes 
novices read a few ḥadīth s from Faza’il-e-A’amal to the audience in English and translate it 
into Borana. It is not uncommon to find in Moyale as well in other regions in the Northern 
Kenya, a Borana speaking Tablīghī make some basic motivational talks in mosques devoid of 
the Arabic recitation of Qur’ān or supporting ḥadīth s. Related to who can preach is the 
question of ethnic rivalry and ‘degree of muslimness’ and religiosity. Borana, relatively recent 
converts to the faith are seen by the Garre as ‘unworthy’ to preach to them. Mamed Roba 
laments:  
Garre and certain classes of clergy here do not believe that a Borana can or should 
stand in front of a congregation of Muslims and preach about the faith. They believe 
that Borana are never capable of such feat due to ignorance despite being Muslims for 
all these years. They argue that Borana however learned they have nothing to teach 
them. 
207
 
 
The Borana Tablīghīs point out that despite their numerical strength as an ethnic community; 
they are largely underrepresented in Muslim leadership positions in Moyale. Secular 
education mainly favoured by the Borana is mentioned as their drawback in access to Muslim 
leadership position. They are hence portrayed by these lay preachers, as having little to show 
in terms of economic, religious and social affairs within the town. Mohamed Arero bluntly 
puts that ‘the inaccessibility to leadership position is there because these positions have for a 
long time dominated by Arab families, Garre, Somali, and even Arsi.’208  Perceiving their 
own rise as a ‘revolt’ against status quo, Mamed Roba states that  
Such 
c
ulamā’ do not wish to see the rise of indigenous class of culamā’, preachers and 
religious opinions that differs from theirs as they challenge their status quo. The 
feeling is that things are supposed to be the way it has always been. Apart from 
masājid at the fringes of the town such as Helu, Butiye, Odda and Somarre, almost all 
mosques in Moyale Central area are in the hands of non-Borana.
209
 
 
Obbu and Uran Divisions are predominantly Borana. The Tablīghī activities in the two areas 
are largely dormant. Sololo Jamia mosque has an active mosque-based jamāʿat that frequently 
sent preaching teams to Golole, Mado Adi and Uran for daʿwa. Moyale and foreign jamāʿats 
visit the area on a regular basis as it is seen as a fertile zone for proselytism. A significant 
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number of youths from diverse backgrounds in Moyale sub-ḥalqa has volunteered for some 
form of Tablīghī travel tours.  
5.3.3 Waso  
Waso area unlike Moyale is less heterogeneous. Save for Sakuye who are integrated within 
the region and Gashe and other minority groups in Madogashe, the area is largely Borana with 
a majority professing Islam. Waso can be roughly divided into two with seasonal river 
separating Merti to the north from Garba Tulla, Sericho, Kula Mawe, Mado Gashe and Kinna 
to the south. Merti’s Masjid Quba acts as the markaz of the Waso sub-ḥalqa. In Merti, the 
Tablīghīs activities are carried out by local adherents through the mosque-maqāmī teams in 
Biliqo Marara, Biliqo, Bulesa, Goda, Awarsitu, Korbesa, Malka Gala, Basa and most 
mosques in Merti town.  
As mentioned earlier most of these mosques in the region were built through the support of 
the Merti Qur’ān Centre. Initially Gamachu mosque located at the fringe of Merti town served 
as the base of the movement. Being on the periphery had it demerits; it limited the presence of 
the movement as an alternative force of religious revivalism to the Merti Qur’ān Centre, a 
position that remained unopposed for over two decades. The periphery also symbolically 
thwarted the penetration of the movement and its recruitment for new members. The 
Tablīghīs repositioned themselves and negotiated for a better space in the religious 
marketplace. Such invisibility was hence seen as unproductive to the cause of revival of the 
faith. The local Tablīghīs acquire a large tract of land near the town’s livestock market, an 
area relatively closer to the centre of the town. When asked about the new Tablīghīs markaz, 
one of the 
c
ulamā’ affiliated to the Merti Qur’ān Centre described it in the following way:  
Oh...that is their new markaz as they call it. They have built a big mosque for 
themselves. Remember this is the first and only mosque that has not been built or 
initiated by the Qur’ān Centre. Now they can do their things away from the 
supervision of the Qalole (bor. ʿ culamā’). They can now preach freely without having 
to ask for permission and with no fear of being told ‘do it this way or that way’. I 
heard that it is going to be a headquarters for their activities in the whole of Waso 
region.
210
  
 
The markaz receives jamāʿats from outside the town, plan their routes and offer 
accommodation to them. Local regulars in Merti rotationally volunteer for a week or more in 
order to offer assistance (nuṣra) to visiting jamāʿats such as khidma and as dalīl, carry out 
instructional sessions and participate in various shūras. There are vibrant Tablīghī activities in 
the sub-ḥalqa with a large section of populace, though not ‘full time’ Tablīghīs having gone 
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for at least three days jamāʿats. In Chari and Cherab, the two main zones in Merti region, 
there is a well-organised daʿwa network. According to Hassan, even in small settlements like 
Korbesa, up to a dozen men have gone for some forms of Tablīghī travel.211 The travel teams 
are sent to every olla (bor. village), laff hori (bor. cattle camps), and eel (bor. boreholes and 
wells). Foreign jamāʿats from destinations like Sudan, India and Bangladesh have in the last 
few years visited the area. In the month of March and April 2011, there is a four months 
jamāʿat from Moyale ḥalqa doing its daʿwa tour in the Waso area. Regulars from Moyale and 
Waso sub-ḥalqas are well known to each other due to inter-regional travels.   
The sub-ḥalqa in recent years has been a zone for experimentation and inculcation of new 
religious practices. The first practical masturat jamāʿat was carried out here. A masturat 
jamāʿat from Bangladesh composed of about five couples requested regulars in Merti to join 
them. Apart from a few couples from Merti town, up to seven couples from Korbesa and Mata 
Arba, settlements about 25 kilometres north from Merti, joined the specialised tour. Without 
such practical training, the elders of the movement sanction self-organized masturat jamāʿat 
for fear of unwarranted innovation and criticism from the 
 c
ulamā’. The local Tablīghīs have 
to get it right by observing and participating in the tour and later carrying it out 
independently. A masturat jamāʿat from Garissa joined the practicals. 
The sub-ḥalqa conducts a monthly shūra on rotational basis in different towns. In these 
meetings, responsibilities are shared and quotas or targets set for each zones within the sub-
ḥalqa. For instance, the deliberations may pass a resolution that each zone within the sub-
ḥalqa mobilises a certain number of four months and 40 days jamāʿats within specific number 
of months. The representatives sent to attend the monthly shūra would inform their maqāmī 
teams about the targets. The monthly meeting also serves to check the progress of the 
movement and to explore which areas need extra attention from the lay preachers.  
Announcements and decisions concerning venues of sub-ḥalqa’s jor are deliberated in these 
monthly shūras. The venues are also made rotational so that each town gets a chance to host 
the jor. Towns in the Waso sub-ḥalqa that have held jors include Biliqo, Merti, Korbesa, 
Sericho, Kinna, Garba Tulla, Kinna and Rapsu. The climax of these gatherings is usually  a 
dispersal of teams for four months, 40 days, 10 days and three days tours. The members of the 
maqāmī group inform the fellow mosques attendants of upcoming jors and ijtimāʿs and 
organize logistics such as vehicles and routes of travels for volunteers. In Moyale sub-ḥalqa, 
Sololo held a successful jor in the year 2002, attended by the national leadership of the 
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Tablīghī Jamāʿat as well as non-Tablīghī ʿulamā. Moyale town has held several jors over the 
years. A sub-ḥalqa is expected to hold at least one jor a year bringing together Tablīghīs and 
non-Tablīghīs for daʿwa tours.  
5.3.4 Membership 
In Moyale and Waso, Tablīghī membership has over the years stabilized. A casual observer 
can say with certainty that indeed there is in-group and out-group membership in as far as the 
movement is concerned. In a group discussion, two non-Tablīghī informants curiously 
observed:  
W: What I observed is that in every mosque including Sololo, the Tablīghī team and 
the sheikh (imām) groups are parallel. They do not interact. The kundi (group) of 
Liban (a Tablīghī) and the kundi of Aw (Sheikh/Maʿalim) Kule and Sheikh Abdullai 
do not mix. Liban is a member of the movement.  
M: Liban himself is not compatible with Aw Kule or Aw Abdi. But in terms of ʿilm, 
the Aw Kule group is more learned. Though these differences exist the sheikhs also do 
not want to disclose that (to the mosque attendants).
212
   
 
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat attracts a host of individuals from varied income groups and educational 
background. Largely missing from the membership are 
c
ulamā’, the custodians of most 
mosques, and madrasa teachers in the region. Most trained sheikhs with relatively advanced 
Islamic learning appear to give the movement a wide berth. This does not imply that they do 
not attend Tablīghī activities. Far from that, some  culamā’ would even accompany them and 
preach to Muslims in remote areas. Others attend the Tablīghī jors and ijtimāʿs and address 
the congregants to be steadfast in their faith.  
Individuals working in civil service, banks and non-governmental agencies and residing in the 
Muslim populated areas are likely to be attracted to the Tablīghī ideals of self-reform. Some 
may volunteer for a few travel tours and become inactive and finally quit the movement, 
while others build up their cultural and social capital over years becoming senior members. 
Teachers, government workers and town council employees with relatively high secular 
education and in need of building proper religious practices are frequently drawn to 
movement. This class of people can afford to pay for their travels easily. It is not a financial 
burden to raise Kshs. 300-500 for three days khurūj or at least Kshs. 4000 for 40 days tour. 
These individuals are literate and can easily read and understand the basic teachings in 
varieties of Tablīghī literature in English or Swahili. These individuals are also likely to be 
inclined to gain from a boost to their religious standing alongside their significant role in the 
social arena. Availability of the Tablīghī religious literature in English and Swahili breaks the 
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monopoly of knowledge of 
c
ulamā’ as the sole propagators of Islamic teaching. The ʿilm 
(religious knowledge) for a long time has been the reserve of the 
 c
ulamā’ due to its 
association with proficiency in Arabic. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat hence can be considered as 
revolutionary in this aspect, as Borana speaking Muslims with little or no madrasa education 
attempt to preach to equally less religious educated masses in local languages rivalling the 
established madrasa educated 
c
ulamā’ class.213  Take Mamed Roba, a prominent Tablīghī 
originally from Marsabit who was until the year 2000 a Christian. He has a high school 
education and has never attended madrasa. He joined the Tablīghī Jamāʿat shortly after 
converting to Islam. The movement provided him and many others with a ‘crash course’ on 
Islamic sciences. Today he is an epitome of a self-made scholar. His speech is a testimony of 
his status as he fuses relevant ḥadīths and verses of Qur’ān in Arabic, Swahili, Urdu and 
Borana. His every day conversations also display a mark of religious refinement and ‘piety’, 
as a host of religious litanies emphasise the themes being deliberated.  
Members of the movement are more likely also to be dissatisfied with the manner in which 
the local ʿulamā conduct religious revivalism in the region and feel that their contribution is 
needed more than ever. An outfit like the Tablīghī Jamāʿat hence provides such a platform. It 
teaches in simple steps on how to be a good Muslim, starting with a retreat from every day 
space and retraining on practical approach to religiosity. It then provides these literate 
individuals with a religious community and a transnational network that espouses similar 
concern. The individuals constitute or join a mosque-based group at their local mosque in 
which the time and sacred space is kept occupied almost on daily basis through meetings and 
neighbourhood tours. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s bureaucratic structure holds these individuals 
together as they meet, plan, travel and redefine religious practice of their communities.  
Small scale traders and other self-employed individuals in Moyale and Waso sub-ḥalqa form 
part of the movement. These entrepreneurs take precaution to ensure that their livelihood 
strategies are not compromised. They delegate management of the business to their spouses 
and relatives. They too can afford to pay for the costs of travel. They are likely to possess 
lesser levels of Islamic learning than mosque-based 
c
ulamā’ but still wish to impact on 
religious revivalism. They blame the 
c
ulamā’ for using an inappropriate approach addressing 
the symptoms rather what they call the real cause of social decadence: weak imān. They 
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believe that as a thoughtful generation they are better placed to work on the hearts of the 
people:  
Take the case of the 
c
ulamā’ and the rest; they keep treating the problems such as zinā 
(Ar. adultery), miraa (leafy stimulant), siyāsa (Ar. politics), hypocrisy and so on. 
These are their targets. But the Tablīghī Jamāʿat goes beyond all this and target to 
clean the core of the issue; the heart. If the heart is weak then it will be easily to be 
tempted to zinā, to consume miraa and drugs, to do bad things. But if this heart is 
made to realize that it has to love Allah, it has to fear Allah, it has to worship Allah 
then change can gradually come. But what this new generation of preachers called ahl 
al-sunna wa`l-jamāʽ does is to condemn, to them everything is bidca (Ar. religious 
innovation). What they see everywhere is bid
c
a bid
c
a bid
c
a and they want to correct 
there and then. They do not want to understand the people. They just want to solve it 
there and then.
214
 
 
It is common to find male secondary and primary school students, travel for khurūj during 
school holiday. Retired policemen and provincial administration officials with ample time on 
their hands often join the movement to ‘recharge’ their religious practices.  
Regular membership in mosque-based maqāmī teams avail an individual with a chance to 
lead. Leadership responsibilities being rotational may with time fall on one’s shoulder 
provided a Tablīghī regularly attends most activities in an area, show commitment to the 
movement and display consistency in travels and mosque attendance. With more travels and 
participation in the weekly and monthly shūra and jors and ijtimāʿs, an individual builds a 
reputation as a reliable and religious person. Such an individual may gain the confidence and 
respect of the local Tablīghīs and be appointed an amīr  for a month with task of coordinating 
meeting, evaluating progress, communicating with national office and welcoming foreign as 
well as local jamāʿats into the sub-ḥalqa or qarya. An individual may gain recognition of his 
peers and of national leadership as a qudamā’ and may lead other privileged responsibilities 
like the Borana translation team at national ijtimāʿ and may upon the closure of gatherings 
appointed or selected to lead a forty days or four months travel team to Ethiopia, Moyale, 
Waso, Isiolo, Marsabit or Tana River. Without such a platform such individuals stand slim 
chances in gaining any position of religious authority within existing institutions. 
The Borana prominence in the movement are at two levels. First as the target audience 
because according to the judgment of the Tablīghīs the levels of adherence to Islamic 
practices are either weak as in the case of Moyale and Waso or non-existent, as in the case of 
traditional followers of Borana indigenous religion. Second, a large section of Tablīghīs are 
drawn from the community. This is essentially true of Waso where the populace is largely 
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Borana. In Moyale, substantial numbers are Borana while a number of Gabra, Garre, Burji 
and families of the Arab and Somali groups in the urban centres also are part of the 
movement.   
A marker of identity for the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the region is clothing. Pakistani kurta 
pyjama, kofia (Swa. Muslim cap) and pony-tailed imma (Ar. headscarf style, also called duubi 
in Somali) and half-coat similar to the ones used by photo-journalists (sleeveless 
windbreakers) are archetypical wear of a male Tablīghī. Beards are often left untrimmed 
while moustaches are removed or kept short.  Ordinary kanzus (Sw. Muslim robes) are also 
worn. When on move, collapsible mosquito nets, thin portable mattress or sleeping bag, 
cooking utensils, handful of kanzus and bed sheets form part of the essential luggage. Wives 
of regular Tablīghīs are more likely to adhere to strict Islamic codes of dressing when outside 
their homes. Hijāb and niqāb are often a must. In the following section, the focus shall be 
case studies of Borana speaking jamāʿats at Tablīghī conventions. 
5.4 Case Studies  
5.4.1 Gathering for the good of the umma: Borana at Tablīghī Conventions 
The regularity of Tablīghī conventions in Kenya makes it a valuable space to explore how 
members of this transnational movement travel, interact and deliberate on proselytism. 
Important for the discussion is, how different Borana speaking jamāʿats from the sub-ḥalqas 
of Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo and Waso congregate, network, recruit and disperse from Tablīghī 
national gatherings as one language group. Therefore case studies from attendance of regional 
and national gatherings shall be used to explore the dynamics of proselytism and the place of 
grass-root ḥalqas at the national conventions. Isiolo jor held at Isiolo Jamia mosque from 10th 
to 12
th
 April 2009, national leadership meetings held on 18
th
 and 19
th
 April 2009 and Nairobi 
ijtimāʿ held from 29th April to 2nd May 2010 shall be analysed. The three events are a typical 
congregational gatherings attended by the jamāʿats from Borana speaking jamāʿats from the 
area of study.  
5.4.2 Isiolo Jor: Bringing Waso and Isiolo sub-ḥalqa together. 
Prior to such regional jors bringing together Tablīghīs from Isiolo and Waso sub-ḥalqa, in the 
monthly sub-ḥalqa shūra of Waso and Isiolo, the dates of upcoming jor and the allocated 
number of jamāʿats to be mobilized by cluster of mosque-based jamāʿats are agreed upon and 
shared. For instance Merti Tablīghīs may be asked to come ‘ready’ to the jor, with two to 
three 40 days jamāʿats. The teams mobilized are expected to depart at the end of the jor to 
identified destinations. This distribution of recruitment quota is called takaza (Urdu).  
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During the Isiolo jor, a number of Tablīghīs from Kinna, Garba Tulla, Kula Mawe, Booji, Ires 
Aboru, Malka Daka, Sericho, Madogashe, Merti town, Biliqo, Bulesa, Korbesa, Mulanda, 
Mata Arba, Basa and Malka Gala of Waso sub-ḥalqa attended. The Isiolo sub-ḥalqa stretches 
from Isiolo town to Logo Logo, a small settlement at the north of Marsabit. In attendance 
were the Tablīghīs from the different mosques within the town. Tablīghīs from Meru and 
Nanyuki were part of the congregation too. They were mainly Kenyan Muslims of Asian 
descent. Meru has a number of Kenyan Asians some of whom are associated with the 
movement since its inception in the country. Transnational attendants included an Arabic 
speaking jamāʿat from Sudan composed of six to eight individuals, a jamāʿat from Wajir 
(Garissa ḥalqa), a Swahili speaking jamāʿat from the Mombasa ḥalqa and another from one 
of unidentified South Asian region. In essence all the three main ḥalqas in Kenya as well as 
the Arabian and South Asian Tablīghīs were represented. It demonstrates the transnationality 
and partnership for proselytism that recreate a miniature Tablīghī Jamāʿat wherever Tablīghīs 
meet. It is a common practice for a foreign and local jamāʿats doing khurūj in an area to 
attend and preach at Tablīghī jors and ijtimāʿs. Kenya Shūra, the national leadership council 
was represented by a couple of individuals who oversaw the logistical support and 
coordinated the deliverance of sermons and recruitment of travel teams.  
Approximately 500 persons attended the jor. The Tablīghīs from Isiolo and Waso formed the 
bulk of congregation.
215
 It was held at the town’s main Jamia mosque. Adjacent to the 
mosque is a prominent educational institution called Al Falah Islamic Educational Complex, a 
modern integrated Islamic school that offers secular and religious education and a health unit. 
Missing from the jor were the regular sheikhs of the mosque and the 
c
ulamā’ from Al Falah 
Complex. The visiting Tablīghīs were accommodated at the centre. They cooked, ate and 
slept at Al-Falah. The classroom were utilised for accommodation. The accommodation was 
arranged on the basis of places of the origin of the group, for instance, Merti, Kinna, Meru, 
India, Sudan, Coast, North Eastern and so on. 
Preferences were given to visiting foreign and regional jamāʿats to deliver bayāns after 
Maghrib, Fajr, ẓuhr and ‘Asr prayers. There was a team of translators on standby to translate 
Urdu, Somali and Arabic into Swahili and Borana for the congregants. Similarly when bayāns 
were in Swahili these individuals were attached to Urdu and Arabic jamāʿats, to get the 
message across. Most Urdu-Swahili translators at the jors were Kenyan Asians from Meru 
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and some members of the Kenya Shūra. None of the bayāns were rendered either from 
Borana to other languages or other languages to Borana. This is partly because Isiolo being 
cosmopolitan area, the choice of language has immense implication for inter-ethnic rivalry 
and ownership of the sacred space being utilised. The mosque attendants are drawn from all 
ethnic groups and use of Borana translation for all may be seen to exclude significant 
numbers of non-Borana attendants. It is only in taʿlīm session on the 11th April that the 
Borana speaking jamāʿats from different areas of Waso and Isiolo town had a chance to 
constitute a team for instructional purpose. Concurrently an equally large Swahili speaking 
jamāʿat mainly composed of non-Borana speaking congregants, jamāʿats from Meru, Coast 
and Nairobi constituted a taʿlīm group. Somali, Sudanese and Urdu taʿlīm sessions were also 
conducted in small circles.  
The Borana taʿlīm had four sections. First, it explored the various ḥadīths and Qurʾānic verses 
that extolled the benefits of reciting Qurʾān, learning Qur’ān and turning the commands 
contained in the Qur’ān into practical religious deeds. The climax of the session was 
regrouping of a hundred or so audience into smaller groups of two to four individuals to recite 
to shorter chapters of the Qur’ān namely: Surāt al-Fātiḥa, Surāt al-Nās, Surāt al-Falaq, Surāt 
al-Ikhlās, Surāt al-Lahab, Surāt al-Nasr, Surāt al-Kafirun, Surāt al-Kathwar, Surāt al-Ma’un, 
Surāt al-Quraysh and Surāt al-Fil. The exercise lasting 20 minutes, broke the monotony of 
the instructions and engaged the audience in practical learning. In the second section, there 
were instructions on different practices encouraged as religiously rewarding as stated in an 
array of selected ḥadīths and Qurʾān. This includes merits of wuḍū’ and ṣalāt among other 
‘ibadāt. The third section was on mudhākara of sitta siffat, a session that basically re-
emphasised the six attributes of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat for easy memorisation. The session was 
given in Arabic then rendered into Borana. A different speaker was invited to offer the 
teaching. The speaker displayed proficiency in comprehension of the six attributes, selected 
ḥadīths and Qur’ān to legitimate the attributes and an immense array of Borana vocabularies 
to render the tenets of the movement in the most understandable way. In an earlier interaction 
with him, he shared his travel experiences to the Borana Ethiopian regions of Dirre and Liban. 
The fourth session was tashkīl, the much anticipated recruitment drive. The target is to get 
motivated individuals to volunteer time to travel. The audience was then split into zonal 
groupings for intensive tashkīl to be supervised by senior Tablīghīs from their own area. 
Therefore, Garba Tulla, Merti, Kinna, Korbesa and other Tablīghīs from smaller towns and 
settlements were made to sit in smaller groupings and mobilisation drive carried out among 
them. The audience was keen and sat through the 1 ½ hours of religious instructions. At the 
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beginning of the taʿlīm, Aw Kombola, one of the most dedicated Tablīghī from Merti town 
gave a religious peptalk on sincerity in prayers and religious deeds to render the heart 
receptive to the reverence of God. Before he handed the audience to the main speaker of the 
taʿlīm, also a regular dāʿi from Merti, Aw Kombola advised the Borana speaking audience in 
this manner:  
Let us all fulfil the promise that we made to Allah to attend this occasion. Let us 
benefit from it. We the Borana people gathered here did not come to Isiolo for 
sightseeing. All these eyes I am seeing are from Waso, whether it is Isiolo North or 
South. Maybe a few are from elsewhere. Did any of us come for tourism in Isiolo? Is 
there any? Did we not come for the jor? Therefore let us all use our time, listen and 
transform ourselves as commanded by Allah and narrated to us by the books. Sawa? 
(Swa. Is that ok?)
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Evaluation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat activities formed the theme of the gathering after cAṣr talk 
on the 11
th
 April. Each of the sub-ḥalqas gathered at the jor gave ahwāl (evaluative report) for 
the last one year. Prior to the start of the jor, each sub-ḥalqa’s amīr were supplied with a form 
to fill in regarding to the past achievement, present state of affairs and projected growth of the 
movement in the area. The analysis of this form shall be given in subsequent sections of this 
chapter.  
Fajr prayers and subsequent session on 12
th
 April marked the general end of the mini-ijtimāʿ. 
The bayān was done by a sheikh from the Urdu speaking jamāʿat and translated into Swahili 
by an elder from Baitul Maal. The sermon normally serves as ḥidāya, a kind of farewell talk 
about how to remain steadfast on the path of faith. It is especially important for all those who 
have pledged to travel for stipulated number of days to take guidance from the elders and 
prominent dāʿis.  
The names of the volunteer lay preachers were called out loudly. The four months jamāʿat 
volunteers were the first to be called. They passed in front of the seated adherents and went to 
the minbar (Ar. a dais on which an imām stand to deliver a sermon) area. Moving from left to 
right, each volunteer shook hand with a seated sheikh (almost with reverence) and the Swahili 
translator as a pledge to travel for the sake of daʿwa. It was a form of acknowledgement of 
their undertaking, binding each volunteer before the adherents and the elders of the movement 
that he shall in deed go for this daʿwa.  There was a four month local group expected to travel 
to India, Pakistan and /or Bangladesh. This group comprised of about 26 persons. The next 
groups to pass the minbar were 40 days jamāʿats. They are about 23 persons. Then ten days’ 
jamāʿats and finally a large number of three days jamāʿat volunteers. Finally the elder seated 
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on the minbar begins the much-awaited dua. The dua was lengthy and emotional. The 
choruses of ‘amīn’ were interrupted by sobs from some ‘pious’ adherents. 
An unexpected guest at the session was Sheikh Abdullai Golicha of Merti Qur’ān Centre. 
Though not a Tablīghī, he asked to be given a chance to say a few things to the congregation. 
He, as is characteristic of him, extolled that reminding the umma about faith as very 
important. He however cautioned those who travel to take heed and take time not just to travel 
around but read and learn Qurʾān. He stated that only then a change could occur in an 
individual's life. His speech took about ten minutes. A tense moment for the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
leaders was when he begun to preach about the totality of religion and umma as well as 
concerns about the suffering of fellow Muslims in global hotspots such as Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Iraq, Palestine and Somalia. He asked the audience to pray for global peace and 
spiritual solidarity with them. The Tablīghī leaders hurriedly took the microphone from him 
and apologized that time was short. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat being avowed ‘apolitical’ appeared 
not to share the contemporary concerns raised by the renowned sheikh. In line with their 
avoidance of controversial matters such as politics, social-political activism and difference 
with 
c
ulamā’, they muted the elderly sheikh’s sermons. 
The Waso ḥalqa did a consultative shūra for their members before its departure from the jor 
venue. The Sudanese jamāʿat was planning to tour the Waso immediately after the end of the 
jor. The questions discussed included: To which towns and mosques should the Sudanese 
jamāʿat be sent? Who should represent the sub-ḥalqa in majma jor (Ur. gatherings for senior 
regulars), the upcoming national leadership shūra? Who shall be the amīr of the Waso-ḥalqa 
at the coming Nairobi ijtimāʿ? How shall the sub-ḥalqa contribute volunteers to various 
departments of the ijtimāʿ management to ensure its success? Who shall be part of the 
publicity team making announcements in mosques in the area about the Nairobi ijtimāʿ so as 
to mobilize as many Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs as possible? The Waso sub-ḥalqa agreed to 
send two representatives with a filled-in appraisal form to the national majma jor. At the back 
of the form, names of Waso volunteers for different responsibilities were noted. Waso 
contributed four person to tashkīl; two to istiqbāl; three to khidma; three to ḥirāsa ; three to 
tarjama and another three extras in case of any need.  
5.4.3 Majma jor: Retreat for the Qudamā’  
Organising an ijtimāʿ in Kenya is a collective work. Before an ijtimāʿ, there are certain 
preparations that must be done. One is that the compound of the venue must be prepared. This 
is called mithan (Ar. compound). The preparation include the installation of microphones and 
loud speakers, wiring and bulbs in the compounds and in the venues to be used, water taps, 
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adequate temporary and permanent toilets and bathrooms, trimming of grass, collection of 
garbage, construction of temporary kitchen, crowd management personnel, reception and food 
tents and cleaning of the main Markaz, the old mosque and offices. Four shuʿba (Ar. 
departments) identified and planned for: First, tashkīl, after every bayān, there should a team 
that stand by to write down the names of the volunteers and sits them aside for further 
instructions. Second, shuʿba majma jor, this refers to the bringing together all or most of the 
senior dāʿis of the daʿwa movement from every sub-ḥalqa in Kenya. They deliberate the 
ijtimāʿ programme to the last details. Third, shuʿba ikhtilāl, this is the team that goes out and 
does tashkīl people to come back into mosque into the ijtimāʿ programme rather than waste 
time on outside mundane activities. Often during the ijtimāʿs the temporary business stalls 
selling food, clothes and books attracts the ijtimāʿ attendants and compete for attention with 
the religious talks going on the mosque. Many others tired with long hours of sitting and 
listening to sermons after sermons prefer to stand outside and chat. These categories of 
individuals engaged in activities that do not add to the success of the gathering have to be 
motivated to get back on track. This department is mandated to do just that. Fourth, shuʿba 
khidma, the department of service and hospitality. They are concerned with varieties of 
service including cooking. The Tablīghīs note that all these works are shared out among the 
volunteers from the different ḥalqas and sub-ḥalqas in Kenya. It is argued no payment is 
claimed from offering of these services.
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 Often individuals are delegated to the duties that 
are similar to their everyday profession. For instance, the teachers within the movement form 
an excellent translation team and recruitment teams and members of security forces do 
splendid job as sentries, crowd management and security logistics in the massive compound.  
The majma jor was held at the Baitul Maal Markaz. Apart from representatives from most of 
the sub-ḥalqas in Kenya, there were a number of Tablīghīs from Tanzania and a few from 
Uganda in attendance. Themes discussed were the performance of various ḥalqas in Kenya 
and country ḥalqas of Tanzania and Uganda, ways of facilitating further growth of the 
movement and details about preparations of the upcoming Nairobi ijtimāʿ to be held in two 
weeks’ time. Logistics such as accommodation, security, and reception of guests from outside 
the country and banning of petty traders from inside the markaz compounds as they 
previously disrupted movement’s programmes were among topics discussed. The names of 
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 Interview with Hassan Jarso, Nairobi, May, 2010, He adds that ‘all the works in the tablīghī ijtimāʿ 
programme is done on voluntary basis. No pay is given. It is Allah who gives the reward to the volunteers. La 
nuridu minkum jaza aww wala shukura (‘We feed you for the sake of God alone: We seek neither recompense 
nor thanks from you. 76:10) There is no payment for the work. It is all freely done. Even if he get burned or 
injured on the work, we should not regret but thank Allah 
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expected elders from IPB and status of their participation were shared.
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 Majma jor was also 
characterized by series of smaller consultative shūras between ḥalqas and different 
committees, mandated to carry out specialized tasks during the ijtimāʿ.  
5.4.4 Nairobi Ijtimāʿ: Borana at Baitul Maal  
How do Borana speaking jamāʿats from Moyale, Isiolo, Marsabit, Kinna and Garba Tulla 
organize to come to Nairobi national ijtimāʿ? Do the jamāʿats travel together or individually 
find their way to the markaz? How and where do they occupy in the expansive and crowded 
sacred space of the main masjid? Who are the translators of main lectures into Borana? Where 
do the Borana speaking jamāʿat eat and sleep? In this section we shall explore the place of 
Borana speaking jamāʿats in the transnational Tablīghī event.  
5.4.4.1 Leaving for Baitul Maal 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, prior to any major Tablīghī convention, a special 
publicity team called taasil jamāʿat  is organized by each sub-ḥalqa and sent around to inform 
the general public as well as the Tablīghīs about an upcoming jor or an ijtimāʿ. The potential 
attendants would hand in their names to the tashkīl team of his local maqāmī. Each individual 
would also give the money for the fare to and from Nairobi and for food while at the ijtimāʿ. 
The local Tablīghīs would then negotiate with vehicle owners for reduced fares. They appeal 
to sentiment of sacrifice for faith and the motive of the journey being spiritual nourishment 
and betterment of the society of which the vehicle owner is also a member. If the travellers 
are a handful, the bargain power may not be much but if the number is large, then the 
Tablīghīs would hire a whole vehicle to Nairobi. On average the cost of fare from Moyale to 
Nairobi is about Kshs. 1000. The means of transport favoured by the Moyale Tablīghīs is 
lorries (trucks). The trucks mainly transport cattle for beef industries in Kenya’s capital city 
and its environ.  The passengers hold firmly to the top frame of the truck as seats. It is also a 
popular and cheaper means of transport supplementing unreliably erratic buses charging at 
least Kshs. 3000. Following a successful publicity drive in every mosque, the sub-ḥalqa can 
mobilize up to 100 persons. The total cost paid by each potential congregant as part of a group 
would be far less than self-organised travel. At times the total cost of the fare to and fro as 
well as three meals daily for four days at the ijtimāʿ would barely be above Kshs. 3000. Each 
person is expected to take care of his food and drinks while on journey. Accommodation 
enroute is obtained for free at mosques along the way. Below is a popular means of transport 
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 Some of the elders frequently invited are Haji Muhammad Abdulwahhab, Mawlana Sa’d, and Mawlana 
Zubair among others. 
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for people travelling from Moyale to Nairobi. In the last few years, regular bus services are 
also available.
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Picture 5 A typical means of transport in northern Kenya 
 
Before departure, an amīr is usually appointed to be in charge of the team. The amīr  is to be 
obeyed throughout the journey until return to Moyale. Sermons are briefly offered on the 
significance of the religious journeying paralleling the travel about to start to historical 
excursions made by Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Strict obedience to the Tablīghī 
codes of behaviour such as avoidance of mundane talks is emphasised. No prayers are to be 
missed. Therefore regular stops for obligatory prayers are made. The Moyale team ordinarily 
leaves the town at round 10 am aboard such trucks arriving in the compound of the markaz 
around the evening of the next day. The highly exhausting journey covers an approximate 
distance of 838 kms. Of the 838 kms, 448 kms is tarmac road.  Brief stops are made along the 
way for food and prayers in Sololo, Turbi, Marsabit, Laisamis, Merille, Isiolo and Nanyuki. 
Upon arrival the amīr and other regulars would inform the istiqbāl at the markaz of the 
presence of Moyale team. Then the group would be directed to put their luggage at one corner 
preferably near the Borana speaking tarjama. The area serves also as their sleeping place at 
night.  
Being en-route from porous international borders, the Kenya Police often mount barriers to 
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 The picture is sourced from http://boksbikeadventure.blogspot.com/2010/05/kenya-uganda-kenya.html.  
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verify identities of road users from Moyale and Marsabit. The last major police check-point is 
in Isiolo. Senior regulars and the amīr ensure that before departure all the travellers have the 
Kenya national identity cards or if they are Ethiopians all the relevant travel documents. 
Students being minors are largely exempted from scrutiny though school identity cards may 
be sought for. The amīr and other leaders in the vehicle would at each check-point negotiate 
with the Police that the passengers are all on spiritual journey to attend Muslim gathering in 
Nairobi. Often the truck would be released to proceed with the journey. 
Merti is about 224km from Isiolo town. The route is all-weather road. The Tablīghīs from 
Merti rely on similar trucks just like the ones used by Moyale Tablīghīs. However unlike the 
Moyale one, they use this means of transport up to Isiolo. The local Tablīghī leaders gather 
the potential attendants and negotiate with vehicle owners for a bargain fare. In Isiolo, they 
would spend the night either at the Ansar mosque that also serves markaz or any other 
mosque or at homes of their relatives within Isiolo. The next day, the team also leaves 
together for Nairobi aboard one of the four buses that ply Isiolo-Nairobi route. Upon arrive at 
midday, the Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghī congregants would walk from 9th Street Eastleigh, 
Nairobi, where the Isiolo bus stage is to the junction of Juja Road and the Eastleigh First 
Avenue, a distance of about 1 km.
220
 Just like the Moyale team, they upon registration head to 
join the Moyale team at the Borana speaking jamāʿat quarters. Tablīghīs from Marsabit, 
Isiolo, Kinna, Sericho, Garba Tulla and Madogashe would equally make the journey and join 
the Borana speaking jamāʿat at the markaz. 
5.4.4.2 Ijtimāʿ: The event 
The ijtimāʿ held annually at Baitul Maal Markaz attracts up to 15000 people. Women do not 
attend. Men of all ages, Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs, from the three ḥalqas in Kenya, arrive at 
the Markaz on different means of transport namely: on foot from sprawling informal 
settlements and low housing estates such as Eastleigh, Kariobangi, Huruma, Dandora, and 
Mathare and by private and public buses and mini-vans. During this event the participants 
also came from the following countries: Kenya (largest group); Tanzania (second largest 
group); Uganda (small group); Rwanda (small group); Burundi (small group);  Democratic 
Republic of Congo (small group); Somalia (large group though it is not easy to distinguish 
between the Kenyan and Somali Somalis); South Africa, Zambia (few, mostly elders of the 
country); Ethiopia (small group, mainly refugees from Section I and II Eastleigh); small 
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 Most buses and trucks leaving for northern Kenya have pick up and drop off points in various streets of 
Eastleigh Nairobi. This somali dominated neighbourhood is hence the final destinations for most buses. Isiolo 
buses are found on 9th Street while Moyale and Marsabit passengers often pick their own on 10th Street.  
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groups of Tablīghīs from unidentified Middle Eastern countries and IPB - India Pakistan 
Bangladesh (foreign jamāʿats in Kenya and invited speakers from centres such as 
Nizamuddin in Delhi, India). Below is the spatial illustration of the markaz compound.  
 
Figure 5 Baitul Maal Markaz 
 
 
I arrived at the Baitul Maal Markaz on the afternoon of 29
th
 April well prepared for the 4 days 
retreat. Upon arrival I met some of key informants whom I had earlier interviewed in my 
previous field excursions. They directed me to join either the Moyale or Merti group of the 
Borana speaking jamāʿat. I placed my luggage in the corner, where the Moyale group was 
based. Apart from observation about the social patterns of relations, spatial arrangement of 
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different linguistic groups from various countries and regions, the speeches of the ijtimāʿ had 
one main aim, to ensure that as many people as possible give their time after the ijtimāʿ to go 
for khurūj or daʿwa tour. The prime objective of ijtimāʿ is hence interpreted as mobilisation 
and dispersal of many jamāʿats for daʿwa. The speeches therefore had similar patterns and 
contents though formulation differed. The speeches centred around: 
● The basic tenets of the movement such as sitta siffat 
● Narratives about the Prophet and his companions 
● Primacy of khurūj as obligatory and the most appropriate form of daʿwa today 
● The neglect of the obligation of daʿwa by the Muslims and need to get back to the 
true faith 
● Review of activities of different country and regional ḥalqas in the last years 
 
The speeches can be roughly divided into three kinds: bayāns after Maghrib, Fajr, ẓuhr and 
Asr prayers; taʿlīms between 9.30 am to 12 pm and various consultative meetings that 
included in it, motivational talks and deliberations of Tablīghī activities for the coming 
months. To get a deeper analysis let us turn to translation and language use at the multi-lingua 
and multi-vocal environment of the ijtimāʿ.  
5.4.4.3 Translating Tabligh: Language-based congregations and domestication of 
transnational ideology  
On 30th April 2010 after the Fajr prayers and just before the bayān was to begin, an 
interesting announcement was made. The announcer informed the congregants that there shall 
be a series of shūras set to take place mid-morning for different categories of people. The 
remarkable aspect of the announcement was not the message but how it was conveyed.   A 
middle-aged man gave the same announcement starting first in Swahili, then Somali, then 
Borana, then English, then Urdu and finally Arabic. With such linguistic proficiency one 
could say with certainty that certain categories of senior Tablīghīs are indeed truly 
transnational. Later inquiries revealed that the man was a Borana who grew up in Nairobi and 
among the experienced coordinators of various programmes of the national events of this 
nature and magnitude and a well-travelled lay preacher.  
It is through preaching and travels that the Tablīghīs have made progress in Kenya. Many 
South Asian Tablīghīs who transverse the Eastern African region hardly speak any other 
languages other than Urdu (or Bihari and Bengali for those from Bangladesh) and ‘broken’ 
English. It should be noted that such linguistic deficiency, has not hindered their prowess in 
carrying out what they believe is the best form of daʿwa. It is not uncommon to find such 
travelling preachers being on the road, at times on foot, for up to a year. This has also 
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remained one of the main points of criticism levelled against the local as well as foreign 
jamāʿats by culamā’ of mainstream Salafī influenced traditions. However with time, Kenyan 
regulars picked rudimentary understanding of Urdu particularly through khurūj for up to 4 
months to India and Pakistan.  
An observation of the language usage at the ijtimāʿ show that while Arabic remained the 
lingua franca of prayers, ḥadīth and Qurʾān; Urdu was primarily used to preach on most 
occasions. This is because Tablīghī elders from IPB and South Africa were often given the 
special privilege of preaching to the Eastern African Tablīghīs. They are specially invited to 
give motivational talks and to boost the morale of local followers. Occasionally a Somali or 
Swahili speaking 
cālim may be granted a short chance to say something, but even that 
remained secondary to the sermons of Urdu speaking elders.  
The work of translation falls under a special team also known as tarjama. It is one of the five 
organisational divisions of management of ijtimāʿ. Apart from tarjama, each of the sub-
ḥalqas of the three ḥalqas as mentioned earlier contributes volunteers for khidma, istiqbāl, 
tashkīl and ḥirāsa. The numbers of languages spoken by the congregants are so many. Each 
of these language groups sat around their tarjama speaker who translated the message of the 
main speaker into local language of the audience. There following were the tarjama circles in 
the main mosque: 
a) Swahili tarjama and language group 
b) Somali tarjama and language group 
c) Borana tarjama and language group 
d) Amharic tarjama and language group 
e) Kinyarwanda tarjama and language group 
f) Eastern Congo tarjama and language group 
g) Baganda tarjama and language group 
h) Arabic tarjama and language group 
i) Urdu tarjama and language group 
 
Each of the language-based jamāʿat occupied specific sections of the enormous markaz. Each 
tarjama team was provided with an earphone and microphone to listen to if they wish to Urdu 
original as well as their main source: Swahili translation. Situated strategically around the 
mosque were hi-fi speakers mounted on the walls belting out the Urdu as well as the Swahili 
translation. In a number of instances Borana speaking jamāʿat complained about ‘loudness’ of 
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the loud speaker prompting the Borana amīrs to mute it. They seemed to prefer getting the 
message ‘live’ in their own language and from their own Tablīghīs.  
The Borana jamāʿat sat at the far right side of the masjid away from the minbar. Placards 
mounted on the wall guided new comers, as to where to find the right circle to join. Ḥirāsa 
and istiqbāl teams strolled the corridors of the main mosque and the compound to offer 
directions and prevent breach of security.  
The procedure of sermons and speech translation followed specific patterns. First an Urdu 
speaking elder (akābir) would give a brief talk for five minutes. By then the Swahili translator 
takes mental notes of the main points in the speech and then relay the message which is then 
picked up by all the tarjama teams to be finally delivered to the eager audience in their own 
‘mother tongues’. The Swahili language acts as the connector between the Urdu original and 
various languages of the congregants. The translations were never word for word but rather 
speakers’ understanding of what was said by the guest speaker. It provided leeway for each 
speaker to render the message comprehensible in the most fitting way. While all the different 
tarjama appropriate and relay the message as best understood to their audience, the Urdu 
speaker would concurrently be giving the next round of brief talks. It was a cacophony of 
sounds with overlapping voices and multiple reinforcement of difference and simultaneous 
confirmation of unity amid diversity. A bayān could take at least 1 ½ hours. For spatial 
arrangement of the different language-based jamāʿats and use of space on the ground floor of 
the main mosque, see the diagram below: 
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Figure 6 Translation circles in the main mosque ground floor 
Spatial distribution of language-based groups in the main mosque ground floor. 
Amh is Amharic speaking group, DRC is a group from the eastern part Democratic Republic 
of Congo, RWD is a team from Rwanda, UG is a team from Uganda, Urdu is an Urdu 
speaking group from Indian Subcontinent, and Arb is a small group from unspecified Arabic 
speaking countries. 
5.4.4.3.1 Swahili Speaking jamāʿat  
The largest and the most diverse congregants were in the Swahili group. Here Kenyans and 
Tanzanians of diverse origin sat and listened directly to the main Swahili translation. The 
group stretched from the minbar to the main doors of the mosque covering over half the space 
of the main ground floor. The congregants directly faced the Urdu and Swahili speakers.  
Swahili group was composed of : 
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• Kenyans from Nairobi ḥalqa (the rest of the county except North Eastern Province, 
Isiolo, Waso, Moyale and Marsabit) 
• Kenyans from Mombasa ḥalqa with exception of Tana River. 
• Tablīghīs from Tanzania  
 
The Swahili group is hence a microcosm of East Africa. The Swahili translators largely hailed 
from among multilingual Kenyan Asians. There is enhanced connectivity between this largely 
naturalized Kenya Asians and South Asian elders and centres from IPB. The Kenyan Asians 
speak Urdu, Swahili and English have impacted on religious revivalism among indigenous 
Kenya Muslims and have for years on private basis contributed towards the building of 
madrasas and mosques. The movement provided this largely ‘philanthropic self-made’ 
sheikhs with organisational capacity to impact on Tablīghīs religiosity in a most dramatic 
way. The movement hence is not only an outreach programme to the indigenous Kenyan 
Muslims to join a transnational network of lay preachers but also a golden opportunity for 
these Kenyan Asians to reconnect with ‘motherland’ in a spiritual way. The role of Kenya’s 
Borana Tablīghīs among the traditional Borana of Ethiopia also alludes to such motives. The 
Kenya Asians in the movement link the local and transnational dimension of the faith 
movement.  
Coming back to the Swahili group, it should be noted that Swahili is an official language in 
Kenya alongside English. Over the years due to mass education, Swahili is widely used by 
Kenyans in almost all forms of interactions. It has served as means of communication 
between various communities in Kenya and by Muslim and Christians in proselytism. In most 
urban centres Swahili is used as the main language of Friday khuṭba. Somali is used largely in 
North Eastern Province and Eastleigh mosques, Borana is used in most mosques in Isiolo, 
most mosques in Waso, Moyale and Marsabit for purpose of preaching and religious 
instructions. The preference of Swahili in the Muslim communication has not however muted 
the use of other languages by the movement in order to reach out to others in their own 
tongue. On the contrary, parallel to demystification of Arabic as language of sermons and its 
replacement with Urdu, the movement in Kenya downplays the use of Swahili except in urban 
areas in Central, Rift Valley and Western region and in the coastal region of Kenya. The 
movement aims to carry out ‘contextual daʿwa’ and packaging of the spiritual goods in the 
language of the people. Individuals are believed to get the message best when it is relayed in 
the language of their socialization. There is a tendency within the Tablīghī phenomena that 
points to facilitation of the ownership of the movement through domestication of the message. 
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This is highly visible at the ijtimāʿ. Despite common understanding of the national language, 
most large linguistic communities gather around their own tarjama teams. Large sections of 
Kenyan Somalis could understand Swahili if they wished to listen to Swahili tarjama so were 
most Borana speaking Tablīghīs. It should be remembered that in the tier of translation, 
Swahili was first and all the other languages obtain their translations ( or commentaries) from 
Swahili and not the Urdu original. Outside the markaz preaching sessions, most informal 
interactions between different Tablīghīs were carried out in Swahili and other local languages. 
Notices and signs for directions and designated areas were done in Swahili and English. 
Different members of organisational departments also converse in Swahili.  
5.4.4.3.2 Somali Speaking jamāʿat  
The Somali tarjama was the second largest linguistic group at the ijtimāʿ. Somali language is 
spoken by the majority of inhabitants of North Eastern Province, Ogaden State in Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Djibouti, by large diasporic communities in Europe and North America and by the 
large Somali population in Eastleigh, Nairobi and various Somali business communities in a 
number of Kenyan towns.  
The Somali speaking jamāʿat was composed of: 
1. Somali Kenyans from North Eastern Province such as Garissa and Wajir 
2. Somali immigrants and Somali Kenyans from the neighbouring commercial hub of 
Eastleigh  
3. Somali Kenyans from various urban centres including the Coastal cities 
4. Garre from Mandera, a bilingual community speaking both Borana and Somali (Most 
Garreh appear to favour to sit in this translation circle than the Borana one) 
5. Somalis from Somalia, may be even Ethiopia; Djibouti; Tanzania 
 
The group, due to its large size, was granted the upper floor of the Markaz as their tarjama 
zone and space for accommodation. The upper floor was by then largely unfinished unlike the 
ground floor that served as the main mosque and where all preaching activities took place. 
Just like the other tarjama teams, the Somali translators were networked with Swahili and 
Urdu speakers via loud speakers, earphones and microphones.  
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Figure 7 Somali tarjama 
  
5.4.4.3.3 Borana Speaking jamāʿat  
The Borana speaking congregation was the third largest after the Swahili and the Somali and 
second largest on the ground floor. It was an interesting mix of Borana speaking congregants. 
Teams from Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Waso and Borana speaking Muslims from nearby 
Eastleigh, Komarock, Mathari, Huruma, Kariobangi and Dandora sat around the translation 
team. An interesting addition to the mix are congregants from Tana River namely the 
Wardhey and the Orma. Orma language is closely related to Borana and is mutually 
intelligible.
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 This formation of such language-based jamāʿats at such transnational events 
helps to reinforce inter-ethnic solidarity and belongingness. Orma and Borana, separated by 
years of outward migration and cut off from each other by colonial rule re-establish 
commonality through sharing the novel message of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat under one roof and 
in one corner as a group. In a side chat, one Orma Tablīghī told me that the Borana and the 
Orma were one and that the two possess similar clan structures and dual moieties.  
Such bond of brotherhood is further reinforced by instantaneous friendship and curious 
interests to rediscover the ‘long lost’ ethnic kin. For some Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs, this is 
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 Schlee states that Tana Orma are closely related to the Borana and other Oromo speakers of Ethiopia. He 
observes that ‘nam Orma’ which means Orma man is used by Borana as designation of all Oromo and ritually 
associated people. Their clan structure is similar to that of Borana with duality in moieties as well as some clan 
names corresponding to each other implying a historical split hundreds of years ago  Schlee (1992).  
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the first close interactions with the Orma or the Borana. To bring fairness, inclusion, 
ownership of the message, equal opportunity and representativity among the various regions 
under the Borana tarjama, the organisers of the ijtimāʿ allocated translation opportunities to 
senior Tablīghīs from Moyale, Kinna, Merti, Isiolo and Tana River. It made the listeners feel 
at home as they keenly follow the bayāns and taʿlims from their own kins. The speakers often 
urged the audience to squeeze closer to allow for better reception, bonding and more space for 
new congregants. 
The Borana tarjama teams appropriated the messages being preached in Swahili and by 
extension Urdu to their everyday situation back home, a loss of meanings notwithstanding. 
There is a recurrent personalised appeal to the target audience to improve their religiosity as 
Muslims who spoke ‘our language’. Some speakers decried the moral laxity among the 
Borana speaking communities, attributing it to a lack of genuine concerns for their faith and 
urged dramatic changes upon returning home. Others appropriated examples from livelihood 
challenges, allegorical reference to cattle the prized Borana possession to drive their points 
home and to Borana cultural survivals affecting proper Islamic revivalism. Some speakers 
were livelier and infused ethnic anecdotes to break monotony.
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 Others were outrightly 
conservative and heavily relied on the Swahili translation. A few translators hardly followed 
the points raised by the Swahili translator and did their own parallel show. Each session had a 
different speaker hence providing the audience with varied oratory skills and interpretations. 
The Borana speaking group ranged between 400 to 500 persons. During the final day of the 
ijtimāʿ, it seemed to hit a hundred people more. At one moment due to the large number of the 
audience, those positioned at the fringes could hardly hear. One member of the ijtimāʿ 
management committee of Kenyan Asian origin suggested that the audience split into two. 
Then the Borana translator of the moment asked for the ra’y (Ar. opinion) of the audience. 
The move was highly resisted as divisive and instead the speaker was asked to move right into 
the middle of the audience. The audience was hence asked to squeeze together even further as 
the speaker attempted with some success to raise his voice to reach those seated at the 
periphery. A few tired elderly Tablīghīs dozed off their backs firmly pressed against the wall 
of markaz. In the next session, a successful split of the audience resulted into two Borana 
tarjama. The audience reluctantly divided themselves into two. 
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 Abdulqadir, a Tablighi from Isiolo and one of the most humorous of the tarjama team made a comparison 
between Borana man and his allegedly constant consultation of wife and Patriarch Abraham and his 
abandonment of his wife Hajar and son Ismael in the arid lands near Makkah. He jokingly say that ‘Abban Libe’ 
(father of Liban, a honorary title used by Borana as a sign of ritual superiority) would never do what Abraham 
did and that would he even consult the wife if he want to go for three days jamaat. Such humour elicited 
laughter.  
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Each session of sermons and preaching always ended with tashkīl for formation of travel 
teams for four months, 40 days follows then 10 days and finally three days tours. The 
recruitment teams noted down the names of the persons who pledged to go for a daʿwa tour. 
Such moves concluded every preaching session and those who gave no promises to go out for 
any number of days were urged to pray over it at night and have a decision ready by the next 
day. Urdu speaking elders from IPB moved among the tarjama teams urging the audience to 
volunteer. In the Borana tarjama one of the akābir pointed out that each of the congregants 
must give time as the main objective of the ijtimāʿ is not speeches but mobility for faith.  
Among the Borana speaking jamāʿats were Tablīghīs who were on varying preaching tours. I 
met one such team that was set to conclude its 40 days khurūj ten days after the ijtimāʿ. They 
asserted that they planned to finish the last leg on the road home. These teams maintained 
their obedience to their amīr, did brief daily shūra, ate, slept near each other and socialise 
together. A few would sneak out of markaz compound and head to Eastleigh or other 
neighbouring areas for personal visits to friends and relatives. This, if done without the 
knowledge of amīr, was considered as unbecoming behaviour.  
5.4.4.4 Specialised Shūras: Consulting for daʿwa 
On the third day of the ijtimāʿ, a number of shūra or consultative meetings were conducted 
targeting khawāṣṣ (traders, rich men, etc), professionals, university students and teachers or 
the educated adherents both new and old, qudamā’  or regulars who have at least done a four 
months khurūj tour, foreign jamāʿats among others. These shūras were conducted in the 
markaz main mosque, the top floor, the basement, the old mosque, offices among others. 
Those, who were not in any of these specialised categories remained in their language-based 
jamāʿats for taʿlīm. 
The contents of the various shūra differed from group to group but the main focus was rooted 
on how to sustain the daʿwa, draw more people into it and guarantee continued assurance and 
support from the target group to remain steadfast in the daʿwa work.  
5.4.4.5 Food and the Faithfuls: Consumption within the markaz and without 
There were two options available for food at the ijtimāʿ. One could eat outside the compound 
of the markaz from a host of makeshift food kiosks or two, from the large food tent within the 
markaz compound. Numerous stalls sprung up during the ijtimāʿs where cheap chapatis, 
mandazis, samosas, milk, tea, bread, stew and ugali could easily be obtained. It was brisk 
business for equally itinerant hawkers serving the lay preachers selling varieties of wares. One 
Borana woman spoke of operating her temporary food kiosk for the last five ijtimāʿs. 
Surprisingly, she added that, she did not operate similar business in Kariobangi where she 
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resides but rather sells vegetables only. Due to the large number of congregants in need of tea 
and snacks, one has to actually queue for that much needed cup of tea. If unlucky, one may be 
compelled to eat while standing. There were stalls selling Tablīghī literature, Muslim robes, 
headscarfs, half-coats and caps, traditional medicine and assortments of other items, all at 
highly subsidized prices. A number of stalls belong to enterprising followers of the 
movement. The markaz is situated right on Juja Road. During the ijtimāʿs and other 
gatherings, both sides of the road often witness thick human traffic and petty trade.  
Within the markaz, the sale of food was proscribed. The task of feeding the hundreds of 
congregants was systematically carried out by the khidma teams from the three Kenya ḥalqas: 
Garissa, Nairobi and Mombasa. The adherents from each of these regions took their food 
from these respective points. Attendants of the Borana tarjama were split into all the three 
ḥalqa food points. The Orma from Tana River headed to Mombasa ḥalqa food point, Moyale 
and Marsabit groups queued at Garissa ḥalqa food point while the Waso and Isiolo 
congregants joined the line of Nairobi ḥalqa. Those on khurūj tours from these regions and 
attended the ijtimāʿ in their daʿwa tour had the prices subsidized while the ordinary attendants 
paid a sum of Kshs. 50-100 for every meal. Eating just like obligatory prayers and shūra is a 
communal affair, with a plate of food shared between three to four persons. Rice and stew 
was offered for lunch and supper. Breakfast was tea and a few slices of bread. At times a 
banana or orange formed part of the meal. Foreign jamāʿats were normally given special 
treatment.
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 Their food is often prepared separately and served in the reserved left section of 
the main markaz or in the old mosque. Criticizing the preferential treatment as discriminatory, 
Sheikh Bafana in an audio-visual polemics against the movement in Kenya lament:  
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Markaz on the extreme left section or at times in the old mosque. It is here that they slept, eat and stored their 
baggage. There are also bathrooms and toilets located strategically for their use at the left side basement of the 
Markaz. Ḥirāsa teams blocked unauthorized persons from accessing this section of the Markaz to safeguard 
against theft and invasion of privacy. At times such preferential treatments raise displeasure among non-
Tablīghīs.   
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We have been there many years. Baitul Maal ikrām (hospitality) is reserved for people 
who are white (Asians and Arabs). Indians and Arabs only! They are given their own 
spaces. Their food is different from others. Their accommodation is special too. The 
food for ordinary people is cooked just out there in open, for instance, rice and meat 
soup and that is it. But the food for the special people, especially the wealthy one, is 
brought from outside by pick-up trucks. In there, you will find pots of pilau, pots of 
biriani, and pots of tambi to mention but a few. These are specially prepared for these 
kinds of people, the good people. However the rest of the ordinary people are served 
with ordinary Pakistani rice and stew made from meat bought at Kariokor (a run-down 
section of the city).
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It is imperative to mention that when it comes to accommodation, the spaces allocated for 
sleep and rest coincides with the spaces used during the day and night lectures for tarjama 
and prayers hence it reinforce in-group belonging within the ḥalqa and between people who 
share similar or same language and ethnic affiliation. Borana speaking congregants and Orma 
shared the same area of accommodation. The congregants sleep almost shoulder to shoulder 
due to size of the ijtimāʿ attendants. Amid the sea of bodies, a number of ‘pious’ Tablīghīs 
offered recommended sunnah prayers such as Ṣalāt al-Layl and Witr (recommended nightly 
prayers). By 05:15, almost everyone was up for another intensive day of Tablīghī activities. 
 
5.4.4.6 Dua and Departure: Final day of the Ijtimāʿ  
Embedded in the last rak
c
a of the Fajr prayer on the last day was an elongated and 
emotionally charged qunuut, a ‘spiritually rewarding’ invocation often recited in times of 
crisis and to ask for mercies from Allah. The prayer on this occasion is often led by one of the 
invited Tablīghī elders. Many Tablīghīs break down in sobs. At times the emotion appears to 
be infectious as those all around join in low tone communal cry. The session was the most 
attended as Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs cash on the abundance of glorious grace (baraka) 
and blessings of Allah on the strength of common dua for umma. Among the Borana speaking 
jamāʿats on that day were three prominent businessmen and a popular politician from 
Moyale. In South Asia, the final prayers are called akhīra munājāt. Devotees from all walks 
of life throng mosques or open fields where the ijtimāʿ are held and the session considered as 
moments of intense spiritual exaltation and that dua within it as maqbūl (Ar. instantaneously 
accepted). For instance akhīra munājāt on the last days of the Bishwa ijtimāʿ held at Tongi in 
Bangladesh attracts approximately 2 million people. The annual gathering is argued to be the 
second largest gathering of Muslims in the world after Ḥajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to 
Makkah. In Kenya, the only other gathering that rival the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ  is the Eid 
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prayers at Sir Ali Muslim Club and closely followed by Friday prayers at Nairobi Jamia 
Mosque during the month of Ramaḍān. 
After the prayers, bayān fajrī was offered. More duas were offered, first in Arabic then in 
Urdu. Chorus of ‘amīn’ and sobbing filled the sacred space. The climax of the event was 
calling of the names of all the individual Tablīghīs who have volunteered to travel for a 
specific number of days. All the four months jamāʿat volunteers plus their amīrs were called. 
The speaker also mentions the daʿwa destination of each jamāʿat. Then the team members 
passed in front of the minbar zone walking from left to right. They shook hands individually 
with the Tablīghī elder and two other equally conspicuous persons of South Asian 
complexion (presumably elders too), then finally the Swahili translator. An amīr then takes 
the list of his new team from the Swahili translator and moves to a corner to deliberate on 
travel plans. The names are read out not by the Tablīghī elders but by a youthful energetic 
Swahili translator, a senior regular from Kenyan Asian community. The four months jamāʿats 
departing after the ijtimāʿs during the year 2010 numbered over 35. Then came the 40 days 
jamāʿats which numbered over a hundred teams. Then 10day jamāʿats. The exercise lasted 
over two hours and the string of people flowing to and from the minbar area formed an 
endless human chain as new ones were called. The markaz team often keeps the names and 
destination of each jamāʿat that depart after ijtimāʿ for record. It also keeps track of their 
progress and route of travel as well as any unexpected indiscipline issues. During this exercise 
there were no parallel translations by different tarjama teams. A large number of congregants 
stood alert, perhaps waiting for their names to be called or just watched the ensuing event. 
Various jamāʿats scheduled to travel for specific number of days or months consulted on 
logistics. Amīrs collected money from the volunteers to cater for transport costs and food 
while on travel. It is important to note that after this ijtimāʿ, a few 40 days Borana speaking 
teams were sent to Tana River. A jamāʿat of this nature is composed of 10-15 persons. A four 
months jamāʿat from Tana River also was sent to Moyale. I met the team in Moyale in the 
months of June and July 2010. Asked what is the reason behind such networking of jamāʿats, 
one Tablīghī asserts that those who speak a language close to each other would be best suited 
to reinforce adherence to the Tablīghī tartīb.225 Two four months Borana speaking jamāʿats 
were sent to Borana areas of Ethiopia. One was from Waso and the other from Moyale. 
Most congregants bid farewell to each other. Some jamāʿats such as those from Tana River, 
Mombasa, Garissa, Tanzania and Uganda left by hired buses. The Moyale and Marsabit 
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jamāʿats left for Eastleigh’s 10th Street where the buses and trucks for plying Moyale-Nairobi 
route. The Waso and Isiolo jamāʿats also headed to 8th and 9th Street to catch mid-day buses 
to Isiolo. Most jamāʿats heading for stipulated modules of travels often spend the night and 
planned well for their journey.  
The question is, what happens the rest of the year at the markaz? The place is seldom empty. 
Foreign as well regional and local jamāʿats find accommodation here. Meetings of senior 
regulars are held at least twice a year at the venue. There is a team of volunteers engaged in 
receiving jamāʿats, guiding as dalīl and offering all sort of nuṣra (Ar/Urd. assistance). The 
markaz is operational, as the Tablīghīs say, 24 hours with all the attendant practices. Kenya 
Shūra, the highest council regularly consults here and discuss streams of incoming progress 
reports in form of karguzari and ahwāl from travelling jamāʿats and sub-ḥalqa updates. 
Rebuking such ‘idleness’ of the Markaz all year around, Sheikh Bafana opines: 
Look at Baitul Maal today. Where Baitul Maal is built there is a very precious and 
large piece of land. A land that is one of its kind! One of the only golden chances 
Muslims have today. A big tract of land! If you have not seen, please just go to Baitul 
Maal and see how the land is. It gradually drops up to the end there. 
But have you seen school built there? Have you seen a hospital built there? Have you 
seen a shopping centre built there? Have you seen any development carried out there? 
Nothing! None! There you will find the biggest mosque in the whole of Nairobi. 
Unfortunately this mosque is used only in the month of August when there is ijtimāʿ 
and people of movement gather there. After the ijtimāʿ of this month, you will not find 
any one coming to the mosque. Instead the prayers are conducted in a smaller mosque 
in the same compound. Where is a school? They say that these are worldly matters and 
should not be emphasised. 
226
 
 
5.4.5 Tablīghī Economy  
Travels for tablīgh cost money. Equally if the man has a home, he is expected to leave 
something at home for his family while he is away for khurūj. It has been observed that often 
the movement attracts people with means to cover for the preaching tours. Many a time 
individuals part with meagre resources to pay for khurūj. Through taʿlīm f’il-bayt and shūra 
f’il-bayt, the women are made to ‘misrecognise’, to use Bourdieu’s term, to see the need to 
revive faith. She may even willingly encourage her husband to make the journey as she and 
her family bear with deficiencies.  
Tales are common among anti-Tablīghīs in Moyale of people who have suffered closure of 
business premises due to complete absorption into the movement’s endless travels and 
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activities. However the Tablīghīs are quick to counter that with a lack of foresight on the part 
of businessman for not balancing dīn and dunya (Ar. worldly concerns). Similarly some 
Tablīghīs who work as teachers and civil servants in the areas have tended to make arbitrary 
decisions of travelling without prior permissions from their bosses. Such employees 
convinced about the truthfulness of the Tablīghī daʿwa make radical decision of dedicating 
their entire life to khurūj. Sometime such individuals, the Tablīghīs argue, are counselled and 
urged to go back to work. Such moves threaten their livelihood and those of their dependents, 
putting a great strain on their domestic economy. 
Polemical materials against the Tablīghī point to the existence of foreign finance of their 
travel and even hint at regular payment of senior amīrs in different sub-ḥalqas for the services 
they offer ‘for free’. Little evidence exists to either disapprove or validate these claims. 
Mamed Roba countering the claim asserts: 
Most people opposed to the Tablīghī daʿwa allege that there are people out there in 
India who pay us monthly salary. Though they say that, none of them wants to join to 
find out the truth. We all pay for our expenses, our travels and our upkeep.
227
 
 
The fact that some Tablīghīs in Moyale and Waso flourish despite lacking formal 
employment or business ventures have left to speculations as to source of their livelihood 
despite spending many days of travels. A popular narrative is that Allah is providing for 
them.
228
 Practical explanations given include engagement in trade such cross border import of 
goods in Moyale. Other Tablīghīs use the income from regular employment in governmental 
or non-governmental agencies to finance their travels.  
The amount paid for different durations of travels differs. A jamāʿat wishing to travel to 
foreign countries must set aside more money than local jamāʿat going for the same period of 
time. Masturat jamāʿat is more expensive than jamāʿat consisting only of males. Masturat 
jamāʿat is argued to require special food such as meat, milk and fruits. The amount paid for 
each of the travel modules are said to have increased with the deterioration of the local 
economy and rising costs of food and cost of travels. Commenting on this gradual rise in the 
cost of Tablīghī travel in Kenya, Abdi Rashid observes:  
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 A story is told especially in Moyale of a senior Tabligh, a government employee who disobeyed his senior 
and went for 4 months khurūj  severally. It is said that the pay continued to come even after his senior wrote 
disciplinary letters to the government. After a while he is argued to have gone to head office to be sacked. It did 
not happen as he is said to have been given a second chance. Then finally he quit all together. Bees were said to 
have filled his home and that he is argued to be selling the proceeds from this for his sustenance. The bee 
incident is used by to validate the truthfulness of the movement and the divine provision of sustenance for 
committed dais. However a visit to that Waso region revealed that bees nesting in home were common 
occurrences in that region. There seem nothing unique about the case. For those from far, the narratives such as 
these, common in the region, legitimate commitment to the movement and travels for faith.  
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The masturat jamāʿat is a bit more expensive than the men-only jamāʿats. It is 
normal. Before we used to pay Kshs. 100 for 3 days, in fact it was more than enough. 
We used to get something back and could buy sweets for our children. Then it 
increased to Kshs. 150. Then that was not even enough to cater well, so it increases to 
200. Nowadays am not sure but it is 200-250/-.   
40 days tour is now Kshs. 4000. It was at one time Kshs 1500 only then it increased to 
Kshs. 2000. Four months is Kshs. 10,000. Ethiopia is considered as four months local 
rates because it is right here.
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Hassen, another Tablīghī confirms that currently the charges for three days jamāʿats is Kshs. 
300, ten days is Kshs. 1000, and four months jamāʿat heading to IPB is about Kshs. 80,000 
depending on the United State dollar exchange rate. He adds that while in South Asian, each 
Tablīghī on khurūj pays for his contribution on a daily basis; in Kenya they pay the lump sum 
amount on or before the date of travel for the entire period. Sometime generous benefactors, 
themselves members of movement, are mentioned to sponsor travel expenses of poor 
preachers. This is despite a tacit discouragement of such practices that inculcate dependency.  
Some Tablīghīs also take advantage of the business opportunity provided by various travels to 
conduct legitimate trade. Take for instance the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ, a number of Tablīghīs 
from border zones such as Moyale bring with them prayer beads (tasbīh), Muslim caps and 
other items for sale. The proceeds are then injected into other goods on demand in Moyale 
such as hijāb, niqāb, buibui, Islamic literature, prayer mats and perfumes. Through the sales 
the individual finances his next travels and supports his home. 
The movement also provides the Tablīghīs with a platform to network, mobilise resource and 
engagement in joint business ventures such as shops selling Islamic goods and other income 
generating projects. It is common for groups of lay preachers to utilise the platform and trust 
availed membership within the movement to run taxi businesses, retail trade distribution 
chains, shops, private schools and bakeries in some parts of Kenya. If one compares Moyale 
and Merti Tablīghīs, the former is more economically organised and networked at social 
level. Moyale is also a border town with immense economic opportunities and hence the 
followers of the movement in the town cooperate on a number of business ventures with 
success than their Waso counterpart in Merti.  Let us now turn to case studies of travels with 
Tablīghīs. 
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5.4.6 A 10 day Travel with Tablīghīs  
‘If you want to learn what Tablīghī Jamāʿat is,’ insisted Aw Boru, an elderly Tablīghī from 
Merti, ‘please take your bag and accompany us.’ Encouraged by such frequent invitations and 
need to document travel experience of Tablīghīs on the move, I joined a 10 days jamāʿat 
leaving from Laroke mosque to neighbouring smaller towns and villages. The outlying areas 
targeted were described by the Tablīghīs in the group as largely nominal with little to show in 
terms of adherence to daily religious obligations such as ṣalāt. The mosque-based jamāʿat 
from the main mosque in this town organised a team to preach, correct and revive Islamic 
practices of their fellow Borana in the town and in nearby villages.  
The main basis of contextual daʿwa is that locals are best suited to carry out proselytism. 
They are knowledgeable of traditional culture, routes of travels, prominent personalities and 
history of Islam in areas being visited. Besides the teams share same first language, clan 
affiliations and have kin in most of the outlying areas.  
A day before the departure, I inquired if my presence as a participant observer was welcomed. 
Gora (not real name), the amīr  who is a senior Tablīghī, accepted by request and added that I 
shall have time to ask all questions that I required concerning practices of the movement. So 
on 18
th
 June, 2010 together with nine other individuals we set off from the mosque. Our 
luggage included a few kanzus, thin sleeping mattresses, mosquito nets, assortment of 
Tablīghī literature and utensils. Gora is a man of many worlds. He settled in the area nine 
years ago from Nairobi. He has a well-stocked wholesale shop. Originally he hailed from a 
town in southern Ethiopia. A self-educated scholar, he is considered as erudite in Islamic 
matters by the locals and Tablīghīs alike. While he lived in Nairobi, he got linked with the 
movement in its early days in Kenya making daʿwa trips to the Indian subcontinent. Apart 
from Borana, he speaks Swahili, Amharic, Arabic, Urdu and a bit of English. He is hence a 
translator for many Urdu speaking jamāʿats that come to the area. He has hence accumulated 
adequate experience befitting a Purana Saati, a senior Tablīghī preacher. He is also the amīr 
of the local Tablīghī unit and coordinates mashwera (meetings) and travels within this zone.  
The rest of my fellow travellers are disparate hosts of individuals. Three are senior regulars: 
Mzee Khurūj (a frequent traveller), Abbo Shulah (a retired police man) and Beda. Second 
timers: Mwalim Ismail (a teacher), Ali Kana (a self-employed man). First timers: Liban (a 
livestock trader), Guyo (a post office worker on leave) and Kuru (a part time Islamic school 
teacher). Each of us in the jamāʿat paid Ksh. 1000 for the 10 day trip. 
Before the departure, the team sat around the amīr who gave ḥidāyat kharijin (guidance 
before departure). A group cannot take the responsibility to preach (takaza) without being 
given guidance. In this talk the amīr praised the reasons ‘why many are called but few are 
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chosen’. He extolled the virtues of such peaceful excursion for the faith. He likened it to jihād 
and quoting a popular prophetic saying, reminded us that the feet that accrue dust on path of 
Allah shall not be touched by hell-fire. He also evoked the Taif excursion by Prophet 
Muhammad and one of his close companion appropriating this incident as khurūj fī sabīlillāh 
similar to the one we were about to embark.  
The ḥidāya introduces the novices and regulars to the uṣūl  al daʿwa (Ar. the principles of 
proselytism).
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 In a way the talk set the Tablīghī ground rule for mobility. The rules were not 
given all at once but were intermittently reinforced over the whole period of travel. Some of 
them included:  Do not engage in vain talks. Keep your tongue in constant remembrance of 
Allah. Keep your glances on the ground while on the travel. Be kind to your fellow travellers 
in the team. Greet every person with assalam aleykum. After consultative meetings the 
decision of the amīr is final and must be obeyed. You cannot leave the team for any reason 
without the permission of the amīr. Political discussions is forbidden. Avoid controversial 
doctrinal issues. Build good network with fellow volunteers. Do not use items of fellow 
members in the jamāʿat without permission. Reform is within you and so engages in 
obligatory as well as Sunna prayers, dhikr and Qur’ān reading to enhance your spirituality. Its 
delivery was grounded in quotes from Qur’ān and ḥadīth.  
The 10 day journey took us to five different villages and smaller towns. We spent 
approximately two nights at each stop. The total distances covered were about 30 kms. We 
travelled the entire distance on foot.  This form of khurūj is called paidal jamāʿat, it is the 
most favoured and ‘blessed’ form of travel mode of the movement. The elders of the 
movement encourage Tablīghīs to carry out this mode of travel. In a popular Tablīghī booklet 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat Made Easy, the author argues that: 
To go on foot is proven. Most of the Daʿwa (invitation to Islam) of Nabi (the Prophet) 
in and around Makkah and Madina was done on foot. In fact, the prophetic sayings 
announce freedom from Jahannam to the feet which are touched by dust in the path of 
Allah. One companion reports that he heard Rasulullaah say, "Allah has forbidden 
Jahannam for the person whose feet become dusty in the path of Allaah."1 Thus 
'paidal' (walking) Jamāʿat is laudable and experience shows that it is most effective.231  
 
The fact that the team is on an Islamic journey to remind their co-ethnics of adherence to 
Islamic faith only, did not dampen all encompassing Borana greetings to everyone we met. 
Greetings for Nagaa Borana (Bor. Peace of Borana) are indeed pervasive. Despite the 
primacy of ‘assalam aleykum’ as the opening formula for the greetings, the amīr  and other 
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older members of the team engaged in lengthened salutations such as ‘Assalam 
aleykum….babaro…fafaya…nageni isan badada…walgul yaa tu…bon baate robb gete… saa 
nami nagaa…ad infinitum’ 
The greetings were always followed by inquiries about our destination and ended with 
blessings and good will from the greeted. Relations between the some members also observed 
the fictive in-law formalities between the two Borana moieties of Sabbo and Goona (e.g. use 
of the title Sodda or brother-in-law) and the older members even maintained ‘joking 
relationship’ (qoosa) with those from ‘friendly’ clans within the Jamāʿat. Borana being an 
exogamous community, each individual must source for a partner from the moiety other than 
one’s own. Everyday life social interactions address between Sabbo and Gonna moieties are 
characterised by respect and pleasantries.  
At every destined stop, certain sets of actions were immediately embarked upon. The point of 
destination was always the local mosque of the settlement. A search party will be dispatched 
to fetch the local imām or the custodian of the mosque. Once the key for the mosque has been 
obtained, the amīr sees to it that the place is swept. Two rakācat sunna prayers are then 
offered by all. After that shūra to plan day’s activities are done, duties were divided 
‘democratically’. Shūra has certain rules. Everyone should express himself freely. No one 
should feel sad if his opinion is not taken, as there could be ‘baraka’ in that. The seating 
arrangement is circular with the amīr chairing such sessions. 
On a daily basis, five duties were delegated: bayān and tashkīl team to give motivational 
speech after Fajr, ẓuhr, Maghrib prayers and another to write down names of local volunteers 
for khurūj; jaula, a team to conduct local neighbourhood outing to call Muslims to the 
mosque between 4pm to 5pm; ḥirāsa, a security team to guard the items of the jamāʿat 
especially at night as sentries and finally khidma, a team concerned with preparation of food 
and drinks. It was khidma that was the first duty to be delegated. The amīr noted that of all the 
duties of a Tablīghī, khidma is the most rewarding. Perhaps this is because ‘ikrām’ or service 
to fellow preachers is undoubtedly a selfless undertaking. Each individual in the team was 
assigned one of these duties on rotational basis.  
Bayāns took place after four of five daily prayers, namely Fajr (5.45am); ẓuhr (it is mainly 
called Kitabul ẓuhr) (1pm), ‘Asr (4pm), and Maghrib (6.45pm). Almost all the speeches were 
concerned with reminding the locals to be steadfast in their prayers. In some of the areas the 
preaching team was more than local mosque attendants. The bayāns were delivered in 
Borana. Most speeches urged the local communities to practice the faith on daily basis and to 
have firm trust in Allah. The speeches were devoid of complex theological arguments. Instead 
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it tended to appeal to the audience with simple convincing narratives to encourage the locals 
to be ‘good Muslims’.  
The bayāns always ended with urging of the locals to volunteer time to form their own 
jamāʿats in the area. The tashkīl team usually stood up and wrote down the names of such 
volunteers. Senior regulars were privileged to carry out this delicate task of preaching. The 
first timers got their chances in smaller villages where the criticisms from resident sheikhs 
were minimal. Liban had his chance at Kaar and so was Guyo. Guyo jokingly confessed that 
to undertake a bayān is easy:  
‘You speak about greatest of Allah, you mention that Islam is the final religion, you 
add that Allah sent all prophets to enjoin the truth and forbid evil and Prophet 
Muhammad completed that work. You add that the work of amr bi’l-macarūf was 
continued by the companions of the Prophet and their successors and that they 
suffered a lot on the work. Finally say that today it is each and every one of us 
gathered here who should carry out this noble duty and then ask for volunteers. That is 
it.’232 
 
These speeches were characterised by four aspects: One, the speakers always drew on 
commonality and never preached from a position of authority 1
st
 person plural/collective 
voice (they used ‘we’ e.g. we have neglected the work of daʿwa as Muslim…we Borana 
have….). Two, there was extensive use of afaan Borana, though opening remarks could be 
made in Arabic. Three, the preaching was tailored to the taste of the audience and sought to 
mobilise each mosque attendant so convincingly. Four, though not many sizeable volunteers 
were obtained, someone always responded (cumulatively 19 people). According to local 
imāms, the residents turn up in large numbers when such a team visits but in other times are 
neglectful of the religious obligations. 
Every morning after the daily consultative meeting, there is a taʿlim session for the jamāʿat 
only between 9.00 am -12.00 pm. This time the mosque is empty, save for the members of the 
travelling group. The topic of this instructional session fazā’il–il Qur’ān (virtues of Qurʾān), 
fazā’il-il dhikr (virtues of remembrance of Allah), fazā’il-il ṣalāt (virtues of prayers) and 
sittah siffat (six attributes). Qur’ān and supporting ḥadīths were given to give emphasis to the 
teaching. In groups of two persons, each individual recite to a partner short chapters of the 
Qur’ān from Surāt al-Fātiḥa to Surāt al-Fīl. Care was given to correct pronunciation. Each 
member of the group also memorised the six attributes. While the novices could only barely 
say more than merely listing of the attributes, the regulars would give a few supporting verses 
of the Qur’ān and ḥadīths in relation to each of the siffat. The taʿlīm session is the most 
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 Conversations with Guyo and Liban, Sololo, June 2010.  
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educative. Many Tablīghīs who go for khurūj frequently compare it with madrasa, the only 
difference the Tablīghī Jamāʿat one is mobile.  
Between 4-5.30pm, jaula, a spatial practice involving a local tour of mosque neighbourhood 
was usually executed. Led by a local guide (dalīl), two to three members of the jamāʿat 
regularly made an excursion to meet locals in the streets and at home to remind them to come 
to mosque and listen to religious teachings. The dalīl helps the team in navigating the social 
landscape. He helps the visiting jamāʿat identify Muslims from non-Muslims, regular mosque 
goers from the rest, as they approach people. Men, young and old were approached. After 
ample and fitting introduction from the local guide, the speaker (mutakallim) often used the 
same formula: 
Assalam aleykum obboleyan. Nu warr tabliqati. Kara rabbi gubba jirra. Jej Kalima ka 
adunyaf akhara wal qaabisisu dumne. Wo malen isani indumne. Wo male isan iraa 
infenu. Qabri bor nu egata… Misajid jirr. Misajid nuawa ammum tan. 
Assalam aleykum brothers. We are people of Tabligh. We are on the path of God. We 
came to convey ‘Oneness of God’ for the benefit of life here and now and hereafter. 
We do not bring you anything else. Neither do we need any thing else from you. Grave 
awaits us…We are based at the mosque. Please come with us now… 
 
Simultaneously, there was usually a special religious instruction going on called at the 
mosque, this talk is called kalām julūs . One of the regulars led the team in the talk. One other 
person was always asked to sit at the corner of the mosque to engage in dua and dhikr. Those 
gathered on the patrol would eventually join, listen and pray the evening prayers with us. This 
kind of outing served to publicise the presence of the jamāʿat to the local community for the 
few days we stayed.  
The ḥirāsa team acted as the sentries at night to keep unauthorised persons and animals from 
the mosque. The night is divided into two. One person stayed guard from 9pm-1am and the 
other 2am-6am. This duty being rotational almost everyone did it. The weapon, as reminded 
to us by the amīr, was not physical ones but spiritual litanies of subhānallāh and assortment 
of protective verses and chapters of Qur’ān such ‘āyat al-kursī, surāt al-nās, falaq and ikhlās.  
The khidma team shopped, fetched water, cooked, served the jamāʿat and washed dishes. As 
encouraged by the amīr those sent to buy food stuff bargained and avoided buying 
unnecessary goods. All the meals were served and consumed collectively in two groups. 
Though religious topics were encouraged, the jamāʿat engaged in lively conversations about 
worldly issues at such moments.  
After the 
c
Ishā’ prayers, the amīr would often read hayat al-ṣaḥāba (stories of the 
companions of the Prophet). The session always turns into lessons on etiquettes as done by 
Prophet Muhammad. The etiquettes were referred to as adabiyāt and included adab al-noum 
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(Ar. etiquettes of sleeping), adab al-ṭacām (Ar. etiquette of eating), adab al-masjid (Ar. 
etiquette of mosque) and adab al-akhlāq (Ar. moral values). The amīr  practically 
demonstrated sleeping and eating manners. After taking Wuḍū’, each of the members of the 
jamāʿat tended to put into immediate practice some of the lessons by re-enacting the ‘proper’ 
sleeping style. Most recited surāt al-nās, falaq and ikhlās in low tone into their hands and 
then passed the hands over the body from toes to head for divine protection throughout the 
night. The amīr urged the group members to wake up late at night to perform Sunnah prayers 
of Ṣalāt al-Layl and Witr. He however cautioned against waking up others unless requested. A 
few of the team members woke at different times of the night to perform the prayers. During 
the day, the period between 2.00pm to 3.30pm was allocated for individualised rest. A 
number of the jamāʿat slept during this time of the day too. This resting time was called 
kailula. 
Below is a summarised schedule of a typical Tablīghī day, while on preaching tour: 
• 5:45 Fajr Prayer 
• 6:00-7:30 Bayān fajrī and tashkīl 
• 8:00 Breakfast 
• 8:30 Shūra (consultations to plan activities of the day and delegate responsibilities) 
• 9:00-12:00 Taʿlim (teaching session for the team) 
• 13:00 ẓuhr Prayer 
• 13:15-13:30 Kitāb al-ẓuhr  and tashkīl 
• 13:30 Lunch 
• 14:00-15:30 Kailula, the siesta  
• 16:00 ‘Asr Prayer 
• 16:10 Targhīb (motivational talk to encourage people to accompany jaula or remain 
behind for kalām julūs ) 
• 16:15-18:00 Jaula (Neighbourhood outing) and Kalām julūs  (teaching circle at the 
mosque) 
• 18.30 Maghrib Prayer 
• 18:45-19:30 Bayān Maghrib and tashkīl 
• 20:00 cishā’ Prayer 
• 20:20 Supper 
• 20:45 Narratives on Hayat al Ṣaḥāba (Stories of the Companions) and talks on 
Adabiyāt (etiquettes such as sleeping, eating and morality) 
• 21:15 Sleep 
• Individually performed late night prayers such as Ṣalāt al-Layl and Witr 
 
Ten days after we left, we came back to the starting point for another round of guidance, 
ḥidāyat raji’in. Individuals were urged to be more steadfast in their prayers and attendance of 
the daily activities of mosque-based maqāmī teams, to volunteer more time preferably 40 days 
or more soon and to carry out gradual household reform through taʿlīm f’il-bayt. After 
bidding each other farewell, each of the members of the jamāʿat left for home. This marked 
the official end of the 10 day khurūj. 
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5.5 Accounting for Growth: Evaluation and Self-Appraisal within the movement 
 
We have so far described the ‘faith bureaucracy’ of the movement in Kenya, its practices and 
place making strategies and the place of the Borana and groups at the national and regional 
gathering.  However it reveals little if any concrete data as to how the movement grew and 
continuously strategises to evaluate the past events and activities, coordinate present 
programmes and plan future undertakings. A glimpse into the movement self-appraisal 
mechanism undoubtedly shed light on how the movement has been able to sustain 
monumental growth in the last few decades. The questions worth asking are: how do the 
Tablīghīs appraise their activities? Are such evaluative measures oral or written? Are they 
done on individual or collective basis? Does each level of Tablīghī territorial unit evaluate 
activities within its jurisdiction? What are the variables that are used in the evaluation 
process? How do such evaluation measures impact on the commitment of individual Tablīghī 
to the various mobility related practices that has bearing on their finance? The case studies 
below and the subsequent analysis shall be used to explore the theme of growth and self-
evaluation of the movement in Kenya in general and in northern Kenya in particular. 
As outlined earlier, Tablīghī practices can roughly be divided into individual (aʽmāl al-ifradi) 
and collective (aʽmāl al-ijtimāʿ) deeds. Individuals are expected to carry out the following 
daily practices without supervision, namely, recite at least a juz (1/30
th
 part of the Quran), 
recite at least 300 adhkār (sing. dhikr) (supplication for remembrance of God), greet a certain 
number of individuals with proper Islamic pleasantries, visit a few fellow Tablīghīs, do 
supplementary recommended prayers aside from obligatory prayers and read some texts from 
Tablīghī prescribed books such as Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Aḥadīth for guidance. 
In sum, a committed Tablīghī is expected to set aside 2 ½ to 8 hours daily for uninterrupted 
aʽmāl al-ifradi. Aside from that, a Tablīghī who is also often an integral member of a 
mosque-based maqāmī unit is expected to attend on daily basis a consultative forum (shūra 
f’il-masjid). He is also expected to accompany fellow Tablīghīs from his mosque in a weekly 
neighbourhood daʿwa outing called jaula between ‘Asr (late afternoon prayer) and Maghrib 
(early evening prayer). A Tablīghī also participate in a collective weekly practice called fikr 
al-dīn, an evaluative session that brings maqāmī units from a number of mosques in an area to 
a central mosque so as to gauge the success of the previous week’s activities, plan the present 
activities and set target for the coming week. Collectively a maqāmī team is expected to 
inculcate the culture of text readings in their local mosque. The reading and discussions are 
called taʿlīm f’il-masjid. As a collectivity, the members of a maqāmī team conducts visits 
(ziyārāt) to religious elites (ūlama), fellow inactive Tablīghīs and pay courtesy calls to barber 
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shops, meat shops, markets, schools and hospitals. They are also expected to organise 
monthly 3 day excursions (khurūj shahrī) for local daʿwa purpose. On quarterly, semi-annual 
and annual basis, they are expected to organise teams to attend local, regional, zonal and 
national three day congregational gatherings called jors and ijtimāʿs. At home, each Tablīghī 
is expected to initiate daily consultative forum (shūra f’il-bayt) and text reading (taʿlīm f’il-
bayt). 
The maqāmī team, the most fundamental unit of Tablīghī Jamāʿat at the grassroot level, is 
expected to contest for sacred space use and own it by conducting corpus of practices called 
panch amaal. Implementation of (five practices) is believed to make the local mosque gain 
the noble characteristics of the sacred spaces of the pristine Islam.  
The question is, with all these expectations and obligations, how does such a lay daʿwa 
movement take stock of its progress and challenges among the Borana speaking 
communities? The obligations required of an individual Tablīghī tasks him in various 
capacities, namely, as individual, as a family man, as a member of a mosque-based maqāmī 
team, and a member of local, regional and national Tablīghī Jamāʿat chapters. To facilitate 
detailed evaluation at various levels, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya has immensely invested in 
the culture of individual and collective appraisal and report mechanism called ahwāl giving or 
karguzari. Ahwāl can be given formally in maqāmī, qarya, sub-ḥalqa, ḥalqa and national 
ḥalqa levels or informally between individual Tablīghīs.  
A maqāmī team is expected to hand in a written or oral report of its activities every week in 
the weekly gatherings (fikr al-dīn) that bring a number of the maqāmī teams from a number of 
local mosques. The team also picks the set targets for coming week. A maqāmī team, in a 
sense, attempts to give an ‘accurate’ report of how many people attend its daily shūra, bi-
weekly taʿlīm, weekly jaula, how many volunteered for various travel durations, how many 
members conduct home-based family consultative meetings and text reading and even how 
many members set aside 2 ½ hours on daily basis. The sum of the maqāmī  reports in a sub-
ḥalqa is discussed in the monthly sub-ḥalqa shūra and sent to the markaz shūra of the ḥalqa 
in Nairobi, Mombasa or Garissa. Quarterly or semi-annually, the markaz shūra consults with 
various sub-ḥalqas and identify a mosque in which to conduct zonal congregational gathering 
of jor. A jor is held on rotational basis in all areas of a ḥalqa. Months before jors and ijtimāʿs, 
each sub-ḥalqa is given targets to mobilise and bring to the gatherings in terms of 40 days and 
four months teams from their area. Often the jor does not end without a specific time set aside 
to discuss the ahwāl of the sub-ḥalqa. A table below is a summary of such a session at Isiolo 
jor in 2009. Annually, a few days before national ijtimāʿs are held, representatives of each 
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ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa attend a consultative shūra for qudamā’ (senior regulars) and they 
submit the details cumulative progress of their ḥalqas orally in front of others and the national 
Kenya shūra members.233 This is done from a standard form distributed among the amīr s. A 
sample of these reports, also called karguzari (Metcalf 1993). Karguzari plays an important 
role of informing, educating and updating each other on current challenges and development. 
The reports from the three ḥalqas are summarised and a representative of the Kenya chapter 
of Tablīghī Jamāʿat presents it in an annual gathering of country representatives at the 
auspicious headquarters of the movement in Nizamuddin, New Delhi, India. See figure below. 
Ahwāl giving session, especially the formal congregational type, is a tense environment. The 
sessions are often chaired by invited members of national consultative council, the Kenya 
Shūra or invited elders of the movement from the IPB. These evaluators are thorough in their 
interrogation of the local and regional amīrs appointed to orally submit the reports. The 
sessions depending on nature of the congregational gathering may be attended by fifty to three 
thousand persons. New directives are often given. The members are encouraged to do better 
in all reported practices. Past efforts though not belittled are often summed up as not enough. 
The members are motivated to believe that they have greater potential to do much better and 
to take the revivalism of the faith to greater heights. In the following section, we shall briefly 
examine two such reports. The first progress report was submitted by a representative of 
Waso sub-halqa in a joint Isiolo-Meru-Waso sub-halqa jor in April 2009. The second report 
was a cumulative summary of the national progress report indicating how each of the three 
halqa of Mombasa, Nairobi and Garissa performed in the year 2011. 
5.5.1 Case Study I: Ahwāl  Giving at Isiolo Jor  
As mentioned earlier, the Isiolo jor took place from 10
th
 – 12th April 2009. The ahwāl giving 
session was held on afternoon of the 11
th
 April 2009. This was done shortly after the Asr 
prayers. Representatives of Waso, Isiolo, and Meru sub-ḥalqa that falls under the Nairobi 
ḥalqa submitted their karguzari reports from a standardised form. The representatives were 
taken to task why certain practices were not performed, for instance, house-hold taʿlīm in 
Isiolo. Meru representative was particularly asked why very few people volunteered to travel 
for Tablīghī daʿwa tours. Waso representative was asked to account for the falling number of 
Tablīghī volunteers in the area. An elder from Baitul Maal chaired the session. He kept 
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 In April 2010, I attended the national qudamā’ shūra. Approximately 300 persons gathered at Baitul Maal for 
the meeting. Representatives from various sub-ḥalqas such as Waso, Isiolo, Moyale, Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, 
Tana River, Kisumu, Nakuru, Kajiado, Mombasa, Malindi, Kwale, and Nairobi are among the congregation. 
Few representatives from Tanzania and Uganda presented karguzari of their country ḥalqas. The two day 
meeting coming days before the national ijtimāʿs discussed logistics and other necessary preparations.   
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lamenting on the sluggish performance of the movement in the region and asked the regulars 
to put extra efforts. The chair particularly compared the Merti lacklustre achievement with its 
‘glorious’ past when at a previous jor held there up to 50 travel teams were recruited (between 
500-600 persons). The Waso achievement sounded modest compared with Meru and Isiolo, 
where the activity seemed limited to a few individuals and mosques. As the session was 
conducted in Swahili, the foreign jamāʿats from Asian and Sudan relied upon translations 
done for them by tarjama teams.  
The karguzari report covered the period from October 2007 to May 2009. The form contains 
set of parameters to gauge success or failure of each zonal unit and give an approximate 
picture of the organisational strength, weaknesses and potentialities.  In a sense, with 
periodical reviews of their practices, the adherents in an area make a personal effort to reach 
targets, own the process and commit themselves to the objective of reforming the self and the 
others to a different level. The categories for review can be roughly classified into six namely: 
‘ulamā’; Brothers (active Tablīghīs); Ladies (women); Mosques; Household: and Jamāʿat (a 
travelling group). The first three are about human beings while the last three are of 
institutional nature. The form is roughly subdivided into two sections. The upper sections 
deals with details of commitment to the recommended travel regimes such as one year, four 
months, 40 days, 10 days by ūlama, brothers and women and also the statistical details on 
number of mosques (masājid and musala) in the area. The second part has 19 entries and each 
of the entry is subjected to review on basis of its previous status (past), present situation and 
future expectations. Below is a replica of the Waso sub-ḥalqa karguzari report (Spellings and 
structure same as in the original). 
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 State/Area: Waso Sub-ḥalqa Date:      Since October 2007-May 2009 
c
Ulamā’ who have spent 1 year  -- No. of Active  -- 
c
Ulamā’ who have spent 4 months 
and 40 days  
10 No. of Active  6 
No. of 4 month brothers  129 No. of Active  48 
No. of 40 days brothers only  519 No. of Active  207 
No. of ladies who have spent 40 
days  
-- No. of ladies who have spent 40 
days with Tartīb  
-- 
Ladies who have spent 10 days  -- Ladies who have spent 3 days  -- 
No. of ladies spending 3 days with 
Tartīb 
-- No. of places for Ladies weekly 
taʿlīm  
-- 
No. of Masajid + Musala  76 
 ITEMS  Previous  Present Intention 
1. Masajid with 5 A’maal 26 29 37 
2. Masajid with some A’maal  19 15 43 
3. No. of Masajid doing daily Abadi of the Masjid  3 -- 7 
4.  3 days Jamāʿat  per month  11 8 30 
5. Brothers spending 2 ½ Hrs Daily  47 23 63 
6. No. of Houses doing daily taʿlīm with muzakra 
of six siffat 
33 16 77 
7.  No. of brothers spending 4 months yearly  14 6 40 
8. Brothers spending 10 days monthly  -- -- 3 
9. Brothers spending 8 hours daily  -- -- 3 
10. No. of 4 months Jamāʿats 5 6 11 
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11. No. of 4 months Jamāʿats on foot 5 6 13 
12. No. of 40 days Jamāʿats  34 24 37 
13. No. of 40 days Jamāʿat s on foot 29 21 34 
14. Jamāʿat s sent to other countries  2 5 7 
15. 40 days Jamāʿat s with ladies  -- -- 1 
16. 10 days Jamāʿat s with ladies  -- -- 1 
17. 3 days Jamāʿat s with ladies -- -- 1 
18. Brothers who have spent two months in  
Bangle Wali Masjid (Nizamuddin) 
-- -- 3 
19. No. of remote locations and karguzari of the  
efforts in these locations  
-- -- 1 
Table 5 A sample of Waso sub-ḥalqa karguzari report 
 
Brief Synopsis  
Though the movement recruits ordinary Muslims for preaching tours, the participation of the 
religious scholars is highly appreciated even if minimal. It was one of the first categories 
under review in the report. The number of women (denoted as ladies in the form) who spent 
10 days and 3 days masturat tours are also noted.  
Mosques form a central sacred space for the enactment of a reform agenda as envisioned in 
the Tablīghī ethos and hence the importance of its exact number, location and nature of its 
custodians for its future and present success. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat are among the few Islamic 
groups who have a consistently accurate number of all the mosques in Kenya.  
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat envisages that all mosques adopted what they call panch amaal (five 
practices). These practices strengthen the bond of network between the Tablīghīs and also 
build their religious capital. Hence the first three items on the second section of the report 
were on in how many mosques that all the five practices are carried out, how many uphold 
some practices and how many exercise the daily daʿwa effort within such as daʿwa,  taʿlīm 
and istiqbāl. 
Commitments of ordinary Tablīghīs were also gauged as an indicator of the performance of 
the movement in the area. The regulars are expected to set aside time for individualized 
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activities such as few hours for dhikr and Qur’ān reading and communal practices approved 
by the movement like spending 40 days and 4 months on daʿwa tours within and outside the 
country.  
The core target of Tablīghī self-reform is the household unit and hence its review. It is 
believed that the practices learnt by a Tablīghī man at the local mosque and on travel can have 
a lasting impact once the household-based practices such as text readings on the core 
teachings of the movement are firmly established. 
The evaluation places emphasis on the means of transport used by the Tablīghīs on daʿwa 
journeys, for instance bus or other motorised means or on foot. Daʿwa travels on foot (Ur. 
paidal jamāʿat) is especially revered as it involves not only greater sacrifice and risks but also 
closer in experience to the idea of travel for faith as done during the pristine period of Islam. 
Tablīghīs in Kenya are increasingly encouraged to visit the Bangle Wali Masjid in 
Nizamuddin, India for advanced training on ways of the movement. 
5.5.2 Case Study II: Purana Saathi Jor - 29th December 2011-1st January 2012 
Currently the Tablīghīs in Kenya have two national gatherings. One is held in early May and 
the other in late December. The former is open to all Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs from Kenya 
and neighbouring countries and the latter is open mainly to the active members of the 
movement from all parts of Kenya. The former attracts up to 15,000 people while the latter is 
attended by about 3000-4000 persons. The former is called ijtimāʿ al-cāmm (general 
congregational gathering) while the latter is called purana saathi jor/majma jor/qudamā’ jor 
(specialised gatherings for active Tablīghīs).  
I arrived on the 29
th
 December shortly before the Maghrib prayers. Each attendee was 
required to report to the istiqbāl (reception) tent to register. Details about name, place of 
origin, mosque of origin, the highest number of travel days or months volunteered in the past, 
expected number of days or months to be volunteered at the end of the gathering and remarks 
were entered into a big black register book. I was number 807 on the register. The atmosphere 
was more cordial and animated. Most of the congregants are regular acquaintance due to 
daʿwa travels and such conventions. The bayān and taʿlīm, just like in the general ijtimāʿ, 
took into consideration linguistic diversity and had translation circles for the Borana, the 
Somali, the Amharic, the Swahili, the Arabic and the Baganda Tablīghīs.   
The evaluation session was held on the 31
st
 December, first by the Mombasa ḥalqa started 
then the Garissa ḥalqa and finally the Nairobi ḥalqa. It is important to note that prior to giving 
of ahwāl, an invited scholar give motivational talk in Urdu about the need for accuracy and 
importance of such reports in the consolidation of faith revivalism. The speeches were 
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translated into Swahili by one of the local Muslim of Asian descent. The invited speakers play 
down any tendency of inter-ḥalqa rivalry and emphasized that such reports are not for record 
keeping but a basis for setting better targets for tangible progress.  
Each of the ḥalqa representatives gave a cumulative summary of Tablīghī activities and 
achievements for the period between May and December 2011. Apart from general summary, 
the ḥalqa representative was asked to invite a representative from one of the mosque within 
his jurisdiction to give more detailed grassroot ahwāl report. Both the general and grassroot 
reports from each ḥalqa were subjected to rigorous interrogations by a band of invited ‘elders’ 
of the movement from the Indian subcontinent. The speakers were at times asked to clarify 
how they go about some of the Tablīghī practices and advices and new directives were given 
on the best way to go about it. It is important to note that a number of congregants took notes 
of the statistical data and new directives for their own record keeping and implementation 
upon return. Finally, the reports from the three ḥalqas are summarised into one form by the 
members of the national consultative council as indicated below. The table below is a replica 
of the original. It was slightly modified for better analysis. While all the rows are as in the 
original, the column on totals is my analytical addition. Spelling and structure of the original 
format closely maintained.  
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Purana Saathi Jor  
 
 KARGUZARI 
HALQA:-KENYA PURANA SAATHI 
JOR 
 DATE:- DECEMBER 2011 
ITEMS 
Nairobi 
ḥalqa 
Mombasa 
ḥalqa 
Garisssa 
ḥalqa 
Total 
1. No. of 4 months brothers 550 324 546 1420 
2 No. of 4 months active brothers 280 151 290 721 
3 No. of (only) 40 days brothers 1710 841 1321 3872 
4 No. of 40 days active brothers 740 331 435 1506 
5 No. of 
c
ulamā’ having spent 1 year 8 5 2 15 
6 No. of active 1 year spent 
c
ulamā’ 6 5 2 13 
7 No. of 
c
ulamā’ having spent 4 months 
/40days 
60 27 39 126 
8 No. of active 4months/40days spent 
Ulama 
35 12 22 69 
9 No. of Shab guzari place(weekly 
programme)  
3 2 5 10 
10 No. of places having Hayatus ṣaḥāba 
taʿlīm 
3 2 5 10 
11 No. of ladies having spent 40 days  20 14 02 36 
12 No. of ladies having spent 10 days  84 70 39 193 
13 No. of places having ladies weekly taʿlīm 7 25 18 50 
14 No. of ladies spending 40 days with 
Tartīb 
- - 2 2 
15 No. of ladies spending 3 days with Tartīb 11 - 18 29 
16 No. of dwellings (villages, towns etc.) - - - - 
17 No. of zones (collection of about 20 
dwellings) 
- - - - 
18 No. of Masajid  1071 1400 1200 3671 
19 No. of Masjids with 5 A‘maals 80 57 129 226 
20 No. of Masjids with some A‘maals 145 159 135 439 
21 No. of average 3 days Jamāʿats per 
month 
130 56 71 257 
226 
22 No. of brothers participating in 2 ½ hrs 
efforts daily 
350 174 170 694 
23 No. of  masajid doing daily efforts with 
abadi (dwt,istq,tlm) 
3 - - 3 
24 No. of houses doing daily taʿlīm 360 202 215 777 
25 No. of houses doing daily taʿlīm and six 
siffat  
120 - 146 266 
26 No. of brothers spending 4 months yearly 52 24 107 183 
27 No. of brothers spending 10 days 
monthly  
5 2 12 19 
28 No. of brothers spending 8 hrs daily  1 2 11 14 
29 No. of 4 months Jamāʿats  13 10 46 69 
30 No. of 4 months Jamāʿats on foot 5 9 38 52 
31 No of 40 days Jamāʿats  46 40 77 163 
32 No of 40 days Jamāʿat s on foot 20 38 56 114 
33 No. of Masjids who sent complete 
Jamāʿat  in the country 
4M-40D 
10 
4M-40D- 4M-40D- 4M- 
40D10 
34 No. of Masjids who sent complete 
Jamāʿat  to abroad 
4M-40D- 4M-40D- 4M-40D- 4M40
D- 
35 No. of Jamāʿats sent to foreign 10 3  9 22 
36 No. of 10 days Jamāʿats with ladies  - 3 2 5 
37 No. of 40 days Jamāʿats with ladies - - - - 
38 No. of 10 days Jamāʿats with ladies to 
foreign 
- - - - 
39 No. of 3 days Jamāʿats with ladies  5 10 9 24 
40 No. of brothers who gave 2 months at 
Nizamuddin  
1 1 - 2 
41 No. of localities where work started  - 9 12 21 
Table 6 A sample of Cumulative Kenya country halqa Karguzari report 
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Brief Synopsis 
The participation of ‘ulamāʿ, religious scholars though is encouraged is so far insignificant. 
Tablīghīs take great care not to mobilise ‘Ulamāʿ for their daʿwa travels as they do with 
ordinary people.
234
 Because the ‘ulamāʿ are in charge of management of mosques and 
religious schools, they are respected as custodians of knowledge. The ‘ulamāʿ are to be 
acknowledged and their support sought. However when they opt to take part in the travels 
with them, they are highly appreciated and honoured as men of knowledge. Their travels with 
ordinary Tablīghīs guarantee the movement legitimacy and a sense of religious orthodoxy in 
the public sphere. Tablīghīs hence take great pride and interests to document and evaluate the 
participation of these scholars in the regular appraisal sessions. As with other evaluative 
measures, they divide the participation of the ‘ulamāʿ into stipulated categories of travel 
periods and their regularity in these travels, namely, how many have spent one year, four 
months and forty days and how many are active participants in these travels. In total 141 
religious scholars partook in Tablīghī travels with Garissa, Mombasa and Nairobi ḥalqas 
contributing 29 %, 23%, and 48% respectively.  
5292 Kenyan Tablīghīs participated in 40 days and four months travels during the evaluation 
period. Of this, 2227 are active Tablīghīs. Of the three ḥalqas in Kenya, Mombasa has the 
smallest number of Tablīghīs volunteering for 40 days and four months travels. 694 Tablīghīs 
and 14 Tablīghīs spend 2 ½ hours and 8 hours daily on movement’s individualised practices. 
There are 183 and 19 active Tablīghīs spending four months yearly and 10 days monthly on 
preaching tours. Only two Tablīghīs, one from Mombasa and Nairobi ḥalqa respectively, 
spent 2 months at Nizamuddin centre during the evaluation period under focus. However at 
the end of the jor, I met at least five Tablīghīs from Moyale and Waso sub-ḥalqas who were 
about to leave for two to four months stay at the Nizamuddin global headquarters. 
229 women have so far spent ten and 40 days on Tablīghī travels. Garissa had the lowest 
entry with 41. There are about 50 places in Kenya where weekly taʿlīm for women are held. 
While no women travel team has been sent to foreign countries for daʿwa, 24 teams were sent 
locally for 3 days daʿwa tours. The report depicts a gradual growth in popularity of women 
jamāʿats in Nairobi and Garissa ḥalqas. 
According to the report, out of 3671 mosques in Kenya, 226 have mosque-based maqāmī 
units that carry out all the panch amaal such as taʿlīm, jaula, fikr al-dīn, khurūj shahrī, and 
shūra. Mombasa ḥalqa has the lowest number of Tablīghī-affiliated mosques despite the large 
                                                 
234
 No tashkīl only ziyārāt for the religious specialists are recommended 
228 
number of mosques in the zone. 439 mosques have Tablīghī teams that execute partial panch 
amaal.   
There 777 households that conduct taʿlīm session on daily basis, of which 306 are from 
Nairobi ḥalqa. 226 households have taʿlīm combined with teaching on the six fundamentals 
of the movement. No household in the Mombasa ḥalqa carry out the latter.  
During the period under evaluation, 121 groups were dispatched for four months daʿwa tours. 
If each group is, on average, composed of 12 individuals, then 1452 persons undertook this 
kind of travel. 227 groups were dispatched for 40 days preaching tours. This means 
approximately 3324 persons volunteered for the stipulated tours within the country. While 
there were no new areas of growth in Nairobi ḥalqa, Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas registered 
9 and 12 places respectively.  
This statistical data helps the national and regional Tablīghī units to plan on how to boost 
dwindling numbers of active members and consolidate gains made over time. The national 
shūra subjects the cumulative data to detailed analysis, compare with previous records and set 
targets for each of the three ḥalqas in the coming period. The practice of allocating quotas for 
each zone is called takaza. The leaders from each ḥalqa redistribute targets for the next six 
months to one year to respective constituent sub-ḥalqas, qaryas and mosque-based maqāmī 
units. This loose flow of information, directives and targets in combination with thorough 
peer-to-peer collective evaluation accounts for the phenomenal growth of the movement in 
Kenya. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Mobility characterises Tablīghī phenomena in Northern Kenya. The movement has initiated 
local followers to ignite religious revivalism within their own respective communities. This 
strategy has seen increasing transborder travels by the Kenya Borana speaking Tablīghīs 
roaming the regions settled by fellow Borana in Ethiopia. The movement attracts a certain 
class of people who can not only pay for the travel cost but also feel dissatisfied with the 
efforts of ‘ulamāʿ and want to impact on religiosity of their local mosque-goers. Regular 
meetings, local neighbourhood tours and regional and national gatherings of Tablīghīs help in 
reinforcing religious and ethnic identification. Not all ethnic groups are attracted to the novel 
religious travels of the movement equally. Those with lesser levels of Islamic awareness are 
hence largely the target for daʿwa. Gatherings such as Nairobi national ijtimāʿ reflect the 
heterogeneity of the Tablīghī phenomena. In ijtimāʿs, one can see that unity in ‘enjoining 
good and forbidding evil’ is best achieve in not as one jamāʿat  but as several language 
jamāʿats. The going and coming to the gathering and dispersal for various travel tours put 
Tablīghīs from different part of the country and the world into contact. The movement has 
also invested immensely in evaluative strategies that keep track of past performance, present 
and future plans, a process and programme that has facilitated its growth in many parts of 
Kenya, including the Borana speaking regions.  
The growth of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya as in other part of the world is not without 
contestation. The Tablīghī being innovative in involving large section of laity in its preaching 
programme exposes itself to criticism from ‘ulamāʿ of established Islamic traditions. The 
nature of their negotiation with the ‘ulamāʿ, their strategies to counter waves of polemics, 
nature of polemics against them and their relationship with Ṣūfī ṭarīqas shall form the core 
focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
‘We Avoid Controversies’: Tablīghī Relations with Other 
Islamic Groups 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, a new entrant into the religious landscape of northern Kenya, continuously 
negotiate with existing Islamic traditions and contests for a niche in order to influence the 
religious practices of ordinary Muslims. These negotiations and contestations have been 
marked by a range of responses from mutual cooperation to polemical attacks. Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat as a new religious trend in an already competitive religious market feels compelled 
not to forcefully assert its presence. Religious commitment in northern Kenya varies between 
regions and this variation also influences its negotiation. Certain places such as Merti have 
greater adherence and strong affiliation with moderately salafī traditions while Moyale, the 
other field site is highly heterogeneous in terms of religious diversity and ethnic mix. In 
Moyale apart from the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, the Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqas, Sheikh Hussein 
ṭarīqa and moderate salafī traditions compete for religious influence. In both areas, the 
moderately Salafī affiliated tradition is the mainstream Islamic trend and they more than the 
other traditions is affected by the resurgence of Tablīghī Jamāʿat as alternative religious 
ideology. Much of polemical materials and discourses also emanates from this group. As 
‘ulamāʿ, madrasa teachers and imāms they feel pressured to not only delegitimise new 
revivalists but also extend their hegemonic control over the nature of discourses that can be 
preached in mosques. 
This chapter mainly focus on the nature of debates between the Tablīghīs and the ‘ulamāʿ, the 
representatives of the mainstream Islamic traditions. It also explores the strategies and 
counter-polemics levelled by the Tablīghīs against their opponents so as to authenticate their 
religious practices as not only in line with Islamic teachings but also the most appropriate one. 
Ṣūfī groups unlike the ‘ulamāʿ of the mainstream Islamic tradition have virtually been 
‘vanquished’ by the Salafī affiliated youthful ʿulamāʿ in late 1980s and early 1990s. They 
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lack concerted expression of their religiosity in public domain. Gone were the days of 
congregational celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (maulid) and other practices.  
As a strategy of ‘survival’, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat capitalise on non-interference in already 
divisive religious sphere by forging a middle path and hence rival religious groups compete to 
win them over. Speaking about such disunity and the opportunity it presents for Tablīghīs to 
forge a compromise ground, Abdi Galgalo notes:  
Already each town is already balkanised groups into such categories as kurrafi,
235
 
there are others, who call themselves orthodox Muslims, and others call themselves 
modern Muslims, there are Ṣūfīs and Wahabis. Already tablīgh is coming to a divisive 
zone. If they do not take part or interfere with the disunity further, they are seen as soft 
spot and everybody wants to win their heart and over to their side but Tablīghīs also 
wants to win them over.
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With realization that the areas that they target to recruit members and impact influence on is a 
competitive religious market, the Tablīghī have over time learnt to navigate the landscape 
alternating between co-opting friendly ʿ culamā’, strengthening bonds of membership, latently 
critiquing religious establishment and appealing to ordinary masses as alternative religious 
experience available to all. The 
c
ulamā’ and non-Tablīghīs who are critiquing the movement 
as unorthodox and recent innovation into Islam utilise select interpretation of the Qurʾān, 
prophetic traditions and writings and legal rulings of prominent scholars. In most cases such 
opponents source their materials from polemics issued by other scholars from outside 
Northern Kenya.
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 The point of contention raised by 
c
ulamā’ as would be discussed below 
concerns themes like knowledge acquisition and its attendant privileges, legitimacy of daʿwa 
tours by the laity, scriptural interpretation and use of (in)authentic books on prophetic 
traditions, apolitical status of the movement, sacred place making and place use and alleged 
neglect of masculine responsibilities. 
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 Kurrafi is a derogatory term used to refer to ‘old-school’ sheikhs who provide divinatory and medicinal 
services by consulting Qurʾān and assortment of quasi-religious texts. They dispense amulets (Bor. irsigi) and 
blessed water (Bor. taalishi) to afflicted person.  
236
 Group discussion with three Tablīghīs, Moyale, July 2010. 
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 There are number of audio cassettes and video CDs that are produced in Nairobi that gain from circulation 
from time to time in towns like Isiolo, Merti and Moyale. Religious writings and legal rulings (Ar. fatwa) by 
renowned scholars are also available. The most popularly quoted fatwa is that of the late ideologue of Wahabism 
and the Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullahi ibn Baaz (1910-1999). Abdub Boru, 
young madrasa-trained ‘ulamāʿ sums up the ruling of Ibz Baaz: ‘the effort of tablīgh is correct and cannot be 
blocked though the group has some innovative practices. The solution is not to condemn but to accompany them 
and correct their erroneous ways. If you condemn, you will increase disunity. They are doing these practices out 
of ignorance.’ Personal conversation with Abdub Boru, Kinna, October 2009.  Other sheikhs like Sheikh Umal 
of Eastleigh remark that were Ibn Baaz given greater details of the bid’a (innovative practices) of the movement, 
he would not have release such a Tablīghī-friendly fatwa but would have declared the group as deviant sect to be 
eradicated entirely.  
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6.2 
cUlamā’ -Tablīghī Relations  
Prior to the recruitment of the local followers of the movement and establishment of the 
Tablīghī ‘faith bureaucracy’ in the region, the culamā’  in the northern parts of Kenya hardly 
saw any urgent need to respond to perceived threats to their power and authority by Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat. Initially, in the 1970s and 1980s the Tablīghī phenomena were dominated by South 
Asian itinerant dāʿis from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and Southern Africa. They then 
appeared to be minimally interested in motivating the locals in establishing their own self-
sustaining daʿwa units. They came and went. They travelled from town to town sleeping and 
preaching in mosques. These pioneer foreign Tablīghīs were largely elderly men. They 
mainly spoke in Urdu. This meant that apart from verses of the Qur’ān that were quoted in 
their motivational talks, the local mosque attendants including the religious scholars barely 
comprehended anything.
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 Often they would travel in groups of four to eight: They were not 
eager to involve local 
c
ulamā’ in their programmes of preaching except to ask for the 
permission to use the pulpit. At the initial stages, the responses of resident 
c
ulamā’ were very 
ambivalent and tolerated the presence of these foreign jamāʿats as long as they respected the 
sanctity of the mosque. However some opponents, citing the age of the pioneers, criticised the 
foreign jamāʿats frequently the region as religious ‘tourists’. Mamed Roba, a Tablīghī, 
reflecting on these initial polemics remembers it this way:  
Initially Indian travelling groups that used to come here were composed of mostly of 
old men. People started saying that these were retired people who had nothing to do at 
home and that what they are doing was some form of religious tourism. People alleged 
that they were rich men who had nothing else to do so guised themselves as preachers 
of Islam. But later the trend changed as young and energetic men started to come to 
our area and taught us how to conduct daʿwa.239  
 
 
After localisation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat through active involvement of ordinary Muslims, a 
clearly durable set of administrative and ideological structures emerged. The local 
c
ulamā’ 
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 Rashid commenting on the initial foray of Tablīghīs from South Asian and the problem of language say: ‘All 
local Muslims could hear from these Pakistani groups preaching and sleeping in mosques was inshallah (Ar. 
God willing). Then the locals would also say inshallah and this is how it continued for some time. In the first 
place the language these pioneers preached in was not local language and not even the international Arabic but 
all the locals heard was inshallah. Whatever that is said in mosque with inshallah is something good to 
remember. The language was foreign; the approach is unique in that we have not seen people staying in one 
mosque and then move to another and like that.’ Group discussion with three Tablīghīs, Moyale, July 2010 
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 Informal conversations with Mamed Roba, Mamed Arero and a few other Tablīghīs, Moyale, June 2010. 
Criticism of Tablīghī travels as forms of carry-over of Buddhist ascetic practices is also raised by Sheikh Said 
Bafana a vocal Nairobi based scholar. He labels such religious mobility as saihun (tourism) and argues it was 
condemn by the Prophet himself. On generational dimension of the South Asian travellers, he raises the point 
that these are old men who even the devil himself have forsaken and are just here to redeem their past. He asks 
‘Have you ever seen their young adults within their groups? There are none. There are only old men. When their 
beards have grown long and white and the devil has refused them; that is the time they come to Africa.’ Sheikh 
Said Bafana, ‘Criticism against the Tablīghī Jamāʿat ’, Video CD, Wa'Haqq Films Production, August 2006. 
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welcomed the new energised and self-organised lay preachers as partners in preaching. They 
even thought that they could rely on them to bring back ‘every one’ to the mosque for further 
religious revivalism. The lay preachers were highly mobile and hence flexible to reach remote 
areas where 
c
ulamā’ could not proselytise.  However with its growth and lasting appropriation 
of mosques as venues of their recruitment and execution of their regular practices, certain 
classes of 
c
ulamā’ felt that local Tablīghīs pose a formidable threat to their control over the 
nature of religious practices and a modification of the behaviour of ordinary believers. Adi 
Abdullah, a young religious scholar, mentions that in the case of Merti, ‘the Tablīghīs 
constitute the most rival group to the authority of the Qalole (Bor.
 c
ulamā’) of the Merti 
Qur’ān Centre and that the Qalole would not be tired of telling them the right thing to do even 
if they would not stop saying that we are fighting them.’240 
Zaman admits that despite massive and unrelenting changes in modern world, the 
c
ulamā’, the 
traditionally trained religious scholars are not utterly redundant. Mass education and literacy 
and impact of print and electronic media has made deep inroads into the ʿulamā’s privileged 
access to authoritative knowledge whereby exposing them more than to highly competitive 
religious public sphere.
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 The 
c
ulamā’ in northern Kenya as in other parts of the Muslim 
world see themselves as the custodians of the faith. As a religious class they are not 
homogenous. There are great diversities in their places and levels of learning, age and 
ideological affiliation. However as part of religious leadership, they have often arrogated the 
powers and privileges of interpreting religious texts such as Qurʾān, ḥadīth and jurisprudence. 
So by virtues of their authority over the laity, they also censor the use of religious public 
space so as to protect unqualified persons from disseminating ‘heretical’ ideas or 
misinforming the unsuspecting laity under the guise of religious proselytism.  They gauge 
orthodoxy of new religious groups and ideas based on their criteria of ‘proper’ Islam. So as 
Abdullah puts it what the 
c
ulamā’ want is simply to guide the Tablīghī Jamāʿat to preach the 
correct ‘aqīda (Ar. doctrine) though such attempts he mentions is often met with resistance.242  
A common narrative in anti-Tablīghī polemical discourse by some culamā’ the concern the 
fear that unless checked, the group being contrary to the ‘correct’ teachings of ahl al-sunna 
wa`l-jamāʽ, would lead unsuspecting umma to the deterioration and eventual disappearance of 
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the faith.
243
  By doing so the Qalole want new entrants such as the Tablīghī Jamāʿat to be 
under their supervision, recognise them as religious scholars and to desist from explicitly 
challenging their authority. Therefore they project their polemics not as attacks on the 
Tablīghīs but as guidance and advice (nasaha) and also as dire warnings. Often the polemics 
attempt to portray the Tablīghīs as heretical and outside the bracket of the Sunni Islam. Some 
scholars invoke the idea that God has privileged them to guide the umma and that if they did 
not raise polemics against such groups they argue that the multiplicity of religious 
interpretations and decentering of authority as witnessed in Christianity shall befell the 
umma.
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 Sheikh Bafana says: 
As you see today concerning the Bible and Christianity, it is on the way to 
disintegration and in fact it has already disappeared; it just started like this. Their 
scholars were silent and did not guide as arguments became common with some 
claiming that Nabii Issa (Ar. Jesus) is son of God while others stated that he was in 
fact god. Their 
c
ulamā’ were just watching! Until today there are over 72 versions 
(multiplicity) of the Bible in the world. All is lost in that faith now.
245
  
 
The range of issues that form the core of Qalole-Tablīghī polemics can be divided into nine 
parts. Each part is interrelated. There is an acute realization on the part of the Qalole that 
despite the perceived ‘inappropriateness’ of the Tablīghī approach to daʿwa, the group has 
converted a number of people into Islam, literally filled mosques with regular worshippers, 
reformed individuals deemed to be social misfits into reputed lay preachers and brought the 
Islamic idea of proper home management to many households. On the other hand Tablīghīs 
acknowledge the indispensability of the Qalole for their own success as an all-out war with 
them would deny them mosque usage and constrain their mobility and proselytism. However 
despite such mutuality of dependence, there exists a rich array of polemical discourses 
between the two groups.  
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 Personal conversation with Abdub Boru, Kinna, October 2009.  Boru warns that this is how Shia also started 
and established their centres in Iran and how Catholicism established itself in Rome in the formative years of 
Christianity and Protestants like Anglican defected and started rival centres in Britain. He cautions that just like 
the examples, the Tablīghīs aspire to create alternative religious centres to Makkah and Madina and alternative 
religious practices to those of mainstream Sunni Islam. It must be checked he adds before it is too late.  
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 Bafana adds ‘If we Muslim scholars are silent about these, then the faith shall deteriorate and finally 
disappear altogether…that is why the Prophet said ‘laa tazalu taifatun lil ummatii dhahirina alal haq’ There is 
no time there would be lacking a small group of people whose work shall be ‘dhahirina alal haq’ who would be 
telling the believers what the truth is…And those who go contrary to them shall be harmed ….Until God 
Almighty brings justice or the day of judgment arrives! Sheikh Said Bafana, ‘Criticism against the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat ’, Video CD, Wa'Haqq Films Production, August 2006. The video is popularly circulated in northern 
Kenya and Nairobi. I transcribed and translated the content of the talk from Swahili into English.  
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6.2.1 Possession of ʿilm: Religious knowledge as a prerequisite to preach 
The main argument levelled against the Tablīghīs concerns possession of limited knowledge 
of religion. Possession of specialised religious knowledge is considered by the 
c
ulamā’ as 
being related with competence and authority in talking about Islam to a general public. They 
see themselves as the sole possessors of ʿilm, the religious knowledge. They have invested 
time and money to acquire it in the local madrasas beyond the basic levels available to all 
Muslims. Others have graduated from universities in Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
affiliated high educational colleges in Thika and Mombasa. A number of elderly Qalole are 
products of traditional duksi (traditional Somali Qur’ān memorisation schools) and halaqa 
systems of education where emphasis were placed on Qur’ān and assortment of other basic 
Islamic sciences.  
The fundamental questions concerning possession of ʿilm are, who can speak about Islam and 
to Muslims? What are the prerequisite for speaking for and to Muslims and about Islam? 
Does the popular ḥadīth that calls upon every Muslim to convey to others even if it is one 
verse a call upon to all Muslims to preach to every Muslim everywhere? Should lay preach to 
the laity? As preaching involves interpretations of Qurʾān, ḥadīth, fiqh (Ar. jurisprudence), 
mu’amalāt (Ar. human interpersonal relations) and ‘aqīda (Ar. belief), who has the ultimate 
authority to interpret these texts and on what basis should these interpretations be done? 
Krämer and Schmidkte (2006) notes that the 
c
ulamā’, on the basis of their acquired religious 
knowledge, claim the rights to interpret the foundational texts of the Qur’ān and Sunna and to 
compose authoritative texts themselves. The authors echo the above questions asking the 
extent to which ʿilm equals authority in religious matters.246 They share the view that religious 
knowledge and religious authority are related. These include the ability to define correct 
belief and practice, to shape and influence views of others accordingly and to identify, 
marginalise, punish or exclude deviance, heresy and apostasy and their agents and 
advocates.
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A significant numbers of the Borana speaking Tablīghīs in the region are drawn not from the 
Qalole but from ordinary regular mosque attendants. The Tablīghīs extol ordinary Muslim 
men to volunteer time, form groups and travel for a number of days or months in their locality 
in order to remind other Muslims of the religious obligations. It collapses the virtual 
monopoly of 
c
ulamā’ over the laity by appropriating the use of pulpit for religious instruction. 
It lowers the requirements to preach to include every Muslim willing to take it up. Though 
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everyone could ideally preach, within the movement, those who volunteer more time and 
inculcate the ethos of the movement have more access to this privilege than the novices.  
The concern raised by the religious scholars to the lay preachers relate to three issues, namely 
one, there are fears that illiterate persons given a chance to preach while on Tablīghī tours 
may give a talk would be basic that it may not be beneficial to mosque audience for religious 
guidance. Two, there are concerns that the lay preachers may quote Qur’ān or ḥadīth out of 
context or give unconventional interpretation of accepted doctrines. Third, because most of 
the lay preachers are not versed in advanced religious sciences, they may not be able to 
answer any question that may arise out of their talks. Though a number of Tablīghīs in 
northern Kenya have moderate madrasa education they are not part of 
c
ulamā’ class. The 
Qalole are dedicated to a lifetime religious career in capacities such as imāms, muezzins, 
madrasa teachers and learned mosque elders. Asked if there are any Qalole involved in the 
daʿwa of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Merti, one informant argues that elderly mosque attendants who 
form the leadership rank of the movement are honorary 
c
ulamā’ and not learned: 
There are no real learned individuals in the whole of Tablīghī movement in the area. 
May be a few. Their leaders are not real sheikhs. They have been given these titles due 
to age and association they have with sheikhs as well as their steadfast attendance and 
participation in Muslim religious activities such as prayers, meetings and so on. Just 
like Sheikh Buke, the muezzin, he is by the virtue of his position; he has been absorbed 
into the class of the 
c
ulamā’. Same case with the people associated with Tablīghī 
activities, for instance, Aw Bidu, Aw Gombore. The title of ‘Sheikh’ and ‘Aw’ has 
always been extended to regular elderly mosque attendants. The titles are in simple 
words honorary and have little to do with ʿilm.248 
 
Another opposition to the Tablīghīs stem from its apparent disregard for pursuance of ʿilm 
within the group except the movement’s principles such as siffa sittah and uṣūl cishirīn. 
Memorisation of shorter chapters of Qur’ān is encouraged during khurūj and ijtimāʿs. 
Ordinarily even such memorisation is valued additional knowledge to significant numbers of 
Borana speaking Tablīghīs who never went to madrasa during their childhood. Hence to these 
groups of people, the movement is indeed a mobile madrasa for the adult. Most of the current 
crop of Tablīghī leadership in Moyale, Merti and Isiolo who had rudimentary understanding 
of Islam at the time of their recruitment are today considered even by the standards of 
c
ulamā’ 
reasonably ‘learned’ persons. However for the opponent, what is learnt is too little and too 
late.
249
 The concerns of the religious scholars also point to the absence of religious 
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 Bafana laments that instead of learning the Quran, what Tablīghī Jamāʿat teaches is their erroneous ideologies 
and etiquettes of eating and sleeping. ‘Ask anyone who has gone for 4 months or a year if he has memorised the 
Quran, if he has memorised ḥadīth of the Prophet, if he has learnt the rules and regulations by which our noble 
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educational instructions that could further human to human relations such as ʿilm on 
inheritance and business transactions. To the opponents, the movement appears so other-
worldly that it acts as though nothing apart from dhikr, ‘ibadāt and recitation of Qur’ān exist 
as ʿilm worthy to be pursued.  
You will never hear them (Tablīghī Jamāʿat preachers) speaking about ʿilm concerning 
business for instance. How can you conduct halal business as taught to us in Qur’ān 
and Sunna? These kind of ʿilm is completely absent from Tablīghī Jamāʿat teachings. 
They tell us that these are matters to do with the world and we should completely 
avoid them. Their ʿilm is these six principles. They do not have ʿilm. What they have 
is what they call taʿlīm. Taʿlīm is to sit and listen to strange books like Hayat us 
Ṣaḥāba, Fazā’il-i a’amaal, Siffat us Sit, Azaad-u Dāʿi and then narrate very unusual 
tales, and then is considered as ʿilm. There is no day you would will see a follower of 
the movement or one of their sheikhs sit in front of a congregation and give a darsa 
(Ar. lecture) on Qur’ān or tafsīr (Ar. exegesis) of the Qur’ān or commentaries on the 
ḥadīth of the Prophet like Ṣaḥiḥ Bukhāri.250 
 
Sheikh Umal, an influential Somali sheikh and an imām of a prominent mosque in Eastleigh 
categorically excludes the Tablīghī Jamāʿat from ahl al-sunna w`al jamāʿ based on his 
analysis that the movement implicitly discourages knowledge acquisition. He adds that in the 
canonical ḥadīth collection such as Ṣaḥiḥ Bukhāri, ʿilm acquisition has been prioritised as 
more urgent and important undertaking even before preaching. Citing the first ʿaya (Ar. 
verse) to be revealed as ‘iqra’ or ‘read’ that situates ʿilm as the very foundation of the faith, 
he faults the Tablīghīs as going contrary to the core teachings of Islam for refusing to attend 
classes on Sharīʿa and other sciences instead opting to ‘roam’ around with little religious 
knowledge. His polemics were widely distributed in Isiolo and other towns in formats of 
audio-cassettes are available in Somali, Arabic and Swahili languages. He condemns what he 
terms as their inherent lack of interest in ʿilm and the superficial understanding and teaching 
of the foundational principles of Islam such as tawhīd (unity of God). In passing the verdict 
that centres on othering the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Sheikh Umal opines ‘but if a group neglects 
ʿilm, refuses to seek for ʿilm, disrespects the culamā’ and does not encourage people to pursue 
ʿilm, all these in itself is enough to remove such a group from the category of ahl al-sunna 
w`al jamāʿ.’251  
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Recalling the withdrawal of the Garre of Moyale from the movement, Jay Kanu, narrates that 
the 
c
ulamā’ of the Garre met and passed a legal ruling that no Garre man should stand in front 
of mosque audience to preach unless he has adequate levels of religious knowledge. The 
c
ulamā’ are said to have put the minimum levels required for giving any form of sermon in 
their mosques to diploma or degree from reputable Islamic institutions and teaching 
experience in their networks of madrasas in the region. Furthermore they encouraged their 
community members to attend various darsas that are held thrice a day in most of their 
mosques in Moyale. Such classes are not common in other mosques in the Borana or Burji 
dominated sections of the town.
252
 The Garre-managed mosques are at times inaccessible to 
the local Borana speaking Tablīghīs largely based on the notion that such itinerant preachers 
are not well-versed in religious knowledge. However in recent times, such rules have been 
relaxed and the lay preachers moderately welcomed. 
The opponents also claim there is a significant number of Tablīghīs whose level of religious 
knowledge have not progressed despite years within the lay movement. Hence the opponents 
conclude that the movement succeeded not in educating the laity but in wasting their time, 
time that could have been used to acquire ‘genuine’ ʿilm under the care of the culamā’ Bafana 
offers perhaps one of the most hard-line critiques of Tablīghīs on the issue of ʿilm. He argues:  
My Muslim brothers, if Tablīghī Jamāʿat was following the right manhaj (Ar. 
method), then we Muslims could have progressed so far. If someone went out for four 
months, it is enough to memorise at least five juzus (Ar. a juzu is one of the 30 
subsections of Qurʾān) if he is a normal person. Ask anyone who has gone for four 
months or a year if he has memorised the Qurʾān, if he has memorised ḥadīth of the 
Prophet, if he has learnt the rules and regulations by which our noble Prophet lived. 
One year is not a joke. It is enough for one to go to an Islamic university and get a 
diploma.
253
 
 
Why do 
c
ulamā’ insist that the Tablīghīs gain ʿilm first before they could preach? The first 
reason emanates from the fact that they are in control of the production of knowledge. The 
c
ulamā’ are the religious scholars in charge of madrasas and mosques in Isiolo, Merti, 
Moyale and Marsabit. They also conduct adult classes from time to time in the mosques. If 
the Tablīghīs enrol into their classes and recognise them as source of their ideas, then they 
could have influence on the direction and focus of Tablīghī proselytism. They could then not 
only coordinate their efforts but also stem any further erosion of their authority. This is not 
happening at all. The Tablīghīs by surpassing them as custodians of knowledge have put to 
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test their significance and impact on the ordinary believers. The credibility test goes further 
deeper as the lay preachers have invested in elaborate and well organised transnational 
networks, preferred religious texts, routinised travel modules, self-sustaining religious 
instructional forums such as taʿlīm f’il-bayt and taʿlīm f’il-masjid and alternative religious 
hierarchy. The ‘threat’ posed by these self organised lay preachers goes beyond the 
ideological war over whether what they do is right or wrong. The Tablīghīs have appeared to 
wrestle the control of two important things from the Qalole: the minds of the lay through 
creation of alternative religious experience based on mobility open to all and the sole use of 
mosque as sacred space.  
With such ‘liberating’ tendencies, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat offers every willing adult male a 
chance to partake in daʿwa tours within and beyond the borders of the region. Fragmentation 
of the authority of the Qalole has been further exacerbated by dwindling external funds that 
once finance the growth and expansion of a number robust Islamic centres and mosques. The 
external funds decline over time due to restriction placed on Muslim humanitarian agencies 
after the August 8 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and September 11 
2001 blasts in the US.
254
 In addition, the mass education facilitated by the Qalole-run 
madrasa in the last 20 years increased the levels of religious commitment among the ordinary 
believers. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat provided these religious individuals with an outlet to interpret 
Islam for themselves and impact on Islamic revival in their own ways. 
6.2.2 They use strange ḥadīth: Critiquing the Tablīghī texts  
Members of the movement are advised to read texts like Fazā’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab 
Aḥadīth during their daʿwa tours and at home with their families. Fazā’il-i A’amaal is 
perceived by most 
 c
ulamā’ as composed of weak ḥadīths that cannot be used for guidance of 
the community. Debates about authenticity and authority of prophetic traditions have a long 
history. The science of classification of ḥadīth has progressed over time culmination in the 
recognition of certain compilation as more authentic than others. Among the authentic 
collections are two well-known Ṣaḥiḥs: Ṣaḥiḥ Bukhāri and Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim by renowned 
scholars Imām Bukhāri (810-870 CE) and Imām Muslim (825-875 CE) respectively. Apart 
from the two canonical compilations, Sunan al-Nasa’i, Sunan Abu Dawud, Jami’ al-Tirmidhi 
and Sunan bin Majah are considered as reliable and authentic compilations that in 
combination with the first two books constitute so called Ṣaḥiḥ Sitta (the six authentic books). 
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The early traditionists classified the ḥadīths into categories of Ṣaḥiḥ (authentic and 
authoritative), hasan (good and acceptable), dāʿif (weak) and finally maudu (fabricated). Most 
of the ḥadīth in the compilation of Ṣaḥiḥ Bukhāri and Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim were considered as 
Ṣaḥiḥein. Classification of ḥadīths into different categories were based on factors such as the 
character of narrators, flow of the chain of narration back to the Prophet Muhammad, 
narration of the message by a number of renowned ḥadīth memorisers, authenticity of the 
message, correspondence of the message of the ḥadīth with other authentic ḥadīth and the 
teaching in the Qur’ān among many criteria. The rationale for stringent scrutiny of the corpus 
of ḥadīths stems from the belief that the action and sayings of the Prophet are in a way 
divinely sanctioned and hence complimentary to the Qurʾānic revelation. Imputing actions 
and deeds to the Prophet were hence considered as one of the most serious sins.  
Fazā’il-i A’amaal is classified by most of the Qaloles opposed to the movement as a book 
based on fabricated and weak Prophetic traditions. Such books according to them cannot and 
should not be used for every day religious instructions. The book according to them fails in 
authenticity and authority tests, crucial concept in validity of use of ḥadīth materials. The 
question of authenticity, argues Musa (2008), refers to whether or not a particular saying or 
action reported in a ḥadīth can be traced back with any historical certainty or probability to 
the Prophet or his companions and that authority refers to the position granted to the ḥadīth as 
a source of religious law and guidance. The two concepts are argued to be interrelated and 
interdependent in that unless a ḥadīth is considered authentic, it will have no authority but if 
ḥadīth were not seen as authoritative, the question of authenticity would be moot.255 The 
opinions of the opponents of Tablīghī Jamāʿat range from complete dismissal of Fazā’il-i 
A’amaal as entirely inauthentic collection of ḥadīths to large sections of its narrations being 
fabricated and weak.  
In addition, the lay preachers at times are said to recite ḥadīths without mentioning a chain of 
transmission or even worse in English or Swahili or Borana instead of the typical Qalole way 
of reading it first in Arabic and then rendering it into other languages. English and Swahili 
version of Fazā’il-i A’amaal is widely used. Significant numbers of the local Muslims in 
northern Kenya have only a very rudimentary understanding of Arabic. Arabic, in the eyes of 
the religious elite, becomes not only a marker of knowledge but also an authenticating 
criterion for appropriate preaching.  
                                                 
255
 Musa,2008, pp. 4-5. 
241 
Commenting on the prominence of Fazā’il-i A’amaal in Tablīghī discourse, Sheikh Bafana 
points out that ‘Fazā’il-i A’amaal is to them more important than even the Qurʾān. Closely 
related with the use of their preferred texts are the issues of interpretation of Prophetic 
traditions. Some of the popularly used prophetic traditions to give legitimacy to Tablīghī 
mobility related practices and proselytism are hence dismissed as self-serving, erroneous and 
fabricated. The Tablīghīs argue the proof that every person should preach is based on a ḥadīth 
in which that the Prophet instructed each Muslim to convey what he knows even if it is an 
ʿaya but opponents peg such preaching rights to possession of adequate knowledge of Islam 
and accuse the Tablīghīs of selective interpretation of ḥadīths. Furthermore Bafana observes 
that:  
Many other ḥadīths are falsely attributed to the Prophet. For example the Prophet is 
narrated to have said: balligu anni wa law ayah…convey for me even if it is an 
ayah…that even if you know only one ‘aya, it is obliged that you convey that one. 
However they do not finish this ḥadīth to its very end because if they narrated the 
ḥadīth to its end it will condemn them. What does this ḥadīth say? It is a Ṣaḥiḥ ḥadīth. 
The Prophet said: balli anni wa law ‘aya...wa ḥadīthu an wa bani israila wala haraj 
wa man kataba alleya muta’amidaa fal yatabawama qa’adahu min annar! (Convey 
for me even if it is an ayah, and speak about the Bani Israil (Israelites) as that is not a 
problem, whoever deliberately attributes false sayings to me, let him prepare for his 
eternal abode in the Hellfire). In reality they have attributed falsely many saying to the 
Prophet and many times as you just say they hold on one part of ḥadīth that favours 
their ideas and discontinue the remaining section as such ḥadīth would condemn 
them.
256
 
 
Sheikh Umal recalls that there was once a Tablīghī team from South Africa that was on 
preaching tour that narrated forged ḥadīth to unsuspecting Muslims from their book chapter 
called Hayatus Ṣaḥāba, a text that according to him; full of misleading and fabricated 
narrations. Attributing falsehood to the Prophet, according to him is despicable, despite 
sincerity of the intention of the lay preachers. Such actions according to him clearly exclude 
the group from the Sunni Islam and push such groups to the realm of heretical sect.  
6.2.3 The Six Principles has replaced the Five Pillars of Islam: Debates over 
fundamentals of faith  
‘Siffa sitta warra taan warri arkanul islam irr jabes (Bor. They give more significance to 
their Six Principles even more than the five pillars of Islam)’ opines Abdub Boru, a Muslim 
scholar from Kinna. He ridicules them for their innovative interpretation of the early Islamic 
history to authenticate their novel practices. He particularly takes issue with the criteria the 
Tablīghī elders used to formulate the six virtues as the most prominent of the many virtuous 
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characteristics of the companions of the Prophet.
257
 Boru like many other opponents dismiss 
the Six Principles as innovative formulations of the Tablīghī elders that cannot be traced to 
Sunna and Qurʾān. Similar sentiments are cited by another informant: 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat have instituted six virtues as the basis of the Islamic faith. They have 
replaced the five pillars of Islam and six pillars of imān. They never mention the two 
at all. This innovation alone is enough to exclude one from the category of ahl al-
sunna w`al jamāʿ. These sitta siffat are not mentioned in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of 
our noble Prophet. They have invented new things that are not in the book of Allah 
and the traditions of the Prophet.
258
 
 
The main point of contention is that the Tablīghīs are argued to neglect the ‘universally’ 
agreed principles that are the fundamentals of Islam for their own ‘invented’ formulations. 
The Pillars of Islam (arkān al-Islām) are Shahāda, ṣalāt (performance of five obligatory 
prayers), saum (fasting for a month during the Islamic month of Ramaḍān), zakāt (alms-
giving) and ḥajj  (pilgrimage to Makkah). The Pillars of Imān (articles of faith) on the other 
hand are six in number: Belief in Allah; Belief in the Angels; Belief in the revealed Books, 
Belief in the commissioned Prophets; Belief in the resurrection and the event of Qiyama; and 
Belief in the predestination by Allah of all things, both the (seemingly) good and the 
(seemingly) bad.
259
 It is not uncommon for opponents to makes statements like this: ‘Today 
the Tablīghī Jamāʿat have taken the whole of Islamic teaching and religion and formulated 
and summarised it under the six principles. They are holding Islam one half and neglecting 
the other half.’260 Beneath the argument of innovation levelled against the Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
are mutual acknowledgment of both the senior Tablīghīs and the opposing culamā’ of the 
relatively short history of the movement. The sheikhs even those not opposed to the 
movement know that the movement emerged in the early years of 20
th
 Century hence a new 
player in the field of Islamic daʿwa. The opponents hence capitalise on the short historical 
existence and dismiss the whole arrays of principles, travel modules, books and ideology of 
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the movement as unwarranted and late addition to the faith. The delegitimising discourse 
takes on the very founding principles of the movement as flawed. Said Bafana asks:  
How can the Prophet instruct Muhammad Ilyās to start a movement under the 6 seeds 
(principles) when there is Qur’ān and Sunna! Qur’ān is here! The Sunnah is here! How 
can the Prophet tell Muhammad Ilyās to start a new group under the 6 seeds? Here it is 
clearly showing that the Prophet has deeply erred and transgressed. The faith that he 
was divinely instructed to teach and that he completed it, is no longer valid and so a 
need for such new things! That these 6 seeds are everything now! But on the contrary 
the Prophet never told him to tell others to be steadfast in their faith but he was told to 
prepare the Tablīghī group!261 
 
The commonalities between pillars of Islam and siffa sittah are the first two principles, 
shahāda and ṣalāt. The rest of the four fundamentals are ʿilm wa dhikr (knowledge and 
remembrance of Allah), iklās-ul-niyyah (sincerity of intention), ikrām-i-Muslim (honouring 
Muslims) and khurūj  fii sabililah (going on preaching tour for the sake of Allah). The sheikhs 
opposed to the movement criticise the Tablīghī doctrinal formulation on tawhīd as faulty and 
leaning towards shirk.
262
 The rest of the six principles are also systematically delegitimised by 
the opponents through polemics. Their ṣalāt are dismissed as that of chance, their 
intentionality as reactionary, and their hospitality as targeted exclusively towards reinforcing 
in-group membership and their travel modules and reasons unwarranted and non-Islamic. 
Bafana adds: 
Let them bring evidence from the Qur’ān and ḥadīth to validate their interpretation of 
tawhīd, their siffa sittah, their apolitical stand, their enjoining only of the good and 
their avoidance of controversies. It should be remembered that even Sheitan (Ar. 
Satan) taught Abu Huraira 
‘āyat al-Kursī. This does not make Sheitan a good 
person.
263
  
 
The polemics against the siffa sittah is strongest due to its primacy in the day to day 
proselytism of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. It is one of the first formulae memorised by a novice lay 
preacher. No taʿlīm session ends without the recitation and memorisation of the siffa sittah, 
this is popularly called muzakara sitta siffat. The principles are hence taught while on 
preaching tours, at home and during different forms of congregational gatherings such as jors 
and ijtimāʿs. The principles have over time come to be the defining ideological basis of the 
movement. 
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6.2.4 There are only three places to travel to: Critiquing visits to IPB and Baitul Maal 
One of the oft-quoted ḥadīth to delegitimise Tablīghī journeys especially to IPB centres is 
this.
 264
 ‘It was narrated from Abu Huraira that the Prophet said: “No journey should be 
undertaken to visit any mosque but three: al-Masjid al-Haraam, the Mosque of the Messenger 
(peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and the Mosque of al-Aqsa.” Narrated by al-
Bukhari (1132) and Muslim (1397).’265 The ḥadīth in essence hierarchically establishes the 
three most holy places where believers could make journey to for spiritual purposes.  
To most of the Qalole, the Tablīghīs have upset the hierarchy of sanctity of the three holy 
sites by creating alternative places for visiting: IPB centres. They are accused of encouraging 
their members to travel to their centres in South Asia than to Makkah and Medina. Kenyan 
Tablīghīs for instance regularly make four to six months tours of India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. These tours are the most sought after by financially-able followers. Most of those 
aspiring to travel for these esteemed tours have not undertaken the obligatory pilgrimage to 
Makkah. Sheikh Bafana apt put it that:  
They claim that whoever goes there (to IPB) is better than those who go to Makkah. 
That such a person is better than whoever goes to Medina. That such a person is better 
than whoever goes to Masjid al-Aqsa in Palestine. They have this as their beliefs. 
Today you will see a Tablīghī who had gone to India more than 10 times. If you ask 
him ‘Sheikh; have you ever gone to ‘Umra?’ ‘No I have not gone!’ Have you ever 
gone to Ḥajj ? No, I have not gone. Why? He has been told that Muhammad Ilyās said 
that going to India is better than going there.
266
  
Borana speaking Tablīghīs who have made or are planning daʿwa tours in IPB are quite a 
number. These tours are seen by opponents as uneconomical and that the funds should either 
be spent on making journey to Makkah or utilised in more localised daʿwa tours in the areas 
in dire needs of Islamic awareness. Such Qalole advise that the money used on such tours is 
enough to sponsor more than ten qualified preachers or even build a small madrasa for 
Muslim children in remote areas. One informant ponders on the foreign travels and asks: 
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Nami qar ulfin min ufiti bahan (Bor. Charity begins at home). We all want our people 
to go to heaven. Before we preach to other people, we need to Islamise our own. But 
Borana Tablīghīs’ major target is to travel to Pakistan. They love to go to Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, Somalia and even Nairobi on annual basis. Most of these areas are 
100 per cent Muslim. On the other hand their mothers, fathers and sisters do not pray 
five times a day. This is religious tourism. How many preachers can you send to just 
here in Golole, Somare, Tuqa and Bor with such travel expenses? Several. Do they 
travel for faith or for their own selves? Does one become better Muslim by going to 
India or Pakistan?
267
 
In the recent past, the Kenyan Tablīghīs combine the journeys to the Indian subcontinent with 
a return leg via Saudi Arabia for ‘Umra or Ḥajj . This may have been necessitated by strong 
polemical discourses and the need to accrue more spiritual rewards from foreign daʿwa 
travels. 
6.2.5 They do not forbid wrong: The Fazā’il vs. Masā’il debates 
The duty of commanding or enjoining good and forbidding wrong is considered as duties 
apparently required to be carried to by all believers. There have been diverse views as to who 
and how the duty of commanding good and forbidding wrong can be carried out. The role of 
religious scholars, state authorities, ordinary men and women and children has been subject of  
a continuous debate since the formative years of Islam. Alongside the role of these diverse 
classes of people, what constitutes wrong, what constitutes good and the extent to which such 
duties can be implemented has implication for the relations between the implementer of the 
duty and those to whom the duty is directed.
268
 Qurʾānic verses such as  ‘Be a community that 
calls for what is good, urges what is right, and forbids what is wrong: those who do this are 
the successful ones.’, (3:104) ‘[Believers], you are the best community singled out for people: 
you order what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God’ (3:110) and many others 
like 3:114; 9:71; outlines the duty of commanding good and forbidding wrong as obligation 
that Muslims should implement. 
There is a number of ḥadīths that indicate the levels to which an individual or groups of 
individuals can carry out the duties of commanding good and forbidding wrong. The most 
popular one compiled in both Ṣaḥiḥ Bukhāri and Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim is ‘Whoever sees something 
evil should change it with his hand. If he cannot, then with his tongue; and if he cannot do 
even that, then in his heart. That is the weakest degree of faith.’ The ḥadīth sets the degree to 
which the duty can carried out depending commanding authority of the implementer. This 
brings us to one of the most critical accusations levelled by some Qalole against the 
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Tablīghīs. ‘The basis of Islam is enjoining good and forbidding wrong’ preached Sheikh 
Umal ‘The Tablīghīs enjoin good but the neglect the noble duty of forbidding evil and this is 
contrary to the Qur’ān that condemns those who believe some verses and ignore others. To 
discriminate in matters of religion is one of the bases of disbelief and expulsion from faith.’269 
The question worth asking is how and why do the Tablīghīs fail in forbidding wrong while 
being able to enjoin good? The answers lie in the different strategies employed by the Qalole 
and the Tablīghīs in carrying out proselytism among rapidly Islamising communities. First the 
Tablīghīs appear to draw a clear line between enjoining good and avoiding doctrinal, sectarian 
and social ills that afflict the umma. In their 20 point principles (Uṣūl  Ishrīn) discussed in the 
preceding chapters, there are certain proscribed topics that should be avoided by the lay 
preachers at all time: siyāsa (politics), cuyūb nās (people’s faults), ikhtilāf culamā’ (arguments 
with religious scholars), and pride. For Tablīghīs tactfully avoiding divisive matters is a 
strategy to build broad based consensus among an already polarised religious community. 
However their strategy of avoiding condemnation of social ills has been counterproductive.
270
 
Condemning the wrongs especially when they already face accusation of lack of adequate 
religious knowledge would open them up to more explicit polemics. So Tablīghīs concentrate 
on reminding the mosque attendants of the fundamentals of the faith. They fear that 
immediately one engages in righting the wrong verbally, they open themselves to criticism. In 
avoiding discussion pertaining to people’s faults, the members attempt as a tactful strategy to 
leave ‘forbidding wrong’ to the religious scholars instead attempting to reform the inner 
reasoning of the individuals, which is ‘heart’:  
 
 
 
                                                 
269
 Sheikh Umal, Sheikh Umal Audio Cassette, recorded in a darsa held in 6th Street Eastleigh Mosque, Nairobi.  
Sheikh Bafana emphasise that that the issue of forbidding evil is non-existent in the movement and the Tablīghīs 
selectively interpret the verses of Qurʾān confirming ‘hypocrisy’ condemned in the verse ‘Afa tu3minuna bi 
baadhilil kitab wa takfuruna bi baadh’ (As for those who ignore God and His messengers and want to make a 
distinction between them, saying, ‘We believe in some but not in others,’ seeking a middle way, they are really 
disbelievers: We have prepared a humiliating punishment for those who disbelieve. 3: 150-151). Sheikh Said 
Bafana, ‘Criticism against the Tablīghī Jamāʿat ’, Video CD, Wa'Haqq Films Production, August 2006. 
270
 Bafana notes that ‘the issues of making people avoid the bad deeds are non-existent in the Tablīghī world. 
They tell you that such matters are called maradi umma or societal ills. ‘Leave societal malaise alone!’ If you go 
somewhere and find societal crisis and decadence and even to the extent of Qurʾān being stepped on! You are 
told: just watch and do not act at all and do not restrain people! They argue that if you become involved to solve, 
it will bring about more problem, more division, more arguments, and more destruction, so just leave it the way 
things are. Allah has commanded us to command people to do good deeds and make them avoid evil, however 
they come in and say the words of Allah are wrong: let us only command people to do good deeds and leave it at 
that and we should not get into making them avoid the bad deeds. Sheikh Said Bafana, ‘Criticism against the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat ’, Video CD, Wa'Haqq Films Production, August 2006. 
247 
Take the case of the 
c
ulamā’ and the rest; they keep treating the problems such as zinā 
(Ar. adultery), miraa (Bor. leafy stimulant drug), siyāsa, hypocrisy and so on. These 
are their target. But the Jamāʿat go beyond all this and target to clean the core of the 
issue; the heart. If the heart is weak then it will be easily to be tempted by zinā, to 
consume miraa and drugs, to do bad things. But if this heart is made to realise that it 
has to love Allah, it has to fear Allah, it has to worship Allah then change can 
gradually come. We avoid discussing social ills…First look at yourself before looking 
at others. As the white people say, when you point a finger at a person, four fingers are 
pointing at you. Before condemning others, we must introspect deeply.
271
   
 
To the Tablīghīs then political matters and vision of political Islam as the blue print of 
governance and rule of law does not arise. To them, such a stage can only be reached when 
and if the ‘hearts’ of the believers have been cured of materialism and Islam became part and 
parcel of their very existent as an ethical system. Mandaville notes that:  
It is in groups such as the Tablīghīs Jama’at – a movement both translocal and post-
national – that the umma, in the sense of a community of believers unhindered by 
geographical or national boundaries, finds its truest expression in Islam today. In 
terms of politics, the Tablīghīs dwell in a translocality that challenges the spatial 
confines of political community. Theirs is, in essence, an inverse normative model in 
which the good does not emanate from an ethical institution (i.e. the state) but rather 
from an emphasis on the collective power of the ethical ‘self ’.272 
 
In Kenya in general and northern Kenya in particular the 
c
ulamā’ do not have the prerogative 
of forcefully carrying out the duty of ‘enjoining good and forbidding wrong’. As religious 
scholars in a secular state their authority over the lay is limited to give guidance to the 
believers on religious observance. There is no mechanism in place for them to punish 
adulterers or heretics or even drunkards. The duty of punishing crimes deemed punishable is 
preserve of state organs such as police and the court of law. The duties of religious scholars 
are restricted to merely condemning and instructing the followers verbally on what is right 
and what is wrong. The 
c
ulamā’ derive their sanctioning power over the nature of the social 
behaviour from the other duties that they perform in everyday life. These duties include 
solving marital disputes, officiating marriages, presiding over funeral and naming ceremonies, 
delivering sermons and talks, teaching at Islamic schools and acting as liaison between local 
religious institutions and national Muslim leadership and the state. They have greater chance 
to be listened to than the Tablīghīs when it comes to ‘forbidding wrong’. So when the culamā’ 
condemn the Tablīghīs for not joining them in forbidding wrong, their mean concern is that in 
their daily preaching tours, the Tablīghīs do not verbally preach against social ills such as 
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adultery, shirk, miraa chewing and use of other recreational drugs, desertion of daily prayers 
and moral decay instead concentrating on individual inner reforms. One informant asks: 
The Jamāʿat avoid solving two kinds of problems that affect the umma. One is societal 
problems be it politic, social, and physical and so on. Second, they avoid completely 
in reconciling or arbitrating in controversies involving faith. How can one call himself 
a person of daʿwa if he is irresponsible and indifferent?273 
 
To the opponents, the movement’s non-confrontational approach to problems does not 
address social issues. Another informant citing an event in which the Tablīghīs failed to 
resolve a protracted disagreement between themselves and the 
c
ulamā’ of a prominent Moyale 
mosque and point out that the silence maintained by the group on matters affecting the 
community is not a sign of patience and humility but a mark of cowardice. The incidence 
resulted in the Tablīghīs being thrown out of the mosque and their office demolished. 
According to the informant instead of contesting for the use of the sacred space as lawful 
mosque attendants, the group quietly left. He adds:  
The Tablīghīs could not reveal the anomalies at that mosque. It is not about 
perseverance but cowardice. They fear fellow human beings at heart. This kind of fear 
is a ticket to hell. If you avoid controversies, how do you expect to preach? They 
refuse to reconcile difference in the society. Imagine, how can you call yourself a 
preacher and a Muslim if you cannot tell people to stop bad deeds? How can you claim 
to be a good Muslim?
274
 
 
The Tablīghīs in their day to day proselytism emphasise spiritual benefits of performance of 
religious obligations. For instance, while they may not go into the details of procedure and 
prerequisite of prayers, recitation of Qurʾān, fasting, zakāt or performance of various 
prophetic deeds such as greetings, they motivate mosque attendants and their family members 
of benefits that they can accrue by performing these deeds. In simple terms, they insist on 
preaching on fazā’il or virtues and benefit of spirituals actions pertaining to worship and 
avoid matters of masā’il that deals with procedure of these actions and matters that deal with 
human relations (mu
camalāt). To Tablīghīs, matters of fazā’il attracts less controversies as 
there are general consensus among religious scholars while masā’il is a minefield due to 
different doctrinal and sectarian interpretations. In any case being less learned on discourses 
of masā’il, the Tablīghīs implicitly accept that the matters should be left to the culamā’ as 
they have deeper knowledge of jurisprudence. However to some sheikhs one cannot 
categorize religious teachings into fazā’il and masā’il as they are intrinsically fused and those 
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matters of ‘ibadāt constitute only a small segment of revealed knowledge. Abdub Boru 
interjects that:  
They avoid any thing to do with mu
camalāt. They have nothing to do with 
jurisprudence and law. What they tell people is that if you do this, you get this, and if 
you do that, you get that. We the 
c
ulamā’ insist that this is wrong. In religion we have 
more to do with masā’il than fazā’il and the latter is equally very important. For God, 
once you pray five times a day and diligently obey all the five pillars of Islam and six 
pillars of imān, you are done. The rest of the dīn is about human relations. These 
include matters dealing with justice, fairness, governance, law, equality, rights and 
wrongs, good neighbourliness, relations with non-Muslims, debates on violence and so 
on. It constitutes up to about 80% of religious matters. Anyone who insists that we 
should avoid these matters for discussion with umma is utterly wrong.
275
  
 
The avoidance of politics and related matters are seen not only as worldly but also divisive by 
the members of the movement. More importantly being ‘apolitical’ ease mobility across and 
within national borders and allow state organs in many countries to consider the movement as 
posing no threats to state security despite its transnationality. The whole avoidance of politics 
is however interpreted by rival religious movements and salafī traditions as acts of ‘unmanly’ 
cowardice and deliberate and selective interpretation of Islamic teachings.
276
 The opponents 
often cite examples of how being ‘apolitical’ means playing right into the hands of the 
‘primordial enemies’ of the faith such the Western powers and culture. The opponents 
literally accuse the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as making the youth of the umma soft, emotional and 
outer-worldly and cite the current cordial relations between state governments and the 
movement as a sign of being enemies in their midst. Sheikh S. Bafana sums up the ‘apolitical’ 
nature of the movement this way:  
If you want clash with the people of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat; speak about politics! Just 
say that the Prophet was commander in chief of an army…just say that the Prophet 
was a head of state and a president….just say that the Prophet was a governor…say 
that the Prophet was a qādi (judge)…they would say that these are worldly matters, so 
leave it aside please!
277
  
 
He argues that the movement relies on inauthentic and fabricated sayings of the Prophet to 
call for inner jihād, a perpetual struggle against one’s own soul, vis-à-vis political and 
military engagements against oppression and unislamic regimes. Accordingly the opponents 
                                                 
275
 Personal conversation with Abdub Boru, Kinna, October 2009. 
276
 Some ulama go to the extent of declaring that because of their selective interpretation, the Tablīghīs are 
among the 72 heretical sects destined for hell because they not only stay aloof of everyday problems of the 
umma but also allowing people with little knowledge to preach, falsely interpreting tawhīd, the basis of Islamic 
monotheism and deserting responsibilities required of a man through unwarranted travels. Sheikh Umal, Sheikh 
Umal Audio Cassette, recorded in a darsa held in 6th Street Eastleigh Mosque, Nairobi.   
277
 Sheikh Said Bafana, ‘Criticism against the Tablīghī Jamāʿat ’, Video CD, Wa'Haqq Films Production, August 
2006. 
250 
of the movement to maintain apolitical stance and to avoid of discussion of the present socio-
political predicaments is akin having hidden agenda to ‘sabotage’ the faith from within. 
Bafana aptly adds that: 
Apart from substituting jihād with khurūj fī sabīlillāh (preaching tours), they have 
gone to the extent of changing the term jihād and called it juhud! (Concerted efforts) If 
you inform that here what is required is jihād, they would object and say that what is 
needed not is juhud. Let’s push juhud! If you tell them we need to combat these or 
that, they would argue that we need just juhud. Jihād has become juhud. It is not juhud 
it is jihād. What did the Prophet say: al jihād mafin ila yawm al qiyama…that jihāds 
hall continue until the day of judgment. Then they claim that it juhud not jihād.278 
6.2.6 The Prophet never travelled like this: Khurūj as bidʿa  
‘Where do they get prophetic traditions and Qurʾānic verses that support their travels for three 
days, ten days, forty days and four months? The Prophet never travelled khurūj the way they 
did?’ asks Ibrahim Adan.279 The opponents of the movement often criticise the ‘innovative’ 
nature of these travels citing the modules as unwarranted addition to the faith by sheikhs of 
the movement. To the opponents the travel modules were never systematised during the time 
of the Prophet and his companions a point that Tablīghīs partly agree to. To the Tablīghīs the 
whole sets of travel modules are not an end in itself but means to facilitate spiritual growth 
and inculcate daily observance of religious obligations become manifest in lives of 
individuals. Some Tablīghīs indeed rationalise the travel system of proselytism that fell into 
disuse for several centuries until it was resuscitated by Muhammad Ilyās in 1920s. They 
absolve their founder of any wrong doing as he was guided in his endeavour to remedy the 
deplorable state of religious observance in colonial India then. Therefore to them tablīgh is 
the only system that could bring back the piety in lives of every Muslim individual.  
Some non-Tablīghī sheikhs who attend ijtimāʿs and give moral support to the movement 
compare it to madrasa for adult Muslims.
280
 Impressed by the efforts taken by the lay in 
charting religious revivalism among fellow ordinary Muslims, these sheikhs participate in 
Tablīghī gatherings and give sermons on general topics. While acknowledging that 
movement’s daʿwa system is relatively new and aimed at revival of the Sunna of the Prophet 
in the lives of each Muslim, Tablīghī equally take issue with culamā’ for not considering their 
madrasa systems as innovation as they did not exist during the formative years of Islam. 
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Tablīghī accuse the culamā’ of not extending their ‘wars’ against innovation to myriads of 
others educational systems such as secular school system. Abdi Rashid observes that: 
Our people have a way of opposing things. If for instance I go to elementary madrasa, 
then to thanawi (Ar. high school) then to Sudan for university, who came with this? Is 
it not just tartīb that have been put in place by humans to get knowledge? They do not 
condemn these. They have no problem against the whole system of school from 
kindergarten one to three to primary school to secondary to university; they have no 
opposition to that. 
The main reason why they condemn the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and spare the secular school 
system is that in the latter there are visible returns! You eat and see the fruits here and 
now. If a child passes an examination, he shall get work. Even in Kindergarten 1; if he 
passes well in his examinations, he is rewarded by the parents. There are visible 
rewards. But if you go forty days with all its hardship, who would give us rewards 
except Allah. It’s all sacrifice.281 
 
The 
c
ulamā’ consider their everyday religious activities such as preaching, teaching, 
conducting marriage, guiding mosque attendants on spiritual matters as part and parcel of 
daʿwa. They therefore claim that daʿwa is their lifestyle as they guide the people on daily 
basis. They often accuse the Tablīghīs of preaching to the public that their khurūj system is 
the only daʿwa and means to revive the faith among the umma.  
6.2.7 Wars of sources and opposites: Arabia vs. India   
Behind the seething conflicts between Tablīghīs and ʿulamā in Northern Kenya, there are 
underlying rivalry between competing dualities. One could actually ask, is it inherently 
between wahabism/salafīsm vs. deobandism? Is it between Arabic influenced reformism vs. 
Indian influenced reformism? Is it the Shafiī school of thought vs. the Hanafī one? Is it 
between madrasa educated sheikhs vs. self-trained lay preachers? Is it between ‘old 
custodians’ of Islam among the Borana speaking community vs. new youthful enthusiasts 
from the fringe of religious leadership? All these dualities are plausible dimensions. Let us 
examine the core underlying clash: that of an Indian-influenced reform vis-à-vis Arabic one.   
The relationship, networks and flow between the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya and their centres 
in South Asian region is strong. The movement was indeed initiated in India by Muhammad 
Ilyās. It is an offshoot of Deobandism and its Ṣūfī affiliation with Chishtiya ṭarīqa is well 
documented. (Reetz 2006, Masud 2000, Haq 1972, Sikand 2002) In fact a large glossary of 
terms used in the movement has Ṣūfī origins such as chilla, ḥalqa, darood, and dhikr.  
The first lay preachers to travel in villages and towns of northern Kenya were Pakistanis, 
Indians and Bangladeshis who often preached in Urdu and other South Asian languages. 
These itinerant preachers were few and far between unlike contemporary regular preaching 
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teams composed of Kenyan Tablīghīs. In Kenya, the contact persons who acted as local 
pioneers of the movement were Kenya’s Asian Sunni Muslims. They not only provided the 
movement with much needed operational bases in terms of markazes but also took on the 
practice of religious mobility to preach to fellow Asians and indigenous Kenyans. They 
trained local Tablīghīs from different parts of the country linking them up in an elaborate 
‘faith bureaucracy’. They put in place the spatial administrative unit of ḥalqas, sub-ḥalqas, 
qaryas, mosque-based jamāʿat, regular national and regional ijtimāʿs and jors, effective travel 
modules for men and women and regular evaluation and audits of progress from grass-root to 
national level. These Kenyan Asian Muslims also dominate the day to day running of the 
national headquarters overseeing travel plans of different preaching teams, entry and 
departure of foreign teams, exact locations of each local and foreign team on preaching tours, 
discipline within movement, consistency and orthodoxy in Tablīghī message proselytism and 
other administrative works. These Kenya’s Asians and a few indigenous Tablīghīs therefore 
constitute the Kenya shūra, the national Tablīghī council. They are hence referred to as 
wazee/jarole (elders) by fellow Kenyan Tablīghīs. They have one thing in common with the 
Tablīghīs in the South Asian centres: ethnic origin. Being a diasporic community their 
attachment with home and involvement with the transnational movement make them the best 
‘brokers’ relaying directives from the headquarters, inviting ‘elders’ and auditing local 
progress of the movement and sharing the information of progress with their transnational kin.  
This immense role played by South Asian Muslims in the affairs of the movement makes the 
c
ulamā’ of mainstream Islamic leadership highly uncomfortable. They feel their niche is being 
threatened. Most of the sheikhs among Borana speaking communities were trained in 
madrasas in Isiolo, Merti, Isiolo, Mombasa and Thika and universities in Sudan Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. They are moderately Salafī. They believe that they have the right ʿilm needed to 
guide their communities. Though supportive of the mobilising impact of the movement in 
bringing reluctant believers back to the mosque, they are uncomfortable with the source of 
such reform: India. No wonder that when the Tablīghīs started recruiting local Muslims into 
their fold, the first criticism was directed to its origin than the content of their reform agenda. 
Mamed Roba recalls the formative days of the movement in the following way: 
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We were fought very much. We were called names, all sorts of names. They (Qalole) 
said we brought a new religion from India. We were denied a chance to preach in 
almost all mosques in the area. Not only that, we were called a sect that is interested in 
destroying Islam instead of building it. They even said that we were being paid by our 
foreign masters to destabilize the religion and that what we were doing is nothing but 
bidʿa.282 
 
India hence conjures in the minds and discourses of the local sheikhs not as formidable 
centres of Islamic learning but a place of religious experimentation.
283
 Such sheikhs appear to 
be vaguely aware of the dynamics of a vibrant Islamic reform movement and heritage that 
characterised Indian subcontinent in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. As a counter narrative, 
local Tablīghīs extol the role that Indian Muslims play in Islamic revivalism as a blessing and 
divine providence following neglect of the faith and moral decadence in Arabia. The Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat is in other words seen as successors of the early Islamic reform movement and the 
best method that can take Islam to greater heights on a global level. The movement’s founders 
in the Indian subcontinent therefore are presented as the leading light in transforming global 
Islamic revivalism. The quotation captures the idea in this way: 
But one should remember that Allah brings fikr al-dīn (Ar. deliberations to revive the 
faith) to any people anywhere. Even right here among our people. In India such fikr 
(Ar. thought/efforts) gained grounds and Alhamdulillah (Ar. Thanks to God) spread 
world over. It was first resisted but now it is even more active in Makka Mukarama 
and Madina Munawara than ever before. Arabs and Muslims in other parts of the 
world have been sleeping for a long time. They have followed the path of pleasure and 
self-indulgence. They had ceased to help in the way of Allah. Now those in opposition 
to daʿwa still stick to the idea that out of India only cow worship and ignorance can 
come out. But it is in the Indian Subcontinent that the best daʿwa efforts were found. 
Thanks to them daʿwa has reached everywhere. The daʿwa work is hence active in 
every country in the world, even in the Jewish state of Israel, USA and Europe.
284
 
 
The local Tablīghīs appear independent and no longer look to the non-Tablīghī sheikhs for 
guidance, religious training and advice on best texts and methods to use in proselytism. For 
all these matters, they look to Kenya’s Asian ‘elders’ and ‘elders’ from IPB. To the 
opponents, Tablīghīs have not only initiated alternative faith bureaucracy but also erode their 
religious authority as custodians of knowledge. Most sheikhs dislike the influential role 
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Tablīghī elders have on practices and decisions of local adherents of the movement. Abdub 
Boru, a discontented scholar says that: 
 
The most serious thing that we religious scholars do not want to hear is these 
emphases on so called jarole/wazee (elders).  They do not call them sheikhs. They do 
not refer to them as 
c
ulamā’. They do not label them as the Muslim jurists (mufti) who 
deliver fatwa (Ar. legal ruling). They just call them elders. In simple terms, we the 
madrasa teachers, we the 
 c
ulamā’, our faith is not tied to some elders out there. Our 
religion is tied to Qur’ān and Sunna. Our faith is based on Allah and the teaching of 
his prophet but not on elders of any kind. Above that, we may debate that these verses 
of the Qur’ān was commented upon by certain renowned scholar in this manner and so 
on.
285
  
 
The Tablīghīs of Pakistan and India origin who roam the region elicit little acknowledgement 
as possessors of religious knowledge. They often preach in Urdu with little reference to 
Qur’ān and ḥadīth in Arabic. Great numbers of Tablīghīs travel within the region. It is 
common to find Tablīghī teams from Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, India, Saudi Arabia 
and South Africa tour a region within a span of a year. Frequently teams of Middle Eastern 
origins get positive review while those from South Asia are largely viewed by opponents as 
lacking proper ʿilm. ‘Warri hindi gul yaa kunn yomma inbekh qarr (Bor. These Tablīghīs 
from Indian subcontinent are indeed illiterate’ notes one informant, ‘One day an Arabic 
speaking jamāʿat from Egypt came here (Isiolo). They had great ʿilm. You see Tablīghīs are 
different; there are those who know and have ʿilm and others who are very illiterate.’286  
6.2.8 Neglecting home: Issues of travels and its relation to the household 
The local Tablīghīs retreat from home for daʿwa tours for duration ranging from three days to 
four months. During these periods they are expected to ensure that their families have enough 
provisions to comfortably sustain their livelihood. It is a common practice for a Tablīghī man 
to allocate a sizeable amount of his income to finance these preaching tours. Frequent absence 
from home and delegation of homestead leadership to women are highly criticised by non-
Tablīghīs as religious innovation that erodes social cohesion and infringe on the rights of 
women. There is a general tendency within polemical circles that the Tablīghīs expose their 
women and children to undeserved hardship. Their women are argued to have been complicit 
in the agenda as they are convinced that it is better for them to miss their husbands for the 
sake of religion. The arguments raised points to the possible number of days a married man 
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could stay for whatever reasons away from home. Examples from the formative Islamic 
history are often cited. Contrasts are made of the Tablīghīs travels. The questions asked often 
by the opponents are: is it so urgent that each man should leave home to tell others about the 
faith? Is daʿwa fardh ʿayn or fardh kifāya? Is it not just adequate to preach to a local mosque 
and to extended families and neighbours than travel to central Somalia or southern Ethiopia 
for daʿwa? The sheikhs opposed to Tablīghī travels often argue that it is irresponsibly 
neglectful for any married man to leave home for preaching tours.
287
 
‘It is not just money that your family requires of you’ says Jamal ‘They need care. They need 
security. They need a father figure at home. These Tablīghīs have perfected the art of 
absentee fatherhood. Their wives have been denied conjugal rights. God forbid that they seek 
it outside.’288 Often unpredictable circumstances such as sickness of a family member, death 
of a relative, expulsion of children from school due to unpaid fees, eviction from home due to 
accumulation rents are mentioned as some of the ills that can occur and has sometime befallen 
Tablīghī households. When an individual on travel mission gets information about a sick 
relative or other urgent matters that require his termination of preaching tour and immediate 
return, often the amīr s are depicted as hesitant dismissing the issue as lures of devil and the 
world concern.  
Related with absence from home is an emerging practice of pledges that individuals take in 
order to travel. These pledges know commonly as sanawi is verbally or informally taken by 
Tablīghīs in forums such as masjid shūra. A Tablīghī may pledge to travel every year for four 
months or a certain number of days in irrespective of circumstances. Ideally apart from the 
sanawi pledge, individual Tablīghīs are required to set aside three days every month for local 
outing. Often fellow Tablīghīs reminds one another of the pledges. The individual in such 
circumstances appear to lack capacity to disregard his peers due to constant pressure to 
conform by the stringent and time-consuming practices of the movement. As a tactic for 
mobilisation, Tablīghīs out to convince fellow lay preachers about their impending sanawi 
would stop at nothing than an acceptance. Pleas such as lack of funds, sickness of a child or 
general fatigue are often enveloped by spiritual goodies that would be accrued by the 
impending preaching tour. ‘Leave your family to Allah’ or better still ‘Allah is the sustainer’ 
are of the common lines used to motivate an individual to leave home for the tours. Abdi 
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Rashid, remarks hypothetically:  
 
If it happens that the other dāʿis come to you and remind you that the sanawi is now. 
You are broke and don’t have any resources to pay for the travel. You try to talk to 
them that there is a problem as you do not have any food for the family and travel but 
they still insist that you should leave your family in the hands of Allah. So because 
your imān is strong and you do not want to show weakness or lack of faith you fear to 
turn back and stay. You fear that you will be affected as the Noah’s wife who turned 
into a pillar of salt. So you go ahead as always whether the family has something to eat 
or not.  Then your family gets into problem while you are away. The hardship would 
be magnified by the society.  Anti-Tablīghīs are so many. They will blow that issue 
out of proportion.
289
 
 
Absence from home also affects family income in several ways. Apart from dedicating funds 
and a long period of time in disparate daily weekly and monthly practices as taʿlims, shūras 
and in regular congregational gatherings such as jors and ijtimāʿ, Tablīghīs are at times forced 
into absenteeism from employment or business. Opponents list names of teachers and other 
government workers who have either out of their own will quitted job or been dismissed due 
to desertion after long periods on khurūj .290 Senior Tablīghīs are also accused of motivating 
novices into quitting jobs while themselves they have steady income from varieties of 
businesses.
291
 ‘Ujji tante namat si qore, ujji waqqi si qor demii’ (Bor. you are employed by a 
human being in your current job, it is better you also have time for the job that allocated to 
you by God) are some of the convincing narratives used to ‘coerce’ reluctant novices. As 
mentioned earlier individuals have to finance their travels. Some travel modules such as four 
months khurūj costs more than Ksh. 10000 (approximately 100 euros). These amounts of 
money allocated for travels have direct impact on household budgetary plans creating 
shortfall for basic and luxury goods for family members. The opponents of the movement also 
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observe that in a number of cases shops and other business ventures of Tablīghīs are affected 
by their absence. One informant observes that: 
If you are a business-man and you volunteer for four months khurūj. After ten days, 
people will forget about you. You lose customers. Goods will expire. Debts will pile. 
If you leave the business under a third party management, they may mismanage the 
business. Then you lose your livelihood and work. Then your work becomes 
tablīgh.292 
 
‘Imagine a person working as a government employee quitting their job to concentrate all the 
time on tablīgh saying that “Allah nalete” (Sw. God provides),’ asks Boru ‘Does God provide 
only for them? There must be funds that they get.’ Boru alleges that a number of times, the 
expenditure of the gatherings could be partially or fully sponsored by some wealthy Asian 
benefactors and that international markazes in India and Pakistan subsidizes the costs. The 
funds collected from the hundreds of the congregants, according to him, are therefore 
redistributed to different markazes all over the country to support local Tablīghī units. 
Allegations about senior Tablīghīs getting constant financial support are gaining ground 
especially buoyed the fact that despite years of daʿwa itinerancy and no job, some senior 
Tablīghīs appear to be living relatively comfortable lives. One informant expresses the claims 
this way ‘There are people from Basa to Merti known to their headquarters in Nairobi as their 
agents. Every month they get something from their sponsors. Even recently they got five 
goats each and five cows are what they are waiting for.’293 These claims are hard to dismiss or 
confirm given the secrecy with which matters of finance are handled within the movement. 
The Tablīghīs counter such allegations with clear appeal to the opponents to either prove it or 
better still join the movement to enjoy the support. They therefore see the opponents as people 
who are not ready to sacrifice for the faith but make a fuss when others do the same. Mamed 
Roba denies these allegations and advises the opponents in the following manner: 
 
Most people opposed to the tablīghī daʿwa allege that there are people out there in 
India who pay us monthly salary. Though they say that, none of them wants to join to 
find out the truth. We all pay for our expenses, our travels and our upkeep.  
You see, people do not want to pay to preach. When there are no immediate financial 
gains, they do not want to incur any expense. This is the major stumbling block to 
daʿwa efforts among our peoples.294  
 
Some Tablīghīs also support themselves by selling merchandises during national and regional 
ijtimāʿs and also returning home with goods for their shops.  
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6.2.9 They have centres everywhere: Tablīghī mobility as a problem  
The opponents claim that Tablīghī Jamāʿat has markazes in many countries world. They are 
accused of having their centres in the every Western countries and even the state of Israel. 
Their ability to negotiate and comply with strict requirements of state governments through an 
‘apolitical’ approach to religious change has always been cited as their greatest threat to social 
and political rights of Muslim within these states.  However, the fact that they are reluctantly 
embraced by governments as ‘good Muslims’ is often pointed out by some non-Tablīghīs as 
an evidence of their faulty ideology. Sheikh Bafana advises fellow Kenyan Muslims and 
cautions them against the movement saying:  
Let us educate ourselves as Muslims. Let us not waste our time following such groups 
likes the Tablīghī Jamāʿat that are being used to break Islam from within; The 
movement which is today not considered as a threat worldwide. They have free access 
everywhere including Tel Aviv, Israel. They have permitted to establish centres in 
Washington where Bush (George Bush, the former president of the United States) was 
born. They are allowed access even to Russia, where when the communist Soviet was 
a superpower any Muslim found with a copy of Qur’ān was slaughtered. But the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat was allowed to enter. Why? Because it has been known that their 
manhaj or method is faulty.
295
  
 
Tablīghīs generally feel less restricted in their preaching tours. In a country like Kenya where 
a section of 
c
ulamā’ often accuse the government of unfavourably targeting Muslim groups 
under the pretext of fighting terrorism, marginalising the faith communities and denying the 
members of the faith travel and national identification documents, the relative ease with 
which the itinerant preachers of the movement obtain passports and cross national and 
international borders is viewed with suspicion. ‘I sense some sinister moves, this group has 
unrestricted travels to any where they want,’ cautions Yasin Abdi ‘They are allowed to move 
across borders freely and this is something that may indicate that they are not in these things 
for good.’296 
6.3 Responding to polemics: Strategies and rationalising tablīgh 
The Tablīghīs in Northern Kenya counter the claims of initiating new religious phenomena 
with acceptance that their system was not in existence during the time of the Prophet as it is 
today. They argue that as a systematized programme with sole aim of reviving the faith 
among the ordinary believers, it is a good innovative practice. Its aim is hence marketed as 
revival of the Sunnah and practical commitment to every religious obligation by each 
individual Muslim. However the system is consistently depicted as a long-forgotten practice 
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of early Islam and render corpus of religious travels in formative days of Islam in a Tablīghī 
motif.
297
 The Tablīghīs expected resistance from rival Islamic traditions. There is a section of 
the religious scholars who oppose the group; others who are indifferent but large numbers of 
the general public partake in the Tablīghī activities and travels from time to time.298  
Tablīghīs rationalize that the main reason why there are so many opponents to the movement 
is not because of its use of weak ḥadīth or perceived innovative practices but because of 
immense hardship and challenges that its followers face for the sake of the faith. They hence 
delegitimize the religious commitment of their opponents. To further counter their opponents’ 
polemics there is an increasing tendency to draw them as ‘lovers’ of worldly pleasure who are 
not ready to leave the comfortable confines of their homes for the sake of the faith. Sample 
these two arguments, the first one by a Tablīghī sympathizer and the other by a prominent 
amīr  of Moyale ḥalqa. 
Tablīghī sympathiser 
Tablīgh takes you to the correct and definite life of religion. It is the only way that can 
save the Borana and save the faith. The people who refuse to go have a reason. Once 
you join the movement, you shall live most times from home, you become wild. You 
live in another world. You live like Ali and Abubakr (companions of the Prophet). 
You grow past this world. This is the commitment that many refuse. Tablīghī warr 
kanke kesa si bas, beshara irra si daab (Bor. The movement removes you from your 
home and impede you from your worldly business). You may take all your wealth and 
place them at the disposal of religion at the slightest conviction for the faith.
299
   
 
Former Amīr, Moyale sub-ḥalqa 
The main reason why the opponents are too many is that people love the world so 
much and they do not like any kind of hardship. In the Tablīghī Jamāʿat there is also of 
sacrifice in terms of wealth, time, and fikra and even when you look at tablīgh itself it 
is about difficulty. Imagine you leave you mattress and sleep on hard floors, you go 
not eat nice food but just things to keep you alive, you are exposed to cold and heat all 
the time, you may be insulted, you carry firewood a job that you have never done, you 
may have to carry a jerrican in the middle of the night, you may be sent on errands for 
milk in the town, this is sacrifice and this is not loved by the heart.
300
   
 
What they lack in ideological exposition, the Tablīghīs make it up through visible pietistic 
behaviour. They adorn Islamic dress, carry religious paraphernalia such as prayer beads, 
books and grow long beards. They demonstrate to the public that they are conservative 
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defenders of the prophetic traditions.
301
 They hence draw themselves as a group who have 
successfully fought their inner soul, cleansing it from the desires of this world and its divisive 
doctrinal and political categorisations. ‘Nafs (Ar. soul) is our enemy. Heart is an enemy. Our 
flesh is our enemy,’ recounts Ali ‘But when you go back on the path of faith, you defeat your 
heart and desires and soul and become a righteous.’302  There is indeed a strong move to 
market the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as exclusive divinely sanctioned approach to proper spiritual 
revivalism.
303
  
The 
c
ulamā’ are therefore displayed as worldly and not bothered with the Muslims beyond 
their mosque and madrasa jurisdiction. The 
c
ulamā’ are also cited as opposed to them for 
reviving religious commitment among the lay, a duty that has been neglected for a long time. 
As full-time religious specialists, the 
c
ulamā’ are shown in the rhetorics of the Tablīghīs as 
benefitting from the religious positions they hold and hence not concerned with genuine 
religious change. They contrast the mainstream religious establishment and their own self-
sufficient Tablīghī system as independent of external funding as individuals are expected to 
pay for their travels and all expenses. ‘Unless you pay, you will not feel the sacrifice,’ 
observes Hassan ‘These sheikhs want to sit here and wait for people to come to mosque. We 
go out to the people. We use our own money. We bring them along with us so that they also 
remind others.’304 Ordinary Muslims opposed to the movement are also portrayed as strongly 
attached to everyday life. One informant avers that ‘Our people (Borana etc.) here cannot 
conceive how one can leave his comfortable home, his wife and children for the sake of 
personal reform and daʿwa fī sabīlillāh.’305 
The Tablīghīs also to some extent perceive themselves as a unifying force in already 
fragmented landscape that has been characterized by rivalry between different religious 
traditions and ethnic groups. However as seen in earlier arguments their appeal to ‘cluster’ 
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every one under the umbrella of ‘shahāda’ suffers constant criticism.306 In the northern part of 
Kenya, the Tablīghīs from different ethnic groups consider each other as brothers and 
cooperate on daʿwa tours despite hostilities between and among their ethnic groups.  
As proof of their success and legitimacy of their religious agenda, Tablīghīs often talk about 
the number of people who have gained ʿilm through frequent travels and converted to Islam 
under their programmes. Rehabilitation of ‘wayward’ individuals such as petty thieves, 
drunkards and other drug users are often raised as Tablīghī success stories. Such individuals 
whose behaviour turned better due to membership in the movement number a dozen. The 
c
ulamā’ to a great extent accept that the Tablīghīs have in a way promoted behavioural change 
among these classes of people who are deemed ‘irredeemable’ and misfits. The idea that the 
local Tablīghī Jamāʿat is some sort of a mobile rehabilitation centre has had mixed outcome. 
On one hand, the movement has reformed consenting ‘rogue’ youth whom the culamā’ and 
parents have given put on. One informant put the dilemma in the following way:  
Our society has a very strange attitude to Tablīghī Jamāʿat now. They look at the 
movement as some sort of rehabilitation team, so when a family has a wayward youth, 
they send them on tablīgh. But tablīgh does not work like that, it works on the 
consenting individuals who have resolved themselves to reform their everyday life, it 
is not a programme, it is a path of self-restoration. It’s you, your intention and your 
relationship with God. Some friends also support you to join Tablīghī Jamāʿat because 
they think that the Jamāʿat is some kind of mental hospital or rehabilitation group to 
transform bad guys into good guys.
307
 
 
The Tablīghīs also argue that the main reason why the culamā’ have not been able to carry out 
proper revitalization of faith among Borana speaking communities is because they operate 
from elevated point of authority. The 
c
ulamā’ unlike them are argued to have erred to preach 
from position of self-righteousness thereby condemning the masses to the sins they also 
engage in. Therefore, the Tablīghīs indirectly hit back at the earlier accusations of ‘enjoining 
good’ but refusing to ‘forbid wrong’. The best way of forbidding wrong accordingly is hence 
by being seen as setting a good example in everyday life, abolishing any hierarchy between 
the preacher and the audience and acceptance that the preacher and the audience are human 
beings with equal propensity to sin. ‘This is not how the ahl al-sunna wa`l-jamāʽ culamā’ 
operate,’ corrects Hassan Duba ‘They say that they say that they have ʿilm. When you listen 
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you will hear…I have ʿilm…I I I. We the Tablīghī Jamāʿat preachers use “we” and never 
“you”. We cannot condemn. We never address people as if we are something better or more 
religious’.308 
To counter tides of criticism that depict the movement as band of illiterate preachers, the local 
Tablīghīs utilise visiting jamāʿats from Arabic speaking countries as the bridge to reach to 
rival mosques and the 
c
ulamā’. Jamāʿats from such countries as Sudan, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia are deliberately put on a preaching circuit that will ensure that they preach at mosques 
run by rival Salafī sheikhs. A good example was in April 2009 when after Isiolo jor, the 
senior Tablīghīs from Waso sub-ḥalqa planned the route of a visiting Sudanese jamāʿats to 
include sojourn at Merti Jamia mosque and other larger mosques in the zone. In Moyale, the 
Garre sheikhs are among the chief opponents of the local branch of the movement, therefore 
the Tablīghīs strategize in this way to win them over albeit temporarily:  
The Garre understand that Islam came from the Arabs, be taught by the Arabs and the 
only system that works is from that region only.  But unfortunately that is their reason 
for opposition to the movement. That is why when there was a jamāʿat from Saudi 
Arabia in the area; we sent it directly to their Taqwa mosque. This was a mosque 
where Tablīghīs can never step in to preach. The jamāʿat was purely Arab, they used 
Arabic to preach, their system and procedure was that of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. To the 
Garre, the fact that the jamāʿat from Saudi, they have ʿilm. It was well received.309   
 
In addition local Tablīghīs frequently invite all religious scholars to their ijtimāʿs and regional 
consultative meetings. Often the 
c
ulamā’ honour such invitation in the hope that they can 
positively guide the lay preachers to the proper Sunni path. The Tablīghīs also regularly 
conduct ziyārāt (visits) to resident culamā’ to get their blessings, to acknowledge their 
authority and to get acquainted with them so as to use their mosques and work together on 
reviving religious observance among the masses. Both groups need each other for mutual co-
existence. This symbiotic relationship averts an all-out conflict between the two classes of 
religious preachers.  
6.4 Ṣūfī-Tablīghī Relations  
The relationship between Tablīghīs and different ṭarīqas of Ṣūfīs in Northern Kenya is very 
ambiguous. Some of the Ṣūfī groups such as Sheikh Hussein tariqa do not have access to use 
mosques as venue of propagation of their practices while decreasing influence of Qādiriyya 
and Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqas in Moyale makes them less vocal in fronting strong ideological 
arguments to counter the rise of Tablīghī movement in the region. The Ṣūfīs-Tablīghī 
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relations are less strained than with the mainstream Salafī traditions. However individual 
practising Ṣūfīs express strong reservations against the sudden rise of the movement. There 
are also regional differences on the relations between Tablīghīs and Ṣūfīs. In Waso, the extent 
of Ṣūfī-influenced religious tradition is minimal and expressed largely through quasi-Ṣūfī 
Ayaan group that prominently engage in spirit possession healing activities. Moyale however 
is richer in the diversity of Ṣūfī groups with Sheikh Hussein, Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqas 
relatively stronger and with active followings. In the section below, we shall briefly explore 
the relations between Tablīghīs and Sheikh Hussein ṭarīqa (Garib) and Tablīghīs and 
Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya ṭarīqas. It is also important to note Tablīghī Jamāʿat itself is 
indirectly influenced by Ṣūfī Islam in India and such practices as withdrawal from home for 
reform, dhikr and emphasis on the inner reform point to its Ṣūfī connections.310 
6.4.1 Tablīghī-Garib relations 
Sheikh Hussein ṭarīqas or Garib as they are popularly known have a number of tomb shrines 
in Moyale Ethiopia side. These tomb shrines attract pilgrims who pray at these sites in the 
hope that the saints buried there would intercede on their behalf. One such popular site is 
Gammo Aba Kadir on Moyale-Ethiopia side. At the Gammo, there are permanent houses that 
house the custodian of the shrine and his family and a host of other followers and wayfarers. 
Garib have special weekly sessions in which members gather and offer dhikr, sacrifices and 
sing songs in praise of their sheikhs such as Sheikh Hussein of Bale, Aba Kadir, Soph Umar, 
Bahr Agal, Ako Makko among others. Moyale being on the border is linked with major 
centres of the Sheikh Hussein ṭarīqas such as Anajina, Bale. Pilgrims from the town 
participate regularly in religious festivals held in Bale. The group attracts disparate classes of 
people common among them women. Members are largely impoverished individuals with 
little religious knowledge and low standing within Moyale and Waso societies. The dhikr 
sessions held at homes of prominent followers feature care-free and festive with free-mixing 
of sexes and excessive consumption of miraa. Often individuals from saintly families 
claiming inherited baraka (Ar. power to bless/charisma) are feted, showered with gifts and 
revered so that they could bless the followers. Within the group there are very few who 
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possess religious knowledge adequate enough to front ideological defence against relentless 
polemics.  
Consistently the 
c
ulamā’ of mainstream Islamic tradition in region condemn the followers of 
Garib for a host of improper and ‘sinful’ behaviours among them carefree atmosphere at their 
congregations, singing of praise songs for their sheikhs, exploitation of the resources of their 
followers by their leaders, non-observance of prayers and other religious obligations and 
worshipping of other beings other than God. Shrines such as Gammo Agal in Ethiopia have 
fallen into disuse largely due to frequent attacks from Garre 
c
ulamā’ as idolatry and 
diminishing number of followers and custodians.
311
 In Merti the main opposition to the Garib 
by the 
c
ulamā’ concerns spirit possession healing activities engaged in by leaders of the 
group.  
Tablīghīs in order to win these groups attempt to tone down condemnation of ‘unislamic’ 
practices.
312
 Preaching groups that tour the southern part of Ethiopia make a point in visiting 
the shrines and tombs as part of their spatial practices such as jaula and ziyārāt. Through 
these visits, they outline their aims in the area urging all the males in such places to 
accompany them to the mosque for sermons. In the event that a few followers of the group 
accompany them to the mosque, the Tablīghīs attempt to convince them to volunteer for some 
time to go with them for periods ranging from three days to four months. For instance, one 
informant recalls that one time Bubba, a renowned spirit medium and leader of Garib group 
in Waso was convinced to volunteer for a forty days jamāʿat. He joined a team that included a 
dozen Tablīghīs and a few culamā’. The preaching tour took them through towns such as 
Merti, Sericho, Korbesa, Ires Aboru, and a number of smaller villages. For the Tablīghīs, he 
was a ‘star attraction’ of the tour as he was given a chance at every mosque to preach on the 
evils of spirit possession cult. He was said to have recounted how the Garib was unislamic, 
exploitative, a group to be shunned and a practice that he shall ‘never’ go back to.  His 
testimony as a reformed man who had greatly benefitted from ‘spirit management’ business 
was capitalized on by the Tablīghīs as the transformative power of the movement. If Bubba, 
despite years of 
c
ulamā’ attempts, can give up Garib through khurūj, then the movement is 
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indeed authentic was the underlying discourse. However the celebratory mood was muted as 
Bubba ‘slid back’ to the spirit possession cult after a few months. Perhaps he was not 
convinced by the economic viability of movement as a religious career and that Ayaan cult 
pays much better. Women constitute significant followers of Garib group, a constituency that 
is hardly directly reached by the mainly men-only preaching groups. This has also reduced the 
interactions between the two groups. 
6.4.2 Qādiriyya/Ṣaliḥiyya-Tablīghī Relations  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat has relatively stronger interactions with formalised Ṣūfī ṭarīqas such as 
Qādiriyya and Ṣaliḥiyya. The two main Ṣūfī traditions dominated the religious landscape 
before the entry of Salafīst trend in mid 1980s. They were then the mainstream traditions in 
Moyale, Waso and Isiolo as well as other part of Northern Kenya. However the ensuing 
competition between Ṣūfīs and Salafī Islam saw gradual take-over of many Ṣūfī-oriented 
mosques by the more youthful Salafī culamā’.  
The arrival of Tablīghīs in the region was marked by itinerant preachers of India and Pakistan 
visiting for a varied number of days. Later as the local base of the movement grew to include 
a number of youth, the movement established a temporary base at the Ṣaliḥiyya mosque in 
Moyale. The mosque periodically held sub-ḥalqa jors that brought ordinary Muslims from as 
far as Uran, Dabel, Sololo and various Moyale town mosques. The mosque was the venue for 
planning and congregation prior to departure for Nairobi annual ijtimāʿs.   
Qādiriyya mosque culamā’ were initially reluctant to grant local Tablīghīs and other self-
organised preachers the chance to use the pulpit for religious instruction. This follows 
incidents in which mainly youthful Garre sheikhs used the venue to expound Salafī ideas 
deemed hostile to cherished Ṣūfī practices such as milād al-nabi (Ar. celebration to mark the 
birthday of the Prophet), recitation of qunūt (a supplication recited by the ṭarīqa in the last 
rakācat of Fajr prayer), audible recitation of basmala (Ar. opening verse of any Qur’ān 
chapters) during Maghrib, ‘Asr, Fajr and Friday prayers, communal dhikr and compulsory 
congregational supplication after obligatory prayers. These young sheikhs were perceived as 
attempting to slowly transform the last bastion of Ṣūfī Islam in the town. They were accused 
of preaching in the mosque without explicit permission from the mosque custodians like the 
imām and other mosque culamā’. This blanket ban on self-organised preachers initially 
affected the activities of the local Tablīghīs as they were viewed with suspicion. However the 
restrictions were eased after the religious scholars were convinced that the new group was not 
what they thought: the Salafīs. Then Tablīghīs in Moyale have cultivated good working 
relations with the Qādiriyya mosque management. Qādiriyya mosque has a number of shop 
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outlets along the outer wall of the mosque compound. One or two of these outlets was at one 
time rented by a group of local Tablīghīs to sell ‘Islamically’ themed products such as 
religious books, women clothes such buibui and ḥijāb, prayer mats, dates, caps, perfumes and 
prayer beads. The shops also serve as the meeting point for the youthful Tablīghīs for 
socialisation. 
It would be prudent to revisit the former Ṣaliḥiyya Mosque culamā’ -Tablīghī relations. Until 
few years ago, Tablīghīs in Moyale had a small ‘field office’ in the mosque compound. This 
office served as the coordinating centre for planning and auditing of the movement’s activities 
in Moyale sub-ḥalqa. A protracted disagreement between the custodians of the mosque and 
Tablīghī leaders led to their expulsion and demolition of the Tablīghī structure. The Tablīghīs 
had to move base to the rival Qādiriyya mosque and later to the Prison mosque. This does not 
mean that there are no mosque-based Tablīghī units in the former Ṣaliḥiyya mosque. 
Committed Tablīghīs who patronise each mosque in the sub-ḥalqa often constitute these 
mosque-based maqāmī teams through which they carry practices such as daily consultative 
meetings, regular religious instructions, motivational talks, hosting foreign and local jamāʿat s 
among others. 
On an individual level, informants who subscribe to a Ṣūfī-affiliated tradition express similar 
polemical arguments against the Tablīghīs as are the culamā’ of mainstream Islamic tradition.  
Points raised include: Tablīghīs should first gain ʿilm before they preach as most of them are 
semi-literate; their influence on rural areas are superficial as they spend few days without 
teaching people about right ʿaqīda (Ar. belief), ṣalāt and zakāt; they do not condemn the 
wrongs done in the society and concentrate on enjoining good; they have wrong priorities as 
people in need of being taught about the faith are not in India and Pakistan but in Somarre and 
Bor (villages near Moyale); their teachings are basic and does not add any value to knowledge 
acquisition and last but not least the ease with which they cross borders, obtain travel 
documents and establish centres in Western countries is a pointer to their dubious ideology 
and complicity in ‘destroying’ Islam. 313  Elderly Ṣūfī informants also do not very much 
differentiate the Tablīghīs from their staunch opponents, the Salafī culamā’ arguing that the 
new youth Muslim generations do not appreciate the long heritage of Islamic traditions in the 
area. They consider both the Tablīghīs and Salafī-affiliated preachers as people without 
madhhab  (school of thought) and hence people lacking sincere imān. Their arguments point 
to generational conflict between the faith as practiced by the elderly mosque attendants and 
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 Interviews with Hussein Ganna, Aw Halle, Aw Ballo, Jirma, Sheikh Abdrahman, Moyale, September, 2009.  
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competing versions of Islamic religiosity as practiced by youthful Muslims. Hussein Ganna, a 
practising Ṣūfī critical of both Salafī and Tablīghīs, sums up the perception of lay preachers in 
the following manner:  
Their founder Muhammad Ilyās aimed at reforming Islam but ended with a quietist 
movement that do not seem to add any value to the spread of Islam. They trace their 
teachings from Deobandi School but now they have moved closer and closer to the 
teachings of Wahabis. Their teachings are not very clear. Just like the Wahabis they 
have a unique way of dressing and walking. They just roam from village to village 
without leaving their members to teaching Islam deeply but just stand there, read a few 
ḥadīth and go. You see these people have unlimited access to travel for visa to almost 
anywhere in the world. They may be working with the enemies of Islam. (laughing) 
How else can one interpret these activities?
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6.5 Conclusion  
 
The 
c
ulamā’-Tablīghī relations in Northern Kenya is characterised by ambivalence. Both 
categories of religious preachers require each other for their mutual existence. Qalole to some 
extent acknowledge that these bands of self-organised preachers convince quite a number of 
people to attend obligatory daily prayers. But what are the impacts of these efforts? The 
Tablīghīs have gradually created an alternative ‘faith bureaucracy’ that transcends the local 
confines of mosque jurisdiction linking each mosque-based unit from their villages to 
transnational networks all the way to Nairobi and on to India. Tablīghīs have also the wrestled 
religious public sphere by successfully influencing the practices that laity can engage in. The 
c
ulamā’s authority as the sole custodian of faith and religious knowledge has also been 
challenged. Now almost anyone can stand and preach. Given the apparent loss of ground, the 
 
c
ulamā’ as a dispossessed class, continuously attempt to delegitimise various practices of the 
movement rendering it as only not irrelevant but also a sect bordering on heresy. Despite such 
a rich array of polemics and counter-polemics, both groups appear to warm up to each other 
in order to reform the society and stay relevant and useful in the eyes of the laity and for the 
sake of the faith. The Tablīghīs more than the culamā’ have adhere to rules of engagement set 
by the 
c
ulamā’ and support them lest they lose the rights to use the pulpit for their own 
proselytism. Tablīghī-Ṣūfī relations are very ambiguous. However given that the movement 
stand clear of condemnation of social ills and doctrinal debates, their relations with relatively 
weakened Qādiriyya ṭarīqa and quasi-Ṣūfī groups such as the Garib and Ayaan are 
moderately cordial. They are targeted for religious mobility on regular basis by the local 
members of the transnational movement. As a conclusive chapter, the following section 
would analytically tackle the main concern of the thesis, the interface of global and local in 
the world of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in northern Kenya.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Interface Global and Local in the Tablīghī North 
7.1 Introduction  
Two major field events capture the discourse of this analytical chapter, that is, the interface of 
local and global. The first one is the proceedings of Isiolo jor held in mid-April 2009. The 
Tablīghīs took over the town’s Jamia mosque for three days. Followers came from Isiolo, 
Meru and Waso sub-ḥalqas. From Meru, Tablīghīs from among the Kenyan Muslims of 
Asian descent were also represented. Prominent national leaders, largely drawn from the 
Muslim Asian community coordinated the proceedings with their counterpart from Isiolo 
central. Among these large array of local Tablīghīs and the national leadership were visitors, 
both from neighbouring regions and from foreign countries. In attendance were a few 
Tablīghīs from the coastal region, A Moyale and Garissa travelling jamāʿat was among the 
congregants. The transnational guests included an Arabic speaking jamāʿat composed of 
Sudanese and Egyptian Tablīghīs and an Urdu speaking jamāʿat from India. It was a 
microcosm of religious transnationalism. Modern means of transport and communication, 
elaborate organisational skills and commitment to common religious aspiration and practices 
have brought together these crowd of diverse Muslims whether they were Borana, Somali, 
Kenyan Asians, Sudanese, Egyptian, Swahili, Meru, Garre, Gabra or Indians in a central 
mosque in this northern Kenyan town. They appear to be united in their quest to bring 
religious change within their own life and lives of others by committing themselves to the 
ethos of this transnational movement. They preached to each other. They renewed their 
friendships and made many more friends. They chatted informally about religious and 
mundane matters, at times with linguistic challenges. Above all they listened, for hours on 
end to sermons and talks delivered in Urdu, Arabic, Borana, Somali and Swahili that had 
almost identical themes. They appear not to tire at the often repetitive motivational talks on 
why it is important to give time and why every Muslim in the world should travel on the path 
of God. We shall return to this event again. 
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The second event that brings forth the interface of global and local was at a national 
consultative forum for the top Tablīghī leadership held just two weeks after the Isiolo ijtimāʿ. 
This was not an ordinary meeting for every Tablīghī. It was held at Baitul Maal, the national 
headquarters of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya. It congregated regional and grassroot Tablīghī 
leaders or their representatives from all parts of Kenya. The agenda was threefold: 
consolidation of growth of the movement, evaluation of regional units and organisation of 
forthcoming national ijtimāʿ. The main language was Swahili. The members gathered 
numbered up to 300 people. Waso was represented by two people. Here I met Tablīghīs from 
North Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Central, Eastern, the Coast and Nairobi Provinces. 
Muslims of Luo, Somali, Orma, Mijikenda, Kamba, Kenyans of Asian descent, Borana, 
Luhya and others were in attendance. Evaluative reports were presented and criticised. Amīrs 
were admonished for jobs not well done and motivated to put in more effort. There were other 
unlikely participants at the national shūra: transnational audience from across the borders and 
other foreign countries. Tanzanian and Uganda Tablīghīs also took part in the proceedings. 
They too presented their country reports. A dozen foreign jamāʿats listened to the two day 
proceedings through mediated translation. The five daily prayers and meals broke the 
monotony of the lengthy discussions. Breaks after meals and after prayers were sessions of 
networking. Most congregants knew each other. They often meet at national ijtimāʿs. Some 
have travelled for proselytism together for different lengths of time. Some have hosted 
jamāʿat led by one amīr or other in their local mosque. Others have served together as khidma 
volunteers in previous gatherings. From time to time, my Tablīghī guide chipped in on 
                                                 
315 Source:  http://www.hobotraveler.com/travel-journal/isiolo-kenya.html 
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‘titbits’ ‘that is the amīr of Garissa ḥalqa…that guy we travelled with him for forty 
days…that guy is very kind, their local mosque-based jamāʿat offered us great nuṣra (Ar. 
assistance/hospitality)…’. In all these events, the interface of local and translocal are 
intertwined. Tablīghī Jamāʿat is a transnational movement that aims to reawaken adherence to 
faith among Muslim individuals. This task involves a great deal of reconfiguration of what 
exists in most areas as generally agreed religious practices and introduction of new and 
commonly shared Tablīghī  specific practices. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
section deals with those elements that demonstrate ‘going beyond local’, that is, translocal 
practices, networks and global undercurrent. The second section examines ‘the staying local’, 
that is, appropriation of local symbols, distinctive contextualised proselytism and Tablīghī 
membership in the prism of local interethnic relations. The two sections flow into each other 
and overlap as the precise boundary of what is local and what is translocal is hard to discern. 
After all, Islamic daʿwa among the Borana speaking community is first and foremost a 
product of translocal proselytism and is affected by global trends in Islamic reformism since 
the faith was introduced in the region and has modelled the community’s self-perception and 
perception by others. As we shall discuss, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat within the region hence not 
only transnationalised the local followers by connecting the followers with fellow Tablīghīs in 
Kenya and in the world through travels and religious deeds, they also invested in committed 
individuals whose target is to act as agents of religious transformation within their own kind.  
7.2 Going beyond the local: Translocal links and global undercurrents  
 
Masud (2000) observes that the peripheral Muslim communities, like South Asians, appear to 
have been more sensitive to their transnational linkages through means like daʿwa. On 
transformation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat into a transnational movement, Masud raises two 
reasons. First, physical movement and travel as the most effective personal reform gradually 
expanded it from a local to transnational travel. Secondly, transnationalism serves as means to 
seeking legitimacy as the more it expands on global scale the more its ideology is recognized. 
As we previously saw, as early as 1950s, the movement sought to establish itself in East 
Africa. Here it found a ready home among some Kenyan Sunni Muslims of Asian descent 
(Hasani, 1967). These ethno-religious communities, heterogeneous as it were, offered the 
visiting Tablīghīs from the Indian subcontinent moral and logistical support. It offered the 
local Asians a more meaningful way of relating to their ‘ancestral’ home. Being financially 
stable and having a history of religious philanthropy, a section of the Kenyan Muslim Asians 
associated with the movement in the early days steering it to make it present among 
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indigenous Muslim populace.
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 Let us look at some of the elements that would help illustrate 
the local-global involvement starting with the most obvious one, mobility. 
7.2.1 Mobility connects: Travels and the Tablīgh 
Common phrases that one encounters at the conventions of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the 
Borana speaking communities include: ‘Inshallah, obboleyan, nam agami rabbif ede guyya 
afurtama bay?’ (Bor. God willing, brothers, how many among you gathered here are ready to 
go out for Allah sake for 40 days?) ‘Meeth nami rabbif rasulki sodaat ka ujjin tan itt 
mustaidina, ark ool qabada… (Bor. Where are those who fear Allah and obey his messenger 
and who are ready and willing for this noble work? May you please raise your hand?) ‘Meeth 
nami rabbif jede kara rabbi bau?’ (Bor. Where are those who, for the sake of Allah, are ready 
to go on the path of Allah?). The first commitment required of any novice or regular is to 
volunteer time to travel for daʿwa. One has to be willing to remain active and mobile for the 
programme of the movement. It is a lifetime commitment to a world of mobility. As 
previously mentioned, this mobility is related to remodeling of an individual’s behaviour 
away from every day space so that he can be more steadfast in observance of the obligatory 
rituals of Islam. It is an experiment in religious acculturation. It is a site for re-education and 
inculcation of the value behest of a proper Muslim as envisioned by the Tablīghīs. A group of 
Tablīghī individuals on travel from place to place also extend their message to local Muslims 
to form similar groups of lay preachers ready to facilitate religious change within their 
communities. What remains obscure within the discussion on the movement in the academic 
circle is the significance of mobility on the resultant religious change. The idea of mass 
mobility for daʿwa by these ordinary believers is a novel practice among the Borana speaking 
Muslims. It is in matters of mobility that the local Tablīghīs have remained ‘truly’ 
transnational. 
Emphasising the role of mobility in transnational formation, Dahinden (2010), points out a 
kind of paradox, that, in order to be able to stay mobile it is necessary for migrants to develop 
some local ties and to be embedded in specific localities. The author further theorises mobility 
as physical movement in transnational space and locality as being rooted or anchored in a 
country of immigration and developing a set of social relations at specific places. One could 
easily extend the above observation to the Tablīghī phenomena in Kenya. The pioneer 
Tablīghīs from the Indian subcontinent never made any part of the country they visited their 
home. They came and went on a regular basis. While at each place, they sought to influence 
                                                 
316Personal interviews with  Abdub Boru, Kinna September 2009, Mamed Roba Moyale October 2009, Hasan 
Doda, Isiolo, May 2010. 
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religious observance. They later sought to initiate similar mobile Tablīghī units in visited 
locales circumstances permitting. Their initial guides, the Kenyan Asians, at times travelled 
with them but above all facilitated to permanence of Tablīghī mobility. They were the first 
locals to take up sustained campaigns of daʿwa travels. They offered their mosques as bases 
to conduct Tablīghī daʿwa. They established friendly relations with many mosques for ease of 
propagation. Above all they helped to construct new Tablīghī centres in selected parts of the 
country. They manage the emerging Tablīghī ‘faith bureaucracy’ and continue to do so.  
Interaction between different Muslim communities, be they the foreign Tablīghīs or local 
Kenyan Muslims, is of importance to the sustainability of the transnational movement. Some 
forms of interaction existed between Kenyan Asians and local indigenous Muslim 
communities. The Asian Muslims have often engaged in financial support and construction of 
mosques and madrasas in Muslim majority areas such as Kinna and Isiolo. This bond of 
cordiality that exists also proved useful for establishment of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Within 
local indigenous communities, the idea of calling people to faith is not a novel venture. Their 
imāms and sheikhs regularly remind them to remain true to their faith and to refine their 
practices to reflect piety. However the efforts of the local religious scholars remain limited to 
the confine of their mosque jurisdictions and that it is rare for religious leadership in network 
of mosques to engage in collective drives of ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’. Unlike the 
new transnational movement, the local Qalole enjoyed relative autonomy in management of 
mosque and leadership and hence do not see the need to travel far and wide for the sake of 
proselytism.
317
 
The Tablīghī travels always ended up at mosques. Mosques formed places for religious 
instructions and venue for formation of new mobile groups. Mobile preaching teams staying 
at the mosque for a few days have a valuable advantage in spreading their message of 
revivalism. Local people, especially the religiously observant ones, attend the five daily 
prayers at their mosque. Being religious conscious of the importance of daʿwa, regular 
mosque attendants stay for few more minutes to listen to these lay local or foreign preachers. 
A few volunteers may be convinced over time to accompany the team or form a group of their 
own under the tutelage of a local Tablīghī. The local volunteers are encouraged to establish 
their own travel circuits to outlying areas and position themselves as the link between local, 
regional and transnational networks of lay preachers.  
                                                 
317 Khuri (1990: 171) similarly notes that religious structure whether they are large, small, central or peripheral, 
operate with a fair degree of autonomy and that often  imāms and other mosque leaders may consult higher 
learned men on voluntary basis. Similarly in northern Kenya, mosque leaders maintain some form of 
independent and may occasionally liaise with visiting scholars. They seldom travel for outreach missions.  
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A related concept to mobility as mentioned above is locality. Locality elicits the notion of 
home, a place one has to go back to after days or months of travelling about for daʿwa. A 
novice accompanying a preaching team for three days would return to his home and to his 
local mosque. He is not necessarily a ‘changed man’ at this juncture. However he would pick 
a few Tablīghī terms and fundamental teachings such as basic memorisation of siffa sitta. The 
individual also builds his register of Tablīghī terminologies with words like khurūj fī 
sabīlillāh, amīr, tashkīl, bayān, khidma and shūra. Because every mobile Tablīghī unit is a 
sort of miniature global movement, an individual’s first experience is crucial in subsequent 
involvements. Some opt out citing stringent requirements such as self-financing, routine 
consultative meetings and constant expectation to volunteer more for Tablīghī mobility. Some 
others stay in an inactive state and only occasionally accompany a team for few days to 
replenish their spiritual ‘arsenal’. A number however may opt to partake in Tablīghī travels 
on regular basis. They return home, or more specifically, return to their local mosques at 
home with an agenda of religious change. At the home mosque, those who have travelled for 
different lengths of time are known to each other. These returnees constitute a network of 
individuals recognised by Tablīghīs from outside the area as contact persons. They often 
establish mosque-based maqāmī team (masjid war jamāʿat), a semi-permanent unit that meets 
on daily and weekly basis and carry out routinesed Tablīghī activities referred to as panch 
alma. At this point, one can observe the embeddedness of transnational Tablīghī phenomena 
at the local level.  
The maqāmī jamāʿat recruits new mobile teams on regular basis and reaches out to regular 
mosque attendants through religious instructions. It entrenches Tablīghī practices in the 
religious culture of their home mosque. It contests for the use of the sacred space for religious 
instructions simultaneously challenging and complimenting the mainstream mosque 
preaching sessions. It hosts short term visits by other local Tablīghīs to their mosques. It also 
hosts foreign, regional and local Tablīghīs for various durations of time and provides local 
translators, guides and linkages.  
Each travel team builds on earlier experiences of others. Tablīghī mobility is informed and 
enhanced by evaluation of an excursion in form of field reports. Karguzari and ahwāl giving 
is critical part of the consolidation of the transnational movement at regional and local levels. 
A team sent for four months to a region ‘lax’ in religious observance would recommend more 
teams to be sent. A mobile team is therefore a preaching cum evaluative unit. It preaches. It 
mobilises. It takes notes of socio-economic and religious activities of local populace. The 
reports are shared orally in formal and informal Tablīghī gatherings and often in form of 
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letters to ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa leadership council. It is upon various local, regional or national 
leadership councils to send follow-up mobile units to ‘areas in need’. The notion of ‘areas in 
need’ is based on religious observance of a visited population.  
Tablīghī mobile units also report about slackened commitment by regular Tablīghīs and needs 
and ways to reverse such trends. It is common to hear regulars converse about lack of juhd 
among Tablīghīs in far away areas. Previous excursions and mobilisation of preaching teams 
become benchmarks to evaluate subsequent commitment. I recall that during Isiolo mini-
ijtimāʿ, the Waso sub-ḥalqa leaders were taken to task by the combined force of Isiolo and 
Kenya shūra for a report of ‘unusually’ low achievements in terms of number of people who 
volunteered for various Tablīghī excursions. They were reminded of the time when up to 50 
preaching teams of various travel lengths were mobilised in one gathering in Merti. In such 
cases, Tablīghī mobility reports act as feedback loop to plan subsequent actions and appraise 
growth of the transnational movement.  
The length of time an individual has volunteered for Tablīghī mobility is also related to his 
standing within the movement. Those who have spent several 40 days and four months away 
from home for khurūj are considered as highly committed and pious individuals. It is natural 
for these individuals to have competence of Tablīghī practices. They can effortlessly preach, 
conduct Tablīghī  meetings, organise temporary outings into an area, lead a preaching team 
for various lengths of time in their capacity as amīrs, cook on behalf of mobile groups, master 
and converse intermittently in languages such as Arabic or Urdu and head local qarya, sub-
ḥalqa and ḥalqa leadership councils. The more an individual travels for Tablīghī excursions, 
the more his religious habitus is refined and the more convinced he will be about the 
legitimacy and authenticity of the movement that he is committed to. One of the first 
questions a volunteer is asked before travels is: ‘Takk duran baate?’ (Bor. Have you ever 
volunteered to go out/travel for tablīgh?).  The answer determines your experience and 
ranking within the movement. This was also the question I was asked by one of my 
informants at the beginning of the field research. In another incident, in an ad-hoc meeting to 
discuss my research questions, a senior Tablīghī from Merti advised me in this way: Obboles, 
oja Tabliqi maani barachu fete, gaafi tanaf bugi tan lafat dabbi, baggi kanke fudadi inshallah 
nukhaas. Tabliqi deema, deema rabbin jaalat (Bor. ‘if you want to learn about the Tablīghī  
Jamāʿat, just drop these books and questions and please take your bag and accompany us. 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat is all about mobility, it is a movement loved by God). 
Vertovec (2009) notes that modern forms of transport and communication have accelerated 
religious transnationalism, that is, the flow of ideologies, access to information on 
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organisational forms and tactics and formation of formerly elite movement to mass 
movement. This is observed to have rendered obsolete earlier notions of frontier as defined by 
geographical boundaries. Roads link villages and towns in Kenya. Buses and trucks facilitate 
the ease of travel from one section of the region to the other. The Tablīghīs utilise these 
means of transport. Mobile telephony has rewired every village and town in Kenya. As 
previously observed, travel to Nairobi ijtimāʿ and other gatherings is practically impossible 
without lorries, buses and personal cars. Some Tablīghīs are fascinated to undertake foreign 
preaching tours and have therefore acquire travel documents such as national passports and 
visas. For those with means to pay for foreign tours, distant countries are now reachable 
through air transport. There are some Borana speaking Tablīghīs who have been to Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Somalia, South Africa and Nigeria. They bring with them new 
imagination of umma beyond their region. All these forms of mobility devoid of secure routes 
is impossible. Improved security and stability within the northern region and along and on 
both sides of the common Kenya-Ethiopia borders has been a boost to the growth of the 
movement. Where roads are narrow or no vehicle exist to use, paidal jamāʿats (travel teams 
on foot) allow Tablīghīs to reach outlying villages and cattle camps. Travel on foot is one of 
the most favoured forms of transport. 
7.2.2 Ritual and Symbols  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a pietistic Islamic movement ascribes to all the mainstream Islamic 
rituals. It in fact wants to make Muslim individuals better by stricter adherence to religious 
rituals. Five daily prayers are emphasised. They are preached to be more spiritually rewarding 
when offered in congregation and in one’s mosque. Rewards (fazāʿil) of religious deeds are 
more emphasised than the doctrinal interpretations and jurisprudential rulings about religious 
deeds. Controversies are avoided. Scholarly interpretations of rituals are held in high esteem. 
Hadīths that extol observance of prayers are often recited. For instance, to give credibility to 
the 40 days preaching tour, the Borana Tablīghīs often cite ḥadīths that state that janna awaits 
he who performs obligatory prayers for 40 days behind an imām  with takbirat al-ula  (Ar. the 
first step i.e. Allahu Akbar in offering obligatory prayer). No better ways of achieving this is 
recommended than a 40 day tour with a reaching team away from the hustle and bustle of 
home life. Other pillars of Islam like zakāt, fasting and ḥajj  are also exalted.  
For a Borana speaking Tablīghī as their counterpart in other parts of the world, every religious 
action, indeed, most human actions have four components: intention, objectives, procedure 
and benefit. They are referred to as niyya, maqṣad , tartīb and fazāʿil. There is an obsession to 
make every religious practice most spiritually rewarding. Everyday life is in totality hence 
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modelled on their definition of traditions of Prophet Muhammad. Life on earth is to be 
modelled on systematised sets of rituals to gain the pleasure of God and to attain his mercies. 
None puts this urgency to make every action religious than a Tablīghī from Moyale, he 
confides:  
What is wanted in daʿwa is that each minute you have to get tawwāb . What you do each 
second should award you tawwāb . We are told that whatever you do as sunna is all 
 cibādat. 
This includes even sleep if you slept as done by the Prophet. A mu'min (Ar. believer) is not 
rewarded for two acts. One is if he is asleep and secondly if he is mentally ill.  But even the 
sleep is also rewarded if you sleep under prophetic traditions.  That is why we have to do 
sunna always.
318
 
 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat is in essence a re-enactment of ritualised lifestyle. Individuals learn from the 
moments of their acceptance to volunteer for Tablīghī travels that certain things are to be 
done at certain times whether on daʿwa journeys or being at home. Apart of the universally 
accepted Islamic rituals, the Borana speaking Tablīghīs just like their counterparts from other 
parts of the world perform specific practices.  One can roughly divide the Tablīghī-specific 
practices into two main categories: individualised and communal/congregational rituals. Both 
forms are expected to inculcate in individuals a sense of spiritual reawakening and in the case 
of communal ones, stronger attachment to the bonds of brotherhood, in-group membership 
and egalitarianism. Tablīghī rituals can also be categorised into two categories: rituals of 
mobility and rituals of locality. Finally, temporally, rituals can take forms of hourly, daily, 
weekly, monthly and yearly basis. These practices prevalent among the Borana Tablīghīs are 
transnationally carried out by members of the movement in other parts of the world. The 
tables below summarise the points raised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
318 Group interview with three Tablighis on 5th July, 2010, Moyale. 
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Individualized Rituals               Congregational Rituals  
 
1. Recitation of the Qur’ān  
2. Recitation of recommended 
litanies and supplications 
3. Performance of recommended 
supererogatory prayers such 
nightly one like Ṣalāt al-Layl 
and Witr 
4. Recommended text readings of 
Tablīghī affiliated books   
  
 
1. All forms of daʿwa travels and its 
constituent rituals: men-only, 
mixed gender; 3 days, 10 days, 40 
days, 4 months 
2. All forms of visits and its 
constituent rituals: to religious 
scholars, to professionals, to fellow 
Tablīghī s, to lay people, to the 
merchants 
3. All forms of preaching in one’s 
local mosque or neighbouring one 
4. All forms of consultative meetings 
and its constituent rituals: local 
mosque, area mosques, regional, 
national, international 
5. All forms of gatherings: local, 
regional, national and international 
6. Home-based text reading for family  
7. Rituals of sacred space 
management (markaz, masjid): 
reception of groups, security, 
hospitality service 
Table 7 Individual and communal rituals 
 
 
From the table above, one can discern two striking issues: There are more communal-oriented 
practices than individualised ones. This does not mean Tablīghīs underemphasise the role of 
individual piety. In fact the more committed the individual is to the collective and 
congregational practices the more he is to the unsupervised individual pietistic practices. 
However there is greater importance given to religious practices that needs to be done on 
congregational basis and in which success depends on the unflinching commitment of each 
Borana speaking Tablīghī. These congregational practices not only bonds the members 
together but it also allows for those in leadership to supervise, motivate, reward and sanction 
individual members. The rituals of congregation serves, in different ways, to integrate new 
members, remodel their lifestyles and allow for upward mobility within the faith bureaucracy 
of the movement. In fact it is the most effective way of in-group solidarity and often the 
individuals carrying out these congregational practices see themselves as something other 
than an arbitrary collectivities but a special translocal group. Others also recognise them as 
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such. They are hence call themselves and by others as warr tabliqa (Bor. the people of 
Tabligh), watu wa tabligh (Sw. the people of Tabligh), warr daʿwa (Bor. daʿwa people) and 
other self-ascriptive titles. 
 
Rituals of Locality  Rituals of Mobility  
  
Table 8 Rituals of locality and mobility 
 
If one is to categorise the practices along temporal lines, it is easy to discern that the 
frequency and consistency in performance of practices enhances gradual inculcation of the 
norms of the movement. On a daily basis, an individual Tablīghī would either alone or with 
others, carry out practices that are seen as not only spiritually rewarding but also socially 
bonding. There are daily practices that one can carry out at home with one’s spouses and 
others to be done alone. There are daily practices that can only be done with fellow Tablīghīs 
at the mosque. These mosque-based practices range from early morning consultative meetings 
to scheduled after-prayer motivational sermons to numerous supererogatory prayers. Daily 
practices are hence emphasised as it is on such basis that transformative spiritual reorientation 
can be effected. Most individualised practices are often to be carried out on a daily basis. 
Weekly practices are communal and are aimed at consolidating the societal growth of the 
movement through recruitment and keeping the members within a system of sustained 
contacts, deliberations and companionship. Within these weekly practices are collective 
deliberations on matters of movement by members of local mosque-based jamāʿat. Plans for 
the week are discussed and agreed upon. News from amīrs of the larger territorial units such 
as sub-ḥalqa and ḥalqa are conveyed. On a monthly basis, Tablīghī representatives from the 
sum total of all mosques in a sub-ḥalqa meet to plan and appraise the progress of the 
movement within their own region. It is also through such forums members and leaders of the 
movement socialise and keep themselves updated on the recent developments in their own 
Bayān 
Text reading  
Shūra 
Ta
clīm 
Jaula 
Ziyārāt 
Jors 
ijtimāʽs 
khurūj fī sabīlillāh 
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individual lives. Information and directives from elders in Nairobi and Nizamuddin are often 
conveyed in such gathering and then re-transmitted to the mosque-based maqāmī units later. 
Monthly consultative meetings are often done on a rotational basis so as to ensure inclusion of 
all mosques and to avoid peripherization of those Tablīghīs in mosques at the fringe of a 
region. For instance in Waso sub-ḥalqa, the monthly meeting is held sometime in Kinna, Kula 
Mawe, Merti, Sericho, Biliqo and other small towns. On monthly basis, the Tablīghīs within 
local mosque also organise three-day preaching tours to areas within the zone. Annual and 
semi-annual practices are often congregational. It is here the Tablīghīs display to other 
Muslims their numerical strength and their universality based on the local and transnational 
congregants in attendance. The gatherings help in socialisation of local and translocal 
congregants, formally through sermons, prayers and travels, and informally through chats, 
discussions and consumption. The gatherings can be divided roughly into specialised 
(international, national and regional consultative meetings) to general (jors and ijtimāʿ s) 
ones. 
 
Daily Practices  
 shūra fi’l-bayt 
 shūra fi’l-masjid  
 Obligatory prayers 
 Recommended prayers  
 Recitation of texts 
 Greeting peoples 
 Taclīm fi’l-bayt 
 Supplications 
 tasbiḥāt 
 
 Weekly Practices  
 Jaula  
 Ziyārāt 
 Taclīm fi’l-masjid  
 fikr al-dīn 
 Bayān 
 Weekly evaluation report 
discussions 
 
 
Monthly Practices  
 Three days monthly excursion 
for preaching (khurūj shahrī) 
 Sub-ḥalqa shūra 
 40 days preaching tours 
Quarterly, Semi-annual, Annual 
Practices 
 Sub- ḥalqa/ḥalqa Jors  
 Regional or national ijtimāʽs 
 Sanawī (annual travel pledge) 
 Majma jor  
Figure 8 Temporal arrangements of main practices of the movement 
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7.2.3 Ideas and Ideologies 
The most vivid image of my field experience was witnessing firsthand the internalisation and 
transmission of six fundamentals of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat also known as siffa sittah by a 
Borana Tablīghī at a mini-ijtimāʿ in Isiolo. The youthful Borana dāʿi was delegated by the 
main speaker to teach congregants in Borana language tāʿlim about the six virtues that 
Tablīghīs believe were spiritual traits prevalent in the lives of the companions of the Prophet. 
He effortlessly narrated the six points namely: the articles of faith, the prayers, knowledge and 
remembrance, honour and respect of Muslims, sincerity of purpose and devoting time for 
tablīgh. What was remarkable was not just the fluency with which the speaker gave the points 
but the way he flawlessly infused each point with explanatory Qur’ānic verses and prophetic 
traditions so as to reinforce its legitimacy and authority as valid religious teachings. He 
alternated between Arabic and Borana. One can deduce that the basis of Tablīghī worldview 
espoused in the six fundamentals form the basis of Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana. 
Procedure, objectives and spiritual benefits that individual Tablīghīs accrue from performance 
of myriad of practices remain the same as anywhere in the world. There in fact parallel 
uniformity in terms of the ideals of the movement and ways of proselytism with observations 
done by other scholars in the Gambia, South Africa, Morocco, South East Asia, South Asia, 
Britain, Belgium, Australia and Canada (Janson 2005, Masud 2000, Reetz 2006, 2008, 
Dickson 2009, Sikand 2002, Metcalf 2003, Tozy 2000, De Feo 2007, Haq 1972, Ali 2010).  
Daʿwa remains the prime focus of the Borana speaking Tablīghīs. Volunteerism is exalted. 
Self-financing is encouraged. Daʿwa is marketed as an obligation compulsory on each and 
every member of their Muslim community. Local Qalole are encouraged to participate but 
often stay aloof of the transnational movement. Tablīghī  proselytism among the Borana 
closely resembles similar outreaches in South Asia in terms of the size of a preaching team, 
the daily programme of daʿwa, delegation of responsibilities, preferred texts for preaching, 
preferred verses of the Quran and ḥadīth and even the way of preaching and motivation. 
Similarly the titles of leaders and Tablīghī terms of South Asian and Arabic origin have found 
wide usage among the Borana followers. This include terms such as tāʿlīm for teaching, 
bayān for after-prayer preaching, targhīb for motivational talks, amīr for leader, qudamā’ for 
senior members, akābir for elders of the movement, shūra for consultative forum, ḥalqa for a 
territorial unit encompassing sum total of mosques with Tablīghī programme in an area, 
khurūj fī sabīlillāh for daʿwa outreach, ijtimāʿ and jor for congregational gathering, and even 
kailula for afternoon rest between midday prayer and afternoon prayer. The range of terms 
and other spiritual-inspired pleasantries that have enriched the everyday speeches of 
committed members and have set them aside from other ordinary Muslims in the region. 
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Listening to two or three Tablīghīs converse, one can clearly see the impact of their religious 
transformation and their modified world view. Such repertoires of terms is reinforced through 
foreign daʿwa tours to the Indian subcontinent, travel with foreign Tablīghīs within the 
country and through transnational and local gatherings in which Tablīghīs from many parts of 
the country participate in. This facilitates uniformity and consistency of practices and world 
view. A Borana Tablīghī hence fits almost flawlessly into the mix of transnational dāʿis with 
ease though he remains uniquely Kenyan.  
The world, even among the Borana speaking Tablīghīs, is viewed with suspicion. Believers 
are reminded that they are only here as sojourners. Their deeds shall be measured on how 
much they avoid the lure of the world for the sacrifice that they make on behalf of the faith. 
Prime among that is observance of daily prayers and good behaviour. The best way to avoid 
the temptation of the world is a retreat, not to a Ṣūfī-like shrine but to the travels and practices 
of the transnational movement. Borana Muslims listening to local Tablīghīs are often made to 
believe that their success in this world and hereafter lies not in just praying the five times a 
day but immediately joining the movement to partake in the work of reminding others of the 
observance of religious duties. They are reminded in their own language that their redemption 
lies not just in individual reforms but also their willingness and active participation in saving 
hundreds of others ‘from the hell-fire’.319 Aw Kombora opines that the world, the properties 
of the believers, their souls and everything that they think they own belongs to God and that it 
is only when the retreat from home to contemplate on their precarious situation in an unstable 
corrupting world that they can reform themselves and help others reform. Home is hence seen 
as a comfortable and alluring niche to attempt to reform one’s practices and behaviour, 
therefore, Borana Tablīghīs are convinced that it by leaving home that one can break from the 
bad past and get in to a promising spiritual future. Aw Kombora opines in a speech to fellow 
Borana Tablīghīs in this manner: 
But if you are together with your family, with your children, and your wife and in the comfort 
of your home, these narrative will not make sense to you. All of us gathered here must donate 
our souls, our time, and our wealth for the sake of Allah. Are we not ready? But if you do not 
like to spend your wealth for the sake of Allah, the love of the world will growth more and 
more in you. Once the love of the world grows in you, the world and Allah cannot exist in the 
same soul. So Allah will leave you and you and your world remain together. Is this not great 
loss?  Our inside is still unripe. We must make it ripe by giving time for the sake of Allah.
320
  
 
                                                 
319
 ‘Nami diram tok yokhaan galgal tok inni rabbi hede gute, nami sun adunyafi waan adunya kes jira isan irr 
hekma qabaa jed.’ (Bor. He who goes out one morning or one evening for the sake of Allah, he is more of more 
value and honour than the whole world and what is in) preaches one Borana Tablighi at a jor in Isiolo. (Borana 
tāʿlim Session, Isiolo Jamia Mosque, April 2009) 
320
 Aw Kombola, Isiolo Jamia Mosque, April 2009. 
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Talib (2000, 70-76) similarly observes that Tablīghīs view the world as scarcely worthy of 
much attention and that it be a waiting room but never the ultimate destination. One is hence 
required to be vigilant. Talib notes that the Tablīghīs do not propose retreat from the world 
but they engage in a moral struggle against the established order by living out a blueprint of 
an ideal life through the programmes of the Jamāʿat. Borana Tablīghīs like their transnational 
counterparts find the solution to the moral decadence and spiritual laxity in getting themselves 
and others Muslims back to the path of dīn. There is heightened emphasis on the role of the 
correct and sincere faith (Ar. imān yaqīn). If the heart is healed of the love of the world, if it is 
cured of the laziness to perform good deeds and made to love the work of itinerary preaching 
then, according to the Borana Tablīghīs, the rest shall all fall in place and the society has be 
transformed. 
In line with the transnational agenda and worldview of the movement, the local Tablīghīs 
remain avowedly ‘apolitical’ as a group. Though this does not restrict them from participating 
in local clan and ethnic politics as individuals, the Tablīghīs as a group generally shun 
discussion on pertinent matters of insecurity, political rivalry, ethnic clashes, human rights, 
issues on marginalization, declining trends in acquisition of secular and religious education, 
substance abuse like miraa (khat) and other social ills. Their preaching sessions in the 
mosques in the region are devoid of social and political activism. Personal reform is preached. 
What is however condemned in private is the failure of religious scholars to effect religious 
revivalism due to engagement in political discussions and approaching the local Muslims 
from ‘self-righteous’ position of authority. Like the Tablīghīs elsewhere, the Borana speaking 
followers also apply the tested method of building commonality with their audience through 
persuasive speech and then customizing their message as appealing to each and every 
individual mosque attendant. 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat has strong Deobandi connections and the members of the movement as the 
rest of the Muslims in South Asia are followers of Hanafi School of law. However Muslims 
in East Africa are largely followers of the Shafiī School. This notwithstanding, the local 
Tablīghīs do not appear to demonstrate any form jurisprudential reorientation. However still, 
some critics accuse them of being without madhhab or propagators of Hanafism within the 
region.
321
 The local followers look to the centres in South Asia for guidance. Take the case of 
preference to travel to Nizamuddin and to Indian subcontinent. The lure and fascination with 
all things Tablīghī is immensely strong among Borana followers. Many aspire to make the 
                                                 
321 Personal conversations with Hussein Ganno, September 2010, Moyale. 
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journey to IPB to learn properly the methods of daʿwa from the source. Mobile telephony and 
improved means of transport and communication and astounding commitment to the 
movements by the local Tablīghīs have facilitated the ease of liaison with worlds beyond 
Borana speaking regions of northern Kenya. Constant flow of foreign Tablīghīs from as far as 
South Africa, India, Pakistan and Egypt make the local Tablīghīs imagine themselves as being 
in a community of lay preachers with immense global presence. This is particularly 
remarkable for those who have made foreign travels. There is hence a sense of pride in the 
transnationalism facilitated by the movement. More so, for these Borana Tablīghīs, being a 
lay preacher is a privilege bestowed upon a select few by God (Bor. warr rabbi uji ufitif 
filat…the people who have been picked by God for his work).  
Similarly, the polemics levelled against the local Tablīghīs by a wide range of critics reflects 
global influence. Issues like the use of inauthentic prophetic traditions, inappropriateness of 
allowing religiously-illiterate followers to preach, innovative practices and programmes, anti-
intellectualism and disinterest in religious schools, unquestioning allegiance to the Tablīghī  
methods as the best  and the leaders of the movement as custodians of faith, apolitical stance, 
avoidance of doctrinal controversies, deliberate avoidance of issues of social ills, and 
‘reverence’ and desire to do tours of centres of the movement like Nizamuddin has been 
raised against local Tablīghīs as it has been against Tablīghīs in other parts of the world. It is 
also possible the critics listened to and read on the movement and about what other religious 
scholars have to say about them in other parts of the world. On the same note, the responses 
of the Borana speaking Tablīghī reflect similar translocal influence. For instance, they 
rationalise that it is duty of every Muslim to preach and they argue that it is better to stay 
away from divisive issues to build consensus and allow for unity of the umma and 
reawakening of the spiritual synergy first.  They point out that they do not innovate in matters 
of religion in respect to their approach as these were done even during the time of the Prophet 
and his companions. They too counteract the critics saying that their 40 days, four months and 
three days daʿwa travels are not ‘cast in stone’ and have been put in place as pragmatic 
reformative and educational programme just as the religious scholars have put up madrasas 
and universities that never existed during the time of pristine Islam. The Borana speaking 
Tablīghīs show the efficacy and legitimacy of their system as ‘thugs’ have been reformed and 
the mosque attendance boosted.  
It is in the realm of religious career path that the local Tablīghīs immensely borrow from the 
transnational network. The route to become a committed senior Tablīghī is open to all as 
anywhere in the world. There are no special requirements to join except the fact that the 
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willing individual must volunteer to travel for any numbers of days. Three days and 10 days 
travel experience are generally introductory and the individual learns the basics of proselytism 
and principles such as six fundamentals, ways of eating and sleeping, and assortment of 
supplications. It is only after an individual travel for 40 days and four months travels that he is 
widening his Tablīghī experience but also thoroughly learns the art of making speeches, 
etiquettes of group leadership, manner of conducting consultative meetings, master the 
underlying supportive Qur’ānic verses and prophetic traditions for myriad practices and above 
all various re-educational programmes that can be re-enacted at home. When a regular 
Tablīghī travels for a number of longer period travel modules and comes back, it is incumbent 
upon other senior Tablīghīs to test his leadership skills by delegating the authority to lead 
short duration travel outreaches in the neighbouring areas, for instance, for three days. Such 
promising individuals would also be given chances to lead neighbourhood excursions and 
being groomed through chairing the maqāmī meetings. This mentoring of budding Tablīghī is 
boosted by the fact that the local followers of the movement are acquainted with each from 
childhood and may be linked by bonds such as ethnic and clan-based kinship. The role and 
the powers of amīr as final decision maker whether he is in charge of a travelling group or a 
localised unit is another transnational Tablīghī phenomenon adopted by the followers in 
northern Kenya. 
A budding Tablīghī often catches the eyes of the local, regional and national consultative 
leadership. The local Borana speaking Tablīghīs gather on monthly basis. This forum also 
socializes new and old members as they discuss the affairs of the movement in the previous 
and coming months and laying out the timetable of upcoming events and set targets. Two 
things stands out as far as the upward mobility of Borana Tablīghīs are concerned: strong 
commitment and ability to internalise various Tablīghī practices. An individual’s chance of 
leading is hence attached to his own availability to take part in ‘unending’ series of local and 
translocal practices and also his ability to flawlessly display ‘piety’ in his speech, his clothing, 
his behaviour, his timely attendance of congregational prayers, his deep knowledge of all 
facets of Tablīghī practices and his own initiative to guide his family to the path of Tablīghī 
ideals. In sum, the individual must find it easy to make Tablīghī his way of life, an effortless 
every day norm. 
By being a gradually introduced and nurtured into various practices, an individual Borana 
Tablīghī acquires cultural capital in form of specialised knowledge available only to the core 
members of the movement. Interpersonal network across and within a territory enhances his 
social capital.  A mosque-based group may allow one of the budding members to lead the unit 
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on monthly basis. Once tested and approved such an individual may hold on similar rotational 
basis sub-ḥalqa and even ḥalqa leadership. One must also maintain close and friendly 
relationship with members of the movement within the region. Such maintenance of 
relationship may at time include formal discussion of personal matters of individual members 
like impeding marriage, separation or divorce, impending foreign travels, status of families of 
local members who are on daʿwa tours, financial assistance to needy committed elders and 
disagreement and rivalry within them.  
It is perhaps in the manners of clothing that the Borana speaking Tablīghīs appropriate the 
visible transnational symbols of the movement. The Indian styled kurta pyjamas with dark 
coloured half-coat are prominently worn across the region by the followers of the movement. 
In addition, Muslim cap and pony-tailed turban are visible markers of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 
northern Kenya as in other parts of the world. Other paraphernalia associated with local 
Tablīghīs include prayer beads and assortments of tiny pocket size Quran and booklets on 
supplications. For instance, despite coming from different parts of Kenya, neighbouring 
countries and even South Asia, one can see rough uniformity in the style of dressing by 
members of the movement at the annual Nairobi ijtimāʽ. Furthermore, these events also offer 
the new and the old members a chance to buy affordable kanzu, kurta pyjama, caps, half-
coats, prayer beads, books associated with the movement, perfumes and other gifts for their 
families upon return.  
7.3 Staying local: Localising Tablīghī, Appropriating symbols, histories and 
aspirations  
Chande (2000) cites a classic case of localisation of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Uganda. Based on 
an in-depth regional study, he explores the transformation of the movement from 
transnational Asian-led ‘apolitical’ daʿwa outfit to a radical indigenous militarised group. 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat came to Uganda in the 1960s through the dāʿis from the Indian subcontinent 
and saw steady growth in that decade. It attracted Muslims of wide religious affiliation, 
Salafīs and non-Salafīs. The leading proponent then included Sheikh Marmazinga and some 
Salafī leaders such as Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto. Schism within the daʿwa movement led a 
group of Salafī-affiliated leaders to split from the main body to start their own version of the 
daʿwa movement. This followed a Supreme Court legal battle in which the government was 
said to have favoured the less radical camp within the movement. Following the split, the new 
splinter group maintained the name and established its own network of mosques, hospitals, 
orphanages and madrasas. The ‘new’ Tablīghī Jamāʿat aimed to establish an Islamic socio-
political order based on Sharīʿa. It also engaged in preaching among Muslims and conversion 
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of non-Muslims and criticism of the ills of the Uganda society and government in purely 
Islamic terms. The leaders of this radical Tablīghī Jamāʿat were hence subjected to arrest, 
imprisonment and exile and largely the mainstream Uganda Muslim leadership often 
disassociated from their activities. Chande observes that following the radicalisation of the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Uganda, Tablīghī dāʿis from India and Pakistan were banned from 
entering Uganda. Whether this ban is still in place is a different issue all together. What is 
certainly clear though is that a dozen Ugandan affiliated with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat often 
attend the annual Nairobi ijtimāʿ. Whether they belong to the original movement or the 
indigenous one is not clear. 
The indigenisation of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Uganda raises three questions: Why did the local 
Tablīghīs re-orientate the largely pacifist transnational movement concerned with spiritual 
reawakening into an indigenous radical movement with socio-political agenda? How ‘the 
original movement’ fared in the face competition from an indigenous and politically engaged 
rival group that sought to appropriate a prominent role in public space? What role did the 
Uganda Asians play in the struggle to maintain Tablīghī orthodoxy and consistency in 
practice and spiritual orientation in the face of the split within the Uganda’s Tablīghī Jamāʿat? 
It is with the last question that we shall start our discussion as it has impact on indigenisation 
of the movement in Kenya.  
The 1970s was certainly a difficult time for Uganda’s Asians, including Muslim Asians. It 
was the reign of Idi Amin Dada (1971-1979). It is certainly possible that the local Asians 
involved in managing the affairs of the lay daʿwa movements were either exiled or adopted 
low profiles in religious and social matters. Furthermore, it is presumed that the international 
dāʿis from the Indian Sub-continent would certainly avoid visiting the country during that 
regime and even afterwards. The local concerns about Uganda’s indigenous Muslims took 
centre stage in 1970s and 1980s when coups and military rule were the order of the day. There 
was hence a vacuum of advocacy and political engagement that many Muslim groups and 
leaders sought to fill. The radical Tablīghīs hence struggled with the existing mainstream 
Muslim leadership to be the voice of Uganda’s Muslim community, a struggle that saw them 
abandon their pietistic, publicity-shunning and apolitical stance.  
The Uganda’s case brings forth the question of sustainability of transnational connections and 
affiliation with the centre in the face of pertinent concerns affecting local Muslim 
communities. That brings us to the next fascinating but obscure splinter lay movement of 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya, the Darwesh-led daʿwa group. However there is little research 
done on this movement and it has not been focus of this thesis. What can however be 
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discerned from preliminary information is that: it is a splinter group of the transnational 
movement, it has bases in Tanzania and Kenya, its members travel for daʿwa tours on similar 
travel modules like the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and it has within its ranks local Muslim Asians. 
In the subsequent section, we shall discuss various aspects of the Borana Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
that alludes to and make use of local symbols, histories and strategies. These aspects are 
indicative of the localisation of the movement as an indigenous lay daʿwa group and are 
uniquely influenced by local ethnic and socio-political circumstances.  
 
7.3.1 ‘We are Daʿwa Group not Tablīghīs’: Shifting Self-Ascription of the local followers 
of the movement  
Initially the Tablīghī Jamāʿat was associated with frequent itinerant bands of Indian, Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi dāʿis. As we saw earlier, the involvement of the Borana speaking Muslims 
was a matter of a later development. By then, the local Muslims and their leaders had not only 
associated Tablīghī Jamāʿat and its form of proselytism as uniquely South Asian but also 
viewed the mobile preachers as old men engaging in religious tourism to atone for lifetime 
sins.
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 People never appeared to understand the motivation behind the largely Urdu speaking 
South Asians crossing borders to preach in incomprehensible languages. Though a few 
volunteers would lead them from mosques to mosques as they sought accommodation, 
Tabligh Jamāʿat was never seen as something local. The term ‘tablīgh’ developed a slightly 
negative connotation.  
When local Borana speaking individuals joined the movement and oversaw its gradual 
establishment in mosques in the region, they had to debunk the notion that the movement is 
South Asian but a transnational lay daʿwa group open to all Muslims irrespective of their 
ethnic origin, sectarian affiliation, age, level of Islamic learning and gender. One such 
demystification involves utilising known terms for self-ascription. One such term is daʿwa. 
Commenting on the shifting identity, Mamed Roba cautiously notes that they described 
themselves as ‘warr daʿwa’ (people of daʿwa) as the term daʿwa was freely used, generally 
accepted as mainstream than ‘tablīgh’ that at time has been associated South Asian dāʿis and 
by extension its respective Hanafi School and Deobandi influence.
323
  
Warr daʿwa and warr tabliqa (Tablīghī group) are in most cases used interchangeably by the 
Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs in reference to the local adherents. The former is more 
acceptable to the religious scholars who share with the Tablīghīs a common understanding of 
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the term. Therefore while among themselves the term ‘warr tabliqa’ may be favoured but 
with the out-group ‘warr daʿwa’ or kundi daʿwa (daʿwa group) is often used in the Borana 
speaking regions.  
7.3.2 We the People who speak our language: Translating Tablīgh for the Borana  
Borana speaking Tablīghīs have a place within Kenya’s Tablīghī Jamāʿat. This is precisely 
visible during the national and ḥalqa ijtimāʿs as well as during national consultative forums. 
At the national ijtimāʿs, their recognition is manifested through language specific translation 
cum commentary circles: Borana tarjama, as they are called. Announcements made during 
these transnational gatherings often are done in a number of languages including Borana. 
Furthermore, there are Borana speaking member(s) or persons who understand the language 
within the Kenya Shūra. As discussed earlier, the work of translating or commenting on 
speeches made in Swahili and Urdu into Borana at the national gatherings fall on the 
shoulders of committed senior Tablīghīs from the region. As seen earlier, the translation of 
direct speeches are not word for word but deliberate appropriation of the messages of the 
movement to the needs of the followers from the region. Often, the speakers do not follow the 
Swahili translated or Urdu original but motivate, admonish and guide their fellow Borana 
speaking Tablīghīs using examples and experiences of their socio-cultural life. As we saw, 
though quite a number of those gathered at Borana translation circles understand Swahili, they 
opt to sit among their own co-ethnics. This tendency to own one’s space even within the 
diverse and all-encompassing transnational movement is a pointer to how such movements 
serve many functions. 
Borana speaking translation circles are often a heterogeneous mix of people who speak 
various dialects of Borana-Oromo. The congregants are from areas as far as Tana River near 
the Kenyan coast to northern border towns of Moyale and Mandera to central-northern towns 
as Isiolo, Garba Tulla and Merti. Ethnic communities that sit at these circles include the 
Borana, Gabra, Sakuye, Garre, Burji, Konso and Orma. Of these, Orma constitute a distinct 
addition as they have been historically been separated from the Borana for decades due to 
outward migration, settlement of Somali clans in areas between the two and ethnic clashes. 
Burji and Konso migrated for job opportunities as labourers in colonial Northern Frontier 
District towns such as Moyale and Marsabit. Later they settled and have significant presence 
in these two towns and in Nairobi’s Kariobangi area. Burji are enterprising and have 
accumulated considerable wealth through transport businesses. They are largely Muslims but 
also have significant population of evangelical Christians among them (Amborn 2009). A 
number of them are active committed Tablīghīs.  
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With such an ethnic diverse constituency, speakers during national ijtimāʿs have to be very 
inclusive in their speeches. They always appeal to the commonality of language. They fall 
back on common origin, common cultural connections, common livelihood strategies and 
common territorial home. The most common term used to initiate discussion and self-
introspection as a unified group is ‘nu warri affan ken dubbat…’, which translates as ‘We, the 
people who speak our language…’ In this way, the speakers avoid marginalising those who 
are non-Borana but speak Borana as their first language and at the same time include the 
Orma into the Borana category as their long lost brothers.  
Similarly, as mentioned in earlier chapters, ways of building consensus and inclusion within 
the heterogeneous Borana Tarjama is by allowing speakers from each of the constituent 
groups to lead the translation circles. Therefore, a Borana from Waso may chair a tāʿlīm 
session, a Tana Orma translates bayān fajrī, an Obbu Borana bayān maghribī and a Gabra 
bayān caṣrī, and a Burji tashkīl works. Garre though few within the movement often opt to sit 
among more religious learned Somalis than among the Borana speaking jamāʿat at the 
national gatherings. However despite sitting as one, territorially Isiolo and Waso Borana 
Tablīghīs are under Nairobi ḥalqa, Moyale and Marsabit Borana, Burji and Konso Tablīghīs 
under Garissa ḥalqa and Tana Orma are from coastal ḥalqa. This translation circle is the only 
one that appears to have fair spatial representation of all the three Tablīghī zones in Kenya.  
Members of Borana speaking Tablīghīs are often sent to areas where their language is spoken. 
This further strengthens the ownership and entrenchment of the movement as local revival 
group. It is common to find groups of Orma Tablīghīs transversing in Borana dominated areas 
of Moyale and Sololo, Waso Borana preaching in mosques in Mandera, Obbu Borana 
mobilizing for the movement among the Orma of Garsen and Hola, Gabra Tablīghīs calling 
people back to faith in Waso and Burji and Borana Tablīghīs preaching in mosques in 
Kariobangi, Mukuru kwa Njenga and Mathari in Nairobi. At these moments, one does not see 
at all the South Asian dimension of the movement. When a group of Orma Tablīghīs toured 
Moyale in June and July 2010, there were considerable interests among the local Borana of 
these ‘Borana speaking brothers’ who have travelled hundreds of kilometres to remind them 
of religious observance. Often interpersonal discussions with these Orma dāʿis shift from 
‘daʿwa’ to their clan structure, their history and separation of ‘them’. In their speeches they 
also emphasise their unity with Borana and their common brotherhood in Islam and the need 
to reform themselves by living pious life as done by the Prophet and his companions. In a 
way, these inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic proselytism bolster ethnic solidarity and mobilisation 
for religious purpose.  
291 
7.3.3 Borana as ‘one undivided unit’: Tablīghī daʿwa to non-Muslim Borana, Muslim 
Borana  
Tablīghī Jamāʿat often does not preach to non-Muslims. Their travels confine them to 
mosques where they reach out to Muslims who come to pray. Traditionally their daʿwa has 
been directed towards Muslims. However among the Borana, the Tablīghīs have taken upon 
themselves to ‘save’ their co-ethnics who are followers of their Borana indigenous religion 
from ‘imminent damnation’. They argue that their outreaches are the most appropriate 
especially among the Borana followers of the indigenous beliefs unlike earlier efforts by non-
Borana Muslims such as the Garre, the Arsi Oromo and the Somali. The failure of earlier 
attempts were dismissed as superficial and confined to urban centres such as Nagelle, Mega 
and Yabello with little penetration into the villages and cattle camps. In addition, being non-
Borana, the proselytisers were accused of cultural insensitivity, ownership of otherwise 
universal faith and cultural conversion of Borana to their own way of life. In short, these 
earlier dāʿis were dismissed as deceptive and unsuitable to present the message of Islam to the 
community in the way that the Borana could relate to it as way of life and a universal faith. 
Therefore the Borana speaking Tablīghīs see themselves as the right dācis cut for the job as 
they not only come from the community but share in its concerns for the future. They draw 
themselves as the children of the community out to bring the faith to their ancestral 
homelands with the sole aim of making it part of Islamic umma.  
Therefore, the transnational lay movement comes to serve the growing needs among the more 
religious observant Borana Muslims to do daʿwa among their non-Muslim Borana in Ethiopia 
and Kenya. Here, the transnational movement serves purely local ethno-religious concerns. 
The movement remains transnational as the Kenyan Borana dāʿis have to cross Kenya-
Ethiopian border and travel around the vast southern region of the Oromo Regional State. 
They visit urban areas, villages and watering points. In areas with large Borana Muslim 
populations, attempts are made to establish self-sustaining Tablīghī units to consolidate gains 
made. Temporary mosques are constructed where conversions are made, often with 
community consent and support. Their requests for teachers and more Tablīghī daʿwa to 
Kenyan Borana are often honoured.  
The region, hitherto connected by the pan-Borana customs (Bor. aada sera) and hence seen as 
one unified cultural zone is increasing redefined and imagined especially by the Borana 
Tablīghī workers as an emerging part of transnational umma. There is a common adage 
among the Borana that says ‘Borani kuta inqab’, that is, the Borana are one undivided whole. 
This is often cited when there is need for a trans-frontier mobilisation against external attacks, 
for local and national elections in Kenya, to access pasture and water resources on both sides 
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of the border, for effective administration of customary laws and customs and now for 
purpose of Tablīghī daʿwa.  
Constituent clans of the Borana dual moieties of Sabho and Gona are found in both Kenya 
and Ethiopia as are those of other Borana speaking communities. Most Borana Tablīghīs from 
areas like Moyale know the landscape and may even have relatives and contacts in Ethiopia. 
They also understand the role and the powers played by the Borana political and religious 
leaders. They are most suited to approach the Gada elders to ask for permission to preach and 
convert their fellow Borana. They also fall back not only on ‘boranness’ (Bor: borantiti), but 
also make informal reference to conversion to Islam as a foretold prophesies of past Borana 
‘prophets’ and diviners who predicted that there shall come a time when the community have 
to choose between Christianity and Islam and that the latter was predicted to be the better 
option. (Bassi and Tache, 2005) The Borana Tablīghīs make optimal use of the exclusive 
entry they have to Dirre and Liban and the audience they get from the Gada leaders to their 
daʿwa use. The Tablīghīs unlike earlier dāʿis who were often in Borana region for reasons 
other than preaching are undoubtedly committed as their aim is to ‘Islamise’ their community. 
Frequent clashes over resources between Garre and Somali have been cited as the reason why 
the community has been reluctant to accept Islamic faith from them. There is a tendency 
within the Borana followers that they have to do something so that their communities ‘catch 
up’ with the rest of neighbouring predominantly Muslim communities such as the Garre and 
Somali. These quotes from informants illustrate this: 
Of all the communities here in this land, Borana are the least Islamized. Our people 
hold their culture in one hand and religion with the other. They do not embrace the 
religion fully.  
 
Whenever and wherever 
c
ulamā’ go out to the Borana area, they are ready to embrace 
shahāda. They are told by the culamā’ that it is ok to hold some aspects of their 
culture. This is hypocrisy. They are also not shown how to pray, what tawhīd is, or 
just how to live as Muslims. Most of the time, after they embrace Islam, they do not 
have any one to teach them about their new faith. So most of them are Muslims with 
names only. 
 
We have seen kundis especially from Waso travelling and transversing the vast Borana 
land from Dirre, Liban, Mega, Sololo, Yabello, and Nagelle and so on. We have had 
groups from here to who have gone to even Abba Gada and Qallu. They are very 
appreciative. They are so eager to learn. 
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I can with confidence say that Borana have accepted tablīgh. They now greatly 
support da'wa effort. In fact they support da'wa more than any other community here. 
We believe that this may be the only nuṣra from Allah to lift this people out of 
ignorance into the light. Many Borana youth are in it, and very ready to sacrifice their 
time and resources for the sake of Allah.
324
  
         
The focus on non-Muslim Borana is particularly stronger among the Waso Borana Tablīghīs. 
They retell stories of the squalor and poverty stricken fellow Boranas whose everyday life is 
compounded by years of alcoholism and in need of spiritual enlightenment. Such narratives 
form the basis for subsequent daʿwa excursions by Borana speaking jamāʿats. These daʿwa 
journeys are more than just Tablīghī tours. For the Borana Muslims it forms some sort of 
‘sightseeing’, albeit one with spiritual dimensions. Before, with restriction on travel between 
Kenya and Ethiopia, the only people who cross the borders were traders, nomads and selected 
visitors to distant relatives. Generally, the ancestral lands of Diree and Liban remain a deeply 
revered area, arda jila. It still ignites feelings of belongingness among the Borana Muslim and 
non-Muslims, a place of their own, a place of ‘eventual return’. It is still seat of the Gada 
council and Qallu. To Borana Tablīghīs, though these traditional symbols do not hold same 
old sentiments, it still gives them a rare and privileged opportunity to transverse the land that 
their fellow Borana reside in for centuries and see beyond it.  
It is also this concerted focus on Borana constituency, both Muslim and non-Muslims, that 
attracts the Borana Muslims to the movement and also make rival ethnic groups such as Garre 
to avoid it. Ethnic rivalry as mentioned in earlier chapters plays a crucial role in the 
transnational movement. Though it is often seen as appealing to every lay Muslim to partake 
in the travels for individual spiritual reform, it is often lay Muslims from certain ethnic groups 
and certain class within that group that is predominantly attracted to the movement. Mewatis 
in India were a classic historical example. Among the northern nomadic group, currently the 
Borana remains the largest followers.  
Attraction by the Borana Muslims to the movement is strengthened by certain Tablīghī 
practices that have parallel manifestation in Borana livelihood strategies and socio-cultural 
norms.  Take the case of khurūj fī sabīlillāh. The Tablīghī  mobility practices in search of 
areas in need of spiritual revivalism rings a bell with Borana rangeland management practices 
of searching for greener and most nourishing pastures for their prized possession, the cattle. 
Scouts (Bor: aburu) are often sent on such missions. Similarly, ilmatu (Bor: journeys) are not 
new. People have travelled for decades from one part of the region to the other for varieties of 
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reasons. When they get home they narrate the news (Bor: oddu) of the places visited just like 
the Tablīghī practices of aḥwāl giving. They broadcast messages of Nagaa Borana (Bor. 
Peace of the Borana) and any other urgent matters. In case village elders or any other 
traditional institution want to make an announcements or pass urgent message, the Borana 
dispatch lapsa or kuta (Bor: messenger) for that mission. Tablīghī dāʿis among the Borana 
also allude to their proselytism as a form of religious lapsa. The notion of conveyance as used 
in Borana every day speech is daqapsisa. The Tablīghīs often used the term in conjunction or 
as translation to daʿwa. In this case, they often call upon Borana Muslims to volunteer to 
convey the preaching of Islam to others. Daqabsisa hence is preached as a duty compulsory 
upon all Muslims irrespective of their levels of religious education.  
Other Tablīghī practices like as consultative meetings as means of consensus building and 
decision making rhymes well with traditional Borana strategies such as korr (Bor. meeting). It 
is common for communal decisions to be made by male Borana elders through deliberation. 
Korr can be held for varieties of reasons, namely: korr gossa (Bor. clan meetings), korr dedha 
(pasture rangeland meeting), korr ola (village meeting), korr gummi ballo (pan Borana 
meeting), korr gara warra (family meeting) to name but a few. Disputes have traditionally 
been solved in this manner. The apex of Borana gatherings is the 8 yearly Gumi Gaayo in 
Ethiopia to deliberate on pan Borana issues under the chairmanship of the reigning Aba Gada 
(Baxter 1954, Legesse 1973). 
It is perhaps in reverence for elders that the Borana Tablīghīs find a common ground with 
Borana equivalent. Elders within the community are a source of blessing and are respected as 
custodians of the traditions. It is common for elders (jarole) to give advice, settle dispute, 
conduct ceremonies, represent their clans or sub-clans in meetings and convey or enforce 
communal decisions based on the sanctioning powers. Tablīghīs generally refer to those 
advanced both in age and experience within the movement as elders. In Swahili, the word 
used is wazee. Among the Borana Tablīghīs they are called jarole. Seniority matters in this 
pastoralist community, so does it among the Tablīghīs. The Borana Tablīghīs refer to 
members of the Kenya Shūra and other senior prominent Kenyan Muslim Asian Tablīghī as 
jarole. The highest ranking jarole are those ‘elders’ at the administrative nexus of the 
movement in Nizamuddin in Delhi who constitute various councils and who frequently 
convey directives to the national elders in each country directives for implementation and 
guidance. Often the Borana Tablīghī leaders would make announcements and new directives 
in this manner: ‘Obboleyan jarolen waan jete…’ (Bor. Fellow comrades, the elders have said 
that…). 
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Furthermore unlike the often authoritative and ‘self-righteous’ sermons of the local culamā’ 
among the Borana, the Tablīghīs maintain certain forms of self-reflective and persuasive 
speech and often address the local Borana with collective voice. They do not condemn, at 
least in public, of transgressions of the moral laws but gently encourage the Borana Muslims 
to mend their ways through doing good deeds. They are not overtly political or militant. They 
do not condemn the local traditions in open like the other non-Borana preachers and do not 
aspire to relegate their traditions to oblivion at the moment. Their bodily adornment is never 
complete without surre (Bor: turban) and ule (Bor: stick) a common feature among the 
Borana males. They also avoid controversies and conflicts with the religious scholars. Their 
gatherings such as ijtimāʿs and shūra just like the traditional Borana congregations always 
end with eeb (Bor: supplication, blessing). They, in all sense of words, appear to maintain the 
Peace of Borana, Nagaa Borana.   
Except in Waso, the Borana Muslims are disproportionally represented in religious hierarchy 
in Moyale. Except in outlying areas, mosques in Moyale central are managed by the families 
of the founders who were mainly Somalis and of Arab descent. Tablīghī Jamāʿat hence found 
an easy niche among the youth from the Borana community and from among secular-
educated Borana speaking youth of the communities. It hence provides this constituency with 
a sense of belonging and importance and also membership and leadership opportunity in a 
transnational body of lay dāʿis that is not confined to a region like the local culamā’. They are 
fascinated by the global reach of the movement and would not hesitate to remind me in the 
interviews that ‘tabliqi kara rabbin ebise, fulan tabliqi arr injirr injir’ (Bor: Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
is a blessed path of God and that there is no place in the world where you will not find it’). 
Unlike the class of the 
c
ulamā’, every person can join the movement and has a considerably 
equal chance to rise within its hierarchy based on his own commitment and piety.  
With the rise in radicalism in the neighbouring Somalia and protracted secessionist conflicts 
among the Oromo and Somali dominated Ogaden region in Ethiopia and fear of gradual 
growth of reformist Islam within Kenya, both Kenya and Ethiopian governments are wary of 
Islamic movements with overt political agenda. The United State embassy bombing in 1998 
in Nairobi and a spate of other attacks committed by terrorist organisations have made the 
regional governments step up its efforts to avert similar crisis with the help of the United State 
of America and other western powers through various methods such as intelligence, policies 
and special police units. Kenya and Ethiopia share a long porous border with each other and 
with unstable Somalia, a haven for all sorts of groups. It is in the interests of these 
governments to allow, if not nurture, any ‘apolitical’ transnational group that would counter 
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the allure of the militant movements. Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya and on the frontiers of Kenya 
and Ethiopia hence has the blessing and freedom to proselytise. Transnational acclaimed 
apolitical stance augurs well with the local needs of such movements in face of perceived 
increasing radicalisation among youthful Muslims in the Horn of Africa.  It is however 
unpredictable how the regional governments handle the movement in the years to come. 
7.4 Facing the future: Tablighi prospects in Kenya  
During one of my field visits, I was lucky to meet a close informant returning from a four 
month travel tour. I asked him a question concerning the future of the movement among the 
Borana speaking communities, I inquired, what next? He answered in Borana:  
 
Ujin tun uji muume jabdunit. Uji nabiyotaf ashaboti ojat. Guyyan isin chit injrit. Ag 
lubbun nam kes jirt, inum chochoan. Ujin tun dini nam daqapsisa challanit. Isin dandi 
rabbi itt nam yam. Warr ini filat male name chufti indem. Isin jijiram gudaan namat 
dufft. Ibadat wal nam eej. Amalat naam qajeel. Warrat naam midag. Sodaa rabbi 
gudaat nam kessat dalat. Ashaboti waan diqo beet warri isanitin daqapsisite, nuulen 
warri afaan keen dubat, dams la ilaha illalahu kaan jiru teen war keen daqabsisin. 
 
This work does not have an end. It was a duty done by the prophets and their 
companions. There is no day that it will be over. As long as one is alive, he must 
remain steady on the work. This duty is not concerned with conveying the message of 
Islam only. It is a path upon which God calls his faithfuls. Only the one He calls are 
the one chosen to remain within it. It brings tons of transformative changes in the life 
of a person. Acts of worship (Ar. 
cibādat) become part of one’s everyday life. One’s 
behavior becomes good. The home is transformed. The sincere fear of God germinates 
in one’s heart. Just as the companions of the Prophet Muhammad relentless relayed the 
little they knew to their people, we the speaker of our language shall convey this 
message of ‘La ilaha illalah’ to our people throughout our lifetime.325  
 
This comprehensive quotation sums up the motivation and attitude of the Tablīghīs among the 
Borana speaking communities today. The level of commitment among those who chose the 
path of lay ministry is high. New recruits are sought, whilst older ones are maintained through 
carefully thought-out visits, regular local meetings and gatherings and interpersonal networks 
of fellow Tablīghīs. The followers of the movement are not only convinced about authenticity 
and orthodoxy of their doctrine and practices but relentlessly assert that due to failure of the 
mainstream religious leadership to initiate and sustain religious revivalism, it is them and only 
them who can bring a meaningful change in religious adherence among the Kenya’s Muslim 
communities. Will they sustain the growth and consolidation of the daʿwa movement for the 
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 Personal conversations with Mzee Duub, September 2010, Merti.  
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next twenty or possibly fifty years? Has the movement reached the apogee of its growth and 
hence on a downward trend? Only time will tell.  
Increasingly the Tablīghī Jamāʿat leaders in Kenya are emphasising the role of mosque-based 
maqāmī units and the house-hold practices. The Borana speaking Tablīghīs are carrying these 
and other new directives home. They are encouraged not only to strengthen the performance 
of the panch amaal but also to increase text reading and consultative forums at home. New 
travel teams to be organised by the maqāmī and sub-ḥalqa committees are instructed to be 
constituted by few regulars and large number of novices. This places a heavy burden on the 
local units to mobilise among already wary ordinary Muslim mosque goers. The regulars are 
also instructed not to postpone or cancel the annual pledges of forty days and monthly pledges 
of three days for whatever reasons. This daunting task has meant that the regulars dedicate 
most  of their free time doing the affairs of the transnational movement at their own cost. New 
routes of travel have opened up: more and more local Borana Tablīghīs are saving their 
money to go to the Indian global headquarters.  
Women travel teams and weekly gathering for women are increasingly encouraged and the 
Tablīghīs especially from the northern Kenya are gearing to experiment and consolidate these 
directives. Core texts are now available in Swahili. Those who have spent at least 10 years 
within the movement are growing in number and have inculcated the Tablīghīs practices and 
undergone self-teaching and learning to be considered religious scholars within their own 
rights. With all these new directives, developments and prospects, it is for subsequent studies 
to continue this promising research on the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as the face of transnational Islam 
within Kenya in general and among the communities of northern Kenya in particular.  
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7.5 Conclusion  
 A question that is often asked among scholars studying transnational religious movement is, 
what happens when a movement travels, crosses borders and firmly establishes itself in a new 
area? As we discussed above the options are two: like the case of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Uganda, 
it may lose its distinctive transnational and apolitical glamour and go local in matters of its 
religious constituencies and concerns or maintain a mix between adopting new practices, 
places and bureaucracy but at the same time appropriating the new movement to local ethno-
religious peculiarities in terms of membership, relations with existing traditional customs and 
needs to effect religious revivalism. Local Tablīghīs are indeed part of this egalitarian 
movement. Any casual observer who accompanies a Borana speaking group would find it 
hard to get non-Tablīghī agenda or concerns. They travel for the same type of daʿwa tours. 
They gather in similar way. They preach and dress like their South Asian counterparts. They 
are joined in the transnational network by select Kenyan Muslims of Asian descent. Their 
daily, weekly and monthly timetables, whether on travel missions or in mosque-based group, 
universally similar and they aspire to mobilise locals and transform their families like their 
counterpart in South Asia. But they too maintain certain form of distinct features. The Borana 
speaking Tablīghīs aspire to proselytise among their own. In this case, ‘their own’ category 
stretches from the banks of Tana River near Kenya coast to the grasslands of Dirre and Liban 
in Ethiopia. Orma, Garre, Sakuye, Gabra, Burji, Konso and above all Borana are all people to 
remind on being steadfast in religious observance. They seek their own rightful place in the 
family of Tablīghī congregation: Borana tarjama. They want to maintain their own identity, 
voice and peoplehood in the cacophony of speeches at national gatherings. They are ready to 
go beyond traditional Tablīghī Muslim-directed proselytism to an urgent mission to their non-
Muslim co-ethnics in Kenya and Ethiopia. International borders do not matter in this case as 
Borana worldview of undivided whole is evoked alongside other useful strategies. Traditional 
Borana leaders are visited to get blessing and permission to reach among the non-Muslim co-
ethnics. The fusion between what is local and global remains meshed. What is however 
unique is that to those committed to the ethos of the movement, they argue, it is the most 
appropriate outfit for religious reawakening and conversion among their own kin.  
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